JUAN HADDOCK VS. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS)

CourtNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
DecidedNovember 8, 2018
DocketA-1618-17T4
StatusUnpublished

This text of JUAN HADDOCK VS. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS) (JUAN HADDOCK VS. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
JUAN HADDOCK VS. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS), (N.J. Ct. App. 2018).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1618-17T4

JUAN HADDOCK,

Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondent. _____________________________

Submitted October 30, 2018 – Decided November 8, 2018

Before Judges Rothstadt and Natali.

On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Corrections.

Juan Haddock, appellant pro se.

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Melissa Dutton Schaffer, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Michael E. Vomacka, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM Juan Haddock, an inmate currently confined in Northern State Prison,

appeals from a September 27, 2017 final administrative decision by the

Department of Corrections (DOC) finding that he committed prohibited act

*.204, use of any prohibited substance such as drugs, intoxicants , or related

paraphernalia not prescribed for the inmate by the medical or dental staff,

contrary to N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a). Haddock was sanctioned to 365 days of

urine monitoring, 150 days of administrative segregation, 100 days loss of

commutation time, twenty days loss of recreation privileges, and loss of

contact visits. He was also referred to Alcoholics/Narcotics Anonymous. We

affirm.

Haddock was housed in a cell with another prisoner when a Correction

Major ordered a search of the cell and also directed Haddock and his cellmate

to provide a urine sample. Haddock's urine sample tested positive for opiates,

a banned substance.

As a result of the positive test result, Haddock was charged with the

*.204 violation. Haddock pled not guilty and requested substitute counsel.

The matter proceeded to a disciplinary hearing where Haddock challenged the

proofs establishing continuity of the urine evidence and further claimed he was

improperly ordered to submit to a urine sample without probable cause.

A-1618-17T4 2 The hearing officer considered evidence from Haddock and the

correctional facility. The evidence submitted by the parties included

Haddock's statement, a laboratory report confirming his positive urine test, and

documentation that a Correction Major ordered Haddock and his cellmate to

provide urine samples.

In addition, the hearing officer considered a continuity of evidence

(COE) form, which established that Haddock's urine was collected, labeled,

tested on-site, transferred and retested at the DOC laboratory. Further, the

form contained Haddock's and a corrections officer's signature confirming that

Haddock's urine sample was "[c]losed, sealed and labeled in [their] presence."

The hearing officer also considered written statements from two corrections

officers clarifying that they mistakenly signed the COE form in the wrong

section. Finally, the hearing officer noted that Haddock did not deny that the

sample was his or that he used drugs.

The hearing officer found Haddock guilty of the *.204 charge. After an

administrative appeal, the Assistant Superintendent upheld the charges and

sanctions.

On appeal, Haddock argues, as he did before the hearing officer, that

the "request for a urine specimen was not based on probable cause" and the

A-1618-17T4 3 DOC "violated the provisions relating to the collection and storage of urine

specimens." We are unpersuaded by these arguments and affirm because the

record contains substantial credible evidence that the corrections officers

ordered and secured Haddock's urine sample in accordance with the relevant

regulations.

We reverse an administrative agency decision "only if it is arbitrary,

capricious or unreasonable or it is not supported by substantial credible

evidence in the record as a whole." Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J.

571, 579-80 (1980) (citing Campbell v. Dep't of Civil Serv., 39 N.J. 556, 562

(1963)). Substantial evidence is evidence that "furnish[es] a reasonable basis

for the agency's action." McGowan v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 347 N.J. Super.

544, 562 (App. Div. 2002) (citing Zachariae v. N.J. Real Estate Comm'n, 53

N.J. Super. 60, 62 (App. Div. 1958)). Substantial evidence has also been

defined as evidence that "a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion." Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186,

192 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting In re Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 35 N.J. 358,

376 (1961)). The burden rests on the challenging party to show the

administrative agency decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.

McGowan, 347 N.J. Super. at 563 (citing Barone v. Dep't of Human Servs.,

A-1618-17T4 4 Div. of Med. Asst., 210 N.J. Super. 276, 285 (App. Div. 1986)). We do not

perform a perfunctory review of the agency findings but engage in a careful

and principled examination. Williams v. Dep't of Corr., 330 N.J. Super. 197,

203-04 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting Mayflower Sec. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J.

85, 93 (1973)).

A prison disciplinary hearing "is not part of a criminal prosecution and

thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant . . . does not apply." Avant v.

Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 522 (1975) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,

480 (1972)). We have recognized that "[p]risons are dangerous places,"

Jackson v. Dep't of Corr., 335 N.J. Super. 227, 233 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting

Blyther v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 322 N.J. Super. 56, 65 (App. Div. 1999)), so

"courts must afford appropriate deference and flexibility to corrections officers

trying to manage a volatile environment." Ibid. (citing Blyther, 322 N.J.

Super. at 65). Further, we have held that “the requirement of probable cause,

or even showing of reasonable suspicion prior to drug testing [may] be

impractical in [the] prison context.” Hamilton v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 366 N.J.

Super. 284, 291 (App. Div. 2004).

Haddock claims a denial of his due process rights because the DOC

lacked probable cause to order him to provide a urine sample. We disagree.

A-1618-17T4 5 N.J.A.C. 10A:3-5.10(b)(8) provides that “[i]nmates shall be tested” for

prohibited substances “[w]hen the Administrator, Associate Administrator,

Assistant Superintendent, or a Correction Major orders all inmates of a

particular housing unit . . . to be tested” (emphasis added). Here, the record

confirms that a Correction Major ordered Haddock and his cellmate, part of a

"housing unit," to provide a urine sample. See N.J.A.C. 10A:1-2.2 ("'Housing

unit' means a cell . . . within a correctional facility.")

Haddock's reliance on N.J.A.C. 10A:3-5.10(b)(6) is misplaced. That

provision permits an inmate to be tested only when "a custody staff member of

the rank of Sergeant or above or a Special Investigations Division Investigator

believes . . . there is a reasonable factual basis to suspect the inmate of using . .

. a non-alcoholic prohibited substance . . . ." N.J.A.C. 10A:3-5.10(b)(6)

(emphasis added). As we have concluded, the DOC properly ordered a test of

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Related

Morrissey v. Brewer
408 U.S. 471 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Borough of Roselle v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co.
173 A.2d 233 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1961)
Campbell v. Department of Civil Service
189 A.2d 712 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1963)
Barone v. D. of Human Serv., Div. of Med. Asst.
509 A.2d 786 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 1986)
Figueroa v. DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS
997 A.2d 1088 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 2010)
Avant v. Clifford
341 A.2d 629 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1975)
Mayflower Securities Co. v. Bureau of Securities
312 A.2d 497 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1973)
Henry v. Rahway State Prison
410 A.2d 686 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1980)
Williams v. Dept. of Corrections
749 A.2d 375 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 2000)
Jackson v. Dept. of Corrections
762 A.2d 255 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 2000)
McGowan v. NJ State Parole Bd.
790 A.2d 974 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 2002)
Blyther v. NJ DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS
730 A.2d 396 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 1999)
Zachariae v. NEW JERSEY REAL ESTATE COMMN.
146 A.2d 491 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 1958)
Hamilton v. New Jersey Department of Corrections
841 A.2d 94 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 2004)

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