Juan Miranda-Godinez v. Loretta E. Lynch

649 F. App'x 456

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 28, 2016
• Docket: 14-71485
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Petitioner Juan Jose Miranda-Godinez petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) determining that Miranda-Godinez’s conviction for arson under California Penal Code § 451(d) was an “aggravated felony” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F). Specifically, the BIA determined that Miranda-Godinez’s arson conviction constituted a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).

However, as the Attorney General concedes, our recent decision in Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir.2015), controls the outcome of this case. In Dima-ya, we adhered to the rationale articulated in Johnson v. United States, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 2558, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), where the Court held that the definition of a “violent felony” in the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act was unconstitutionally vague. We held that similar language in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), as incorporated into 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F)’s definition of a “crime of violence,” is also unconstitutionally vague. See Dimaya, 803 F.3d at 1111. We are bound by this precedent, which does not support the BIA’s determination.

The petition for review is GRANTED and we REMAND to the BIA for termination of removal proceedings.

** This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.