Juan Rodriguez Rodriguez v. Pamela Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: August 19, 2025
• Docket: 18-73240
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 19 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JUAN RODRIGUEZ RODRIGUEZ, No. 18-73240 Agency No. Petitioner, A209-823-530 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted August 15, 2025** Pasadena, California

Before: NGUYEN, FORREST, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges. Concurrence by Judge VANDYKE. Petitioner Juan Rodriguez Rodriguez petitions for review of the Board of

Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) dismissal of his appeal from the Immigration Judge’s

(IJ) denial of withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against

Torture (CAT). We deny the petition.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Where, as here, the BIA provides its own reasoning, we review the BIA’s

decision, except to the extent it expressly adopts the IJ’s decision. Diaz-Reynoso v.

Barr, 968 F.3d 1070, 1075–76 (9th Cir. 2020). We review the BIA’s factual findings

for substantial evidence and its legal conclusions de novo. Plancarte Sauceda v.

Garland, 23 F.4th 824, 831 (9th Cir. 2022) (as amended). Ordinarily, the BIA’s

decision on a due-process challenge is a legal issue that we review de novo. See

Olea-Serefina v. Garland, 34 F.4th 856, 866 (9th Cir. 2022). Under the substantial-

evidence standard, we reverse a factual finding only if “any reasonable adjudicator

would be compelled to conclude to the contrary based on the evidence in the record.”

Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Adverse Credibility. Petitioner argues that the IJ violated his due-process right

to a full and fair hearing when the IJ failed to state that he found Petitioner not

credible during the IJ’s initial announcement of his decision at the end of the hearing.

However, like the BIA, we assume that Petitioner was credible. We therefore do not

address Petitioner’s due-process claim because, given this assumption, no prejudice

could result from the IJ’s failure to state its adverse-credibility finding during the

initial announcement of decision. See Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir.

2000). We also do not address Petitioner’s challenge to the IJ’s adverse-credibility

finding because it was not a basis for the BIA’s decision. See Garcia v. Wilkinson,

2 988 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2021). (“In reviewing the BIA’s decisions, we

consider only the grounds relied upon by that agency.”).

Withholding of Removal. Petitioner argues that the BIA erred by concluding

that his proposed family-based social group was not the basis for the threats that he

received. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion. The record

demonstrates that the threats were based on an interpersonal dispute between

Petitioner and his stepdaughter’s husband related to the husband’s domestic

violence, not their family status. See Pagayon v. Holder, 675 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th

Cir. 2011) (explaining that a personal dispute, standing alone, does not establish the

basis for a withholding-of-removal claim).

CAT Relief. Petitioner also argues that the BIA erred by determining that his

experience with gang violence in 1998 and 1999 did not constitute past torture in

Guatemala. Petitioner does not provide any support for his conclusory argument, and

in any event, the assaults he suffered at the hands of gang members neither rise to

the level of torture required for a CAT finding nor establish a past or future

likelihood of government acquiescence to torture. See Hernandez v. Garland, 52

F.4th 757, 769 (9th Cir. 2022).

Finally, Petitioner argues that the BIA erred by failing to consider his

contradictory evidence showing a likelihood of torture. While Petitioner’s country-

conditions reports demonstrate the presence of significant human-rights concerns in

3 Guatemala, they do not compel the conclusion that Petitioner would be tortured if

removed. See, e.g., Almaghzar v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 915, 923 (9th Cir. 2006) (as

amended). In fact, the report on which the agency relied shows that the Guatemalan

government prohibits torture and that the police, while often ineffective and

underfunded, are involved in anti-gang operations. Accordingly, substantial

evidence supports the BIA’s determination that the Guatemalan government would

not acquiesce to any alleged gang torture that Petitioner fears.

PETITION DENIED.

4 Juan Rodriguez Rodriguez v. Pamela Bondi, No. 18-73240 FILED VANDYKE, Circuit Judge, concurring in the result: AUG 19 2025 I concur in the result. MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS