NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0232-17T2
JUAN PAGAN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
FELIPE'S PLACE, INC., d/b/a CRYSTALLINE LIQUORS,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
CRISTOBAL ACOSTA and KARINA ACOSTA,
Defendants. _____________________________
Submitted December 12, 2018 – Decided October 18, 2019
Before Judges Nugent and Mawla.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Passaic County, Docket No. L-0682-15.
Paul E. Fernandez, attorney for appellant. Bedi Rindosh, attorneys for respondent (Jason Alexander Rindosh, on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
NUGENT, J.A.D.
Plaintiff Juan Pagan, fell in a Paterson bar and liquor store owned by
defendant Felipe's Place, Inc. d/b/a Crystalline Liquors (Crystalline), and
severely fractured his right leg. During the trial of Pagan's personal injury action
against Crystalline, the parties presented conflicting evidence about what Pagan
was doing in the bar, whether he was sober when he entered, where in the bar
he fell, what caused him to fall, and whether he sustained permanent injuries.
The jury determined Crystalline's negligence was the sole cause of Pagan's
accident and awarded him $175,000 in compensatory damages.
Crystalline appeals. First, it challenges the trial court's interlocutory order
assessing defendants' and their attorney's fees after they successfully moved to
vacate a default judgment. Next, Crystalline argues the trial court wrongly
denied both the "motion for a directed verdict" it made during the trial and the
"motion for ruling of a mistrial, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the
alternative remittitur" it made after the trial. Last, Crystalline argues the trial
was unfair due to the cumulative effect of many errors, including the trial court
taking judicial notice that Pagan had sustained a permanent injury.
A-0232-17T2 2 Because Pagan's evidence and the legitimate inferences a juror could
deduce from it would sustain a verdict if accepted as true, we conclude the trial
court did not err by denying Crystalline's motion for a directed verdict. Our
review of the record discloses no basis for concluding the trial court abused its
discretion by denying Crystalline's post-verdict motions. Nor do we find the
trial court abused its discretion in making the rulings Crystalline includes in its
"cumulative error" argument. On the other hand, we cannot glean from the
appellate record the court's reason for assessing fees—in connection with
defendants' motion to vacate the default—against defense counsel, particularly
after Pagan's attorney agreed not to enforce the award against defense counsel.
We thus affirm the judgment but vacate the part of the pretrial order that awarded
fees against defense counsel.
I.
A.
Pagan commenced this case by filing a complaint in February 2015.
Defaults were entered against defendants Crystalline and Karina Acosta
(Acosta) in July and September 2015, respectively. No default was entered
against defendant Cristobal Acosta, who was never served with process, as he
apparently passed away before the complaint was filed. The trial court entered
A-0232-17T2 3 default judgment against Crystalline and Acosta in January 2016 and scheduled
a proof hearing for May 2016. In April, Crystalline and Acosta successfully
moved to vacate the default judgment over Pagan's opposition.
The order vacating the default judgment was filed on June 10, 2016. Five
days later, Pagan's attorney filed a motion for an order awarding attorney's fees
and costs pursuant to Rule 4:50-1. He argued in a memorandum that fees and
costs should be awarded as "an equitable remedy to ameliorate prejudice
suffered by a plaintiff in obtaining the default and defending the motion to set
aside." The attorney filed a certification attesting to the work he performed in
drafting the motion to enter default judgment, preparing for the proof hearing,
appearing for the proof hearing, and argument on the defense motion to vacate
the default judgment. His itemized billing totaled $2037.50. The motion
included a proof of service on defense counsel.
The trial court granted the motion and awarded attorney's fees and costs
against Crystalline, Acosta, and their attorney in the amount of $2000. The
order includes no notation of the motion being opposed or unopposed and no
explanation of the equitable basis for assessing the fees against Acosta and
defense counsel.
A-0232-17T2 4 Defendants moved for reconsideration and challenged the basis for the fee
award. Defense counsel certified he never received the motion for fees and
costs. He also pointed out that fees had been assessed against him personally,
and he had conferred with Pagan's counsel, who had agreed not to p roceed
against him. The court denied the motion for reconsideration and noted on the
order that the original motion included notice to defense counsel. The court also
noted the motion for reconsideration failed to show the original decision was
based on palpably incorrect reasoning or that the court failed to consider relevant
evidence.
The case proceeded to trial. The court denied Crystalline's motion for an
involuntary dismissal at the close of Pagan's proofs but dismissed the claims
against the Acosta defendants, Crystalline's principals, as Pagan had presented
no evidence to support a claim against them. The jury returned a verdict for
Pagan, and the court entered judgment on the verdict. Crystalline filed a motion
for a ruling of a mistrial, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or alternatively
for remittitur. The trial court denied the motion. This appeal followed.
B.
The parties presented the following evidence at trial. Crystalline's bar has
two rooms and a bathroom. Entering from the street, one walks into the first
A-0232-17T2 5 room, which includes the liquor store, a cashier, and a bar. Continuing toward
the rear of the store, there is a step down to the billiards room, where there is
another bar. One must walk through the billiards room to get to the bathroom.
Pagan was thirty-four years old on the day he fell. He had been going to
Crystalline's bar since he turned twenty-one. On the day he fell, he went to
Crystalline's bar in the afternoon, though he did not recall the exact time. He
sat at the bar in the liquor store area, drank Coors Light, and talked with a few
friends, though he did not know their names. There were more than ten people
in the bar. Pagan did not know the names of the two bartenders, one whom he
described as a "blond heavyset lady," the other whom he described as a "dark
skinned man." A bartender he knew as "Mr. Grullon" was not present.
According to Pagan, it was sunny when the day started but it began to
snow. He explained to the jury, "it was snowing that day and you know over
ten people in the bar, . . . it's going to get - - the floor is going to get soaked at
some point. . . . I let the . . . [male] bartender know that the floor was slippery."
After drinking two beers Pagan left the bar, walked through the billiards
room, and used the bathroom. On the way back to the bar, either in the area
around the step or on the step, he slipped and fell. Asked how he fell, exactly,
A-0232-17T2 6 he said he did not remember. Asked what caused him to fall, he replied, " [t]he
wetness on the floor." He later made clear that he slipped on the step.
Pagan testified the bar had no signs that day warning of the wet floor, nor
had it ever had such signs during the twenty-one years he had been going there.
He also testified the lighting in the billiards room is "pretty weak, it's not enough
lighting in there."
After falling, Pagan attempted to stand up but his leg gave out and he fell
back down. Three men picked him up and carried him to the front bar and
someone called an ambulance. While waiting for the ambulance, he was in such
"horrible" pain that he drank approximately one-half pint of E & J eighty proof
brandy. His foot was "off of [his] leg to the . . . right side." He described his
foot as "jiggling on [his] leg."
Pagan's mother and stepfather arrived at the bar and spoke with him before
the ambulance came and transported him to the hospital. Without objection,
Pagan described his injuries, "a tibial fracture and a split leg bone." He also
described his treatment in the hospital. He explained that he had surgery to
repair his leg and has "a [seven] inch titanium rod and two screws . . . holding
[his] leg together."
A-0232-17T2 7 Pagan remained in the hospital for approximately a week and upon his
discharge—on crutches—"was basically in bed for seven months." He
underwent physical therapy three times a month for approximately three months.
During the year following his discharge from the hospital, he could not walk,
felt helpless, and could not do much of anything, including playing with or
taking out his son. Pagan described the situation as "sad, . . . very sad." He now
walks with a slight limp and has a scar on his right leg from the surgery. He
showed the jury the scar and demonstrated his limp.
A woman who recalled arriving at the bar at approximately 7:00 or 8:00
p.m. said she was playing pool in the billiards room when she saw Pagan fall.
She knew him as "Tone." She said he "was walking up the stairs like saying hi,
and I just seen him on the floor." According to her, he fell on his way to the
bathroom and injured his leg; "[t]he bone was just sticking out."
During cross-examination, defense counsel asked this witness, "Did you
have any trouble walking in and out of that area?" She replied, "I tripped over
that step a couple of times." Defense counsel persisted: "Anything on that step
that had caused you to trip before?" The witness replied, "Yes, the step." She
also said she did not recall seeing anything wet on the step when Pagan fell, nor
did he tell her he fell because the step was wet.
A-0232-17T2 8 Pagan's stepfather testified that after receiving a telephone call he and his
wife went to the bar where his stepson "was lying sprawled out on the floor with
one leg located underneath his body." According to the stepfather, a woman at
the bar called an ambulance and then "we tried to . . . pick him up, but we weren't
able to because he was in a lot of pain." He emphasized that he was lying on
the floor at the entrance door to the business. He corroborated that Pagan
remained on crutches for approximately one year following the accident.
As his final witness, Pagan called Crystalline's manager, Felix Grullon.
On the day Pagan fell, the manager swept and mopped the floor when he opened
the bar that morning. He neither swept nor mopped the floor again. He said,
however, if something falls, such as a beer or a glass with ice, it must be cleaned.
Because he was in his office when the accident happened, the manager did
not witness it. He had known Pagan for approximately ten years and claimed
Pagan would frequently make purchases from the liquor store but would not sit
and drink at the bar. On the day of his accident, Pagan came into the store but
did not drink. Acknowledging there were cameras at the bar when Pagan fell,
the manager said he did not think it was important to retain the video that would
document how the fall had occurred.
A-0232-17T2 9 The defense presented the testimony of two witnesses, the bar's owner,
Karina Acosta, and bartender Delores Grullon, the manager's sister. Acosta
testified she had owned the bar with her husband, who had passed away. When
he died, she moved to Florida. She was in the process of selling the bar to the
manager, who ran it. Before leaving for Florida, Acosta instructed him about
daily maintenance. "[T]hey would clean the floor in the morning and keep an
eye on whatever could be on the floor, and before they leave at night they have
to clean the floor." Acosta was not present when Pagan fell.
The bartender was at the front bar when Pagan fell. She testified he did
not drink at the bar that day. When he entered the bar, he was drunk, and he
needed to use the bathroom. After using it, he was leaving the bar when he fell
"right at the front door, at the front entrance." When Pagan fell, her brother was
in his office working and one other patron was in the bar. No one was in the
billiards room playing pool.
The bartender said she cleaned the bar as soon as she arrived that day and
the floor was dry. Routinely, she would sweep or mop the floor whenever it was
necessary during the day. "If a drop of water were to fall on the floor, if a beer
were to fall," the bartenders would clean it so that no patron would fall or slip
on the floor. When Pagan fell, she went to his aid. There was nothing on the
A-0232-17T2 10 floor that would have caused him to fall, nor did he complain about anything on
the floor that caused his fall. There was no precipitation on the floor, as it did
not start to snow until approximately five o'clock in the afternoon. The
bartender denied that anyone gave Pagan brandy after he fell. She
acknowledged there were video cameras in the bar on the day of the accident
but claimed they had been damaged.
In addition to the two witnesses, the defense introduced into evidence a
physical therapy note stating that Pagan admitted slipping and falling while
intoxicated.
C.
Although Pagan had asserted in his pleadings, maintained in his opening
statement, and presented through his trial proofs a single theory of liability—
the bar's floor was wet from patrons tracking in precipitation and the bar did
nothing to prevent patrons from slipping and falling—he added another during
his summation. Based on the eyewitness who claimed to have seen Pagan fall
on the interior step, Pagan's attorney repeatedly argued the step was in a
defective condition.
For example, the attorney told the jury: "We know from [the eyewitness]
that the stairs had actually almost caused her to fall on other occasions. Are
A-0232-17T2 11 these dangerous stairs? How come the defense act[s] as if they don't even exist?
Are they in the stairs? The danger exists." Later, counsel added: "So
considering that, is the stair itself, even if it's not wet, isn't it potentially a
dangerous condition?" He repeated his inquiry: "But the existence of that step
and that people have tripped over it, do we really believe that Mr. Pagan is [the]
first one that stumbled over that step?" Shortly before concluding, responding
to the assertion Pagan was intoxicated, his counsel said: "I don't think - - to say
that that caused the fall and this was the specific thing, where you have this
location described by an independent witness that this is what causes the fall
and she says, it's a dangerous condition indirectly or by inference."
Defense counsel did not object, but the court, following the closing
arguments and dismissal of the jury, admonished Pagan's attorney for injecting
a new theory of liability into the case. When the court noted it could grant a
mistrial, defense counsel initially protested. Defense counsel requested the
court give a curative instruction as the parties had invested time and effort trying
the case. When counsel commented that a mistrial could be revisited after the
verdict was rendered, the court disagreed. In response, defense counsel made
what the court characterized as "a lukewarm application" for a mistrial.
A-0232-17T2 12 The court drafted a curative instruction, which Crystalline agreed upon.
In its charge to the jury, the court began with the following instruction:
THE COURT: All right. Ladies and gentlemen, in summation reference was made to an alternative theory of liability, that is that the step in this bar was a dangerous condition in and of itself without regard to any wetness. There is no evidence – I'm gonna instruct you that there is no evidence in the record to support this particular theory. The theory of liability to be considered by you is whether there was a wet floor, which would include the step, which caused a slippery condition in the bar. That would be the hazardous and/or dangerous condition alleged. And you must restrict your deliberations to that particular theory, not to whether the step in and of itself, without regard to wetness, was a dangerous condition.
The jury returned a verdict for Pagan. This appeal followed.
II.
We first address the trial court's award of counsel fees to Pagan upon
vacating the default judgment. The imposition of terms upon vacating a default
judgment "pursuant to Rule 4:50-1 lies within the trial court's discretion and
'should be judged against the relative strength or weakness of the movant's
application' and sustained 'when reasonably proportionate to the prejudice
suffered by plaintiff.'" ATFH Real Prop., LLC v. Winberry Realty P'ship, 417
N.J. Super. 518, 528 (App. Div. 2010). When terms are imposed to ameliorate
A-0232-17T2 13 prejudice to plaintiff resulting from granting the relief, we review the imposition
of such sanctions for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 527-28.
Here, the costs incurred by Pagan were caused solely by defendants'
delays in answering the complaint and filing a consent order to vacate the
default. As a result of these delays, Pagan's attorney expended unnecessary time
and incurred unnecessary expense. Consequently, we find no abuse of discretion
on the part of the trial court in granting Pagan fees to ameliorate the wasted time
and expense occasioned by the delay.
Having said that, we note the record does not necessarily support the
imposition of sanctions against Acosta. After all, if the relief granted to Pagan
was indeed equitable in nature, it is difficult to discern how it was equitable for
Pagan to name Acosta as a defendant, apparently on the basis that she was a
shareholder in the corporation. This is particularly so in view of the record being
devoid of any basis to pierce the corporate veil. Yet, Acosta did not file a cross-
appeal from the order. Consequently, we need not resolve the issue.
We reach a different conclusion concerning the inclusion of sanctions
against defendants' attorney. The attorney who was sanctioned did not initially
represent either defendant. There is nothing in the record to suggest any basis,
equitable or otherwise, for sanctioning him. Moreover, there is nothing in the
A-0232-17T2 14 appellate record that suggests the trial court gave any reason for imposing
sanctions against the attorney. Accordingly, we vacate that part of the order
imposing sanctions that includes defendants' counsel.
III.
We next address the trial court's denial of the dismissal motions
defendants filed—at the close of Pagan's proofs at trial and again after the
verdict was rendered.
When Pagan rested, defendants moved for a "directed verdict." They did
not specify whether they were moving for an involuntary dismissal under Rule
4:37-2(b) or a motion for judgment at trial under Rule 4:40-1. Nevertheless, the
test is the same under both rules:
whether "the evidence, together with the legitimate inferences therefrom, could sustain a judgment in . . . favor" of the party opposing the motion, i.e., if, accepting as true all the evidence which supports the position of the party defending against the motion and according him the benefit of all inferences which can reasonably and legitimately be deduced therefrom, reasonable minds could differ, the motion must be denied.
[Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 5 (1969) (quoting Bozza v. Vornado, Inc., 42 N.J. 355 (1964)).]
A-0232-17T2 15 When considering such a motion, "[t]he trial court is not concerned with the
worth, nature or extent (beyond a scintilla) of the evidence, but only with its
existence, viewed most favorably to the party opposing the motion." Id. at 5-6.
The trial judge denied the motion based on Pagan's testimony that the floor
was wet, he told the bartender the floor was wet, Crystalline employees had
made no effort to mop up the water, and Pagan fell on a wet floor. Accepting
that evidence as true, and according to Pagan the benefit of all inferences which
could reasonably and legitimately be deduced from that evidence, the evidence
and legitimate inferences would sustain a jury verdict.
Crystalline argues that its attorney asked the trial court to take judicial
notice of a weather report. If the document accurately reported the weather in
the area of Crystalline's on the day of Pagan's fall, it would have raised
considerable doubt about his theory that as a result of snow falling, patrons
tracked precipitation into the bar. Pagan's argument fails, however, because the
trial court did not take judicial notice of the weather report and he did not
attempt to have the weather report admitted into evidence. Consequently, the
report was never presented to the jury, even though the trial court had
commented on it. We thus reject Crystalline's argument.
A-0232-17T2 16 Next, Crystalline argues the judge erred by denying the post-verdict
motion for a new trial it made under Rule 4:49-1(a). The rule requires a judge
to grant a new trial "if, having given due regard to the opportunity of the jury to
pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, it clearly and convincingly appears
that there was a miscarriage of justice under the law." R. 4:49-1(a). We review
a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial under the same
standard. Risko v. Thompson Muller Auto. Grp., Inc., 206 N.J. 506, 522 (2011).
Generally, trial courts exercise their discretion to grant a mistrial "with great
reluctance, and only in cases of clear injustice. . . . Neither trial nor appellate
courts may grant a new trial unless it clearly appears there was a miscarriage of
justice." Boryszewski v. Burke, 380 N.J. Super. 361, 391 (App. Div. 2005).
Crystalline sought the mistrial based on Pagan arguing in summation a
new theory of liability, namely, the step between the bar and billiards room was
in an inherently dangerous condition. The issue of whether to declare a mistrial
and grant a new trial presents a close call, particularly in view of so many
credibility issues and factual disputes. To be sure, there were many
inconsistencies in Pagan's proofs. On the other hand, there were inconsistencies
in Crystalline's explanation about why there was no video surveillance footage
A-0232-17T2 17 of Pagan's fall. In such a close case, the trial court's decision is due considerable
deference.
[I]n ruling on a motion for a new trial, the trial judge takes into account, not only tangible factors relative to the proofs as shown by the record, but also appropriate matters of credibility, generally peculiarly within the jury's domain, so-called "demeanor evidence", and the intangible "feel of the case" which [the judge] has gained by presiding over the trial.
[Dolson, 55 N.J. at 6.]
Here, considering the trial court's feel of the case, especially in the context
of considerable conflicting proofs and credibility issues, we cannot conclude the
court abused its discretion by deciding it did not clearly and convincingly appear
there was a miscarriage of justice of the law. Accordingly, we affirm the trial
court's denial of Crystalline's motion for a new trial.
IV.
We have considered Crystalline's remaining arguments and except for the
following brief comments found them to be without sufficient merit to warrant
further discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Crystalline argues that when instructing the jury on fair and reasonable
compensation for Pagan's injuries, the court should not have instructed the jury
on awarding compensation for permanent injuries. The trial was certainly
A-0232-17T2 18 unusual in that Pagan presented his proofs on damages through his own
testimony, with no testimony from any medical expert, and without introduci ng
into evidence any medical records.
Defendants did not object to the method by which Pagan sought to prove
his damages. Perhaps defendant had no bona fide dispute with Pagan's
testimony that he suffered a tibial fracture and underwent surgical repair of his
leg, which included a seven-inch titanium rod and two screws attached to repair
the fracture. Significantly, there was no testimony that the rod and screws would
ever be removed. Cf. Gilhooley v. Union, 164 N.J. 533, 542-43 (2000)
(explaining that "as is the case with dismemberment and disfigurement, when
pins, wires, mechanisms and devices are required to make the plaintiff normal,"
the plaintiff has suffered "permanent injury resulting in a permanent loss of
normal bodily function even if modern medicine can supply replacement parts
to mimic the natural function"). In addition, without objection, Pagan displayed
his surgical scar to the jury.
Crystalline did not object to the trial court's jury instructions. Now, on
appeal, he argues the trial court took judicial notice that Pagan had sustained a
permanent injury. The trial court did no such thing. More importantly,
Crystalline's argument—that there was no evidence of permanent injury—is
A-0232-17T2 19 based on medical articles it has submitted on the appellate record. The articles
address whether, in certain cases, hardware will be removed. Crystalline never
presented the articles to the trial court. Thus, its argument based on those
articles is unavailing.
Our consideration of Crystalline's arguments is based upon the record of
the pre-trial, trial, and post-trial proceedings. Based upon the record of these
proceedings, as well as the trial court's evaluation of the issues and arguments
presented to it, we cannot conclude that any single error, or the alleged errors
considered cumulatively, warrant a new trial.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
A-0232-17T2 20