Juarez-Morales v. Mukasey

Ninth Circuit

Juarez-Morales v. Mukasey

269 F. App'x 729

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedMarch 12, 2008

DocketNos. 06-74974, 07-70165

StatusPublished

This text of 269 F. App'x 729 (Juarez-Morales v. Mukasey) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Juarez-Morales v. Mukasey, 269 F. App'x 729 (9th Cir. 2008).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM

**

In these consolidated petitions for review, Sergio Juarez-Morales, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions pro se for review of two orders of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), one dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s removal order and the other denying his motion to reopen. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. See Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir.2006). We review de novo questions of law, id., and we review for abuse of discretion denial of a motion to reopen, Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir.2004). We deny the petitions for review.

Juarez-Morales’s contention that his conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes section 13-3415 is not a crime relating to a controlled substance under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)© is foreclosed by Luu-Le v. INS, 224 F.3d 911, 916 (9th Cir.2000). We reject Juarez-Morales’s request that we revisit Luu-Le. See Gee v. Southwest Airlines, 110 F.3d 1400, 1406 (9th Cir. 1997) (“In this circuit, a panel cannot overturn a decision of a previous panel except by en banc review, unless there has been an intervening statutory change or Supreme Court decision.”).

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Juarez-Morales’s motion to reopen because Juarez-Morales’s conviction was set aside pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes section 13-907(A), a state rehabilitative statute, and therefore, remained valid for immigration purposes. See Nath v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 1185, 1188-89 (9th Cir.2006) (a vacated conviction can serve as the basis of removal if the conviction was vacated for equitable, rehabilitation or immigration hardship reasons); see also Murillo-Espinoza v. INS, 261 F.3d 771, 774 (9th Cir.2001).

PETITIONS FOR REVIEW DENIED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM

**

In these consolidated petitions for review, Sergio Juarez-Morales, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions pro se for review of two orders of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), one dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s removal order and the other denying his motion to reopen. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. See Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir.2006). We review de novo questions of law, id., and we review for abuse of discretion denial of a motion to reopen, Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir.2004). We deny the petitions for review.

Juarez-Morales’s contention that his conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes section 13-3415 is not a crime relating to a controlled substance under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)© is foreclosed by Luu-Le v. INS, 224 F.3d 911, 916 (9th Cir.2000). We reject Juarez-Morales’s request that we revisit Luu-Le. See Gee v. Southwest Airlines, 110 F.3d 1400, 1406 (9th Cir. 1997) (“In this circuit, a panel cannot overturn a decision of a previous panel except by en banc review, unless there has been an intervening statutory change or Supreme Court decision.”).

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Juarez-Morales’s motion to reopen because Juarez-Morales’s conviction was set aside pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes section 13-907(A), a state rehabilitative statute, and therefore, remained valid for immigration purposes. See Nath v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 1185, 1188-89 (9th Cir.2006) (a vacated conviction can serve as the basis of removal if the conviction was vacated for equitable, rehabilitation or immigration hardship reasons); see also Murillo-Espinoza v. INS, 261 F.3d 771, 774 (9th Cir.2001).

PETITIONS FOR REVIEW DENIED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

Shirley Gee Ryan Jeffrey Gee Sean Paul Fong, a Minor by and Through His Guardian Ad Litem Shirley Gee Patricia Seto Samantha Seto Corey Seto v. Southwest Airlines, Southwest Airlines Company, Herbert H. Gadbury v. Delta Airlines, Inc., Foreign Corporation Doing Business in Oregon, Jan Rowley v. American Airlines, Inc., Donna Costa v. American Airlines, Inc. Roe Corporation, Inclusive

110 F.3d 1400 (Ninth Circuit, 1997)

Minh Duc Luu-Le v. Immigration and Naturalization Service

224 F.3d 911 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)

Juan Manuel Murillo-Espinoza v. Immigration and Naturalization Service John Ashcroft, Attorney General

261 F.3d 771 (Ninth Circuit, 2001)

Jose Roberto Fernandez-Ruiz v. Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General

468 F.3d 1159 (Ninth Circuit, 2006)

Nath v. Gonzales

467 F.3d 1185 (Ninth Circuit, 2006)