TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-19-00922-CV
Juan Enriquez, Appellant
v.
David Gutierrez, Presiding Chair, Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles, and TBPP Members James LaFavers, Federico Rangel, Cynthia Tauss, Ed Robertson, Fred Solis, and Sherman Skyme, Appellees
FROM THE 53RD DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. D-1-GN-17-002610, THE HONORABLE KARIN CRUMP, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Juan Enriquez appeals from the district court’s order granting the plea
to the jurisdiction filed by appellees David Gutierrez, Presiding Chair, Texas Board of Pardons
and Paroles (TBPP), and TBPP Members James LaFavers, Federico Rangel, Cynthia Tauss, Ed
Robertson, Fred Solis, and Sherman Skyme (collectively, appellees). In four points of error on
appeal, Enriquez asserts that the district court erred in granting the plea to the jurisdiction. We
will affirm the district court’s order.
BACKGROUND
In 1966, the State alleged that Enriquez “shot to death his girlfriend, her father,
her brother, a woman he abducted, and a Texas Highway Patrolman.” Enriquez v. Procunier, 752 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1984). A jury convicted Enriquez of murdering the woman he
abducted and imposed the death penalty for that offense.1 Id.; see Enriquez v. State, 429 S.W.2d
141, 145 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968) (affirming Enriquez’s murder conviction). In 1972, the Texas
Governor commuted Enriquez’s death sentence to life imprisonment after the United States
Supreme Court declared the death penalty unconstitutional under all then-existing capital-
sentencing schemes. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972); see also Ex parte
Enriquez, 490 S.W.2d 546, 547 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (discussing applicability of Furman
decision to Enriquez’s case); Enriquez v. Crain, No. 03-12-00065-CV, 2014 WL 236859, at *1
(Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 16, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (summarizing procedural history of
case). Since that time, Enriquez has filed numerous civil suits and habeas corpus applications in
federal and state courts, challenging the legality of his sentence and continued imprisonment
beyond the date that Enriquez believes himself entitled to release on parole or mandatory
supervision.2 See Tex. Gov’t Code § 508.147(a) (providing that “[e]xcept as provided by
1 In separate proceedings arising out of the other deaths, Enriquez pleaded guilty to murder and assault with intent to commit murder, receiving three concurrent 99-year sentences for the murder pleas and one 25-year sentence for the assault plea. See Enriquez v. State, Nos. 13-02-480-CR, 13-02-481-CR, 13-02-482-CR, 13-02-483-CR, 2003 WL 22736517, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg, Nov. 20, 2003, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication). 2 See, e.g., Enriquez v. Stringfellow, 81 F. App’x 487, 487 (5th Cir. 2003) (affirming dismissal of Enriquez’s federal suit challenging procedures used by Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles to determine Enriquez’s parole eligibility); Enriquez v. Procunier, 752 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1984) (denying Enriquez’s federal habeas application and noting that “Enriquez has filed nine state habeas applications, all of which were denied by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in orders dating from October 7, 1968 to November 7, 1979”); Ex parte Enriquez, No. 04-17-00356-CR, 2018 WL 3747677, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 8, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (affirming denial of Enriquez’s state habeas application pursuant to Articles 11.01 and 11.08 of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure); Enriquez v. Crain, No. 03-12-00065-CV, 2014 WL 236859, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 16, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (affirming dismissal of Enriquez’s suit against state officials as frivolous); Enriquez v. State, No. 04–10–00071–CR, 2011 WL 2637370, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 6, 2011, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding that 2 Section 508.149, a parole panel shall order the release of an inmate who is not on parole to
mandatory supervision when the actual calendar time the inmate has served plus any accrued
good conduct time equals the term to which the inmate was sentenced”); but see id. § 508.149(a)
(providing that “[a]n inmate may not be released to mandatory supervision if the inmate is
serving a sentence for or has been previously convicted of” certain offenses including capital
murder and first-degree murder).
In this proceeding, Enriquez filed suit against appellees for various causes of
action related to his continued imprisonment. In his first cause of action, Enriquez asserted that
his continued imprisonment without proper parole review violates his federal civil rights. See
42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his second cause of action, Enriquez claimed that he is being “falsely
imprisoned” beyond the date that he was entitled to release. In his third cause of action,
Enriquez argued that appellees have violated the Texas Constitution by reviewing improperly his
parole eligibility, refusing him release on mandatory supervision, and ignoring case law that he
believes entitles him to release. In his fourth cause of action, Enriquez sought mandamus relief
against appellees, asking that the district court order them to comply with the law regarding the
requirements for parole review and mandatory supervision. In his fifth cause of action, Enriquez
claimed that appellees were “negligent per se” by “failing or refusing to correct their records”
related to the judgment of Enriquez’s conviction. In his sixth cause of action, Enriquez accused
appellees of publishing defamatory information on their website showing that Enriquez was
Enriquez was not entitled to judgment nunc pro tunc following commutation of death sentence); Enriquez v. Owens, No. 03-09-00309-CV, 2010 WL 2698764, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin July 9, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (affirming grant of summary judgment against Enriquez in his suit complaining that Board of Pardons and Paroles used improper procedures when reviewing him for parole).
3 convicted of first-degree murder and that he is imprisoned on a “commuted life sentence” even
though, in Enriquez’s view, “no valid commutation order exists.”
Appellees removed the case to federal court because Enriquez alleged a federal
cause of action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). In federal court, Enriquez requested permission to
dismiss his federal cause of action and remand the remaining causes of action to state court. The
federal district court granted Enriquez’s request. Upon returning to state district court, appellees
filed a plea to the jurisdiction relating to Enriquez’s remaining causes of action. In the plea,
appellees argued that Enriquez’s tort claims are barred by the doctrines of absolute immunity,
sovereign immunity, and official immunity. Regarding Enriquez’s claims under the Texas
Constitution, appellees argued that “there is no recognized private cause of action for violation of
civil rights under the Texas Constitution.” At the hearing on the plea to the jurisdiction,
appellees further argued that Enriquez lacks standing to bring any of his claims and that the
district court does not have mandamus jurisdiction over appellees. Following the hearing, the
district court granted the plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed all of Enriquez’s remaining causes
of action. This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“A plea to the jurisdiction challenges the court’s authority to decide a case.”
Heckman v. Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex. 2012) (citing Bland Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tex. 2000)). “The burden is on the plaintiff to affirmatively
demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction.” Id. (citing Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v.
Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004)). “Immunity from suit implicates a court’s subject-
matter jurisdiction and is properly asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction.” Nettles v. GTECH
4 Corp., 606 S.W.3d 726, 731 (Tex. 2020) (citing Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. v. City of Houston,
487 S.W.3d 154, 160 (Tex. 2016)). “Because subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law, we
review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction.” Id. (citing Brown & Gay
Eng’g, Inc. v. Olivares, 461 S.W.3d 117, 120 (Tex. 2015)).
“When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the pleadings,” as it does here, “we
determine if the pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction
to hear the cause.” Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. “We construe the plaintiff’s pleadings
liberally, taking all factual assertions as true, and look to the plaintiff’s intent.” Heckman, 369 at
150. Courts “must grant the plea to the jurisdiction if the plaintiff’s pleadings affirmatively
negate the existence of jurisdiction.” Id.
DISCUSSION
Enriquez asserts that the district court erred in granting the plea to the jurisdiction.
In his first point of error, Enriquez argues that he has standing to pursue his claims. In his
second point of error, Enriquez contends that “immunity does not shield a governmental entity
for equitable relief for a violation of rights under the Texas Constitution.” In his third point of
error, Enriquez asserts that Article 11.07 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply in
this case because he “is not challenging a final felony conviction” but is instead challenging “the
use of non-existent crimes and non-existent convictions in parole and mandatory supervision
eligibility decisions.” In his fourth point of error, Enriquez asserts that the district court has
jurisdiction with respect to his negligence per se and slander claims because appellees were
acting “ultra vires.”
5 Article 11.07
Regarding Enriquez’s cause of action seeking mandamus relief against appellees,
the district court made the following conclusion:
The appropriate avenue for the appellant to pursue the relief sought by his claim for mandamus relief is to file an application for writ of habeas corpus under Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.07. Because Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.07 provides the exclusive avenue for challenging custody under a final felony conviction, this court does not have jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s request for mandamus relief, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief of the nature sought by Plaintiff in this case. As such, the Motion is GRANTED and IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Plaintiff’s requests for mandamus, injunctive, and declaratory relief are DISMISSED.
We agree with the district court that because of Article 11.07, the district court does not have
jurisdiction to grant Enriquez mandamus, injunctive, or declaratory relief in this case.3 We also
conclude that Article 11.07 applies to all of Enriquez’s remaining causes of action.
A common thread running through all of Enriquez’s claims is his allegation that
his continued imprisonment for his 1966 murder conviction is unlawful. As alleged in his
petition, Enriquez’s legal theory is as follows:
“Under Texas law, all prisoners under sentence of death when Furman was decided were entitled to retrial or release,” because “an appellate court may not reduce the sentence assessed by the jury.”
“However, when the death penalty was obtained in a bifurcated trial, the governor
3 Although Enriquez also sought in his petition monetary relief in the form of actual, exemplary, and nominal damages, this relief appears to be limited to his cause of action for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which was dismissed in federal court. Enriquez makes this clear in his reply brief, in which he writes that in this case, “neither § 1983 nor damages are involved.” Thus, Enriquez’s claims for mandamus, injunctive, and declaratory relief are all that remain in this proceeding. 6 was authorized to cure penalty error by commuting the invalid death sentence because a valid verdict of ordinary murder existed to serve as a basis for commutation.”
“[T]he Attorney General of Texas interpreted Furman as it applied to Texas law and to prisoners then under sentence of death,” opining that “absent commutation the court concerned must either grant a new trial (or in habeas corpus, order the release of the prisoner if a new trial is not granted).”
“[T]he [Texas] governor issued [a proclamation] wherein he purported to commute [Enriquez]’s death penalty verdict . . . to a life sentence; however, the commutation order had no effect because the death penalty was part of the guilt determinative process.”
“Furman . . . erased the one-stage trial forced on [Enriquez] when the State announced it would seek the death penalty and the conviction obtained under the constitutionally infirm death penalty statutes of that time.”
“Defendants’ predecessors as defendants today knew that the commutation was a nullity but . . . misled the courts reviewing [Enriquez]’s detention that [Enriquez] was held . . . on a first-degree murder conviction.”
“Prison officials admitted that ‘the Director does not have a copy of the judgment and sentence documenting Enriquez’s [first-degree murder] conviction.’”
“Instead, prison officials detained [Enriquez] on a policy implemented to detain on null commutation orders prisoners for whom they did not have a judgment of conviction.”
Enriquez goes on to allege that a similar situation occurred with another prisoner who had his
death sentence commuted and that the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded in that case that “the
governor’s proclamation of commutation was a nullity.” Hartfield v. Thaler, 403 S.W.3d 234,
240 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). For these reasons, Enriquez believes that his “death-penalty
judgment is legally non-existent under Furman and Texas law” and that the commutation order
sentencing him to life imprisonment is invalid.
7 This legal theory is central to all of Enriquez’s causes of action. In his cause of
action for false imprisonment, Enriquez is asserting that he is entitled to release on mandatory
supervision because, even though prisoners serving life sentences are not entitled to release on
mandatory supervision,4 Enriquez’s life sentence is “non-existent.” In his cause of action for
violations of the Texas Constitution, Enriquez is asserting that appellees are refusing him proper
parole review, refusing to release him on mandatory supervision, and refusing to follow the
decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals in Hartfield, supra. In his cause of action for
mandamus relief, Enriquez wants the district court to order appellees to comply with the
Hartfield decision and statutes that Enriquez believes entitle him to release. In his cause of
action for negligence per se, Enriquez is complaining that appellees failed to correct their records
to contain his “official judgment” of conviction rather than the commutation order that he claims
is “illegal under the Furman and Hartfield holdings.” And in his cause for action for defamation,
Enriquez accuses appellees of slander and libel based on their publishing of information related
to his conviction and sentence, specifically that he is imprisoned on a commuted life sentence for
first-degree murder even though, according to Enriquez, “no valid commutation order exists.”
Enriquez asserts that in this proceeding, he is not seeking release from
confinement. However, it is clear from the allegations in his petition, summarized above, that
his causes of action in effect challenge the legality of his confinement. It is well established that
the remedy for unlawful confinement is to file an application for writ of habeas corpus. See
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977); Ex parte Adams, 768 S.W.2d 281, 287 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1989) (orig. proceeding); Ex parte Ramzy, 424 S.W.2d 220, 223 (Tex. 1968). It is
4 See Ex parte Franks, 71 S.W.3d 327, 328 (Tex. 2001) (“[I]t is mathematically impossible to determine a mandatory supervision release date on a life sentence because the calendar time served plus any accrued good conduct time will never add up to life.”). 8 also well established that the Court of Criminal Appeals is “the only court with jurisdiction in
final post-conviction felony proceedings,” Ater v. Eighth Court of Appeals, 802 S.W.2d 241, 243
(Tex. Crim. App. 1991); see also Sheppard v. Wichita Cnty. Dist. Att’y’s Off., 616 S.W.3d 655,
658 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no pet. h.); Calton v. Schiller, 498 S.W.3d 247, 252 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 2016, pet. denied); Smith v. Lynaugh, 792 S.W.2d 110, 111–12 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ), and the procedure set out in Code of Criminal Procedure
Article 11.07 is “the exclusive State felony post-conviction judicial remedy available in Texas,”
Adams, 768 S.W.2d at 287; see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07, § 5 (“After conviction the
procedure outlined in [Article 11.07] shall be exclusive and any other proceeding shall be void
and of no force and effect in discharging the prisoner.”).
It is the role of the convicting court to make any preliminary fact findings related
to Enriquez’s confinement and the role of the Court of Criminal Appeals to determine such
issues as the legality of the commutation order, see Hartfield, 403 S.W.3d at 240, the
applicability of the court’s decision in Hartfield to the facts of Enriquez’s case, the legality of the
procedures used by appellees to review Enriquez’s eligibility for parole, see Ex parte Geiken, 28
S.W.3d 553, 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000), and Enriquez’s entitlement to release on mandatory
supervision, see Ex parte Noyola, 215 S.W.3d 862, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Under Article
11.07, the 53rd District Court of Travis County, which played no role in convicting Enriquez,
plays no role in reviewing the legality of Enriquez’s continued confinement following that
conviction. Thus, the district court did not err in granting the plea to the jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Ater, 802 S.W.2d at 243 (“We are the only court with jurisdiction in final post-conviction felony
proceedings.”) Sheppard, 616 S.W.3d at 658 (“A collateral attack on the procedures or results of
a prior criminal trial are not proper matters to be litigated in a civil proceeding.”); Calton, 498
9 S.W.3d at 252 (concluding that trial court did not have jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief to
inmate who was serving term of life imprisonment because “exclusive post-conviction remedy in
final felony convictions in Texas is through a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to” Article 11.07);
Martinez v. Thaler, 931 S.W.2d 45, 46 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied) (“A
district court has no constitutional or statutory jurisdiction to exercise supervisory control over
prison officials.”); see also Ex parte Touchstone, No. 07-12-00239-CR, 2012 WL 2368546, at *1
(Tex. App.—Amarillo June 22, 2012, orig. proceeding) (order, not designated for publication)
(dismissing for want of jurisdiction inmate’s request for declaration that his underlying
conviction was “null and void” “because the exclusive means of challenging a final felony
conviction is in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals according to article 11.07 of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure”); cf. Board of Pardons & Paroles v. Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Dist., 910 S.W.2d 481, 483 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (per curiam) (concluding that district
court did not have authority to grant relief from allegedly improper revocation of parole because
Court of Criminal Appeals “enjoys the exclusive authority to grant relief in such a proceeding”).
Enriquez asserts that Article 11.07 does not apply in this case because he “is not
challenging a final felony conviction” but is instead challenging “the use of non-existent crimes
and non-existent convictions in parole and mandatory supervision eligibility decisions.”
However, Enriquez acknowledged in his petition that he was convicted of the crime of murder, a
felony offense, and that the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction, making it final.
See Enriquez, 429 S.W.2d at 145. Thus, the procedures in Article 11.07 apply here, and Article
11.07 requires that Enriquez seek relief in the Court of Criminal Appeals. See Ex parte
Williams, 239 S.W.3d 859, 861–62 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, no pet.).
10 We overrule Enriquez’s third point of error challenging the applicability of
Article 11.07. Because we conclude that the procedures in Article 11.07 provide the exclusive
means for Enriquez to obtain relief from his allegedly illegal confinement, we need not consider
Enriquez’s remaining points of error challenging the district court’s grant of the plea to the
jurisdiction on other grounds.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court’s order granting the plea to the jurisdiction.
__________________________________________ Gisela D. Triana, Justice
Before Justices Goodwin, Triana, and Smith
Affirmed
Filed: April 30, 2021