Juan Largo-Serrano v. Attorney General United States of America

Opinion

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT No. 25-2530

JUAN LEONARDO LARGO SERRANO; JESSICA VALERIA CONTRERAS CONTRERAS; A.L.C.; S.L.C., Petitioners

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, _____________________________ On Petition for Review from a Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals A220-502-225, A220-971-432, A220-971-433, A220-971-434 Immigration Judge: Pallavi S. Shirole

Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge; RESTREPO, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges Submitted Jun. 10, 2026; Decided Jun. 29, 2026 _____________________________

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION*

MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judge.

Juan Leonardo Largo Serrano, Jessica Valeria Contreras Contreras, and their two

children (“Petitioners”) seek review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (the “BIA”) de-

nial of their motion to reopen. 1 Petitioners argue the BIA erred in denying their motion

after finding that Petitioners’ changed-country-conditions evidence was immaterial or oth-

erwise insufficient. We disagree and will deny the petition.

Petitioners unlawfully entered the United States from Ecuador in 2021. They left

Ecuador after they learned that local gangs were extorting small business owners like them,

* This is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to 3d Cir. IOP 5.7, is not binding prec- edent. and after unknown men started visiting their store and making intimidating comments.

Concerned with eventual extortion and doubtful of the police’s ability to help, Petitioners

fled to the United States.

On arrival, Petitioners applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection

under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied Pe-

titioners’ applications. The BIA agreed and dismissed a later appeal.

More than a year later, Petitioners moved to reopen their removal proceedings,

claiming changed country conditions. Petitioners submitted evidence identifying Ecuador

as a dangerous place to live due to a high risk of gang violence. The BIA denied the motion,

holding that Petitioners’ newly submitted evidence was immaterial to their asylum and

withholding-of-removal applications and insufficient to save their CAT application. Peti-

tioners claim that the BIA abused its discretion in denying their motion. We disagree. 2

The BIA may grant a motion to reopen if the applicant’s motion introduces material

evidence of changed-country conditions that was not available during the previous removal

proceeding and was otherwise undiscoverable. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); Arckange

Saint Ford v. Att’y Gen., 51 F.4th 90, 97 (3d Cir. 2022). “The requirement to present ma-

terial evidence is a ‘heavy burden.’” Darby v. Att’y Gen., 1 F.4th 151, 160 (3d Cir. 2021)

(quoting Khan v. Att’y Gen., 691 F.3d 488, 496 (3d Cir. 2012)). To meet that burden, a

2 The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2, and we exercise jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review the BIA’s decision to deny a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Gen Lin v. Att’y Gen., 700 F.3d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 2012). We will disturb the BIA’s decision only if its decision is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.” Id. (quoting Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 2006)). 2 petitioner must offer evidence rebutting an IJ’s findings “that provided the basis for deny-

ing relief” in the first instance. Id. (citation modified). If an applicant presents material

evidence, the BIA then assesses the sufficiency of that evidence. Id. at 162. Changed-

country-conditions evidence is sufficient if it establishes prima facie eligibility for relief

under the appropriate standard. Id. at 161–62.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioners’ motion to reopen. For

asylum and withholding of removal, applicants must establish that they “suffered past per-

secution” or have “a well-founded fear of future persecution.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b). An

applicant’s well-founded fear of persecution must be “on account of race, religion, nation-

ality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(42)(A). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Petitioners’

newly submitted evidence was immaterial to whether Petitioners were at risk of future per-

secution. Petitioners’ evidence shows only general human-rights violations in Ecuador and

not a “nexus between the alleged protected grounds and the feared or past persecution.”

Hernandez Garmendia v. Att’y Gen., 28 F.4th 476, 483–84 (3d Cir. 2022). Even assuming

Ecuadorian shop owners enjoy protected status, Petitioners submitted no new evidence to

suggest that Ecuadorian shop owners are at an increased risk of persecution—which the IJ

previously held. Darby, 1 F.4th at 160 (holding that a petitioner must offer evidence re-

butting an IJ’s or the BIA’s findings “that provided the basis for denying relief” (citation

modified)).

For CAT relief, an applicant must provide “objective evidence showing a ‘reasona-

ble likelihood’ that [the applicant] can establish that he is more likely than not to be

3 tortured.’” Id. at 161 (quoting Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 175 (3d Cir. 2002)).

“Torture” is defined under the relevant regulations as acts done, consented to, or acquiesced

to by public officials acting in their official capacities in the country of removal. 8 C.F.R.

§ 208.18(a)(1). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Petitioners’ newly

submitted evidence was insufficient to establish that Ecuadorian government officials

would acquiesce to Petitioners’ torture at the hands of gangs. Petitioners’ failure to ask the

Ecuadorian police for help when they were still in Ecuador coupled with evidence that the

Ecuadorian government is prosecuting increasing gang violence renders the BIA’s decision

a sound exercise of discretion.

For these reasons, we will DENY the petition.