Juarez v. Morris

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedAugust 5, 2022
Docket2:21-cv-01090
StatusUnknown

This text of Juarez v. Morris (Juarez v. Morris) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Juarez v. Morris, (E.D. Wis. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

DAVID C. JUAREZ,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 21-CV-1090-JPS

SGT. MORRIS and MP LATISHA, ORDER Defendants.

Plaintiff David C. Juarez, formerly an inmate confined at Racine County Jail, filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the defendants violated his constitutional rights. ECF No. 1. On October 7, 2021, Plaintiff filed a motion for a protective order. ECF No. 7. On December 28, 2021, Plaintiff filed a notice of change of address-indicating he was no longer incarcerated-along with a motion for e-filing privileges. ECF Nos. 10, 12. On June 17, 2022, Plaintiff filed a motion requesting review of the case to be heard. ECF No. 13. On August 3, 2022, Plaintiff filed a motion for order to accept verified complaint and a notice of change of address. ECF No. 15. Plaintiff’s motion for a protective order requests that the Court remove him from Racine County Jail; the Court liberally construes the motion as request for preliminary injunctive relief. See ECF No. 7. Plaintiff’s most recent notice of change of address, ECF No. 15, indicates that Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated. As such, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion for a protective order as moot. See Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 716 (7th Cir. 2011) (concluding that prayer for injunctive relief was moot because plaintiff was transferred to a different facility and failed to allege “a realistic possibility that he will again be incarcerated in the same state facility and therefore be subject to the actions of which he complains”). The Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion for e-filing privileges, ECF No. 12, without prejudice. Plaintiff states that the reason he would like e- filing privileges is because his living conditions have been unstable. E-filing by individuals not in custody generally is limited to members of the bar. Non-incarcerated individuals must have a PACER account, a computer, a program to create PDF documents, and a scanner. There are also charges associated with using a PACER account. At this time, the Court declines to extend e-filing privileges to Plaintiff. If his living conditions stabilize, Plaintiff may renew his motion and should describe to the Court how he would be able to satisfy the e-filing requirements. The Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion requesting review of the case, ECF No. 13, as this Order addresses Plaintiff’s outstanding motions. The Court will, however, deny Plaintiff’s motion for order to accept verified complaint as it is not clear what relief Plaintiff seeks. Plaintiff’s motion attaches a lengthy complaint of over one-hundred pages filed in Racine County Circuit Court. He requests that the Court accept the verified complaint “under indigents proclaimed by Mr. Juarez and granted under Case No: 21cv1090, 21cv1091, 21cv1092, and 21cv1161.” ECF No. 15. To the extent that Plaintiff wishes to file an amended complaint in his cases, Plaintiff is instructed to refile his motion in accordance with the procedures outlined in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 and Local Civil Rule 15. The remainder of this Order resolves Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and screens his complaint. 1. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING THE FILING FEE The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) applies to this case because Plaintiff was a prisoner when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). The PLRA allows the Court to give a prisoner plaintiff the ability to proceed with his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee. Id. § 1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the prisoner must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). He must then pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id. On October 4, 2021, the Court waived payment of the initial partial filing fee. ECF No. 6. The Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee. ECF No. 3. He must pay the remainder of the filing fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this Order. 2. SCREENING THE COMPLAINT 2.1 Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA, the Court must screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint if the prisoner raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same standard that applies to dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). A complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). 2.2 Plaintiff’s Allegations Plaintiff names two defendants, Sgt. Morris and MP Latisha, in this action. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff names Sgt. Morris in relation to the conditions of his confinement and placement in a cell where a COVID-19 positive inmate had been located.

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Juarez v. Morris, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/juarez-v-morris-wied-2022.