UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION JULIA DAVIS-HARRIS,
Plaintiff, Case No. 25-cv-11617 v. Hon. Matthew F. Leitman
CARRINGTON MORTGAGE SERVICE, et al.,
Defendants. __________________________________________________________________/ ORDER (1) OVERRULING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS (ECF Nos. 49, 56) TO REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (ECF Nos. 48, 55); (2) ADOPTING RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION OF REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS; AND (3) GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS (ECF No. 14, 21) In this action, Plaintiff Julia Davis-Harris brings claims against Defendants Carrington Mortgage Service, LLC (“Carrington”) and Orlans Law Group PLLC (“Orlans”) arising out of the servicing and foreclosure of her mortgage. (See Compl., ECF No. 1.) Davis-Harris purports to bring claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (the “FDCPA”), 12 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (the “RESPA”), 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et al., as well as claims for slander of credit and the intentional infliction of emotional distress. (See id.) Both Defendants have now filed motions to dismiss. (See Mots., ECF No. 14, 21.) The motions were referred to the assigned Magistrate Judge. On November 5, 2025, the Magistrate Judge issued a report and recommendation in which he recommended that the Court (1) grant Orlans’ motion, (2) dismiss Davis-Harris’ federal claims against Orlans, and (3) decline supplemental jurisdiction over any
state-law claims brought against Orlans (the “Orlans R&R”). (See Orlans R&R, ECF No. 48.) On January 28, 2025, the Magistrate Judge issued a second report and recommendation in which he recommended that the Court reach the same conclusion
and result with respect to Carrington’s motion and the claims brought against Carrington (the “Carrington R&R”). (See Carrington R&R, ECF No. 55.) Davis-Harris has now filed purported objections to both R&Rs. (See Objs., ECF Nos. 49, 56.) As explained below, neither objection even attempts to address
the legal reasoning or analysis included in the R&Rs. The purported objections are thus tantamount to no objections at all. And they provide no basis on which to disturb the recommended disposition of either R&R. Accordingly, the Court will
ADOPT the recommended disposition of both the Orlans R&R and the Carrington R&R, GRANT Defendants’ motions to dismiss, DISMISS Davis-Harris’ federal claims, and DECLINE supplemental jurisdiction over her state-law claims. I
When a party objects to portions of a Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation, the Court reviews those portions de novo. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); Lyons v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 351 F.Supp.2d 659, 661 (E.D. Mich. 2004). The Court has no duty to conduct an independent review of the portions of the R&R to which a party does not object. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985).
II A The Court begins with the Carrington R&R. In that report, over the course of
thirty pages, the Magistrate Judge carefully reviewed Davis-Harris’ claims against Carrington, and he explained in detail why Davis-Harris had failed to state viable claims against Carrington under either the FDCPA or the RESPA. (See generally Carrington R&R, ECF No. 55.) He also concluded that, to the extent Davis-Harris
sought to bring a federal claim against Carrington for the slander of her credit, that claim also failed. (See id., PageID.740-742.) Finally, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Davis-Harris’ state-law claims against Carrington. (See id., PageID.742-743.) At the conclusion of the Carrington R&R, the Magistrate Judge explained that Davis-Harris had the right to file objections to his recommendations. (See id., PageID.743-744.) The Magistrate Judge instructed Davis-Harris that “[a]ny
objection must recite precisely the provision of this Report and Recommendation to which it pertains,” and he told her that “[f]iling objections that raise some issues but fail to raise others with specificity will not preserve all the objections a party might
have to this Report and Recommendation.” (Id.) Davis filed purported objections to the Carrington R&R on February 10, 2025. (See Objs., ECF No. 56.) But those three-page objections do not address the
Carrington R&R in any way. They never mention the Carrington R&R, nor do the objections attempt to show any error in the Magistrate Judge’s reasoning or analysis. Thus, the objections are tantamount to no objections at all. See Fields v. Lapeer 71-
A District Court Clerk, 2 F. App’x 481, 482 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that plaintiff had “waived any challenge to the district court’s conclusions” because his objections to report and recommendation did not “specifically address how [the Magistrate Judge’s] factual and legal recommendations were incorrect” and did not address the
Magistrate Judge’s reasoning); Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995) (explaining that an ”objection to a magistrate’s report, which fails to specify the issues of contention, does not satisfy the requirement that an objection be filed”).
Under these circumstances, where a plaintiff has not filed any cognizable objections to an R&R, a plaintiff has waived the right to review. See Thomas, 474 U.S. at 149. See also Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, (6th Cir. 1987) (explaining that where party fails to file “timely objections” to report and recommendation, court may accept that
recommendation “without expressing any view on the merits of the magistrate’s conclusions”). The Court therefore OVERRULES Davis-Harris’ objections to the Carrington R&R on this basis. The Court further ADOPTS the recommended
disposition of Carrington R&R, GRANTS Carrington’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 14), DISMISSES Davis-Harris’ federal claims against Carrington, and DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Davis-Harris’ state-law claims against
Carrington. B The Court next turns to the Orlans R&R. As with Davis-Harris’ claims against
Carrington, the Magistrate Judge carefully reviewed Davis-Harris’ claims against Orlans and concluded that Davis-Harris had not pleaded any viable federal claims against Orlans. (See Orlans R&R, ECF No. 48.) More specifically, he determined that the only federal claim against Orlans was brought pursuant to the FDCPA, and
he explained why Davis-Harris had failed to state a plausible FDCPA claim against Orlans. (See id., PageID.627-629.) He therefore recommended that the Court grant Orlans’ motion to dismiss and decline supplemental jurisdiction over Davis-Harris’
state-law claims against Orlans. (See id.) Finally, the Magistrate Judge explained to Davis-Harris that if she wanted to file objections to his recommendations, she needed to file specific objections with this Court that “recite[d] precisely the provisions of this Report and Recommendation to which [the objections] pertain[].”
(Id., PageID.631.) Davis-Harris filed objections to the Orlans R&R on November 21, 2025. (See Objs., ECF No. 49.) But as with her objections to the Carrington R&R, Davis-
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION JULIA DAVIS-HARRIS,
Plaintiff, Case No. 25-cv-11617 v. Hon. Matthew F. Leitman
CARRINGTON MORTGAGE SERVICE, et al.,
Defendants. __________________________________________________________________/ ORDER (1) OVERRULING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS (ECF Nos. 49, 56) TO REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (ECF Nos. 48, 55); (2) ADOPTING RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION OF REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS; AND (3) GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS (ECF No. 14, 21) In this action, Plaintiff Julia Davis-Harris brings claims against Defendants Carrington Mortgage Service, LLC (“Carrington”) and Orlans Law Group PLLC (“Orlans”) arising out of the servicing and foreclosure of her mortgage. (See Compl., ECF No. 1.) Davis-Harris purports to bring claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (the “FDCPA”), 12 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (the “RESPA”), 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et al., as well as claims for slander of credit and the intentional infliction of emotional distress. (See id.) Both Defendants have now filed motions to dismiss. (See Mots., ECF No. 14, 21.) The motions were referred to the assigned Magistrate Judge. On November 5, 2025, the Magistrate Judge issued a report and recommendation in which he recommended that the Court (1) grant Orlans’ motion, (2) dismiss Davis-Harris’ federal claims against Orlans, and (3) decline supplemental jurisdiction over any
state-law claims brought against Orlans (the “Orlans R&R”). (See Orlans R&R, ECF No. 48.) On January 28, 2025, the Magistrate Judge issued a second report and recommendation in which he recommended that the Court reach the same conclusion
and result with respect to Carrington’s motion and the claims brought against Carrington (the “Carrington R&R”). (See Carrington R&R, ECF No. 55.) Davis-Harris has now filed purported objections to both R&Rs. (See Objs., ECF Nos. 49, 56.) As explained below, neither objection even attempts to address
the legal reasoning or analysis included in the R&Rs. The purported objections are thus tantamount to no objections at all. And they provide no basis on which to disturb the recommended disposition of either R&R. Accordingly, the Court will
ADOPT the recommended disposition of both the Orlans R&R and the Carrington R&R, GRANT Defendants’ motions to dismiss, DISMISS Davis-Harris’ federal claims, and DECLINE supplemental jurisdiction over her state-law claims. I
When a party objects to portions of a Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation, the Court reviews those portions de novo. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); Lyons v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 351 F.Supp.2d 659, 661 (E.D. Mich. 2004). The Court has no duty to conduct an independent review of the portions of the R&R to which a party does not object. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985).
II A The Court begins with the Carrington R&R. In that report, over the course of
thirty pages, the Magistrate Judge carefully reviewed Davis-Harris’ claims against Carrington, and he explained in detail why Davis-Harris had failed to state viable claims against Carrington under either the FDCPA or the RESPA. (See generally Carrington R&R, ECF No. 55.) He also concluded that, to the extent Davis-Harris
sought to bring a federal claim against Carrington for the slander of her credit, that claim also failed. (See id., PageID.740-742.) Finally, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Davis-Harris’ state-law claims against Carrington. (See id., PageID.742-743.) At the conclusion of the Carrington R&R, the Magistrate Judge explained that Davis-Harris had the right to file objections to his recommendations. (See id., PageID.743-744.) The Magistrate Judge instructed Davis-Harris that “[a]ny
objection must recite precisely the provision of this Report and Recommendation to which it pertains,” and he told her that “[f]iling objections that raise some issues but fail to raise others with specificity will not preserve all the objections a party might
have to this Report and Recommendation.” (Id.) Davis filed purported objections to the Carrington R&R on February 10, 2025. (See Objs., ECF No. 56.) But those three-page objections do not address the
Carrington R&R in any way. They never mention the Carrington R&R, nor do the objections attempt to show any error in the Magistrate Judge’s reasoning or analysis. Thus, the objections are tantamount to no objections at all. See Fields v. Lapeer 71-
A District Court Clerk, 2 F. App’x 481, 482 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that plaintiff had “waived any challenge to the district court’s conclusions” because his objections to report and recommendation did not “specifically address how [the Magistrate Judge’s] factual and legal recommendations were incorrect” and did not address the
Magistrate Judge’s reasoning); Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995) (explaining that an ”objection to a magistrate’s report, which fails to specify the issues of contention, does not satisfy the requirement that an objection be filed”).
Under these circumstances, where a plaintiff has not filed any cognizable objections to an R&R, a plaintiff has waived the right to review. See Thomas, 474 U.S. at 149. See also Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, (6th Cir. 1987) (explaining that where party fails to file “timely objections” to report and recommendation, court may accept that
recommendation “without expressing any view on the merits of the magistrate’s conclusions”). The Court therefore OVERRULES Davis-Harris’ objections to the Carrington R&R on this basis. The Court further ADOPTS the recommended
disposition of Carrington R&R, GRANTS Carrington’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 14), DISMISSES Davis-Harris’ federal claims against Carrington, and DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Davis-Harris’ state-law claims against
Carrington. B The Court next turns to the Orlans R&R. As with Davis-Harris’ claims against
Carrington, the Magistrate Judge carefully reviewed Davis-Harris’ claims against Orlans and concluded that Davis-Harris had not pleaded any viable federal claims against Orlans. (See Orlans R&R, ECF No. 48.) More specifically, he determined that the only federal claim against Orlans was brought pursuant to the FDCPA, and
he explained why Davis-Harris had failed to state a plausible FDCPA claim against Orlans. (See id., PageID.627-629.) He therefore recommended that the Court grant Orlans’ motion to dismiss and decline supplemental jurisdiction over Davis-Harris’
state-law claims against Orlans. (See id.) Finally, the Magistrate Judge explained to Davis-Harris that if she wanted to file objections to his recommendations, she needed to file specific objections with this Court that “recite[d] precisely the provisions of this Report and Recommendation to which [the objections] pertain[].”
(Id., PageID.631.) Davis-Harris filed objections to the Orlans R&R on November 21, 2025. (See Objs., ECF No. 49.) But as with her objections to the Carrington R&R, Davis-
Harris’ objections never mention the Magistrate Judge’s reasoning in the Orlans R&R, and she makes no attempt to show any particular error in the Magistrate Judge’s legal analysis. Her objections therefore fail on that basis alone. See, e.g.,
Fields, supra; Miller, supra. The Court OVERRULES Davis-Harris’ objections to the Orlans R&R on this basis. The Court has nonetheless conducted its own independent review of Davis-
Harris’ Complaint, and the Court concludes that she has not plausibly alleged that Orlans violated the FDCPA. Indeed, while the Complaint contains a handful of specific allegations concerning allegedly-improper conduct by Carrington, the Complaint says little, if anything, about any specific acts or omissions by Orlans. At
most, the Complaint says that Orlans violated Section 1692g(b) of the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b), when it failed to provide a “wet ink” copy of her promissory note (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.6), but an alleged debt collector “is not required to
provide the original ‘wet-ink’ signature promissory note to satisfy its debt verification requirements under § 1692g(b).” Williams v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, No. 2:24-CV-4259, 2025 WL 2696476, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 22, 2025) (collecting cases). The Court OVERRULES Davis-Harris’ objections to the Orlans R&R on
this additional and independent basis. The Court therefore ADOPTS the recommended disposition of the Orlans R&R, GRANTS Orlans’ motion to dismiss, DISMISSES Davis-Harris’ federal claims against Orlans, and DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Davis-Harris’ state-law claims against Orlans.
III For all of the reasons explained above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
Davis-Harris’ objections to the Carrington R&R (ECF No. 56) and to the Orlans R&R (ECF No. 49) are OVERRULED; The recommended dispositions of the Carrington R&R (ECF No. 55) and the Orlans R&R (ECF No. 48) are ADOPTED;
Carrington’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 14) and Orlans’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 21) are GRANTED; Davis-Harris’ federal claims against the Defendants are DISMISSED;
and The Court DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Davis-Harris’ state-law claims.
IT IS SO ORDERED. s/Matthew F. Leitman MATTHEW F. LEITMAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE Dated: February 25, 2026 I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties and/or counsel of record on February 25, 2026, by electronic means and/or ordinary mail.
s/Holly A. Ryan Case Manager (313) 234-5126