Juarez v. Racine City Clerk Odd Number Doe

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedFebruary 27, 2024
Docket2:24-cv-00094
StatusUnknown

This text of Juarez v. Racine City Clerk Odd Number Doe (Juarez v. Racine City Clerk Odd Number Doe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Juarez v. Racine City Clerk Odd Number Doe, (E.D. Wis. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

DAVID C. JUAREZ,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 24-CV-94

RACINE CITY CLERK ODD NUMBER DOE, et al.

Defendants.

ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION

Currently pending before the court is David C. Juarez’s Request to Proceed in District Court without Prepaying the Filing Fee. Having reviewed Juarez’s request, the court concludes that he lacks the financial resources to prepay the fees and costs associated with this action. Therefore, Juarez’s Request to Proceed in District Court without Prepaying the Filing Fee will be granted. Because the court is granting the plaintiff’s Request to Proceed in District Court without Prepaying the Filing Fee, it must determine whether the complaint is legally sufficient to proceed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Congress sought to ensure that no citizen would be denied the opportunity to commence a civil action in any court of the United States solely due to poverty. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting Adkins v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 342 (1948)). However, Congress also recognized

that “a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” Id. (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To

balance these competing concerns, before the court can allow a plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis it must determine that the case neither (1) is frivolous or malicious, (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, nor (3) seeks monetary relief

against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Thus, although “a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)), a pro se complaint must meet

these minimal standards before the court shall grant a plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in

fact. Denton, 504 U.S. at 31; Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325. Although factual allegations must be weighed in favor of the plaintiff, that does not mean that the court is required to accept without question the truth of the plaintiff's allegations. Denton, 504 U.S. at 32. Thus, a

court may dismiss a claim as frivolous if it is “clearly baseless,” “fanciful,” “fantastic,” “delusional,” “irrational,” “wholly incredible,” or “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Id. at 32-33. A court may not dismiss a claim as frivolous simply because “the plaintiff’s allegations are unlikely.” Id.

A claim might not be frivolous or malicious but nonetheless fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and, therefore, be subject to dismissal. In determining whether a complaint is sufficient to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the

court applies the same well-established standards applicable to a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 611 (7th Cir. 2000), abrogated on other grounds by Savory v. Cannon, 947 F.3d 409 (7th Cir.

2020). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Although the allegations in a complaint need not be detailed, a complaint “demands

more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of

further factual enhancement.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted). The complaint must be sufficiently detailed “to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)) (quotation marks and ellipses omitted). If the complaint contains well-pleaded non-frivolous factual allegations, the court should assume the veracity of those allegations and “then determine whether they

plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will … be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”

Id. With the standards set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) in mind, the court turns to the allegations raised in the plaintiff’s complaint. Juarez filed a lawsuit in Racine

County Circuit Court in July 2020. In October 2020 the court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Juarez argues that the circuit court should have handled the case differently and he seeks $7.2 million as well as exemplary damages. Juarez’s complaint does not allege any plausible claim for relief. Judges are

absolutely immune from the sorts of allegations Juarez makes. See Richman v. Sheahan, 270 F.3d 430, 434 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225-29 (1988)). A federal district court has no ability to review or

upset judgments of state courts under the circumstances Juarez presents. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005); Frederiksen v. City of Lockport, 384 F.3d 437, 438 (7th Cir. 2004); cf. Johnson v. Orr, 551 F.3d 564, 568 (7th Cir. 2008). His allegations rest on legally incorrect premises; a Wisconsin circuit court has no

authority to sua sponte transfer a case to federal court. Finally, the court notes that Juarez’s complaint appears to be untimely. See Jay E. Hayden Found. v.

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Related

Adkins v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.
335 U.S. 331 (Supreme Court, 1948)
Conley v. Gibson
355 U.S. 41 (Supreme Court, 1957)
Estelle v. Gamble
429 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Forrester v. White
484 U.S. 219 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Mireles v. Waco
502 U.S. 9 (Supreme Court, 1991)
Denton v. Hernandez
504 U.S. 25 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.
544 U.S. 280 (Supreme Court, 2005)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Jay E. Hayden Foundation v. First Neighbor Bank, N.A.
610 F.3d 382 (Seventh Circuit, 2010)
Johnson v. Orr
551 F.3d 564 (Seventh Circuit, 2008)
Johnnie Savory v. William Cannon, Sr.
947 F.3d 409 (Seventh Circuit, 2020)

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Juarez v. Racine City Clerk Odd Number Doe, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/juarez-v-racine-city-clerk-odd-number-doe-wied-2024.