Opinion issued June 16, 2026
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00563-CR NO. 01-24-00596-CR ——————————— JUAN DAVID ALMANZA, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 228th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case Nos. 1625009 & 1625010
MEMORANDUM OPINION
After celebrating St. Patrick’s Day, Juan David Almanza drove his truck the
wrong way on an interstate, causing a collision that killed one person and seriously injured another. He was charged with intoxication manslaughter1 and intoxication
assault.2 The jury found him guilty of both offenses, and he was sentenced to 11
years’ imprisonment for intoxication manslaughter and 2 years’ imprisonment for
intoxication assault with the sentences running concurrently.
On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in admitting toxicology
evidence. He alleged the evidence was unreliable due to a recall affecting the test
tube used to draw his blood. The State responds that Almanza did not preserve this
issue for our review because he did not obtain a ruling on his pretrial motion to
suppress and he did not object when the evidence was later admitted at trial.
Almanza responds that the record shows by implication that the motion to suppress
was denied. We hold that even assuming the motion to suppress was denied and
that the issue was preserved for our review, the trial court did not err in admitting
the evidence at trial. We affirm.
Background
On St. Patrick’s Day in 2019, Almanza went out to bars with his cousin and
consumed alcohol. Around 2:00 a.m., he drove the wrong way on Interstate 45 in
1 A person commits intoxication manslaughter if the person operates a motor vehicle in a public place and is intoxicated and by reason of that intoxication causes the death of another by accident or mistake. TEX. PENAL CODE § 49.08. 2 A person commits intoxication assault if the person, by accident or mistake, while operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated, by reason of that intoxication causes serious bodily injury to another. TEX. PENAL CODE § 49.07. 2 Houston and collided head-on with another vehicle. One passenger in the other
vehicle died and the other was seriously injured.
Almanza was transported to the hospital. At the hospital, law enforcement
obtained a search warrant for Almanza’s blood, which was collected at 6:53 a.m.
The next day, the sample was transferred to the Houston Forensic Sciences Center
(“HFSC”) where it was stored in a refrigerator. The sample was tested a month
later, and HFSC produced a report in May 2019 opining that the blood alcohol
concentration in the sample was 0.191. Later that month, the manufacturer of the
tube used to collect Almanza’s blood sample issued a recall because some of its
tubes had no additive in the tube.
Almanza was indicted for intoxication manslaughter and intoxication
assault. He proceeded to trial.
A. Motion to Suppress
Almanza filed a pretrial motion to suppress the toxicology report based on
alleged defects in the blood collection process. Almanza argued that the test tubes
used were the subject of recall and did not meet reliability standards. Specifically,
Almanza argued that due to the recall, the vials used to contain his blood sample
could have resulted in the potential for contamination or artificially inflated blood-
alcohol results.
3 The trial court held a hearing on the motion to suppress where the Director
of Quality Management for the manufacturer of the vials testified. She described
the recall process and its extent. She stated that at most, approximately 1,500 vials
were affected by a manufacturing error and about 252,000 vials were subject to
recall. The manufacturer received 399 returned tubes pursuant to the recall, and of
those, 298 were defective. The defect among the tubes returned was absence of any
anticoagulant and preservative powder in the tube. She testified that she reviewed
body camera footage of Almanza’s blood draw showing that there was powder
present in the tubes used to collect his sample.
The manager of the toxicology section of HFSC testified that there was a
manufacturer’s recall of a small portion of a lot of test tubes that contained no
additive. The recall information included that if a sample was stored for more than
two days, the result for blood-alcohol determination may not be accurate. The
manager stated that Almanza’s whole blood sample was tested on April 9, 2019.
He also testified that the ethanol concentration in a sample without additives that
was refrigerated would stay the same or decrease over time. He testified that
contamination or failure to refrigerate could cause concentration to increase. The
HFSC manager testified that Almanza’s sample was refrigerated, and there was no
evidence of contamination.
4 Amanda Culbertson, an expert in forensic toxicology and forensic chemistry,
testified for the defense. She opined that there were fundamental flaws in the
testing procedure, and opined that no police lab should test blood from the recalled
blood vials.
At the end of the hearing, the trial court stated that it “need[]ed to think
about this.” The clerk’s record does not contain an order on the motion.
B. Jury Trial
Almanza proceeded to a jury trial.3 A different trial judge presided over the
trial than the judge who had presided over the motion to suppress hearing. During a
pretrial discussion of Almanza’s motion in limine seeking to exclude, due to the
recall, mention of blood vials drawn pursuant to a warrant and analyzed by HFSC,
the State responded that the request was moot “because that was already addressed
at the suppression hearing.” When the State introduced the toxicology evidence at
trial, Almanza’s counsel stated that he had no objection. The evidence was
admitted by the trial court. After trial, the jury convicted Almanza of both charges.
He appealed.
3 His theory at trial was that the blood evidence was either contaminated or otherwise unreliable and that he was involuntarily intoxicated on the night of the crash. 5 Admission of Evidence
On appeal, Almanza argues that the trial court erred in admitting blood
toxicology evidence. The State responds that Almanza waived his challenge
because he did not obtain a ruling on the motion to suppress and he did not object
when the evidence was admitted at trial. In his reply brief, Almanza contends that
though it is not in the record, the motion was denied, and the parties proceeded to
trial under that belief.4 Assuming without deciding that the trial court denied the
motion and the issue was preserved for our review, we conclude that the trial court
did not err in admitting the evidence at trial.
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated
standard of review, reviewing the factual findings for an abuse of discretion and
the application of the law to facts de novo. Lerma v. State, 543 S.W.3d 184, 189–
90 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). We give deference to the trial court’s factual
determinations because the trial court is the sole trier of fact and judge of witness
credibility and the weight to be given their testimony. Id.; Valtierra v.
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Opinion issued June 16, 2026
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00563-CR NO. 01-24-00596-CR ——————————— JUAN DAVID ALMANZA, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 228th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case Nos. 1625009 & 1625010
MEMORANDUM OPINION
After celebrating St. Patrick’s Day, Juan David Almanza drove his truck the
wrong way on an interstate, causing a collision that killed one person and seriously injured another. He was charged with intoxication manslaughter1 and intoxication
assault.2 The jury found him guilty of both offenses, and he was sentenced to 11
years’ imprisonment for intoxication manslaughter and 2 years’ imprisonment for
intoxication assault with the sentences running concurrently.
On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in admitting toxicology
evidence. He alleged the evidence was unreliable due to a recall affecting the test
tube used to draw his blood. The State responds that Almanza did not preserve this
issue for our review because he did not obtain a ruling on his pretrial motion to
suppress and he did not object when the evidence was later admitted at trial.
Almanza responds that the record shows by implication that the motion to suppress
was denied. We hold that even assuming the motion to suppress was denied and
that the issue was preserved for our review, the trial court did not err in admitting
the evidence at trial. We affirm.
Background
On St. Patrick’s Day in 2019, Almanza went out to bars with his cousin and
consumed alcohol. Around 2:00 a.m., he drove the wrong way on Interstate 45 in
1 A person commits intoxication manslaughter if the person operates a motor vehicle in a public place and is intoxicated and by reason of that intoxication causes the death of another by accident or mistake. TEX. PENAL CODE § 49.08. 2 A person commits intoxication assault if the person, by accident or mistake, while operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated, by reason of that intoxication causes serious bodily injury to another. TEX. PENAL CODE § 49.07. 2 Houston and collided head-on with another vehicle. One passenger in the other
vehicle died and the other was seriously injured.
Almanza was transported to the hospital. At the hospital, law enforcement
obtained a search warrant for Almanza’s blood, which was collected at 6:53 a.m.
The next day, the sample was transferred to the Houston Forensic Sciences Center
(“HFSC”) where it was stored in a refrigerator. The sample was tested a month
later, and HFSC produced a report in May 2019 opining that the blood alcohol
concentration in the sample was 0.191. Later that month, the manufacturer of the
tube used to collect Almanza’s blood sample issued a recall because some of its
tubes had no additive in the tube.
Almanza was indicted for intoxication manslaughter and intoxication
assault. He proceeded to trial.
A. Motion to Suppress
Almanza filed a pretrial motion to suppress the toxicology report based on
alleged defects in the blood collection process. Almanza argued that the test tubes
used were the subject of recall and did not meet reliability standards. Specifically,
Almanza argued that due to the recall, the vials used to contain his blood sample
could have resulted in the potential for contamination or artificially inflated blood-
alcohol results.
3 The trial court held a hearing on the motion to suppress where the Director
of Quality Management for the manufacturer of the vials testified. She described
the recall process and its extent. She stated that at most, approximately 1,500 vials
were affected by a manufacturing error and about 252,000 vials were subject to
recall. The manufacturer received 399 returned tubes pursuant to the recall, and of
those, 298 were defective. The defect among the tubes returned was absence of any
anticoagulant and preservative powder in the tube. She testified that she reviewed
body camera footage of Almanza’s blood draw showing that there was powder
present in the tubes used to collect his sample.
The manager of the toxicology section of HFSC testified that there was a
manufacturer’s recall of a small portion of a lot of test tubes that contained no
additive. The recall information included that if a sample was stored for more than
two days, the result for blood-alcohol determination may not be accurate. The
manager stated that Almanza’s whole blood sample was tested on April 9, 2019.
He also testified that the ethanol concentration in a sample without additives that
was refrigerated would stay the same or decrease over time. He testified that
contamination or failure to refrigerate could cause concentration to increase. The
HFSC manager testified that Almanza’s sample was refrigerated, and there was no
evidence of contamination.
4 Amanda Culbertson, an expert in forensic toxicology and forensic chemistry,
testified for the defense. She opined that there were fundamental flaws in the
testing procedure, and opined that no police lab should test blood from the recalled
blood vials.
At the end of the hearing, the trial court stated that it “need[]ed to think
about this.” The clerk’s record does not contain an order on the motion.
B. Jury Trial
Almanza proceeded to a jury trial.3 A different trial judge presided over the
trial than the judge who had presided over the motion to suppress hearing. During a
pretrial discussion of Almanza’s motion in limine seeking to exclude, due to the
recall, mention of blood vials drawn pursuant to a warrant and analyzed by HFSC,
the State responded that the request was moot “because that was already addressed
at the suppression hearing.” When the State introduced the toxicology evidence at
trial, Almanza’s counsel stated that he had no objection. The evidence was
admitted by the trial court. After trial, the jury convicted Almanza of both charges.
He appealed.
3 His theory at trial was that the blood evidence was either contaminated or otherwise unreliable and that he was involuntarily intoxicated on the night of the crash. 5 Admission of Evidence
On appeal, Almanza argues that the trial court erred in admitting blood
toxicology evidence. The State responds that Almanza waived his challenge
because he did not obtain a ruling on the motion to suppress and he did not object
when the evidence was admitted at trial. In his reply brief, Almanza contends that
though it is not in the record, the motion was denied, and the parties proceeded to
trial under that belief.4 Assuming without deciding that the trial court denied the
motion and the issue was preserved for our review, we conclude that the trial court
did not err in admitting the evidence at trial.
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated
standard of review, reviewing the factual findings for an abuse of discretion and
the application of the law to facts de novo. Lerma v. State, 543 S.W.3d 184, 189–
90 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). We give deference to the trial court’s factual
determinations because the trial court is the sole trier of fact and judge of witness
credibility and the weight to be given their testimony. Id.; Valtierra v. State, 310
S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Our deferential review also applies to
the trial court’s conclusions regarding mixed questions of law and fact that turn on 4 To preserve error for our review, the defendant must either file a motion to suppress and obtain a ruling on the motion or timely object when the State offers the evidence at trial. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Garza v. State, 126 S.W.3d 79, 81–82 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (stating record must show that appellant made a timely request, objection, or motion and that trial court ruled on it). 6 credibility or demeanor. State v. Ortiz, 382 S.W.3d 367, 372 (Tex. Crim. App.
2012).
Scientific testimony must be both reliable and relevant to assist the trier of
fact to reach a conclusion in a case. Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568, 572 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1992); see TEX. R. EVID. 702. The proponent of the evidence bears the
burden to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that scientific evidence is
reliable. Jackson v. State, 17 S.W.3d 664, 670 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). This is
achieved by demonstrating: (1) the validity of the underlying scientific theory;
(2) the validity of the technique applying the theory; and (3) the proper application
of the technique in the specific instance. Id. (citing Kelly, 824 S.W.2d at 573).
B. Analysis
The evidence presented at the motion to suppress hearing supported
admission. The test tube manufacturer’s director of quality management testified
that the recall affected a very small number of manufactured tubes. The uniform
defect among the defective tubes was the absence of any preservative or
anticoagulant powder. Law enforcement body camera footage showed that there
was powder present in the tubes used to collect Almanza’s sample. As the trier of
fact, the trial court could weigh the testimony from Almanza’s expert with the
testimony from the tube manufacturer and HFSC director, and choose to believe all
or any part of any witness’s testimony. In denying the motion to suppress, the trial
7 court could have reasonably concluded that the evidence was admissible because
the tubes used to collect Almanza’s sample were unaffected by the defect that
formed the basis of the recall.5
We overrule Almanza’s issue on appeal.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Susanna Dokupil Justice
Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Johnson, and Dokupil.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
5 To the extent that the trial court did not rule on the motion to suppress, the court did not err in admitting the evidence at trial. At trial, a law enforcement officer testified that he observed anticoagulant in the test tubes prior to the draw. An HFSC forensic scientist testified that the manufacturer recalled a small number of tubes that did not have proper anticoagulation and preservative powder inside them. She stated that Almanza’s blood appeared normal with no clotting when she tested it, which indicated the presence of anticoagulant in the tube. The record reflects that Almanza’s specimen was collected and tested according to existing protocol to prevent contamination. Questions about the reliability of Almanza’s blood specimen considering the recall go to the weight of the evidence, rather than admissibility. See Yanez v. State, No. 07-23-00161-CR, 2024 WL 1814058, at *5 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Apr. 25, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (stating question of defect in tube after recall likely goes to weight, not admissibility of blood toxicology evidence). 8