Juan Torres-Santoyo v. Merrick Garland
This text of Juan Torres-Santoyo v. Merrick Garland (Juan Torres-Santoyo v. Merrick Garland) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 19 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JUAN CARLOS TORRES-SANTOYO, No. 19-71795
Petitioner, Agency No. A087-531-169
v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted October 12, 2021**
Before: TALLMAN, RAWLINSON, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.
Juan Carlos Torres-Santoyo, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his motion to
reopen and terminate, or alternatively, to reopen and remand, his removal
proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). discretion the denial of a motion to reopen, Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983,
986 (9th Cir. 2010), and the denial of a motion to terminate, Dominguez v. Barr,
975 F.3d 725, 734 (9th Cir. 2020). We deny the petition for review.
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Torres-Santoyo’s motion to
reopen and terminate as untimely and number-barred, where it was filed more than
three years after the order of removal became final and was beyond the numerical
limitations, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and
where Torres-Santoyo has not established that any statutory or regulatory
exception applies, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3).
The BIA also did not abuse its discretion in denying Torres-Santoyo’s
motion to reopen and terminate as untimely where Torres-Santoyo failed to
demonstrate that he met the requirements for equitable tolling based on intervening
case law in Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018). See Lona v. Barr, 958
F.3d 1225, 1230-31 (9th Cir. 2020) (discussing the circumstances in which a
movant may be entitled to equitable tolling); see also Aguilar Fermin v. Barr, 958
F.3d 887, 895 (9th Cir. 2020) (“the lack of time, date, and place in the NTA sent to
[petitioner] did not deprive the immigration court of jurisdiction over her case”).
Torres-Santoyo does not raise, and therefore waives, any challenge to the
BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen and remand to consider additional evidence
of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. See Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder, 706
2 19-71795 F.3d 1072, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2013) (issues not specifically raised and argued in an
opening brief are waived).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
3 19-71795
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