Juarez-Aroche v. Blanche

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 21, 2026
• Docket: 23-151
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 21 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DALILA JUAREZ-AROCHE; D. A. S.-J., No. 23-151 Agency Nos. Petitioners, A208-445-111 A208-445-110 v.

TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney MEMORANDUM* General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted April 16, 2026** San Francisco, California

Before: RAWLINSON, R. NELSON, and BADE, Circuit Judges.

Dalila Juarez-Aroche and her minor son, natives and citizens of Guatemala,

petition for review of a final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)

affirming an immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of asylum and withholding of

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). removal.1 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

Where, as here, the BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision pursuant to

Matter of Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872, 874 (B.I.A. 1994), “we review the IJ’s

order as if it were the BIA’s.” Chuen Piu Kwong v. Holder, 671 F.3d 872, 876

(9th Cir. 2011). We review the agency’s “legal conclusions de novo and its factual

findings for substantial evidence.” Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051,

1059 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (citations omitted); see also Urias-Orellana v.

Bondi, 146 S. Ct. 845, 848 (2026) (“[T]he agency’s conclusion that a given set of

undisputed facts does not constitute persecution” is reviewed for substantial

evidence.). Under the substantial evidence standard, we will reverse the agency

“only on a finding that the evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion, but

compels it.” Diaz-Torres v. Barr, 963 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting

Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1137 (9th Cir. 2016)).

1. The IJ did not legally err in relying on Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d

1049 (9th Cir. 2009), to conclude that Juarez-Aroche did not establish past

persecution. Under Wakkary, harm to a petitioner’s family and friends bears on

past persecution only when it is “part of ‘a pattern of persecution closely tied to’”

the petitioner. 558 F.3d at 1060 (quoting Arriaga-Barrientos v. INS, 937 F.2d 411,

1 Juarez-Aroche’s minor son, who is not a U.S.-citizen, is listed as a derivative beneficiary of her application for asylum. He did not file a separate application for withholding of removal.

2 23-151 414 (9th Cir. 1991)). The IJ properly applied this standard in concluding that the

harm and threats to Juarez-Aroche’s family were not “part of a ‘pattern of

persecution closely tied’” to her to establish past persecution.

2. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that

Juarez-Aroche did not establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future

persecution to support her applications for asylum and withholding of removal.

Although her family has suffered sporadic instances of violence in Guatemala,

Juarez-Aroche was never directly harmed or threatened. Cf. Hussain v. Rosen, 985

F.3d 634, 646 (9th Cir. 2021). The IJ reasonably concluded that the attacks against

her family were not part of a pattern of persecution closely tied to Juarez-Aroche

considering she was not named or threatened by anyone opposing ANACAMPRO

during these attacks. Wakkary, 558 F.3d at 1060; Arriaga-Barrientos, 937 F.2d at

414.

Further, after her husband’s murder, Juarez-Aroche continued to live safely

in Guatemala until she left for the United States. And her relatives, many of whom

are former members or still active in ANACAMPRO, have mostly lived in

Guatemala without incident. Her continued safety and that of her family

significantly undercuts the likelihood that she will face persecution if removed to

Guatemala. Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1066 (9th Cir. 2021); Castillo v.

INS, 951 F.2d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir. 1991).

3 23-151 3. The agency’s denial of asylum and withholding of removal was also

proper because substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that

Juarez-Aroche could reasonably relocate within Guatemala. Kaiser v. Ashcroft,

390 F.3d 653, 659 (9th Cir. 2004); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16(b)(2), 1208.13(b)(2)(ii).

After her husband was murdered by unknown individuals, Juarez-Aroche lived in

Guatemala City for a year, Quetzaltenango for a year and a half, and Malacatán for

about seven months. During that time, she was not harmed and did not receive any

direct threats. The country conditions reports, which do not address violence

against ANACAMPRO members do not compel the conclusion that her relocation

would be unsafe or unreasonable.

PETITION DENIED.2

2 The motion for a stay of removal, Dkt. 18, is denied as moot.

4 23-151