JUAN HADDOCK VS. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS)
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Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1618-17T4
JUAN HADDOCK,
Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent. _____________________________
Submitted October 30, 2018 – Decided November 8, 2018
Before Judges Rothstadt and Natali.
On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Corrections.
Juan Haddock, appellant pro se.
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Melissa Dutton Schaffer, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Michael E. Vomacka, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM Juan Haddock, an inmate currently confined in Northern State Prison,
appeals from a September 27, 2017 final administrative decision by the
Department of Corrections (DOC) finding that he committed prohibited act
*.204, use of any prohibited substance such as drugs, intoxicants , or related
paraphernalia not prescribed for the inmate by the medical or dental staff,
contrary to N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a). Haddock was sanctioned to 365 days of
urine monitoring, 150 days of administrative segregation, 100 days loss of
commutation time, twenty days loss of recreation privileges, and loss of
contact visits. He was also referred to Alcoholics/Narcotics Anonymous. We
affirm.
Haddock was housed in a cell with another prisoner when a Correction
Major ordered a search of the cell and also directed Haddock and his cellmate
to provide a urine sample. Haddock's urine sample tested positive for opiates,
a banned substance.
As a result of the positive test result, Haddock was charged with the
*.204 violation. Haddock pled not guilty and requested substitute counsel.
The matter proceeded to a disciplinary hearing where Haddock challenged the
proofs establishing continuity of the urine evidence and further claimed he was
improperly ordered to submit to a urine sample without probable cause.
A-1618-17T4 2 The hearing officer considered evidence from Haddock and the
correctional facility. The evidence submitted by the parties included
Haddock's statement, a laboratory report confirming his positive urine test, and
documentation that a Correction Major ordered Haddock and his cellmate to
provide urine samples.
In addition, the hearing officer considered a continuity of evidence
(COE) form, which established that Haddock's urine was collected, labeled,
tested on-site, transferred and retested at the DOC laboratory. Further, the
form contained Haddock's and a corrections officer's signature confirming that
Haddock's urine sample was "[c]losed, sealed and labeled in [their] presence."
The hearing officer also considered written statements from two corrections
officers clarifying that they mistakenly signed the COE form in the wrong
section. Finally, the hearing officer noted that Haddock did not deny that the
sample was his or that he used drugs.
The hearing officer found Haddock guilty of the *.204 charge. After an
administrative appeal, the Assistant Superintendent upheld the charges and
sanctions.
On appeal, Haddock argues, as he did before the hearing officer, that
the "request for a urine specimen was not based on probable cause" and the
A-1618-17T4 3 DOC "violated the provisions relating to the collection and storage of urine
specimens." We are unpersuaded by these arguments and affirm because the
record contains substantial credible evidence that the corrections officers
ordered and secured Haddock's urine sample in accordance with the relevant
regulations.
We reverse an administrative agency decision "only if it is arbitrary,
capricious or unreasonable or it is not supported by substantial credible
evidence in the record as a whole." Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J.
571, 579-80 (1980) (citing Campbell v. Dep't of Civil Serv., 39 N.J. 556, 562
(1963)). Substantial evidence is evidence that "furnish[es] a reasonable basis
for the agency's action." McGowan v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 347 N.J. Super.
544, 562 (App. Div. 2002) (citing Zachariae v. N.J. Real Estate Comm'n, 53
N.J. Super. 60, 62 (App. Div. 1958)). Substantial evidence has also been
defined as evidence that "a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion." Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186,
192 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting In re Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 35 N.J. 358,
376 (1961)). The burden rests on the challenging party to show the
administrative agency decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
McGowan, 347 N.J. Super. at 563 (citing Barone v. Dep't of Human Servs.,
A-1618-17T4 4 Div. of Med. Asst., 210 N.J. Super. 276, 285 (App. Div. 1986)). We do not
perform a perfunctory review of the agency findings but engage in a careful
and principled examination. Williams v. Dep't of Corr., 330 N.J. Super. 197,
203-04 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting Mayflower Sec. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J.
85, 93 (1973)).
A prison disciplinary hearing "is not part of a criminal prosecution and
thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant . . . does not apply." Avant v.
Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 522 (1975) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
480 (1972)). We have recognized that "[p]risons are dangerous places,"
Jackson v. Dep't of Corr., 335 N.J. Super. 227, 233 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting
Blyther v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 322 N.J. Super. 56, 65 (App. Div. 1999)), so
"courts must afford appropriate deference and flexibility to corrections officers
trying to manage a volatile environment." Ibid. (citing Blyther, 322 N.J.
Super. at 65). Further, we have held that “the requirement of probable cause,
or even showing of reasonable suspicion prior to drug testing [may] be
impractical in [the] prison context.” Hamilton v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 366 N.J.
Super. 284, 291 (App. Div. 2004).
Haddock claims a denial of his due process rights because the DOC
lacked probable cause to order him to provide a urine sample. We disagree.
A-1618-17T4 5 N.J.A.C. 10A:3-5.10(b)(8) provides that “[i]nmates shall be tested” for
prohibited substances “[w]hen the Administrator, Associate Administrator,
Assistant Superintendent, or a Correction Major orders all inmates of a
particular housing unit . . . to be tested” (emphasis added). Here, the record
confirms that a Correction Major ordered Haddock and his cellmate, part of a
"housing unit," to provide a urine sample. See N.J.A.C. 10A:1-2.2 ("'Housing
unit' means a cell . . . within a correctional facility.")
Haddock's reliance on N.J.A.C. 10A:3-5.10(b)(6) is misplaced. That
provision permits an inmate to be tested only when "a custody staff member of
the rank of Sergeant or above or a Special Investigations Division Investigator
believes . . . there is a reasonable factual basis to suspect the inmate of using . .
. a non-alcoholic prohibited substance . . . ." N.J.A.C. 10A:3-5.10(b)(6)
(emphasis added). As we have concluded, the DOC properly ordered a test of
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