Juan L. Jenkins v. State of Florida

269 So. 3d 584
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedMarch 7, 2019
Docket18-1843
StatusPublished

This text of 269 So. 3d 584 (Juan L. Jenkins v. State of Florida) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Juan L. Jenkins v. State of Florida, 269 So. 3d 584 (Fla. Ct. App. 2019).

Opinion

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________

No. 1D18-1843 _____________________________

JUAN L. JENKINS,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee. _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County. Mark W. Moseley, Judge.

March 7, 2019

PER CURIAM.

In 2007, Juan Jenkins pleaded no contest to aggravated battery and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the court sentenced Jenkins to two concurrent probation terms. After Jenkins violated probation, the court sentenced him to two consecutive fifteen-year prison terms—a total of thirty years. This court affirmed that sentence without a written opinion. See Jenkins v. State, 995 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (table).

Jenkins then filed a rule 3.800(a) motion, contending his sentence was illegal. The trial court denied the motion, and Jenkins now appeals. Jenkins first argues that his thirty-year sentence violates his original plea agreement. But “when a defendant pleads guilty pursuant to a plea bargain and the court places him on probation, if he violates his probation the court can sentence him to a term in excess of the provisions of the original bargain.” State v. Segarra, 388 So. 2d 1017, 1018 (Fla. 1980). Jenkins also argues that because his probationary terms were concurrent, his sentences after he violated probation must likewise be concurrent. We reject this argument as well. “The fact that the original terms of probation were ordered to run concurrently does not mandate that the sentences imposed after violation of probation also run concurrently.” Troncoso v. State, 825 So. 2d 494, 497 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002); accord Ellis v. State, 406 So. 2d 76, 78 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). Finally, we reject Jenkins’s argument that his consecutive sentences violate double jeopardy. See § 921.16, Fla. Stat. (2005); State v. Cantrell, 417 So. 2d 260, 260 (Fla. 1982).

AFFIRMED.

LEWIS, WINSOR, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________

Juan L. Jenkins, pro se, Appellant.

Ashley B. Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

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Related

State v. Segarra
388 So. 2d 1017 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1980)
Jenkins v. State
995 So. 2d 957 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2008)
Troncoso v. State
825 So. 2d 494 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2002)
State v. Cantrell
417 So. 2d 260 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1982)
Ellis v. State
406 So. 2d 76 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1981)

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Bluebook (online)
269 So. 3d 584, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/juan-l-jenkins-v-state-of-florida-fladistctapp-2019.