Juan Anselmo Maestas v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: August 20, 2024
• Docket: 07-23-00438-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-23-00438-CR

JUAN ANSELMO MAESTAS, APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

On Appeal from the 320th District Court Potter County, Texas Trial Court No. 082039-D-CR, Honorable Steven Denny, Presiding

August 20, 2024 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

Juan Anselmo Maestas appeals from his jury conviction for continuous sexual

abuse of children. His sole issue concerns the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the

verdict. We affirm.

Background

Appellant was married to the complainants’ grandmother for some thirty years.

During the midst of the grandmother’s declining health and separation from appellant, the

complainants (his two step-granddaughters) revealed he had touched their vaginas, put his mouth on their vaginas, and made them put their mouths on his penis. These actions

occurred several times over a period of years when they were under the age of fourteen.

Appellant was tried before a jury during which the victims and other witnesses

testified. The jury found him guilty of the charged offense.

Analysis

Through his sole issue on appeal, appellant contends the evidence was insufficient

to support his conviction because the testimony of each of the victims was successfully

impeached at trial as they had previously denied any sexual abuse. Further, appellant

argues, there was no evidence to show any of the alleged acts were committed with the

intent to arouse or gratify sexual desire. We overrule the issue.

The applicable standard of review is that discussed in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 318-19, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979), Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516

(Tex. Crim. App. 2012), and Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We

will apply it here and while doing so, consider all the evidence favorable to the verdict,

even if inadmissible. Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).

As noted, the State indicted appellant for continuous sexual abuse of a child. The

crime occurs when “during a period that is 30 or more days in duration” a 17-year-old or

older person “commits two or more acts of sexual abuse, regardless of whether the acts

of sexual abuse are committed against one or more victims” and the victim is “younger

than 14 years of age . . . .” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(b)(1), (b)(2)(A). A review of

the evidence at bar illustrates that appellant sexually abused his two step-

granddaughters. The acts included touching their vaginal areas, putting his mouth on

their vaginal areas, and making the two girls put their mouths on his penis. He did so

more than twice during a period spanning more than thirty days. And, at the time, the 2 girls were under fourteen years of age. In fact, the victims’ testimony shows these acts

occurred on many occasions for many years, all while the girls were under thirteen years

of age. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.07(a), (b)(1) (uncorroborated testimony

of victim is sufficient to support conviction for sexual offense if victim was seventeen years

of age or younger at the time of the offense). Thus, the record contains evidence on

which reasonable jurors could find appellant guilty, beyond reasonable doubt, of

committing continuous sexual abuse of a child.

That the victims earlier may have denied or nominalized any occurrence of sexual

abuse does not change that result. They explained at trial that they did so out of

embarrassment, a desire to keep the acts hidden, or desire not to complete forms

containing questions about sexual abuse. The “fact that a witness makes contradictory

or inconsistent statements does not destroy his [or her] testimony as a matter of law.”

McDonald v. State, 462 S.W.2d 40, 41 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); Owens v. State, 381

S.W.3d 696, 709 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, no pet.); see Hughes v. State, No. 07-22-

00298-CR, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 3848, at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo June 6, 2023, no pet.)

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (stating, “[t]hat the victim may have recanted

or otherwise became unable or unwilling to recall being assaulted does not mandate a

contrary determination”). Rather, inconsistencies or contradictions in witness testimony

create questions of fact for the factfinder to resolve. Moreover, “[a]ll inconsistencies in

the evidence must be resolved in favor of the verdict.” Taylor v. State, No. 07-10-0099-

CR, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 9943, at *11-12 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Dec. 16, 2011, no pet.)

(mem. op., not designated for publication).

Nor is appellant’s second contention of consequence. Intent to arouse or gratify

sexual desire may be inferred from “the defendant’s conduct, his remarks, and all 3 surrounding circumstances.” McKenzie v. State, 617 S.W.2d 211, 216 (Tex. Crim. App.

1981). Indeed, “the conduct itself is sufficient to infer intent.” Abbott v. State, 196 S.W.3d

334, 340-41 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, pet. ref’d). Most significantly, one of the victims

testified that appellant would “touch hisself [sic] while he was touching me . . . [h]e would

jerk off.” Furthermore, appellant does not suggest his placing his mouth on their vaginas

or having them place their mouths on his penis was incidental or related to health care or

hygiene. See Vizcaino v. State, No. 08-22-00062-CR, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 416, at *10

(Tex. App.—El Paso Jan. 24, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(finding the evidence indicated defendant’s contact “was not incidental or related to his

care for the victims as a relative, but rather established that [defendant], through his acts,

intended to arouse or gratify his sexual desires”). In short, those acts provided some

evidence from which a rational jury could reasonably conclude, beyond reasonable doubt,

that appellant had the requisite intent to arouse or gratify sexual desire while abusing the

victims.

Having overruled appellant’s sole issue on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the

trial court.

Brian Quinn Chief Justice

Do not publish.