Judith Sanderson v. Martin O'Malley

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: September 19, 2024
• Docket: 23-35382
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 19 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JUDITH SANDERSON, No. 23-35382

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:22-cv-05749-MLP

v. MEMORANDUM* MARTIN J. O’MALLEY, Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Michelle L. Peterson, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted September 10, 2024 Seattle, Washington

Before: GRABER and SUNG, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF,** District Judge.

Claimant Judith Sanderson appeals the district court’s decision affirming the

Commissioner of Social Security Administration’s denial of her application for

disability insurance benefits. We review de novo a district court’s judgment

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. upholding the denial of social security benefits and will set aside the decision of an

administrative law judge (ALJ) to deny benefits only if it “contains legal error or is

not supported by substantial evidence.” Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1153–54 (9th

Cir. 2020) (quoting Tomasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008)). We

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. Sanderson first argues that the ALJ erred by finding her not disabled at

step four of the sequential evaluation process because she was impliedly limited to

six hours of sitting. Even assuming a six-hour sitting limitation, the ALJ properly

relied on testimony from a vocational expert (VE) to find that Sanderson could

perform her past relevant work as a customer complaint clerk. Although the VE

testified that the role requires sitting “essentially . . . all day,” she agreed that “the

standard for sedentary is six out of eight” and explained that “short standing could

be done” because it is “standard for people to wear a headpiece now.” The record

could be interpreted more favorably to Sanderson, but we must defer to the ALJ’s

interpretation as long as it is rational. See Terry v. Saul, 998 F.3d 1010, 1013 (9th

Cir. 2021). Therefore, even if Sanderson were limited to six hours of sitting,

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s step-four finding that Sanderson could

perform her past relevant work.

2. Sanderson next argues that the ALJ erred by discounting the medical

opinion evidence. The governing regulations, see 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a)–(b),

2 required the ALJ to assess the persuasiveness of each medical opinion and to

explain how he considered the consistency and supportability factors. The ALJ

determined that Dr. Thomas Gritzka’s opinion was supported by his examination

of Sanderson and review of her records. But the ALJ found that Dr. Gritzka’s

opinion was inconsistent with record evidence, including Sanderson’s statements

about the severity and timing of her symptoms, as well as her conservative

treatment during the period at issue. Because the ALJ is “responsible for

determining credibility” and “resolving ambiguities,” Ford, 950 F.3d at 1149

(quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995)), substantial

evidence supports the ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Gritzka’s opinion.

Dr. Brian Iuliano and Dr. Michael Strohbach agreed with Dr. Gritzka’s

opinion but did not explain their concurrences. An ALJ “may take into account the

quality of the explanation when determining how much weight to give a medical

opinion.” Id. at 1155 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3)); see 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(c)(1) (same). “[T]he ALJ may permissibly reject check-off reports that

do not contain any explanation of the bases of their conclusions.” Id. (citation

omitted). Because we conclude that the ALJ did not err in discounting Dr.

Gritzka’s opinion, we reach the same conclusion as to Dr. Iuliano’s and Dr.

Strohbach’s opinions.

3 3. Finally, Sanderson argues that the ALJ erred by discounting her subjective

symptom testimony. The ALJ was required to provide “specific, clear and

convincing reasons” for rejecting Sanderson’s testimony about the severity of her

symptoms. Smith v. Kijakazi, 14 F.4th 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting

Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1015 (9th Cir. 2014)). The ALJ did so: he

explained that Sanderson’s daily activities, her report of doing “okay,” and her

conservative care during the relevant period undermined her claims that she was

“unable to walk, sit, stand, drive, or lift.” Because the record reasonably supports

the ALJ’s findings, see Ferguson v. O’Malley, 95 F.4th 1194, 1199 (9th Cir. 2024),

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s assessment of Sanderson’s subjective

symptom testimony.

AFFIRMED.