Judith Tarrant v. Clear Creek Independent School District and Shirley J. Neeley, Ed.D., Commissioner of Education, in Her Individual Capacity

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJuly 12, 2007
Docket01-06-00653-CV
StatusPublished

This text of Judith Tarrant v. Clear Creek Independent School District and Shirley J. Neeley, Ed.D., Commissioner of Education, in Her Individual Capacity (Judith Tarrant v. Clear Creek Independent School District and Shirley J. Neeley, Ed.D., Commissioner of Education, in Her Individual Capacity) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Judith Tarrant v. Clear Creek Independent School District and Shirley J. Neeley, Ed.D., Commissioner of Education, in Her Individual Capacity, (Tex. Ct. App. 2007).

Opinion

Opinion issued July 12, 2007



In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas



NO. 01-06-00653-CV



JUDITH TARRANT, Appellant



V.



CLEAR CREEK INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT AND

SHIRLEY J. NEELEY, ED.D., COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION

IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY, Appellees



On Appeal from the 56th District Court

Galveston County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 05CV1355



O P I N I O N

Appellant, Judith Tarrant, a retired school teacher, appeals the summary judgment rendered in the trial court in favor of appellees Clear Creek Independent School District (CCISD) and Shirley J. Neeley, Ed.D., in her official capacity as Commissioner of Education (the Commissioner). Appellant brings one issue in which she complains that the Commissioner's decision to deny appellant's appeal of CCISD's nonrenewal (1) of her one-year contract was arbitrary and capricious and contains erroneous conclusions of law and must, therefore, be reversed. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

In 2003, appellant, resigned from CCISD. She then retired that same year from Sweeney Independent School District after one day's work. She was rehired by CCISD for the 2004-2005 school year under a special provision permitting retirees who are certified in an "acute shortage area" to return to work without forfeiting their pensions or retirement benefits. Appellant's contract with CCISD was for a one-year term. In March 2005, appellant was notified by letter that the superintendent of CCISD would recommend to the Board of Trustees (the Board) that her contract not be renewed. Approximately three weeks later, appellant received notice informing her that the Board had adopted the superintendent's recommendation and that the reasons the contract was not renewed included the following: (2)

32. Failure of a retired/rehired employee to meet the criteria for continued employment as set forth at DC(LOCAL).



Specifically, Board Policy DC(LOCAL) requires that the contracts of persons hired under the retire/rehire policy "shall be limited to one year." You were hired in an "acute teacher shortage area" under this policy in August 2004. At the end of each year, these positions are vacated, and under the terms of your contract, the contract expires each year. Of course, you may reapply subject to the requirements stated in Board Policy DC(LOCAL).



The letter also informed appellant that she could request a hearing before the Board. Appellant requested a hearing, and, at the close of the hearing, the Board voted not to renew appellant's contract. Appellant appealed the Board's decision to the Commissioner, who made findings of fact and conclusions of law and denied the appeal. Appellant filed suit in the district court for judicial review of the Commissioner's ruling. See Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 21.307 (Vernon 2006). The district court rendered summary judgment in favor of CCISD and the Commissioner, and appellant then filed this appeal.

DISCUSSION

In support of her contention that the Commissioner's decision was arbitrary and capricious and contained erroneous conclusions of law, appellant advances three arguments. She first contends that the school district was not authorized to issue a teaching contract that expired after one year and could not be renewed. Second, she argues that the Government Code does not require that positions held by teachers under the "acute shortage area exception" be vacated in order to hire nonretirees. Third, she asserts that the Education Code permits a school district to nonrenew a teacher's contract only for a pre-established reason and that participation in the "acute shortage area exception" was not a pre-established reason.

A. Standard of Review

We review the district court's judgment affirming or denying the Commissioner of Education's decision by a substantial-evidence standard, as follows:

We must determine whether the evidence as a whole is such that reasonable minds could have reached the same conclusion as the agency in the disputed action. We may not substitute our judgment for that of the agency and may only consider the record on which the agency based its decision. The true test is not whether the agency reached the correct conclusion, but whether some reasonable basis exists in the record for the action taken by the agency. The findings, inferences, conclusions, and decisions of an administrative agency are presumed to be supported by substantial evidence, and the burden is on the contestant to prove otherwise.



Tijerina v. Alanis, 80 S.W.3d 292, 295 n.2 (Tex. App.--Austin 2002, pet. denied) (citations omitted). We must uphold an agency finding--even if the evidence actually preponderates against that finding--as long as the evidence suggests that the agency's determination was within the bounds of reasonableness. Sw. Pub. Serv. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 962 S.W.2d 207, 215 (Tex. App.--Austin 1998, pet. denied). An agency decision that is not supported by substantial evidence is deemed arbitrary and capricious. Weslaco Fed'n of Teachers v. Tex. Educ. Agency, 27 S.W.3d 258, 266 (Tex. App.--Austin 2000, no pet.) (citing Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 809 S.W.2d 201, 211 (Tex. 1991)). We give great weight to the construction of a statute by an administrative agency charged to enforce the statute as long as the construction is reasonable and does not contradict the plain language of the statute. Reliant Energy, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 153 S.W.3d 174, 187 (Tex. App.--Austin 2004, pet. denied). We may not reverse the Commissioner's decision unless it is not supported by substantial evidence or unless the Commissioner's conclusions of law are erroneous. Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 21.307(f) (Vernon 2006).

B. The Commissioner's Decision

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Related

Reliant Energy, Inc. v. Public Utility Commission
153 S.W.3d 174 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2004)
Southwestern Public Service Co. v. Public Utility Commission of Texas
962 S.W.2d 207 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1998)
Weslaco Federation of Teachers v. Texas Education Agency
27 S.W.3d 258 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2000)
Public Utility Commission v. Gulf States Utilities Co.
809 S.W.2d 201 (Texas Supreme Court, 1991)
Tijerina v. Alanis
80 S.W.3d 292 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2002)

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Judith Tarrant v. Clear Creek Independent School District and Shirley J. Neeley, Ed.D., Commissioner of Education, in Her Individual Capacity, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/judith-tarrant-v-clear-creek-independent-school-di-texapp-2007.