Judith D. Guillory, individually, as the Other of Michael John Guillory, and As the Administrator of the Estate of Michael John Guillory, Deceased v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: October 16, 2025
• Docket: 2:23-cv-02010
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 6 * * *

7 JUDITH D. GUILLORY, individually, as the Case No. 2:23-CV-2010 JCM (BNW) Other of MICHAEL JOHN GUILLORY, and 8 As the Administrator of the ESTATE OF MICHAEL JOHN GUILLORY, Deceased, 9 Plaintiff(s), ORDER 10 v. 11 LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE 12 DEPARTMENT, et al.,

13 Defendant(s).

14 15 Presently before the court is defendant Clark County’s motion for reconsideration. (ECF 16 No. 50). Plaintiff Judith D. Guillory, Administratrix of the Estate of Michael John Guillory, filed 17 a response, (ECF No. 51), to which Clark County replied (ECF No. 54). 18 I. Background 19 This is a wrongful death action with both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims and state law claims. 20 21 (See ECF No. 1). Decedent Michael Guillory was allegedly suffering a mental health incident 22 outside an apartment complex in Las Vegas on December 5, 2021. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 40). Las Vegas 23 Metropolitan Police Department (“LVMPD”) officers were dispatched and established a perimeter 24 to contain Guillory. (ECF No. 28). The parties dispute the nature of the events that followed. 25 Guillory was allegedly inside a parked vehicle with a defensive object when officers and 26 27 an ambulance owned and operated by Community Ambulance arrived. (ECF No. 26 ¶¶ 22, 40, 28 42). Plaintiff contends Guillory became frustrated. (Id. ¶ 47). He tried to exit the vehicle to 1 surrender when officers shot him with rubber bullets and/or bean bags and caused him to retreat. 2 (Id. ¶ 50). Officers then released a K-9 police dog to control Guillory. (Id. ¶ 51). An LVMPD 3 sergeant then used a taser on Guillory. (Id. ¶ 52). Officers, and potentially a Community 4 Ambulance EMT, then placed their body weight on him and treated him with the sedative 5 6 Ketamine. (Id. ¶ 58). Guillory never regained consciousness and was pronounced dead on 7 December 6, 2021. (Id.). 8 Guillory’s mother, Judith Guillory, brought this action on behalf of Guillory’s estate, 9 naming LVMPD, Clark County, the City of Las Vegas, RBR Management (dba Community 10 Ambulance), and three of the officers allegedly involved as defendants. (ECF No. 26). 11 12 On March 10, 2025, the court granted Clark County’s motion to dismiss in part. (ECF No. 13 49). The order considered equitable tolling and state statutory notice arguments, ruling that the 14 state law claims were dismissed as noncompliant with Nevada’s statutory notice requirement. (Id. 15 at 4–6). Clark County brings the present motion for reconsideration under LR 59-1 and FRCP 59 16 to clarify the status of the remaining § 1983 and Monell claims. 17 18 II. Legal Standard 19 A motion for reconsideration “should not be granted, absent highly unusual 20 circumstances.” Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 880 21 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 389 Orange St. Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999)); 22 see also Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003). Reconsideration is appropriate 23 24 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) only if the court (1) “is presented with newly 25 discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) 26 if there is an intervening change in controlling law.” Sch. Dist. No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 27 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Kona Enters., Inc. v. Est. of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th 28 1 Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted); LR 59-1(a). 2 The court can review whether it committed clear error of law. See McDowell v. Calderon, 3 197 F.3d 1253, 1255 (9th Cir. 1999). “Clear error exists only when the reviewing court is left with 4 a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Milenbach v. Comm’r of 5 6 Internal Rev., 318 F.3d 924, 935 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Gonzalez-Caballero v. Mena, 251 F.3d 7 789, 792 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations omitted). There is no clear error when the question 8 at issue is debatable. Calderon, 197 F.3d at 1256. 9 A motion for reconsideration should not “raise arguments or present evidence for the first 10 time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.” Marlyn Nutraceuticals, 11 12 571 F.3d at 880. It should not “repeat arguments already presented unless (and only to the extent) 13 necessary to explain controlling, intervening law or to argue new facts.” LR 59-1(b); see also 14 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 486 n.5 (2008) (citation omitted); Zimmerman v. City 15 of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 2001). It is inappropriate to ask the court to “think about 16 [an] issue in the hope that [it] will come out the other way the second time.” Teller v. Dogge, No. 17 18 2:12-cv-00591-JCM-GWF, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17425, 2013 WL 508326, at *6 n.6 (D. Nev. 19 Feb. 8, 2013) (Mahan, J.). 20 III. Discussion 21 The court will first determine whether to grant Clark County’s motion for reconsideration, 22 and then, if necessary, reconsider the underlying motion to dismiss. 23 24 A. Motion for Reconsideration 25 Clark County argues that reconsideration is warranted because this court did not address 26 the status of the § 1983 and Monell claims against it. (ECF No. 50). Although Clark County’s 27 motion to dismiss focuses primarily on equitable tolling and statute of limitations, Clark County 28 1 also raised arguments that under which the court could have dismissed the § 1983 and Monell 2 claims. The court did not address these arguments, leaving § 1983 and Monell claims pending 3 against Clark County. 4 Furthermore, plaintiff does not set forth any arguments or analyze any case law opposing 5 6 Clark County’s motion for reconsideration. (ECF No. 51). “The failure of an opposing party to 7 file points and authorities in response to any motion…consents to the granting of the motion.” LR 8 7-2(d). 9 Clark County’s motion for reconsideration is granted. 10 B. Motion to dismiss 11 12 The court may dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief 13 can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A properly pled complaint must provide “[a] short and 14 plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 15 Although rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it does require more than labels and 16 conclusions. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Furthermore, a formulaic 17 18 recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not suffice. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 19 677 (2009) (citation omitted). Rule 8 does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed 20 with nothing more than conclusions. Id. at 678–79. 21 To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to “state 22 a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff 23 24 pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 25 liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. When a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent 26 with a defendant’s liability, and shows only a mere possibility of entitlement, the complaint does 27 not meet the requirements to show plausibility of entitlement to relief. Id. 28 1 In Iqbal, the Supreme Court clarified the two-step approach district courts are to apply 2 when considering a motion to dismiss. Id. First, the court must accept as true all of the allegations 3 contained in a complaint. However, this requirement is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Id. 4 Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Id. 5 6 at 678. Where the complaint does not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of 7 misconduct, the complaint has “alleged – but not shown – that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. 8 at 679. When the allegations in a complaint have not crossed the line from conceivable to 9 plausible, plaintiff's claim must be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 10 The Ninth Circuit addressed post-Iqbal pleading standards in Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 11 12 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). The Starr court held as follows: 13 First, to be entitled to the presumption of truth, allegations in a complaint or counterclaim may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but 14 must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and 15 to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively. Second, the factual allegations that are taken as true must plausibly suggest an entitlement to 16 relief, such that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery and continued litigation. 17 Id. 18 In ruling on a motion to dismiss, a district court generally “may not consider any material 19 beyond the pleadings.” Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 20 21 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990). There are several exceptions to this rule. For example, the court may 22 consider material properly submitted as part of the complaint, take judicial notice of undisputed 23 matters of public record, and—when the plaintiff fails to introduce a pertinent document—may 24 consider the exhibit if the “defendant introduces it as part of his motion attacking the pleading.” 25 Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Hal Roach Studios, 896 F.2d at 1555 26 27 n. 19) (emphasis added) (properly submitted material as part of the complaint); id. at 453 (when 28 plaintiff fails to introduce a pertinent exhibit); Harris v. County of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1131– 1 32 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001)) (on judicial 2 notice). 3 Clark County argues that the § 1983 claims cannot stand because plaintiff failed to identify 4 conduct by a Clark County employee or officer; and the Monell claims must likewise be dismissed 5 6 because Clark County is not liable for the conduct of third-party private entities like Community 7 Ambulance. (ECF No. 50 at 3). 8 i. Excessive force, unlawful seizure, and denial of medical treatment 9 claims 10 Plaintiff alleges § 1983 claims against Clark County for excessive force (claim one), 11 unlawful seizure (claim three), and denial of medical treatment (claim five). (ECF No. 26 ¶¶ 73– 12 76, 79–81, 86–95). Section 1983 claims may be brought against municipalities; however, they 13 may not be sued “for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.” Monell v. Dep’t of 14 Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). To impose Monell liability on a municipality under § 1983, 15 16 a plaintiff must prove: (1) he had a constitutional right of which he was deprived; (2) the 17 municipality had a policy; (3) the policy amounts to deliberate indifference to his constitutional 18 right; and (4) “the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Gordon v. Cty. 19 of Orange, 6 F.4th 961, 973 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Dougherty v. Cty. of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 20 900 (9th Cir. 2011)). 21 22 Claims one, three, and five describe the actions of LVMPD officers and Community 23 Ambulance. Plaintiff fails to allege any conduct by Clark County, an employee, or an officer 24 thereof, at the scene of the incident. (See ECF No. 26 at 12–20); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 678–79. 25 Plaintiff attempts to connect Clark County to these claims by alleging that LVMPD and 26 Clark County “developed policies that denied medical care to individuals in the custody of 27 28 defendant officers and LVMPD,” and that in making these policies, the Clark County deprived 1 Mr. Guillory of his federal constitutional rights as set out in the first, third, and fifth claims for 2 relief. (ECF No. 26 ¶¶ 91–93). This policy is alleged earlier in the complaint, in a section on 3 LVMPD’s alleged unconstitutional practices and customs, wherein plaintiff claims that Clark 4 County and LVMPD “permitted, failed to correct, promoted, fostered, or ratified a number of 5 6 customs, patters or practices that condoned and required officers…” (Id. ¶ 67–72). 7 These policy allegations focus on the conduct, practices, and duties of LMVPD, not Clark County. 8 (Id. ¶ 71). Clark County is a separate entity from LVMPD with separate policies and duties, so 9 plaintiff must specifically allege separate conduct and policies from LVMPD that deprived Mr. 10 Guillory of his constitutional rights. She does not. After separating out the content that falls within 11 12 LVMPD’s purview, all that is left are conclusory allegations and recitations of the Monell 13 requirements. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 678–79. Claims one, three, and five are dismissed. 14 ii. Ratification, policy, practice, or custom, and failure to train claims 15 Plaintiff’s final three claims are that Clark County (1) ratified the acts and omissions of 16 Community Ambulance’s EMTs (claim eight); (2) had an unconstitutional policy, practice, or 17 18 custom to deprive persons in custody of proper medical treatment (claim nine); (3) and failed to 19 train the EMTs or have adequate policies to train the EMTs (claim ten). (ECF No. 26 at 18–20). 20 Plaintiff alleges that Clark County hired Community Ambulance to provide ambulatory services, 21 and that it must be held liable for the Community Ambulance EMT’s actions because Clark County 22 owes a nondelegable duty to provide and regulate ambulatory services to the citizens of Clark 23 24 County, and to enforce and establish minimum standards of emergency medical care. (ECF No. 25 26 ¶¶ 13, 28). These arguments are unpersuasive. 26 First, contrary to plaintiff’s understanding, the statute does not direct Clark County to 27 regulate minimum standards of emergency medical care, including ambulatory services. The 28 1 Nevada Revised Statutes provide that 2 the board shall adopt regulations establishing minimum reasonable standards for: . . 3 (a) Sanitation in ambulances and air ambulances; (b) Medical and non medical equipment and supplies[]; 4 . . . (c) Permits for operation of ambulances, air ambulances and vehicles of a fire- 5 fighting agency; and 6 . . . (f) Treatment of patients who are critically ill or in urgent need of treatment 7 NRS 450B.130. 8 9 The “board” required to adopt these regulations is defined in NRS 450B.060 as “the district 10 board of health.” In Clark County, that is Southern Nevada Health District, which is a separate 11 entity from Clark County. 12 Second, state law does not create a nondelegable duty for Clark County to provide 13 ambulatory services. Although Clark County administers franchise agreements for ambulatory 14 15 service providers, it is not required to do so.1 Should a local government choose to provide such 16 services, it must comply with the board’s regulations. See NRS 450B.840. Nowhere in NRS 17 450B.015 does it say that local governments have a nondelegable duty to provide ambulatory 18 services. 19 NRS 450B.015 et seq. is intended to provide for minimum standards and ensure prompt 20 21 and efficient medical care. If the legislature intended to create a nondelegable duty for cities and 22 counties as part of this mission, it would have included that within the law. It did not. 23 Third, Clark County does not hire ambulatory servicers—it licenses them. These licensing 24 agreements are “functionally business licenses” that ensure a minimum level of service is offered 25 26

27 1 Franchise Services, CLARK COUNTY, NEV., 28 https://www.clarkcountynv.gov/business/doing_business_with_clark_county/divisions/franchise_services/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2025). 1 to the general public (as intended by the state legislature) throughout the county, in exchange for 2 a right to operate in Clark County; they are not contracts. (ECF No. 30 at 9). Entities must pay 3 service fees to Clark County (not the other way around), carry liability insurance, and agree to 4 indemnify Clark County for all claims asserted against it for conduct related to the services 5 6 provided. Clark Cnty. Mun. Code §§ 5.03.080, 5.03.210, 5.03.220. 7 Accordingly, claims eight, nine, and ten fail. Plaintiff’s claim against Clark County for 8 ratification fails because it is based on her nondelegable duty theory. (See ECF No. 26 ¶ 103). 9 Her policy, practice, or custom claim fails because the minimum standards of care are not 10 promulgated by Clark County, and she cites to no other law supporting her nondelegable duty of 11 12 care contention. (Id. ¶ 108). 13 Plaintiff claims that the training policies of Clark County and Community Ambulance were 14 not adequate to train the EMTs, but Clark County does not regulate the training policies of EMTs, 15 and it is not responsible for the training of its licensees’ employees. (Id. ¶ 114); see supra at 8. 16 For this reason, and those discussed in the next section, plaintiff’s negligent supervision and 17 18 training claim fails. 19 a. Immunity 20 Clark County is immune from any claims of negligent supervision or training. Nevada 21 waives sovereign immunity in civil actions, subject to certain exceptions. See NRS 41.031. One 22 such exception is that no action may be brought based on the discretionary actions of the state, its 23 24 agencies, political subdivisions, or employees or officers thereof. NRS 41.032. An act is 25 discretionary if (1) it involves an element of individual judgment or choice and (2) is based on 26 considerations of social, economic, or political policy. Martinez v. Maruszczak, 123 Nev. 433, 27 446–47 (2007). Discretionary act immunity may protect decisions “at all levels of government, 28 1 including frequent or routine decisions…if the decisions require analysis of government policy 2 concerns.” Id. at 447. 3 Decisions regarding the training and supervision of employees, such as programming, 4 staffing, management styles, and discipline, are ones that involve choice or judgment. These are 5 6 decisions are susceptible to a policy analysis. Thus, Clark County’s training and supervision of 7 employees are discretionary acts immune from suit. 8 Accordingly, plaintiff’s claims for ratification, policy, practice, or custom, and failure to 9 train, are dismissed. See Gordon, 6 F.4th at 973; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 678–79. 10 IV. Conclusion 11 12 Accordingly, 13 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that defendant Clark County’s 14 motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 50) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. 15 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Clark County’s motion to dismiss, (ECF No. 30), is 16 GRANTED with prejudice as to claims one, three, five, eight, nine, and ten. (See ECF No. 49). 17 18 There are no remaining claims against defendant Clark County. The clerk of court is 19 instructed to terminate Clark County as a defendant in this case. 20

21 DATED October 16, 2025.

23 ______________________________________ 24 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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