Juengst v. Hill Pub. Co.

267 F. 428, 1919 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 646
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedAugust 1, 1919
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 267 F. 428 (Juengst v. Hill Pub. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Juengst v. Hill Pub. Co., 267 F. 428, 1919 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1919).

Opinion

DEARNED HAND, District Judge.

The machines involved in the patent in suit and the alleged infringement are. exceedingly complicated, as well as are those which preceded them in the art. The claims are, moreover, all in somewhat abstract form, functional in fact, though not on that account necessarily bad, according to existing notions. However, it must be kept in mind that, since there was no invention in the mere idea of a continuously operating coverer, and since on this account the invention must lie in the specific means which the patentee disclosed for accomplishing that general purpose, the claims, to be valid at all, must be read upon the disclosure somewhat narrowly. In other words, the patent cannot be held to include all those means by which the results enumerated in the claims can be accomplished; they must be limited to those means which the patentee disclosed, or which were obvious equivalents, available to the ordinary skilled artisan.

Furthermore, not only was the mere idea of continuous movement not patentable, but the succession of the processes was equally not invention for the art established and required it. There remain open [429]*429for invention only changes in the terminal tools which touch the books and covers; i. e., the actual fingers of the process, and the mechanical connection of the parts, so disposed as to operate synchronously.

[1, 2] As to the last element, the defendant seems to suppose that, having once shown some similarity between the terminal tools and the prior art, all chance for invention disappears. This is not so. It may be that any one of the inventors whose patents fill the record could have successfully co-ordinated these tools; but it certainly does not follow that a journeyman artisan could do ‘so. These men are the pick of their art, presumably, and what may be easy for them might be as impossible for the ordinary artisan as it would be for a layman. Invention may therefore lie in the adaptation of the oldrintermittent tools to a continuous machine.

[3] It is quite true that, if invention does lie only there, there can be no infringement, unless the same means are used to accomplish the synchronization of the movements. That, however, is only a caution when the issue of infringement arises; it does not affect invention. In such complicated machines as these it is pretty sure that almost any practicable machine, which will work continuously, requires for all its parts some genuine inventive capacity, as that word is understood. The ordinary man might easily imagine the outlines of the result, but the tangled complexities of interaction would be quite without his practical powers. An invention does not call for the genius of a Farraday, a Helmholtz, or a Kelvin; whatever is outside the powers of the ordinary journeyman, once he becomes well grounded in the art, is enough. That is not a high standard of originality.

[4] The first process with which Juengst had to deal was the feeding of his books into the conveyor or belt, in which they were to be held while the bottoms were glued, the covers pressed on, and later “broken,” as the word goes; these being the three necessary processes. The Sheridan horizontal machine, though intermittent, had an endless horizontal belt, with two turns and two parallel straight stretches, exactly like the defendant’s. It-carried clamps, which operated upon the same principle as his; clamps holding the books firmly between two horizontal and immovable pins. The opening mechanism of these clamps, is shown in Figure 1 of Bredenberg, 1,073,324, and, while it operates through fingers fixed upon an oscillating shaft, instead of by the cam, 36, oí the defendant’s machine, it is to be regarded as in every sense an equivalent. In so far as the patent depends for its in-feed' upon its horizontal continuously moving belt with a series of clamps, the infringing machine is derived, not from it, but from the earlier Sheridan machine. Nor can it be thought any invention to keep Sheridan’s belt in continuous motion; rather was invention necessary, assuming invention had anything to do with the matter, to stop the belt, so that the intermediate processes should take place.

Juengst’s disclosure, in which one side of the clamps swings in a plane perpendicular to the plane of the belt, could introduce the books in the same plane as the belt and parallel in two planes to one of its straight runs. As the clamp pins in the defendant’s machine were fixed, the books must be introduced from above or below, and in order [430]*430to be continuous this introdüction must be gradual, which could not be effected, except by a gradual incline. But Juengst did not need to introduce the books as he disclosed in Figure 1 of the patent. It so happens that the figure shows the books arriving on an endless belt from Juengst’s gatherer stitcher. They might equally have come from a platform, where they had been, stacked side by side on end, as shown in Lewis. It is quite plain (page 2, lines' 89-99) that the patent did not include this delivery from the gatherer stitcher, and that the in-feed does not include it.

The patent can fairly be said to begin with the finger, £8, which picks off the book and carries it until the. clamp descends. Whether the in-feed feature is- patentable, therefore, depends in my judgment altogether upon the opening of the’ clamps “at an angle with respect to the advancing movement of the conveyer,” as claim 4 puts it. The finger, £8, is not patentable (see Lewis). It is a combination as a whole, which alone could be the basis of a claim. Therefore I do not read the language of the claims, “in substantially the direction of the path of movement of said clamps,” as covering the defendant. I do not care whether verbally it answers or not. Mere verbal correspondence will not, of course, prove infringement; there must be functional equivalence. I cannot see that the defendant has borrowed a single element of Juengst’s in-feed, and there would indeed be scarcely a plausible argument in its favor, were it not that the figures show a series of single books arriving from .the’gatherer. I do not, of course, mean to suggest that Juengst’s in-feed was' not a highly meritorious invention, taking all its coactive elements together.

Coming next to the glue pot and detector, with their attendant-' mechanism, we find in each-the same means; i. e., a glue roller contacting with the bottom of each book as it advances. But this was not new;' Lewis shows such a glue roller operating in unison with the movement of the books, and the Sheridan horizontal machine has the same thing. There was no pause at this stage of the operation in either machine. Now there is no need for a “detector, where the feed is not sheet by sheet, because with a pile of covers there can be no missing, unless the pile is exhausted, a contingency not probable enough to require provision. It does not require invention merely to think of the necessity for a detector to provide against a missing sheet, and if the mechanism actually employed were at hand to accomplish the result, claim S3 would not be valid. Bascom, a detector for missing sheets in a glueing machine, is such a device, but it corresponds only partially with the device of the patent. Dexter, 602,816, is another, also unlike in structure.

Nor can I say that it required no invention for Juengst to make his detector with either Dexter or Bascom before him. Certainly a valid claim could be made, which would, sustain the details of his disclosure in the face of either.’ Bascom is much closer, but is by no means the same.

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Bluebook (online)
267 F. 428, 1919 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 646, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/juengst-v-hill-pub-co-nysd-1919.