Juan Carlos Cirilo A/K/A Juan Cirilo v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: April 24, 2025
• Docket: 13-24-00228-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

NUMBER 13-24-00228-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

JUAN CARLOS CIRILO A/K/A JUAN CIRILO, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE 357TH DISTRICT COURT OF CAMERON COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices West and Cron Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Tijerina

Appellant Juan Carlos Cirilo a/k/a Juan Cirilo was convicted of two counts of the

first-degree felony offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child, Mandy, and sentenced

to concurrent terms of twenty years’ confinement. 1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

1 We refer to the complainant and her family by pseudonyms to protect her identity. See TEX. § 22.021(a)(2)(B). By what we construe as two issues, appellant contends the evidence

is insufficient to support either conviction. We affirm.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW

In a sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to

the verdict and determine whether any rational fact finder could have found the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence and reasonable

inferences from that evidence. Whatley v. State, 445 S.W.3d 159, 166 (Tex. Crim. App.

2014); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 898–99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.).

Sufficient evidence exists if “the inferences necessary to establish guilt are reasonable

based upon the cumulative force of all the evidence when considered in the light most

favorable to the verdict.” Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The

fact finder is the exclusive judge of the facts, the credibility of witnesses, and the weight

to be given to their testimony. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899.

We measure the sufficiency of the evidence in reference to the elements of the

offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Villarreal v. State, 286 S.W.3d

321, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App.

1997). “Such a charge [is] one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the

indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily

restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for

which the defendant was tried.” Villarreal, 286 S.W.3d at 327 (quoting Malik, 953 S.W.2d

CONST. art. I, § 30(a)(1) (granting victims of a crime “the right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the criminal judicial process”); cf. TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8 (requiring identification of children by means of initials or fictitious names in parental rights and juvenile court cases).

2 at 240). The “law as authorized by the indictment” includes the statutory elements of the

offense and those elements “as modified by the [indictment].” Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d

394, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Appellant committed the offense of aggravated sexual

assault of a child as charged in Count 1 if appellant intentionally or knowingly caused

Mandy’s mouth to contact his sexual organ, and as charged in Count 2, if he intentionally

or knowingly caused the penetration of Mandy’s sexual organ who was a child younger

than fourteen years of age by his finger. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021(a)(1)(B),

(a)(2)(B).

II. IDENTITY

By his first issue, appellant contends the evidence presented at trial is insufficient

to establish his “identity in light of his son’s crimes against” Mandy. Specifically, appellant

argues: “Both Appellant and his son, Juan Carlos Cirilo Jr., share the same name and

lived in the same household during the relevant period. Witnesses identified the

perpetrator only as ‘Carlos,’ failing to distinguish between the two.”

A. Pertinent Facts Regarding Appellant’s Identity

At trial, during its opening statement, the State explained to the jury that appellant

is Mandy’s stepfather and that appellant and appellant’s son, Juan Cirilo Jr. (J.C.) had

lived in Mandy’s home. During his opening statement, appellant’s trial counsel

acknowledged that appellant is Mandy’s former stepfather and that J.C. pleaded guilty to

sexually abusing Mandy.

Victor Diaz, former patrol officer with the Primera Police Department, testified that

Mandy’s mother, Y.R., reported that both appellant and his son had sexually assaulted

3 Mandy. Sergeant Angelica Sandoval with the Primera Police Department stated that she

investigated Mandy’s allegations that Y.R.’s “ex-husband had touched her” on “her private

parts.” (Emphasis added). Sergeant Sandoval stated, “[Mandy] made the outcry to [Y.R.]

that the ex-husband had put his private part to her mouth. Then, touching to the privates

and also that his mouth had touched her privates.” (Emphasis added). Sergeant Sandoval

clarified that she “just knew” appellant as “Cirilo” and knew his son as “Junior,” who she

stated was also referred to as “J.C.” in the report. When asked how many incidents

involved J.C., Sergeant Sandoval replied, “J.C., which at the time was a younger child

himself, it was a one-time, one event.” The State asked, “Okay. And what about with the

Defendant Juan Carlos Cirilo?” Sergeant Sandoval said, “It was unknown the amount of

times. She could not recall.” The State then asked, “Where did these assaults allegedly

take place, the assault by Juan Carlos Cirilo, Sr., the defendant, where did those take

place?” (Emphasis added). Sergeant Sandoval responded, “In Cameron County, [Texas,]

my city, Primera, [Texas].”

Sergeant Sandoval testified that Mandy referred to appellant as her mother’s ex-

husband and did not call him her “stepdad.” Sergeant Sandoval continued, “She said, ‘My

mother’s ex-husband put his private in my mouth. He touched my private parts with [h]is

hands.’” Sergeant Sandoval clarified that Mandy claimed “[t]hat he put his penis in her

mouth” and “touched her private parts [vagina] with the hand.” The State asked Sergeant

Sandoval if she contacted “the defendant during the course of [her] investigation.”

Sergeant Sandoval replied that she had, and she “informed him of these allegations

against him and . . . provided him [with the opportunity] to make a statement.” According

4 to Sergeant Sandoval, she told appellant he was accused of sexual assault of a child and

told him “[t]he details of his ex-wife and the child.” Sergeant Sandoval testified that when

Mandy made the allegations, appellant was no longer living in her home and that he had

moved out when Mandy was thirteen years old.

Y.R., identified appellant as “Carlos” who she had previously married and then

divorced. Y.R. discussed her relationship with appellant extensively during her testimony,

including why she filed for divorce in 2021. Y.R. stated that they were in court because

“my daughter came out to me that he was [sexually] messing with her.” The State said,

“And when you say ‘he,’ who are you referring to?” Y.R. replied, “Carlos.” Y.R. called

appellant “Carlos” throughout her testimony.

Y.R. stated that when Mandy was fourteen years old, Mandy told her that “J.C. had

touched her one time.” The State asked, “And who is ‘J.C.’” Y.R. responded, “Carlos’s

son.” Y.R. referred to appellant’s son as “J.C.” throughout her testimony. Y.R. asked

Mandy if there was anything else; Mandy said, “No, not with J.C.” Y.R. said that her other

daughter interjected, “‘You need to tell her about Carlos.’” Y.R. testified she asked Mandy

about “Carlos”, and Mandy said, “that he put his thing in her mouth and then he put . . . her

thing in his mouth.” Y.R. clarified that Mandy claimed “Carlos” put his penis in her mouth

and he put his mouth on her vagina. Y.R. called the police.

During cross-examination, appellant’s trial counsel asked, “Now, you’re aware that

Juan Carlos Cirilo, Jr., was also accused of doing something to [Mandy], right?” Y.R.

replied, “Yes.” Appellant’s trial counsel said, “And would it have been around the same

time as [appellant] is allegedly charged of the same thing?” Y.R. responded, “From what

5 she said, yes.” Appellant’s trial counsel asked if Mandy’s sister knew of the allegations

against appellant “or did she just know about Juan Carlos Cirilo, Jr.?” Y.R. stated, “From

what I understand, [Mandy’s sister] knew about both.” On re-direct, the State asked if Y.R.

was still married to appellant when Mandy made her outcry, and she said, “Yes.”

Peggy Rosa, Y.R.’s mother, testified that Mandy became “troubled” and “wasn’t

herself anymore.” The State asked, “And when she wasn’t herself anymore, who-all was

living at the house” with Mandy. Peggy replied, “Carlos. That’s when it all started.” The

State said, “You said ‘Carlos,’ who are you speaking of?” Peggy pointed at appellant and

stated, “Him right there.” The State asked, “Who is J.C.?” Peggy replied, “His son.”

Appellant’s trial counsel objected to the State’s further questions regarding appellant’s

son. The trial court then said, “This is not a case about J.C. It’s not a case about that. It’s

[a] case against Mr. Juan Carlos Cirilo. J.C. is not a defendant in this case” and “That’s

not the defendant in this case. He’s not—that’s the defendant right there.”

J.C. testified that he is twenty-two years old and that he lived with appellant, his

father, and Y.R. for approximately one year when he was in ninth or tenth grade. J.C.

stated that he pleaded guilty to attempted assault of Mandy, but he did not recall what he

had done because he was doing illegal drugs when the offense occurred.

Mandy’s sister, K.M., testified that they were in court “[b]ecause of what happened

with Carlos.” The State asked if K.M. recognized “Carlos,” and she replied, “He’s in a red

shirt.” The record reflects that K.M. identified appellant as “Carlos.” K.M. testified that

Mandy told her what appellant had done to her, and K.M. told Mandy to tell their mother.

K.M. said that Mandy told her “other stuff about J.C.,” who she identified as her former

6 stepbrother. During cross-examination of K.M., appellant’s trial counsel referred to

appellant as “Carlos” and his son as “J.C.”

Mandy testified that she was in court “[b]ecause he touched me.” The State asked

Mandy to state who she meant by “he.” Mandy said, “Carlos,” and described him as her

former “stepdad” who was married to Y.R. The State asked Mandy to identify “Carlos,”

and the record reflects that she identified appellant. Mandy testified that she called

appellant “dad” and considered him her father. Mandy stated that she recalled “laying

down in the bed and he was just touching [her] and then . . . he licked [her] down there

and [she] was staring at the ceiling.” The State asked Mandy to discuss what “Carlos” did

to her “one at a time.” Mandy remembered that she and appellant were in her mother’s

bedroom, and “he told [her] that [she] needed to touch [herself] or touch him and he said

that for [her] to put his thing in [her] mouth and ‘suck it like a lollipop.’” Mandy stated that

she “had put it in [her] mouth and . . . was scared.” Mandy said that on another occasion,

while in her mother’s room, “He would just touch me or lick me down there.” Mandy did

not know how often appellant did this to her but said, “I know it was more than three

times.” Mandy clarified on redirect examination that appellant touched her clitoris while

“moving his fingers around.” Mandy testified that although appellant sexually abused her,

she sent him messages stating that she loved him when he left the home. The State

asked, “Did Juan Carlos Cirilo sexual[ly] abuse you?” Mandy said, “Yes, he did” and

denied that there was any confusion about “who did what to” her.

The State asked Mandy if she had accused someone else of sexual abuse, and

Mandy said she had accused “[h]is son.” The State asked, “And when you say ‘his son,’

7 who are you referring to?” Mandy replied, “J.C. . . . My stepbrother.” The State asked,

“What did J.C. do to you?” Mandy said, “He had touched me too.” Mandy testified that the

incident with J.C. only occurred one time. Mandy testified that the incident with J.C. had

“[n]othing to do with” the incidents with appellant. Mandy stated that she told appellant

what J.C. had done, and appellant told her he would speak with J.C.

Finally, appellant presented the testimony of several witness who all referred to

appellant as “Carlos.” Appellant testified that he “didn’t do none of this.” Appellant’s trial

counsel asked if what Mandy alleged occurred, and appellant said, “No, none of those.

Those are all false accusations.” On cross-examination, the State asked, “And you’re

telling me that everything that’s coming out of her mouth is a lie?” Appellant said, “Yes.”

B. Discussion

Appellant argues that the evidence “creates significant doubt as to whether

[a]ppellant was correctly identified as the perpetrator.” We disagree. Throughout Mandy’s

direct examination and cross-examination, it is abundantly clear that Mandy is describing

events and incidents that occurred with appellant. As described above, the witnesses

clearly set out that appellant is Mandy’s former stepfather who is referred to as “Carlos”

and that “J.C.” is appellant’s son. Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a rational fact finder could have found beyond

a reasonable doubt based on the evidence and reasonable inferences from that evidence

that appellant was the person who committed the charged offenses. Whatley, 445 S.W.3d

at 166; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d 898–99. We overrule appellant’s first issue

8 III. PENETRATION

By his second issue, appellant contends that Mandy’s “testimony only indicated

that he touched her without providing sufficient detail to meet all elements of the charged

offense.” We construe this argument as challenging the element of penetration.

“[I]n common parlance, mere contact with the outside of an object does not amount

to a penetration of it.” Vernon v. State, 841 S.W.2d 407, 409 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).

However, “pushing aside and reaching beneath a natural fold of skin into an area of the

body not usually exposed to view, even in nakedness, is a significant intrusion beyond

mere external contact.” Id. Therefore, penetration occurs if the touching as described by

the victim can be “regarded by ordinary English speakers as more intrusive than contact

with her outer vaginal lips.” Id.

Here, Mandy testified that appellant rubbed her clitoris. The State’s expert witness,

Sonja Eddleman, a sexual assault nurse examiner, testified that the area of a female

vagina inside the labia majora is the female sexual organ.2 The State’s expert witness

agreed with the State that “anything past the labia majora is considered penetration.”

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a rational

fact finder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence and

reasonable inferences from that evidence that appellant’s touching was more intrusive

than contact with her outer vaginal lips and thus, constituted penetration. See Vernon,

841 S.W.2d at 409–10; Karnes v. State, 873 S.W.2d 92, 96 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, no

pet.) (“Touching beneath the fold of the external genitalia amounts to penetration within

2 Eddleman did not examine Mandy in this case.

9 the meaning of the aggravated sexual assault statute.”); see also Whatley, 445 S.W.3d

at 166; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d 898–99; Manzanarez v. State, No. 05-22-00671-CR, 2024

WL 260481, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 24, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated

for publication) (“It is proper to describe Manzanarez’s touching of S.T. in this case as

penetration, as contact with her clitoris or the area below the plane of her labia majora

could reasonably be regarded as more intrusive than just contact with her outer vaginal

lips.”); Levitz v. State, No. 08-99-00200-CR, 2001 WL 225934, at *3 (Tex. App.—El Paso

Mar. 8, 2001, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“[P]enetration between

the labia is sufficient to establish penetration of the female sexual organ even if the vagina

was not entered.”); Buckner v. State, No. 14-97-01399-CR, 1999 WL 649098, at *4 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 26, 1999, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (“[A]ny penetration of the female sexual organ, not just the vagina, is sufficient

to show sexual assault.”). We overrule appellant’s second issue.

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

JAIME TIJERINA Chief Justice

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed on the 24th day of April, 2025.