1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JUAN ANTONIO MARTINEZ (A-208- No. 1:26-cv-2998 DAD CSK 165-222), 12 Petitioner, 13 ORDER AND FINDINGS & v. RECOMMENDATIONS 14 WARDEN, GOLDEN STATE ANNEX, et 15 al, 16 Respondents. 17 18 Petitioner, an immigration detainee proceeding without counsel, filed a petition for writ of 19 habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and a request for the appointment of counsel. As 20 discussed below, this Court denies petitioner’s motion for appointment of counsel, and 21 recommends that his habeas petition be denied for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 22 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 23 Petitioner is a citizen and native of El Salvador. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) In 2014, petitioner 24 entered the United States without inspection, was detained by U.S. Customs and Border 25 Protection, and released a few days later. (Id.) On August 16, 2016, petitioner was granted 26 asylum. (ECF No. 10-1 at 3 (Form I-213).) Since then, petitioner has been convicted of multiple 27 crimes, including theft, burglary, assault, and robbery. (Id.; ECF No. 10-2.) 28 On February 25, 2026, petitioner was taken into immigration custody from the Valley 1 State Prison in Chowchilla, California. (ECF Nos. 1 at 5, 10-1 at 2.) Petitioner was not provided 2 a pre-detention hearing. (ECF No. 1 at 5, 6.) Petitioner has been in continuous detention since 3 February 25, 2026. (Id. at 11.) Respondents do not contest petitioner’s factual allegations. (See 4 ECF No. 10.) 5 II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 6 On April 21, 2026, petitioner filed the petition for writ of habeas corpus, a motion for 7 temporary restraining order, and a motion for appointment of counsel. (ECF No. 1, 3, 4.) On 8 April 26, 2026, respondents timely filed an opposition to the motion for temporary restraining 9 order, and an answer to the petition. (ECF No. 10.) On April 29, 2026, the district court denied 10 the motion for temporary restraining order and referred the habeas petition to the undersigned. 11 (ECF No. 11.) On May 4, 2026, this Court granted petitioner ten days to file a reply to 12 respondent’s answer to the habeas petition. (ECF No. 12.) Petitioner did not file a reply. (See 13 Docket.) Briefing is now complete. 14 III. LEGAL STANDARD 15 The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every 16 individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) 17 (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in 18 custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure 19 release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas 20 corpus may be granted to a petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the 21 Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has 22 served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its 23 protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). A district court’s 24 habeas jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration detention. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 25 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). 26 IV. DISCUSSION 27 Petitioner raises a Fifth Amendment due process claim for prolonged detention that 28 exceeds six months. (See ECF No. 1 at 16-17.) It is undisputed that petitioner has not been 1 detained for more than six months. Because petitioner is proceeding pro se and pro se pleadings 2 are liberally construed, the Court construes petitioner’s claim as a Fifth Amendment due process 3 claim challenging his re-detention, and not as a claim limited to challenging his detention as 4 prolonged. Respondents contend that petitioner is detained pursuant to the mandatory detention 5 provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) because his post-2016 convictions render him inadmissible 6 and removable. (ECF No. 10 at 2, 4.) Respondents further argue that this Court should find that 7 because petitioner failed to seek a Joseph hearing in immigration court, petitioner failed to 8 exhaust his administrative remedies and the petition should be dismissed. (Id. at 4-5 (citing 9 Matter of Joseph, 22 I & N Dec. 799 (BIA 1999)).) 10 Section 1226(c)(1)(E) mandates detention of any noncitizen who meets two requirements: 11 (i) the noncitizen is inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(A), 1182(a)(6)(C), or 1182(a)(7); 12 and (ii) the noncitizen “is charged with, is arrested for, is convicted of, admits having committed, 13 or admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of any burglary, theft, larceny, 14 shoplifting, or assault of a law enforcement officer offense, or any crime that results in death or 15 serious bodily injury to another person.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). This Court agrees with 16 respondent that petitioner has been detained and put in removal proceedings based on his criminal 17 record, and is therefore subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). 18 Section 2241 “does not specifically require petitioners to exhaust direct appeals before 19 filing petitions for habeas corpus.” Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2004). 20 However, “[a]s a prudential matter, courts require that habeas petitioners exhaust all available 21 judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.” Ward v. Chavez, 678 22 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012). Because exhaustion is not required by statute, it is not 23 jurisdictional. Brown v. Rison, 895 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds by 24 Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 54-55 (1995) (citing Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc. v. CHG Int’l, Inc., 25 811 F.2d 1209, 1223 (9th Cir. 1987)). If a petitioner has not properly exhausted his claims, the 26 district court, in its discretion, may “determine whether to excuse the faulty exhaustion and reach 27 the merits or require the petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies before proceeding in 28 court.” Id. “Courts may require prudential exhaustion if (1) agency expertise makes agency 1 consideration necessary to generate a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation of 2 the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme; and 3 (3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude 4 the need for judicial review.” Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal 5 citation and quotation marks omitted). 6 Under the circumstances of this case, this Court finds that petitioner should not be excused 7 from exhausting administrative remedies. See Buckley v.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JUAN ANTONIO MARTINEZ (A-208- No. 1:26-cv-2998 DAD CSK 165-222), 12 Petitioner, 13 ORDER AND FINDINGS & v. RECOMMENDATIONS 14 WARDEN, GOLDEN STATE ANNEX, et 15 al, 16 Respondents. 17 18 Petitioner, an immigration detainee proceeding without counsel, filed a petition for writ of 19 habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and a request for the appointment of counsel. As 20 discussed below, this Court denies petitioner’s motion for appointment of counsel, and 21 recommends that his habeas petition be denied for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 22 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 23 Petitioner is a citizen and native of El Salvador. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) In 2014, petitioner 24 entered the United States without inspection, was detained by U.S. Customs and Border 25 Protection, and released a few days later. (Id.) On August 16, 2016, petitioner was granted 26 asylum. (ECF No. 10-1 at 3 (Form I-213).) Since then, petitioner has been convicted of multiple 27 crimes, including theft, burglary, assault, and robbery. (Id.; ECF No. 10-2.) 28 On February 25, 2026, petitioner was taken into immigration custody from the Valley 1 State Prison in Chowchilla, California. (ECF Nos. 1 at 5, 10-1 at 2.) Petitioner was not provided 2 a pre-detention hearing. (ECF No. 1 at 5, 6.) Petitioner has been in continuous detention since 3 February 25, 2026. (Id. at 11.) Respondents do not contest petitioner’s factual allegations. (See 4 ECF No. 10.) 5 II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 6 On April 21, 2026, petitioner filed the petition for writ of habeas corpus, a motion for 7 temporary restraining order, and a motion for appointment of counsel. (ECF No. 1, 3, 4.) On 8 April 26, 2026, respondents timely filed an opposition to the motion for temporary restraining 9 order, and an answer to the petition. (ECF No. 10.) On April 29, 2026, the district court denied 10 the motion for temporary restraining order and referred the habeas petition to the undersigned. 11 (ECF No. 11.) On May 4, 2026, this Court granted petitioner ten days to file a reply to 12 respondent’s answer to the habeas petition. (ECF No. 12.) Petitioner did not file a reply. (See 13 Docket.) Briefing is now complete. 14 III. LEGAL STANDARD 15 The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every 16 individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) 17 (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in 18 custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure 19 release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas 20 corpus may be granted to a petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the 21 Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has 22 served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its 23 protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). A district court’s 24 habeas jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration detention. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 25 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). 26 IV. DISCUSSION 27 Petitioner raises a Fifth Amendment due process claim for prolonged detention that 28 exceeds six months. (See ECF No. 1 at 16-17.) It is undisputed that petitioner has not been 1 detained for more than six months. Because petitioner is proceeding pro se and pro se pleadings 2 are liberally construed, the Court construes petitioner’s claim as a Fifth Amendment due process 3 claim challenging his re-detention, and not as a claim limited to challenging his detention as 4 prolonged. Respondents contend that petitioner is detained pursuant to the mandatory detention 5 provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) because his post-2016 convictions render him inadmissible 6 and removable. (ECF No. 10 at 2, 4.) Respondents further argue that this Court should find that 7 because petitioner failed to seek a Joseph hearing in immigration court, petitioner failed to 8 exhaust his administrative remedies and the petition should be dismissed. (Id. at 4-5 (citing 9 Matter of Joseph, 22 I & N Dec. 799 (BIA 1999)).) 10 Section 1226(c)(1)(E) mandates detention of any noncitizen who meets two requirements: 11 (i) the noncitizen is inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(A), 1182(a)(6)(C), or 1182(a)(7); 12 and (ii) the noncitizen “is charged with, is arrested for, is convicted of, admits having committed, 13 or admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of any burglary, theft, larceny, 14 shoplifting, or assault of a law enforcement officer offense, or any crime that results in death or 15 serious bodily injury to another person.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). This Court agrees with 16 respondent that petitioner has been detained and put in removal proceedings based on his criminal 17 record, and is therefore subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). 18 Section 2241 “does not specifically require petitioners to exhaust direct appeals before 19 filing petitions for habeas corpus.” Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2004). 20 However, “[a]s a prudential matter, courts require that habeas petitioners exhaust all available 21 judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.” Ward v. Chavez, 678 22 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012). Because exhaustion is not required by statute, it is not 23 jurisdictional. Brown v. Rison, 895 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds by 24 Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 54-55 (1995) (citing Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc. v. CHG Int’l, Inc., 25 811 F.2d 1209, 1223 (9th Cir. 1987)). If a petitioner has not properly exhausted his claims, the 26 district court, in its discretion, may “determine whether to excuse the faulty exhaustion and reach 27 the merits or require the petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies before proceeding in 28 court.” Id. “Courts may require prudential exhaustion if (1) agency expertise makes agency 1 consideration necessary to generate a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation of 2 the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme; and 3 (3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude 4 the need for judicial review.” Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal 5 citation and quotation marks omitted). 6 Under the circumstances of this case, this Court finds that petitioner should not be excused 7 from exhausting administrative remedies. See Buckley v. Chestnut, 2026 WL 1030931, at *2-4 8 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2026) (court declined to waive the prudential exhaustion requirements 9 because petitioner’s appeal of his Matter of Jospeh hearing was pending). At a Joseph hearing, 10 petitioner “may avoid mandatory detention by demonstrating that he is not an alien, was not 11 convicted of the predicate crime, or that the INS is otherwise substantially unlikely to establish 12 that he is in fact subject to mandatory detention.” See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 514 n.3 13 (2003) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 3.19(h)(2)(ii) (2002)). The Joseph hearing process enables petitioner to 14 challenge his mandatory detention under § 1226(c), and the immigration court has the expertise 15 necessary to develop the record and reach a proper decision. Relaxing the exhaustion 16 requirement under these circumstances would encourage others to bypass the administrative 17 exhaustion process. Finally, in this case administrative review is likely to allow the agency to 18 correct its own mistakes and thus avoid the need for judicial review. 19 “If a petitioner fails to exhaust prudentially required administrative remedies, then ‘a 20 district court ordinarily should either dismiss the petition without prejudice or stay the 21 proceedings until the petitioner has exhausted remedies,’” unless exhaustion is excused. 22 Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 23 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2011)). Petitioner has provided no argument as to why exhaustion should be 24 excused under the circumstances of his case. Therefore, this Court finds that the exhaustion of 25 the petition should be denied without prejudice based on petitioner’s failure to exhaust 26 administrative remedies. 27 /// 28 /// 1] V. MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 2 Petitioner filed a motion for appointment of counsel. (ECF No. 4.) There currently exists 3 || no absolute nght to appointment of counsel in habeas proceedings. See Nevius v. Sumner, 105 4 | F.3d 453, 460 (9th Cir. 1996). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, the court can appoint counsel at any 5 || stage of the case “if the interests of justice so require.” See Rule 8(c), Fed. R. Governing § 2254 6 || Cases. The Court concludes that the interests of justice do not require appointment of counsel, 7 || and petitioner’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied without prejudice. 8 | VI. CONCLUSION 9 In summary, the Court recommends that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be 10 || dismissed without prejudice. 11 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that petitioner’s motion for appointment of 12 || counsel (ECF No. 4) is DENIED. 13 Further, IT IS RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus 14 | be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE based on petitioner’s failure to exhaust administrative 15 || remedies. 16 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 17 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days 18 || after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 19 || objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 20 || “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 21 || objections shall be filed and served within seven days after service of the objections. The parties 22 || are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal 23 || the District Court’s order. Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 24 25 || Dated: May 19, 2026 A aA Aan Spe | CHI SOO KIM 27 | □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 28