Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Justice

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: February 4, 2026
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2023-3004
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JUDICIAL WATCH, INC.,

Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 23-3004 (JEB) U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The Federal Bureau of Investigation uses legal process to request information from tech

platforms and reimburses them for the cost of complying. In this Freedom of Information Act

suit, Plaintiff Judicial Watch sought documents about the FBI’s reimbursements to Twitter (now

known as X). Defendant Department of Justice eventually turned over responsive documents but

redacted portions of them under various FOIA exemptions. The parties have since narrowed

their dispute to whether DOJ may withhold the FBI’s quarterly payments to Twitter over a

number of years under Exemption 7(E), a question on which both sides now move for summary

judgment. The Court holds that the contested information falls within that exemption, that

releasing it would foreseeably harm the interests that the exemption protects, and that there is no

unprotected material that Defendant could segregate from those records and release. It therefore

grants DOJ summary judgment.

I. Background

As the rest of human activity has moved online, so has crime — from hacking to money

laundering to meddling in elections. The FBI has accordingly turned its attention to cyberspace.

1 It serves tech companies with search warrants and subpoenas to gather online evidence and

monitor digital threats to the nation’s security. See ECF No. 23-1 (Amie Marie Napier Decl.),

¶ 7. It then reimburses those companies for the cost of complying. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.

§ 2706(a) (requiring agencies to “pay . . . a fee for reimbursement for such costs as are

reasonably necessary and which have been directly incurred in” complying with requests for

information under Stored Communications Act).

Concerned about the FBI’s online snooping, Plaintiff submitted a FOIA request for

(1) “[a]ll records documenting any payments made to Twitter, Inc. and/or any employee thereof

by the Federal Bureau of Investigation,” and (2) “[a]ll contracts or similar records documenting

the purpose or basis of any [such] payment[s],” with both requests seeking records from

“January 1, 2016 to the present.” ECF No. 17-3 (FOIA Req.) at ECF p. 4. When the FBI

refused to produce any responsive records or even acknowledge whether such records existed,

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit. See ECF No. 1 (Compl.), ¶¶ 7–11.

Once dragged into court, the FBI turned over 44 pages of responsive documents. See

ECF No. 17-2 (Shannon R. Hammer Decl.), ¶ 14. Yet the parties hit an impasse over whether

the Bureau properly redacted certain information, see ECF No. 14 (Feb. 2025 JSR), ¶ 2, leading

them to each move for summary judgment. See ECF Nos. 17 (Def. MSJ); 20 (Pl. MSJ). In their

briefing, the two sides further narrowed their dispute. See Pl. MSJ at 1 n.1. They are now

fighting over only one issue: whether the FBI may redact the total amount it paid Twitter for

legal-process requests in each calendar quarter from 2016 to 2023. See ECF Nos. 20-5

(Redacted Records) (records at issue); 23 (Def. Reply) at 1 (acknowledging that dispute has

narrowed to these records).

2 II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment may be granted if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). A genuine issue of material fact is one that would change the outcome of the litigation.

See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (“Only disputes over facts that

might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of

summary judgment.”). In the event of conflicting evidence on a material issue, the court is to

construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Sample v. Bureau

of Prisons, 466 F.3d 1086, 1087 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

“FOIA cases typically and appropriately are decided on motions for summary judgment.”

Defs. of Wildlife v. Border Patrol, 623 F. Supp. 2d 83, 87 (D.D.C. 2009); Bigwood v. U.S.

Agency for Int’l Dev., 484 F. Supp. 2d 68, 73 (D.D.C. 2007). In those cases, the agency bears

the ultimate burden of proof. See U.S. Dep’t of Just. v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 142 n.3

(1989). The court may grant summary judgment based solely on information provided in an

agency’s affidavit or declaration when it describes “the justifications for withholding the

information with specific detail, demonstrates that the information withheld logically falls within

the claimed exemption, and is not contradicted by contrary evidence in the record or by evidence

of the agency’s bad faith.” ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 628 F.3d 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2011).

Such affidavits or declarations are accorded “a presumption of good faith, which cannot be

rebutted by ‘purely speculative claims about the existence and discoverability of other

documents.’” SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (quoting

Ground Saucer Watch, Inc. v. CIA, 692 F.2d 770, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).

3 III. Analysis

FOIA requires agencies to release records that a member of the public requests, unless

they fall into one of nine enumerated exemptions. Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 562 U.S. 562,

564 (2011); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (listing exemptions). Those exemptions are exhaustive: if

a responsive document does not fit within one, the agency must release it. Tax Analysts, 492

U.S. at 151. Even if a record falls within a FOIA exemption, the agency may withhold it only if

“disclosure would harm an interest protected by [the] exemption.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(8)(A)(i)(I).

The Court first assesses whether the disputed documents fit Defendant’s claimed exemption,

then briefly tackles whether they would harm an interest the exemption protects. Finally, it

considers whether the documents contain further unprotected information that Defendant could

segregate and release.

A. Exemption 7(E)

Defendant claims that the FBI’s quarterly payments to Twitter are protected by

Exemption 7(E). See Def. MSJ at 5. To fit within that exemption, records must first meet the

threshold requirement for Exemption 7: they must be “compiled for law enforcement purposes.”

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7). Once a record checks that box, it is exempt from FOIA only if it also falls

within one of Exemption 7’s subsections. Subsection 7(E) protects documents that “would

disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would

disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could

reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.” Id., § 552(b)(7)(E).

As relevant here, then, the disputed records fall within Exemption 7(E) if: (1) they were

compiled for law-enforcement purposes, (2) they would disclose techniques and procedures for

law-enforcement investigations, and (3) disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk

4 circumvention of the law. See Def. MSJ at 6–7 (arguing only that these records would disclose

techniques and procedures, not guidelines). The Court assesses those elements in turn,

recognizing that the last two overlap significantly.

1. Compiled for Law-Enforcement Purposes

A record is “compiled” for law-enforcement purposes if it was “created, gathered, or

used” for such purposes. Pub. Emps. for Env’t Resp. v. U.S. Section, Int’l Boundary & Water

Comm’n, U.S.-Mex., 740 F.3d 195, 203 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Law-enforcement purposes include

both enforcing domestic criminal law and protecting national security. Id. at 203–04; Elec. Priv.

Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 777 F.3d 518, 522–23 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Ctr. for Nat’l

Sec. Stud. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 331 F.3d 918, 926 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d

408, 421 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

When an agency is dedicated to law enforcement, as the FBI is, courts defer to its

assertion that its records were compiled for law-enforcement purposes. Campbell v. U.S. Dep’t

of Just., 164 F.3d 20, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1998). After all, those purposes are the ultimate reason for

everything that the agency does. Such an agency’s records satisfy this prong if (1) the

“investigatory activities that give rise to the documents” are “related to the enforcement of

federal laws or to the maintenance of national security,” and (2) there is a rational relationship

“between the investigation” that produced the documents “and one of the agency’s law

enforcement duties.” Pratt, 673 F.2d at 420–21.

Both elements are met here. These records were created as part of serving subpoenas,

warrants, and other requests on Twitter to retrieve information that would help the FBI

investigate crimes and national-security threats. See Hammer Decl., ¶ 24; Napier Decl., ¶¶ 6–7.

The investigatory activities that gave rise to the documents were thus related to enforcing federal

5 laws and maintaining national security, and there was a rational relationship between those

investigations and the Bureau’s law-enforcement duties.

Plaintiff rejoins that the records “were compiled for administrative purposes, not a law

enforcement purpose.” Def. MSJ at 2–3. Yet that is a specious dichotomy: when administrative

recordkeeping is part of an agency’s law-enforcement functions, then the records were created

for both administrative and law-enforcement purposes. Take, for example, evidence logs, which

are routine administrative documents but are plainly compiled for law-enforcement purposes.

Similarly, these invoices were created so that the FBI could pay for warrants, subpoenas, and

other legal-process requests that it sent Twitter and that helped it investigate crimes and protect

the homeland. See Hammer Decl., ¶ 24; Napier Decl., ¶¶ 6–7. While the records might have an

administrative character, they were undoubtedly created for law-enforcement purposes.

2. Techniques and Procedures

On to whether they “would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement

investigations.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E). To meet this prong, the techniques and procedures

must not be publicly known. Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. DEA, 192 F. Supp. 3d 92, 112 (D.D.C.

2016). After all, if everyone already knows all about a technique or procedure, then releasing a

document could hardly “disclose” it. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E).

Yet even if a technique or procedure’s existence is publicly known, records still meet this

element if they would reveal new “information about” it. Sack v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 823 F.3d

687, 694 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (emphasis added); see, e.g., id. (protecting information about

effectiveness of polygraphs, whose existence was publicly known); Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. U.S.

DEA, 401 F. Supp. 3d 37, 46 (D.D.C. 2019) (although database’s existence was publicly known,

which agencies used it was not, so revealing their identities would reveal technique and

6 procedure); Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 525 F. Supp.

3d 181, 190–91 (D.D.C. 2021) (it was publicly known that Secret Service accompanies President

on trips abroad, but documents would reveal new details about those operations and so would

disclose techniques and procedures); Associated Press v. FBI, 265 F. Supp. 3d 82, 99–100

(D.D.C. 2017) (existence of iPhone hacking tool was known, but unknown details about how

much FBI paid for it would reveal techniques and procedures). Especially relevant here, that

includes details about a technique’s use, effectiveness, and limitations. Sack, 823 F.3d at 694

(limitations of polygraphs, along with when agencies used them); Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. U.S.

DEA, 401 F. Supp. 3d at 46 (which agencies used database); Associated Press, 265 F. Supp. 3d

at 100 (capabilities of hacking tool).

The records here fall squarely within those principles. When the FBI seeks information

from Twitter to investigate crimes, those requests are a law-enforcement technique and

procedure. Allard K. Lowenstein Int’l Hum. Rts. Project v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 626 F.3d

678, 682 (2d Cir. 2010) (“The phrase ‘techniques and procedures[]’ . . . refers to how law

enforcement officials go about investigating a crime.”). True, the existence of these requests is

publicly known. See Napier Decl., ¶ 9. But how much the FBI paid for them is not, and

disclosing that information would reveal unknown details about this technique and procedure.

First, the amount that the FBI reimbursed Twitter would hint at the volume of requests that it

sent the platform, which would imply how much the Bureau relies on this technique. Second,

one could compare how much the FBI reimbursed Twitter to how much it reimbursed other

platforms (which would also be discoverable via FOIA) and thereby derive where the Bureau

uses this technique relatively more and relatively less. Id. Both of which would reveal

“information about the underlying techniques and procedures.” Sack, 823 F.3d at 694.

7 3. Risk of Circumvention

Exemption 7(E) covers records that “would disclose techniques and procedures for law

enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement

investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk

circumvention of the law.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E) (emphasis added). Reading that text in

isolation, one might think that the highlighted phrase modifies only “guidelines.” In other

words, if disclosure would reveal techniques and procedures, it need not also risk circumvention.

See Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003) (“[A] limiting clause or phrase . . . should

ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows . . . .”). The

D.C. Circuit, however, holds otherwise: when a document would reveal techniques and

procedures, its disclosure must also risk circumvention of the law to qualify for Exemption 7(E).

Pub. Emps. for Env’t Resp., 740 F.3d at 204 n.4; Sack, 823 F.3d at 694.

That requirement is “a relatively low bar.” Blackwell v. FBI, 646 F.3d 37, 42 (D.C. Cir.

2011). The agency need not show that disclosure would lead to circumvention, only that it

would “risk” it; disclosure need not create that risk, so long as it is “expected to”; and that

expectation need not be certain, only “reasonabl[e].” Mayer Brown LLP v. IRS, 562 F.3d 1190,

1193 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E)). It is enough if

disclosure “could increase the risks that a law will be violated or that past violators will escape

legal consequences.” Id. (emphasis omitted). When it comes to national-security risks like the

FBI asserts here, see Napier Decl., ¶¶ 10–11, courts defer to the executive branch’s assessment

of potential harm. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Stud., 331 F.3d at 927.

Courts consistently find a risk of circumvention when information would reveal an

agency’s resource allocation or focus. That includes records showing “how often the [FBI] uses

8 [a particular] technique,” which signals “how much effort [criminals] should put into avoiding

it.” Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. FBI, 548 F. Supp. 3d 185, 200 (D.D.C. 2021),

partially reconsidered on other grounds, 754 F. Supp. 3d 56 (D.D.C. 2024); see also Kendrick v.

FBI, 2022 WL 4534627, at *9 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2022) (similar); Poitras v. Dep’t of Homeland

Sec., 303 F. Supp. 3d 136, 159 (D.D.C. 2018) (similar); Shapiro v. Dep’t of Just., 2020 WL

3615511, at *36–37 (D.D.C. July 2, 2020) (similar). It also includes information on where a

law-enforcement agency uses a given technique relatively more and relatively less. Reps.

Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 548 F. Supp. 3d at 200 (“[W]rongdoers operating in a

region . . . with a high number of responsive records could infer that the Bureau is devoting

significant resources to catching them and thus attempt to evade detection by relocating their

operations, shifting to a different type of crime, or lying low temporarily.”); see also Broward

Bulldog, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 939 F.3d 1164, 1194 (11th Cir. 2019) (information fell

within exemption because it would tell suspects “where to avoid”).

The records here would do both. First, by revealing how much the FBI spent getting

information from Twitter, see Napier Decl. ¶ 10, they risk revealing “how often the [Bureau]

uses [this] technique.” Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 548 F. Supp. 3d at 200. Second,

wrongdoers could compare the FBI’s reimbursements to Twitter with its reimbursements to other

social-media companies, infer which platforms the FBI scours and which it ignores, and move

their activities to the Bureau’s blind spots. See Napier Decl., ¶ 9. True, Plaintiff seeks records

only about Twitter, not rival platforms. But when courts analyze such requests, they consider

what rule a case would establish, assess what it would let future plaintiffs get their hands on, and

judge the consequences of those disclosures in general. See Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in

Wash., 525 F. Supp. 3d at 191 (“[A]dopting an interpretation of FOIA that requires DHS to

9 disclose this information would imply that DHS will need to release every piece of similar data

requested under FOIA, making the Secret Service progressively more vulnerable to

circumvention.”); Shapiro, 2020 WL 3615511, at *38 (disclosing “individual budget line-items”

in one case would risk “reveal[ing FBI’s] entire budget” one request at a time). If a plaintiff

could access the FBI’s reimbursements to Twitter today, she could get its payments to WhatsApp

tomorrow and Discord the day after. She could thereby learn where the Bureau is looking and

where it is not.

Disclosure would create another risk, too. As Defendant explains, a foreign adversary

that conducted an operation over Twitter could check whether the Bureau’s reimbursements

surged right after. See Napier Decl., ¶ 11. The answer would hint at whether the FBI had

detected the operation, which in turn would reveal the Bureau’s capabilities or weaknesses. Id.

Plaintiff responds with two arguments, neither of which moves the needle. First, it

maintains that the records are so old that they cannot help would-be criminals evade FBI

surveillance today. See Pl. MSJ at 11–14. To the extent that historical data offers a clue to the

Bureau’s current priorities and capabilities, however, releasing it creates a risk of circumvention.

Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 548 F. Supp. 3d at 201 (using this reasoning to protect

data that was up to eleven years old). For instance, if the FBI failed to detect a foreign-influence

operation in 2017, that is valuable information for a foreign adversary planning a similar

operation today. Plaintiff offers nothing to rebut these worries. Plus, the party who knows best

whether the FBI’s priorities and capabilities in the recent past resemble their equivalents today is

Defendant. Its declarations assert that disclosure would create a risk of circumvention, and “in

the FOIA context, [courts] have consistently deferred to executive affidavits predicting harm to

10 the national security, and have found it unwise to undertake searching judicial review.” Ctr. for

Nat’l Sec. Stud., 331 F.3d at 927.

Second, Plaintiff points out that Twitter releases semi-annual reports on how many legal-

process requests it received and how many it complied with. See Pl. MSJ at 14–16; id., Exhs. 3–

4 (example reports). Quarterly information, however, supplies more detail than a semi-annual

equivalent. What is more, those reports list total requests, not ones from the FBI specifically.

More granular information on the FBI’s inquiries would therefore add new detail. While that

tidbit might seem unimportant by itself, Exemption 7(E) guards against “separate disclosures of

otherwise innocuous information [that] could be assembled . . . to reveal how, when, and under

which circumstances certain techniques are employed by law enforcement and investigative

agencies.” Whittaker v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 2020 WL 6075681, at *5 (D.D.C. Oct. 15, 2020)

(cleaned up). “[T]he only way to prevent anyone from constructing the broader ‘mosaic’ is to

shield each individual piece from disclosure.” Id. The records therefore fall within Exemption

7(E).

B. Foreseeable Harm

Even when a record falls within a FOIA exemption, however, the agency may withhold it

only if “disclosure would harm an interest protected by [the] exemption.” 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(a)(8)(A)(i)(I). Defendant plausibly argues that it would because (as described above)

disclosing these records would arm criminals and foreign adversaries with knowledge that could

help them evade detection. See ECF No. 17 (Def. MSJ) at 7–8. Plaintiff does not contest

foreseeable harm, so it has conceded this point. Wilkins v. Jackson, 750 F. Supp. 2d 160, 162

(D.D.C. 2010).

11 C. Segregability

While the Court is satisfied that the relevant documents contain exempt information,

Defendant must still “take reasonable steps necessary to segregate and release nonexempt

information.” 5 USC § 552(a)(8)(A)(ii)(II). That includes information falling outside

Exemption 7(E), as well as information within the exemption whose release would not

foreseeably harm the interests that 7(E) protects. Rudometkin v. United States, 140 F.4th 480,

494–95 (D.C. Cir. 2025). Plaintiff does not contest segregability, but the Court must still

consider it sua sponte and make an express finding on the issue. Id. at 495; PHE, Inc. v. Dep’t of

Just., 983 F.2d 248, 252 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

That said, “[a]gencies are entitled to a presumption that they complied with the obligation

to disclose reasonably segregable material.” Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 494 F.3d 1106,

1117 (D.C. Cir. 2007). “To rebut this presumption, the requester must offer, at least, evidence

that would warrant a belief by a reasonable person that the agency” stumbled in such task.

Flyers Rts. Educ. Fund, Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 71 F.4th 1051, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 2023)

(cleaned up). Plaintiff, however, offers no evidence — indeed, it does not even argue — that

Defendant failed to release segregable material. The presumption therefore stands unrebutted.

Even without a presumption in its favor, Defendant offered two sworn declarations

detailing how it “carefully examined” all responsive documents for segregable material, released

with redactions anything that it could, and determined after this “extensive review” that no

further information could be disclosed. See Napier Decl., ¶ 13; Hammer Decl., ¶¶ 31–32.

“Those sworn statements sufficiently establish that ‘no portions of the withheld documents may

be segregated and released.’” Porup v. CIA, 997 F.3d 1224, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting

Juarez v. Dep’t of Just., 518 F.3d 54, 61 (D.C. Cir. 2008)) (holding same for similar statements).

12 The Court therefore finds that the redacted records do not contain reasonably segregable

information that Defendant could release.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons above, the Court will grant Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

and deny Plaintiff’s. A separate Order so stating will issue this day.

/s/ James E. Boasberg JAMES E. BOASBERG Chief Judge Date: February 4, 2026