Juan Carlos Garcia Molina v. the State of Florida

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: January 29, 2025
• Docket: 3D2024-0381
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed January 29, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D24-0381 Lower Tribunal No. F22-15451 ________________

Juan Carlos Garcia Molina, Appellant,

vs.

The State of Florida, Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Laura Anne Stuzin, Judge.

Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Jennifer Thornton, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

John Guard, Acting Attorney General, and Haccord J. Curry, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Before LOGUE, C.J., and EMAS and GORDO, JJ.

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985) (“The public

is fully aware that it is accorded less privacy in its automobiles because of

this compelling governmental need for regulation. Historically, ‘individuals

always [have] been on notice that movable vessels may be stopped and

searched on facts giving rise to probable cause that the vehicle contains

contraband, without the protection afforded by a magistrate's prior evaluation

of those facts.’ In short, the pervasive schemes of regulation, which

necessarily lead to reduced expectations of privacy, and the exigencies

attendant to ready mobility justify searches without prior recourse to the

authority of a magistrate so long as the overriding standard of probable

cause is met.”) (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 806 n.8

(1982)). See also State v. Andreskewicz, 363 So. 3d 229 (Fla. 6th DCA

2023); State v. Thornton, 286 So. 3d 924, 929 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019) (“The law

does not require that a law enforcement officer know with certainty that the

item or substance is contraband in order for there to be probable cause that

a crime is being committed in the officer's presence.”) (citing State v. Walker,

729 So. 2d 463, 464 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (“In determining whether the

incriminating nature of the evidence is immediately apparent, police are not

required to know that an item is contraband. . . . Such a determination merely

requires that the facts available to the officer would lead a reasonable man

2 of caution to believe that certain items may be contraband. That subjective

belief on the part of the officer need not ultimately be proven true.”)

(additional citation omitted); State v. Fischer, 987 So. 2d 708, 712 (Fla. 5th

DCA 2008) (“Based on an officer's training and experience, the incriminating

nature of a substance in open view may be determined by the officer's visual

observation and identification of the substance.”)