Juan Cea-Campos v. Merrick Garland

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: October 4, 2024
• Docket: 23-2092
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-2092

JUAN CARLOS ALBERTO CEA-CAMPOS,

Petitioner,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.

Submitted: September 4, 2024 Decided: October 4, 2024

Before NIEMEYER, THACKER, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Daniel Joseph Melo, CAPITAL AREA IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS (CAIR) COALITION, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, John S. Hogan, Assistant Director, Andrea N. Gevas, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 23-2092 Doc: 39 Filed: 10/04/2024 Pg: 2 of 5

PER CURIAM:

Juan Carlos Alberto Cea-Campos, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for

review of the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) dismissing his appeal

from the immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for deferral of

removal under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We deny the petition for review.

To be granted deferral of removal under the CAT, Cea-Campos must demonstrate

that he is more likely than not to be tortured if he returns to El Salvador. See 8 C.F.R.

§§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.17 (2024). “Torture” is “any act by which severe pain or suffering,

whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person” in a manner that is “by,

or at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official acting in an

official capacity or other person acting in an official capacity.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1)

(2024); see Joshi v. Garland, -- F.4th --, --, 2024 WL 3710511, at *10 (4th Cir. Aug. 8,

2024). However, “not every instance of violence will qualify” as torture. Del Carmen

Amaya-De Sicaran v. Barr, 979 F.3d 210, 218 (4th Cir. 2020). “Acquiescence of a public

official requires that the public official, prior to the activity constituting torture, have

awareness of such activity and thereafter breach his or her legal responsibility to intervene

to prevent such activity.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7). “The official or officials need not

have actual knowledge of the torture; it is enough if they simply ‘turn a blind eye’ to it.”

Mulyani v. Holder, 771 F.3d 190, 200 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Suarez-Valenzuela v.

Holder, 714 F.3d 241, 245-47 (4th Cir. 2013)). The likelihood of torture need not be linked

to a protected ground. Zelaya v. Holder, 668 F.3d 159, 167 (4th Cir. 2012). But the

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applicant must show that he or she “will be tortured, not merely threatened.” Ortez-Cruz

v. Barr, 951 F.3d 190, 202 (4th Cir. 2020) (emphasis in original).

In assessing a claim for CAT protection, the agency shall consider “‘all evidence

relevant to the possibility of future torture,’ including ‘[e]vidence of past torture,’

‘[e]vidence that the applicant could relocate to a part of the country of removal where he

or she is not likely to be tortured,’ and ‘[e]vidence of gross, flagrant, or mass violations of

human rights in the country of removal.’” See Gomez-Ruotolo v. Garland, 96 F.4th 670,

685 (4th Cir. 2024) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3)). Evidence of past torture does not

create a presumption of future torture. Suarez-Valenzuela, 714 F.3d at 245.

We review the denial of relief under the CAT for substantial evidence, and “[t]he

agency’s ‘findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be

compelled to conclude to the contrary.’” Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 584 (2020)

(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). The relevant legal determinations, however, are

subject to de novo review. Turkson v. Holder, 667 F.3d 523, 527 (4th Cir. 2012). We can

reverse the Board’s decision only if the evidence “was so compelling that no reasonable

factfinder could fail to find” the requisite likelihood of torture and government

acquiescence. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1992). “The Board’s removal

‘decisions must remain undisturbed if they are supported by reasonable, substantial, and

probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.’” Tang v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 176,

180 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Tassi v. Holder, 660 F.3d 710, 719 (4th Cir. 2011)). “We may

not reweigh the evidence.” Id.

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When the applicant seeks CAT protection based upon a risk of torture from several

entities, as in this case, the agency must first determine the likelihood of torture by each

entity. Lopez-Soto v. Garland, 103 F.4th 242, 254 (4th Cir. 2024). “[T]he risks of torture

from all sources should be combined when determining whether a CAT applicant is more

likely than not to be tortured in a particular country.” Rodriguez-Arias v. Whitaker, 915

F.3d 968, 973 (4th Cir. 2019). “There is nothing in the regulations, agency guidance, or

our precedents that require the IJ to employ any specific methodology when considering

and aggregating the likelihood of risk from multiple entities, nor do they require any

specific statistical or quantitative analysis when evaluating the ‘more likely than not’

standard in the regulations.” Ibarra Chevez v. Garland, 31 F.4th 279, 290 (4th Cir. 2022)

(quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2), (c)(3)).

When, as here, the Board affirms the IJ’s decision with an opinion of its own, we

review both decisions. Ortez-Cruz, 951 F.3d at 197. We will limit review of the IJ’s

decision to those portions adopted and incorporated by the Board in its decision. Garcia

Hernandez v. Garland, 27 F.4th 263, 266 n.* (4th Cir. 2022).

We conclude that substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that Cea-

Campos did not show that he will be targeted for intentional torture if he is detained in El

Salvador. The evidence does not compel a finding that the Salvadoran government is likely

to torture him. We also conclude that the agency did not ignore relevant documentary

evidence. We note that Cea-Campos does not challenge with compelling evidence the IJ’s

finding that documentary evidence showed only a small percentage of inmates being

tortured. We also conclude that there is no evidence that the Board engaged in any

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impermissible factfinding. We further conclude that the agency sufficiently aggregated the

risk of torture by the relevant three entities and there was no error in this regard.

Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this

Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED