Juan Villa Gonzalez v. the State of Texas

Opinion

Court of Appeals

Tenth Appellate District of Texas

10-25-00070-CR

Juan Villa Gonzalez,

Appellant

v.

The State of Texas,

Appellee

On appeal from the

13th District Court of Navarro County, Texas Judge James E. Lagomarsino, presiding Trial Court Cause No. D42515-CR

JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the opinion of the Court.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury convicted Juan Villa Gonzalez of the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child under 14 years of age. The trial court sentenced Gonzalez to 88 years in prison. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. BACKGROUND H.P., a child, made a general outcry to her mother, E.M., of sexual abuse by Gonzalez. Prior to this outcry, E.M. discovered that H.P. was looking at pornography on a cell phone. Because Gonzalez does not question the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, we will not further discuss the facts of the underlying case. DISCOVERY In his first issue, Gonzalez complains that the trial court erred in denying Gonzalez’s motion for mistrial because the State violated the Michael Morton Act. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 39.14. Specifically, Gonzalez complains that the State failed to provide him with the contact information of a therapist who spoke to H.P. at E.M.’s request when, approximately nine months before H.P.’s outcry of continuous sexual assault by Gonzalez, E.M. caught H.P. watching pornography on a cell phone. 1 Gonzalez contends the evidence was material under Watkins and article 39.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and should have been provided to him. See id.; Watkins v. State, 619 S.W.3d 265 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). At the least, Gonzalez contends, the State should have let him know that it was not going to provide that information pursuant to article 39.14(c) (“The state shall inform the defendant that a portion of the document, item, or information has been withheld or redacted.”). See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 39.14(c). A year prior to trial, the

1 It is unclear on whose phone the pornography was contained. In the bill of review, it appears that E.M. says H.P. was watching it on her brother’s phone. In her trial testimony, testimony that the trial court did not consider when ruling on the motion for mistrial, E.M. said the porn was on H.P.’s phone.

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State provided a copy to Gonzalez of the officer’s body cam in which E.M. informed the officer of the therapist and the circumstances surrounding why one was called. 2 But neither assertion on appeal was the complaint made by Gonzalez in his motion for mistrial or during the hearing on the motion for mistrial. In his motion for mistrial, Gonzalez alleged:

1. During the investigation, Sergeant Sergio Palacios of the Corsicana Police Department was informed of at least two therapy sessions that apparently occurred months prior to the arrest of the Defendant and during the time of the alleged abuse. This apparent therapy was provided by a therapist to the alleged victim, “H.M., [sic]” in this case. These sessions apparently lasted “many hours”.

[sic]. The evidence indicates that H.M. [sic] received therapy for sexually related issues. According to the statements made by the mother of the alleged victim to Sergeant Sergio Palacios, the therapist's screening and sessions apparently yielded no signs of sexual abuse to H.M. [sic].

2. This information was reported to the Corsicana Police on September 14, 2024, by the mother of the alleged victim; however, it was not included in Sergeant Sergio Palacios' initial police report. This information, if accurate, would be considered exculpatory evidence.

Gonzalez then advises the court in his motion that the “Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Section 39.14; State v. Watkins; and State v. Heath provide that this information should have been investigated and disclosed by the State” and requests “that this information be investigated and disclosed to the Defense.”

2 The conversation between E.M. and the officer was in Spanish. Gonzalez waited until the weekend before trial to have it translated.

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Logically, because there is no other information specified in the motion, the information contained in item 1 of the motion must be the information requested to be investigated and disclosed. Contact information was not part of that “information” to be investigated and disclosed.

At the hearing on his motion for mistrial, Gonzalez essentially argued that the State should have found the therapist, interviewed her, investigated whether H.P. said anything exculpatory about the offense against Gonzalez, and reported it all back to Gonzalez. 3 Because the State did not, Gonzalez argued a mistrial should be granted. Again, Gonzalez did not argue that the State should have provided him with the therapist’s contact information.

Thus, Gonzalez's argument on appeal does not comport with the argument made at trial and is not preserved for review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Lovill v. State, 319 S.W.3d 687, 691-92 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) ("A complaint will not be preserved if the legal basis of the complaint raised on appeal varies from the complaint made at trial."); Ibarra v. State, 11 S.W.3d 189, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) ("Because his trial objection does not comport with the issue raised on appeal, he has preserved nothing for review.").

3 This was the argument understood by the State before the trial court as well. See R.R. 3 at pg. 23. (“We dragged this into an absurd position where the State is now obligated to go hunt down anyone and everyone that the child may have spoken to. He knows that she's spoken to this person, at her home, on a couple occasions. And he knows all of those things, [sic] because the State turned that over. It is not mine to, then, hunt down this person and determine whether or not their conversations with the child were, one, admissible; two, exculpatory or anything of the sort.”).

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Gonzalez’s first issue is overruled.

JUROR WITHHOLDING MATERIAL INFORMATION Next, Gonzalez contends the trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial after a juror (“juror Johnson”) disclosed that she knew the victim in this case. Specifically, he complains that juror Johnson withheld material evidence because she failed to inform anyone during voir dire about her teacher—student relationship with H.P. We disagree with Gonzalez’s complaint.

Law A trial judge's denial of a motion for mistrial is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, and his ruling must be upheld if it was within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253, 292 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Under this standard, we do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court; rather, we decide whether the trial court's decision was arbitrary or unreasonable. Becerra v. State, 685 S.W.3d 120, 127 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024).

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to a trial before an impartial jury. Franklin v. State, 138 S.W.3d 351, 354 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (Franklin IV); U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Part of that right includes adequate voir dire to identify unqualified jurors. Id. “When a juror withholds material information

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during voir dire that the defense, using due diligence, could not uncover, the parties are denied the opportunity to exercise their challenges, which hinders their selection of an impartial jury.” State v. Gutierrez, 541 S.W.3d 91, 99-100 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).

A defendant must show both that the juror withheld material information during voir dire and that the information was withheld despite due diligence exercised by the defendant. Franklin IV, 138 S.W.3d at 355-56. When deciding whether the withheld information is material, a juror's good faith is largely irrelevant. Gutierrez, 541 S.W.3d at 100; Franklin v. State, 12 S.W.3d 473, 478 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (Franklin II). Yet, mere familiarity with a witness is not necessarily material information. Franklin II, 12 S.W.3d at 478. A potential juror's acquaintance with a witness is material only if the nature of the relationship reveals a potential for bias or prejudice on the part of the juror. See id.; Decker v. State, 717 S.W.2d 903, 907 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Diligence, however, requires that counsel ask questions calculated to bring out information that might indicate a juror's inability to be impartial and truthful. Armstrong v. State, 897 S.W.2d 361, 363-64 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). Unless defense counsel asks such questions, material information that a juror fails to disclose is not really “withheld.” Id. at 364.

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Application Juror Johnson told the trial court that she did not know during voir dire that the victim in the case was actually H.P., because the first name given to the panel was wrong. She did not discover that she knew H.P. until she checked her grading report for school during a break after the SANE nurse’s testimony. An exhibit which contained H.P.’s correct name and H.P.’s mother’s name had just been introduced through the SANE nurse. Juror Johnson then saw that the names in the exhibit matched her grading report. Although the names of the potential witnesses for the case were listed on a screen during Gonzalez’s voir dire, H.P.’s first name was misspelled. Even when Gonzalez asked if anyone knew H.P., he did not use initials to identify her, and he pronounced her first name incorrectly. Consequently, because Gonzalez did not ensure that H.P.’s name was spelled correctly or pronounced correctly, he failed to exercise diligence in bringing information to light that might show juror Johnson’s potential bias.

Further, questioning of the entire panel regarding the objectivity of the panel members occurred only in general terms. Although one panel member stated during voir dire that she was concerned about being objective if the victim was a student of hers, Gonzalez did not conduct any follow-up questions with the panel regarding whether anyone else was a teacher and if those panel members, if any, would have the same concern, even though juror Johnson indicated on her questionnaire that she was a teacher. Gonzalez simply continued with his previous general question, “could you be objective?” When he reached juror Johnson, he did not repeat the question, asking only, “Ms. other Johnson?” 4 Thus, in light of this record, Gonzalez also failed to exercise diligence in asking questions calculated to bring out information that might indicate juror Johnson’s potential inability to be impartial and truthful. 5 Accordingly, because Gonzalez failed to exercise diligence in revealing any potential material information of bias regarding juror Johnson, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Gonzalez’s motion for mistrial.

Gonzalez’s second issue is overruled.

CONCLUSION Having overruled each of Gonzalez’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

LEE HARRIS

Justice

4 The last name of the panel member seated before her was also Johnson.

5 We need not discuss Gonzalez’s assertion about whether the trial court’s decision, influenced by an objection by the State, to deny Gonzalez’s request to question juror Johnson further because that decision is only considered in a harm analysis. See Franklin v. State, 138 S.W.3d 351, 353 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (Franklin IV).

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OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: August 27, 2026 Before Chief Justice Johnson, Justice Smith, and Justice Harris Affirmed Do Not Publish CRPM