Judith Tompson v. Madhu Gaddam
This text of 2018 DNH 225 (Judith Tompson v. Madhu Gaddam) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Hampshire primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Judith Tompson
v. Civil No. 18-cv-470-LM Opinion No. 2018 DNH 225 Madhu Gaddam
O R D E R
Judith Tompson, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint
against Madhu Gaddam, alleging claims that appear to arise out
of the sale of her home. Gaddam moves to dismiss. Tompson
objects.
DISCUSSION
Gaddam moves to dismiss Tompson’s complaint pursuant to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). First,
Gaddam argues that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction,
both because the complaint does not present a federal question
and because all “proper” parties are not diverse.1 Second,
Gaddam argues that, regardless, the complaint does not state a
plausible claim for relief.
1 Gaddam’s argument as to the lack of diversity of citizenship is based on his assertion that to the extent the complaint states any claims, those claims lie against Madhu Estates, LLC, a New Hampshire company, rather than against him personally. For purposes of Gaddam’s motion, where extrinsic evidence
is not an issue, the standard of review under Rule 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6) is the same. Cf. U.S. ex rel. Winkelman v. CVS
Caremark Corp., 827 F.3d 201, 207 (1st Cir. 2016). When
considering motions under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), the court
accepts as true the properly pleaded facts and takes all
reasonable inferences from those facts that support the
plaintiff’s claims. Mulero–Carrillo v. Roman–Hernandez, 790
F.3d 99, 104 (1st Cir. 2015); New England Patriots Fans v. Nat’l
Football League, No. 16–10659–FDS, 2016 WL 3248207, at *2 (D.
Mass. June 10, 2016). Based on the properly pleaded facts, the
court determines “whether the factual allegations in the
plaintiff’s complaint set forth a plausible claim upon which
relief may be granted.” Foley v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 772
F.3d 63, 71 (1st Cir. 2014) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). A claim is facially plausible “when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). Because Tompson is proceeding pro se, the court
construes her complaint liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam).
The central problem with Tompson’s complaint is that there
are insufficient facts to piece together any sort of coherent
2 narrative. Tompson lists the address of the real property that
is apparently at issue in this case, and states that she is
entitled to assert her rights under the Federal and New
Hampshire Homestead Acts and is entitled to damages for both
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. See
doc. no. 1 at 1. She also references a sheriff’s sale notice
not being properly served and attaches certain bankruptcy
filings and the sheriff’s deed. The majority of Tompson’s
complaint cites law related to the Federal Homestead Act.
Other than alleging that diversity jurisdiction exists
because Gaddam is a Massachusetts resident, the complaint
contains no allegations against him. Nor do any of the
attachments to the complaint mention him. Put simply, even
assuming the truth of—and construing liberally—the few factual
allegations in Tompson’s complaint, the court is unable to
discern any viable claims against Gaddam.
The court, therefore, grants Gaddam’s motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim without prejudice to Tompson’s ability
to file a complaint that sets forth facts sufficient to state a
plausible claim against Gaddam.2
2 The court offers no opinion concerning Gaddam’s argument as to the lack of diversity jurisdiction. The court notes for the sake of clarity that although Gaddam argues that this court lacks diversity jurisdiction because Madhu Estates, LLC is domiciled in New Hampshire, a limited liability company is deemed to be a citizen of every state of which any of its
3 CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss
the complaint (doc. no. 4) is granted without prejudice to
plaintiff’s ability to file an amended complaint setting forth
facts sufficient to state a plausible claim against defendant.
Tompson has until December 12, 2018 to file an amended
complaint. Failure to file an amended complaint within this
time frame will result in dismissal of Tompson’s complaint with
prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
__________________________ Landya McCafferty United States District Judge
November 13, 2018
cc: Judith Tompson, pro se Michael J. Scott, Esq.
members is a citizen. See D.B. Zwirn Special Opportunities Fund, L.P. v. Mehrotra, 661 F.3d 124, 125 (1st Cir. 2011). Further, to the extent Tompson’s complaint names Gaddam as a defendant, it is his citizenship that is relevant for diversity jurisdiction. See, e.g., Kilgore v. Providence Place Mall, No. CV 16-135S, 2016 WL 3092990, at *2 (D.R.I. Apr. 1, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 16-135 S, 2016 WL 3093450 (D.R.I. June 1, 2016.)
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