Judgment rendered December 3, 2025 Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 2166, La. C.C.P.
No. 56,543-CA No. 56,544-CA No. 56,545-CA No. 56,546-CA No. 56,547-CA No. 56,548-CA (Consolidated cases)
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
No. 56,543-CA
JU’KADYNN CARTER Plaintiff-Appellee
versus
STEVE HOLLOWAY Defendant-Appellant
Appealed from the Forty-Second Judicial District Court for the Parish of DeSoto, Louisiana Trial Court No. 85,753
Honorable Nicholas E. Gasper, Judge
SMITHERMAN, HILL & BRICE, L.C. Counsel for Appellant By: F. Weber Hill
JU’KADYNN CARTER In Proper Person
Before PITMAN, STEPHENS, and MARCOTTE, JJ.
STEPHENS, J., concurs in the result. MARCOTTE, J.
These consolidated civil appeals arise out the 42nd Judicial District
Court, Parish of DeSoto, the Honorable Amy Burford McCartney and the
Honorable Nicholas E. Gaspar presiding. Defendant Steve Holloway
(“Holloway, Sr.”) appeals the trial court’s granting of three protective orders
against him. Defendant Stevie Holloway (“Stevie”) also appeals the trial
court’s granting of three protective orders against him. For the following
reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions. A
separate opinion is issued for each protective order.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Because the facts for each protective order arise out of the same series
of events, and the same assignments of error are alleged in each appeal, the
facts, arguments, relevant law, and analysis for the six protective orders will
be provided in this opinion, and the companion memorandum opinions will
reference this opinion.
On January 3, 2025, Ju’Kadynn Carter (“Carter”) filed two petitions
for protective orders against Holloway, Sr., and his son, Stevie (together,
“the Holloways”), alleging in each petition that on January 1, 2025, the pair
approached Kylin Boykins (“Boykins”), Carter’s brother, at the Blink’s
Quick Stop Store/Whataburger (“Blinks”) in Joaquin, Texas, believing he
was Carter. Carter said that the Holloways “swung on” Boykins and that
Holloway, Sr. later “pulled a gun while Stevie had a bat.” He alleged that
the Holloways were determined to hurt Boykins “or do something bad to
him [because] they even chased [Boykins] from Joaquin to Logansport.” He alleged that there was a “big fight” in 2024, in which Stevie and Carter were
involved.
On January 3, 2025, Tyshequa Boykins (“Tyshequa”) filed on behalf
of her minor son, Boykins (DOB: 6-13-08), two petitions for protective
orders against Holloway, Sr. and Stevie. She alleged that on January 1,
2025, while at Blink’s, Holloway, Sr. instructed Stevie to attack Boykins
believing him to be his brother, Carter. Tyshequa stated that Holloway, Sr.
continued to chase Boykins with a gun to his vehicle and toward his
residence. She said that the incident resulted in Boykins having to go to the
hospital with a bruised eye and a cut on his foot. She said Stevie used a bat
to charge at Boykins. She also alleged verbal abuse by making racial
comments.
On January 3, 2025, Cratelyn Henderson (“Henderson”) filed two
petitions for protective orders against Holloway, Sr. and Stevie alleging that,
on January 1, 2025, “[Holloway, Sr.] approached me. He used profane
language, shoved, and punched me. The defendant also pulled a weapon,
which I perceived to be a gun, threatening my life.” He said that Stevie
approached him holding a bat and threatened to harm him. Henderson said
that there was a prior incident in class where Stevie threw things at him and
slapped him in the head. Henderson said that, in turn, he pushed Stevie.
On January 16, 2025, Carter, Henderson, and Tyshequa on behalf of
Boykins each filed two new petitions for protection from stalking against the
Holloways alleging the same facts.
On January 16, 2025, Judge McCartney held a hearing on the petitions
for a protective order that Boykins and Henderson filed against Stevie.
2 Henderson testified that on January 1, 2025, he and Boykins were at
Blink’s/Whataburger in Joaquin, Texas purchasing food when they heard
Holloway, Sr. say to his son, “Get him, get him.” Henderson continued to
shop, and Boykins approached him, asking him what the Holloways were
doing. Henderson asked the Holloways what they were doing, and the father
and son began following Boykins and Henderson around the store.
Henderson testified that Stevie swung at Boykins, and a fight ensued.
Henderson told Holloway, Sr. to “get your son,” but he refused. Henderson
stated that the Holloways seemed to think that Boykins was his brother,
Carter, because Holloway, Sr. referred to Boykins as “Smelly,” which was
Carter’s nickname.
Henderson stated that he and Boykins ran from the store and the
Holloways chased them outside. Henderson and Boykins got into
Henderson’s car; Boykins then said that he left his phone in the store, so he
exited the car to retrieve it. The Holloways, who had gotten into their truck,
then exited their vehicle with weapons. Stevie had a bat and Holloway, Sr.
“had something in his hand,” which Henderson believed to be a gun.
Henderson testified that the Holloways moved toward his car; he got out of
the car to protect Boykins, a minor. Boykins ran back to the car, got inside,
and fled, leaving Henderson behind. The Holloways gave chase.
Henderson said the only prior incident was that one day in class,
Stevie hit him in the back of the head. He told the teacher, and Stevie was
moved to a different seat and given in-school suspension. On cross-
examination Henderson said he was aware that Stevie was charged with a
crime for the incident at Blink’s, but he was not informed that there was a
3 no-contact order in place in Shelby County, Texas, where Blink’s was
located.
Boykins’ testimony was the same as Henderson’s. He said that as he
was running away, a woman who was with the Holloways grabbed his
hoodie to try to let Stevie get close to him and “jump on me.” He affirmed
that Holloway, Sr. exited his vehicle with a handgun. Boykins left in the
car, and the Holloways followed him to Logansport. Boykins said that he
“almost got hit off the bridge by Stevie and his dad.” He returned to the
store and stayed there until police arrived. He stated that he went to the
hospital because he had a headache and his eye was swollen.
The trial court granted Boykins’ and Henderson’s protective orders
from stalking against Stevie. The trial court stated that it found that Stevie’s
behavior of following the pair around the store, exiting the store and getting
into his vehicle, and then exiting the vehicle to go after Boykins again, to fit
within the legal definition of stalking because he repeatedly followed them.
Also on January 16, 2025, Judge Gasper held a hearing on Carter’s
petition for protection from stalking against Stevie. Carter testified that on
January 1, 2025, he received a call from Boykins saying he got into a fight
with Stevie. Carter said that he and Stevie had a “big fight” in February
2024, but they had not had any problems since. Carter and Stevie played
football together in high school. Carter said he worked at the Whataburger
in Joaquin, where the incident occurred, and had seen Stevie there several
times, but there was never a confrontation between them. Carter said he had
had no contact with Stevie since the January 1, 2025, incident. Carter
affirmed that his nickname was “Smelly.” Boykins and Henderson testified
4 that Holloway, Sr. repeatedly said to Stevie, “Get Smelly,” while at the truck
stop, trying to get Stevie to attack Boykins. Defense counsel argued that
Stevie knew Carter from football and school, so he knew the difference
between Carter and his brother.
The trial court stated that while Stevie’s previous visits to Carter’s
workplace did not result in threats of harm, the Holloways’ later actions
threatened him. The trial court pointed out that the January 1, 2025, incident
occurred at Carter’s workplace, and he was the focus of the Holloways’
threats. The trial court granted the protective order against Stevie. The three
protective orders stated that Stevie was not allowed to own, possess, or
purchase any firearms. They were put in place for two years.
On January 24, 2025, a hearing on the three petitions for protective
orders against Holloway, Sr. was held in front of Judge Gasper. Henderson
provided similar testimony to what he gave at the hearings on January 16,
2025. He added that when Stevie was threatening Boykins inside the store,
Holloway, Sr. picked up a plastic “wet floor” sign and threatened to hit
Henderson with it if he intervened. Boykins provided the same testimony as
he did in Stevie’s case. Carter stated that in February 2024, he attended a
bonfire party with several other people. He said Stevie was drunk and called
one of his friends a racial slur and “ran up on my friend, and then that’s
when the fight broke out.” The petitioners said that the Holloways had not
contacted them since the incident.
In each case, Holloway, Sr. argued that there was no stalking because
what occurred at Blink’s was an isolated incident and did not constitute
repeated following of an individual. The trial court granted the petitioners’
5 protective orders against Holloway, Sr., finding that the events that occurred
on January 1, 2025, constituted stalking. In Carter’s case, the trial court
added that he was the focus and aim of the Holloways’ actions, so the
stalking statute applied. The protective orders were put in place for two
years. They stated that Holloway, Sr. was not allowed to own, possess, or
purchase any firearms. The Holloways now appeal.
DISCUSSION
Stalking Under La. R.S. 14:40.2
In their first assignments of error, the Holloways argue that the district
court erred in failing to apply the definition of stalking to the particular facts
of their cases. They contend that La. R.S. 14:40.2 defines stalking as
“intentional and repeated following or harassing.” Appellants reason that
their actions on January 1, 2025, at Blink’s did not fit the legal definition of
stalking. They state that their actions constituted one continuous act. They
also argue that Carter was not present for the incident, so there was no
repeated following and harassing in his case.
A trial court’s decision to grant or deny a protective order will not be
reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Truelove v. Isaacs, 56,152
(La. App. 2 Cir. 4/9/25), 409 So. 3d 456, writ denied, 25-00477 (La.
9/10/25), 415 So. 3d 1278. The trial court, sitting as a trier of fact, is in the
best position to evaluate the demeanor of the witnesses, and its credibility
determinations will not be disturbed on appeal absent manifest error.
Whatley v. Garrison, 56,311 (La. App. 2 Cir. 7/16/25), __ So. 3d __, 2025
WL 1945304.
6 Louisiana Revised Statute 46:2171, et seq., known as the “Protection
from Stalking Act,” was enacted to provide a civil remedy for stalking
victims against perpetrators, offering immediate and easily accessible
protection. Raymond v. Lasserre, 22-0793 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/6/23), 368 So.
3d 82, writ denied, 23-00893 (La. 10/31/23), 372 So. 3d 335. Under the
Act, “stalking” means any act that would constitute the crime of stalking
under La. R.S. 14:40.2. Id. The crime of stalking is:
[T]he intentional and repeated following or harassing of another person that would cause a reasonable person to feel alarmed or to suffer emotional distress. Stalking shall include but not be limited to the intentional and repeated uninvited presence of the perpetrator at another person’s home, workplace, school, or any place which would cause a reasonable person to be alarmed, or to suffer emotional distress as a result of verbal, written, or behaviorally implied threats of death, bodily injury, sexual assault, kidnapping, or any other statutory criminal act to himself or any member of his family or any person with whom he is acquainted.
La. R.S. 14.40.2(A).
The statute goes on to provide:
(1) “Harassing” means the repeated pattern of verbal communications or nonverbal behavior without invitation which includes but is not limited to making telephone calls, transmitting electronic mail, sending messages via a third party, or sending letters or pictures.
(2) “Pattern of conduct” means a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing an intent to inflict a continuity of emotional distress upon the person. Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of pattern of conduct.
La. R.S. 14:40.2(C).
Despite the Protection from Stalking Act’s reference to the criminal
stalking statutes, petitions for protection from stalking are not criminal
proceedings. Truelove v. Isaacs, supra. Rather, the sole relevance of the
7 criminal stalking statutes in the context of a petition filed under the Act is to
provide the definition of stalking. Raymond v. Lasserre, supra. At a hearing
on a protective order, a petitioner must prove the allegations by a
preponderance of the evidence. Id. Proof is sufficient to constitute a
preponderance of the evidence when the entirety of the evidence, both direct
and circumstantial, shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable
than not. Id.
The Holloways cite several cases in support of their assertions that
their actions constituted one continuous act and not a repeated following
under La. R.S. 14:40.2. First, defendants cite Selcer v. Boudreaux, 20-623
(La. App. 3 Cir. 5/26/21), 318 So. 3d 393, where the trial court issued an
order of protection from stalking against Boudreaux in favor of his aunt,
Selcer. Boudreaux and his mother left on the door to the house where he
and Selcer lived, a summary of hurtful comments Selcer had made to her
nephew. On a later date, Selcer hit Boudreaux in the face while trying to
slap a phone out of his hand. Boudreaux then followed his aunt through the
house, where both were staying, until she told him not to touch her, at which
point her nephew kicked her several times. Id.
Boudreaux immediately moved out of the house. The court of appeal
found that there was no evidence that the nephew intentionally and
repeatedly followed his aunt, constituting stalking. Boudreaux had
immediately moved out of the house where Selcer was staying after the
incident where he kicked her. The court noted that Selcer was obviously not
afraid of him as she returned to stay at the home where they both lived after
8 he left the note for her on the door of the house. The court reversed the
granting of the protective order. Id.
The Holloways also cite State v. Rico, 99-158 (La. App. 3 Cir.
6/2/99), 741 So. 2d 774, writ denied, 99-1883 (La. 12/10/99), 751 So. 2d
244, in which Rico was convicted of stalking. One evening, the victim,
Suzanne, returned to her mother’s home with her mother, Charlotte, and her
child. While she was unloading her vehicle, Rico drove past the home,
leaned out of the window, and said, “Hey baby” to Suzanne. She then got
into her vehicle to return to her home. Rico pulled over to the side of the
road, and as Suzanne passed him in her vehicle, he began following her.
Suzanne noticed Rico following her, went to her house, which was a few
blocks away, and went inside to get her brother into the car. Suzanne left
and Rico continued to follow her. To lose him, she pulled around the fish
market, but the defendant proceeded behind her. Id.
Charlotte, out of concern for her daughter, followed Rico. Charlotte
told Suzanne to go to a nearby café. Charlotte followed defendant and
recorded his license plate number. Rico stopped, exited his vehicle, and
asked if Charlotte had a problem. Charlotte then left to meet her children.
The First Circuit reversed the conviction finding that the word “repeated,” as
found in the La. R.S. 14:40.2 (C)(1) definition of “harassing,” meant
“renewed or occurring again and again.” State v. Rico, supra at p. 5, 741 So.
2d at 777. The court said that Rico’s conduct was not a renewed or
recurring following, but rather a continuous following which occurred once.
The court also found that Rico had not verbally threatened Suzanne, the
person he had been following. State v. Rico, supra.
9 Defendants further cite State v. Ryan, 07-504 (La. App. 3 Cir.
11/7/07), 969 So. 2d 1268, in which the defendant was convicted of stalking
and the Third Circuit reversed his conviction. Ryan parked his vehicle in
front of the victims’ residence for two minutes and drove past the house
several times in a single day. The court said that frequenting areas where
and at times the alleged victim would typically be present did not constitute
“following.” The court stated that Ryan did not pursue the victims, so the
state failed to establish a “following” in that instance. The court found that
the state did not establish that Ryan willfully, maliciously, repeatedly, and
uninvitedly was at someone’s home and making verbal or behaviorally
implied threats that would cause a reasonable person to become alarmed or
suffer emotional distress. The court stated that Ryan was traveling on public
roadways, which was constitutionally protected activity. Id.
We do not find that the trial court abused its discretion here. The
criminal stalking statute, La. R.S. 14:40.2, which defines “stalking,”
provides that stalking involves a “series of acts over a period of time,
however short, evidencing an intent to inflict a continuity of emotional
distress.” We find those elements present here. The Holloways followed
Boykins and Henderson around Blink’s, making verbal threats. Stevie, at
the behest of his father, attacked Boykins, a 16-year-old child. That
altercation ended when the parties left the store and got into their respective
vehicles. Boykins left Henderson’s vehicle to retrieve his phone. The
Holloways then exited their vehicles, armed with a baseball bat and a gun.
Henderson exited his vehicle to protect Boykins. Boykins, in fear, got back
10 into Henderson’s car and drove away. The Holloways got into their truck
and gave chase, attempting to run Boykins off a bridge.
We find those facts sufficient to say that there was an intentional and
repeated following of Boykins and Henderson that would cause them to feel
alarmed or suffer emotional distress. The Holloways terrorized a child and
his friend. What this court finds even more disturbing is that the true target
of the Holloways’ behavior was Carter, Boykins’ brother. Stevie played
football and attended school with Carter, so the two were familiar with each
other. At Blink’s, Stevie likely knew that Boykins was not Carter, but he
attacked him anyway because his father told him to.
We likewise find the trial court granting Carter’s petitions for
protective orders appropriate. Louisiana Revised Statute 14:40.2 states that
stalking also includes behaviorally implied threats of bodily injury against
any member of the victim’s family. Here, Holloway, Sr. told his son to “Get
Smelly,” referring to Carter. While Carter was not present, the Holloways
were at his workplace, and he was their intended target. They attacked
Boykins, Carter’s brother, proclaiming that he was Carter.
We find this case dissimilar to those cited by the Holloways. In
Selcer v. Boudreaux, supra, the parties did not leave the premises, and there
was no marked end to the altercation between Selcer and Boudreaux. The
court also found that Selcer was not afraid of Boudreaux. In State v. Rico,
there was no point at which the defendant stopped following the victim and
then began again. The court also said that Rico had not made verbal threats.
Here, there were three distinct acts that together constituted stalking
for the purposes of issuing the protective orders: (1) the Holloways attacked
11 Boykins and Henderson in the store and then got into their truck; (2) the
Holloways exited their vehicle while armed to renew their attack on Boykins
and Henderson; and (3) the Holloways got into their vehicle and followed
Boykins in their truck and tried to run him off the bridge. Here, Boykins and
Henderson testified about their emotional distress during and after their
altercations with the Holloways. Carter expressed his alarm at knowing the
Holloways attacked his brother and that he was the intended target of that
violence.
In State v. Ryan, supra, the court found that Ryan had the
constitutional right to park his vehicle on the street and drive in front of the
victims’ house. The Holloways’ conduct in attacking Boykins and
Henderson, threatening them while armed, and then attempting to drive
Boykins off the road was not constitutionally protected activity. We find
that the trial court was correct in granting the protective orders. We affirm
that part of the court’s ruling granting Carter’s protective order against
Holloway, Sr.
Possession of Firearms
The Holloways next argue that the trial court erred in finding that, as
part of the protective orders against them, they could not possess firearms.
They state that La. R.S. 46:2136.3 prohibits a defendant from possessing a
firearm for the duration of a protective order when he represents a “credible
threat to the physical safety of a family member, household member, or
dating partner.” They contend that there exists no such relationship between
them and the plaintiffs; therefore, they are not members of the protected
class contemplated by the statute. They also argue that the court erred by
12 incorrectly interpreting La. C. Cr. P. art. 1001, which concerns the transfer
of firearms only after La. R.S. 46:2136 applies.
Louisiana Revised Statute 46:2136.3 provides that any person against
whom the court has issued a protective order pursuant to the provisions of
La. R.S. 46:2173 shall be prohibited from possessing a firearm or carrying a
concealed weapon for the duration of the protective order if it includes a
finding that both (1) the person subject to the protective order represents a
credible threat to the physical safety of a family member, household
member, or dating partner; and (2) the protective order informs the person
subject to the protective order that he is prohibited from possessing a firearm
pursuant to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8) and La. R.S. 46:2136.3.
“Family member” means spouses, former spouses, parents, children,
stepparents, stepchildren, foster parents, foster children, other ascendants,
and other descendants. “Family member” also means the other parent or
foster parent of any child or foster child of the offender. La. R.S. 14:35.3.
“Household member” means any person presently or formerly living in the
same residence with the offender and who is involved or has been involved
in a sexual or intimate relationship with the offender, or any child presently
or formerly living in the same residence with the offender, or any child of
the offender regardless of where the child resides. Id.
“Dating partner” means any person who is involved or has been
involved in a sexual or intimate relationship with the offender characterized
by the expectation of affectionate involvement independent of financial
considerations, regardless of whether the person presently lives or formerly
lived in the same residence with the offender. “Dating partner” shall not
13 include a casual relationship or ordinary association between persons in a
business or social context. La. R.S. 14:34.9.
We find that the trial court erred in determining that the Holloways
were prohibited from possessing firearms for the duration of the protective
orders. The petitioners were not family members, household members, or
dating partners of the Holloways; no evidence was submitted to the court
showing the presence of such a relationship. Therefore, we reverse that part
of the trial court’s order prohibiting Holloway, Sr. from possessing firearms
in the protective order in favor of Carter.
Duration of the Protective Orders
Lastly, the Holloways argue that the trial court erred in granting the
protective orders for two years. They maintain that La. R.S. 46:2136(F)(1)
provides that the duration of a protective order cannot exceed 18 months.
Any final protective order or approved consent agreement shall be for
a fixed period, not to exceed 18 months, and may be extended by the court,
after a contradictory hearing, in its discretion. Such protective order or
extension thereof shall be subject to a devolutive appeal only. La. R.S.
46:2136(F).
Here, no contradictory hearings were held prior to the court issuing
the protective orders preventing the Holloways from having contact with the
petitioners for two years. While the trial court may, after a contradictory
hearing is conducted, extend the fixed period, it may not do so prior to the
hearing. We find that the trial court improperly extended the period for each
protective order. We therefore remand for the trial court to reduce the fixed
14 time to the maximum allowable period in accordance with La. R.S.
46:2136(F). See Whatley v. Garrison, supra.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the trial court’s granting of Ju’Kadynn
Carter’s protective order against Steve Holloway is affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded in accordance with this opinion. The cost of
the appeal is assessed to appellant.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.