Juan Alaniz v. the O'Quinn Law Firm, John M. O'Quinn & Assoc., LLP, the Estate of John M. O'Quinn, and Abel Manji

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedApril 8, 2014
Docket01-14-00027-CV
StatusPublished

This text of Juan Alaniz v. the O'Quinn Law Firm, John M. O'Quinn & Assoc., LLP, the Estate of John M. O'Quinn, and Abel Manji (Juan Alaniz v. the O'Quinn Law Firm, John M. O'Quinn & Assoc., LLP, the Estate of John M. O'Quinn, and Abel Manji) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Juan Alaniz v. the O'Quinn Law Firm, John M. O'Quinn & Assoc., LLP, the Estate of John M. O'Quinn, and Abel Manji, (Tex. Ct. App. 2014).

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER OF ABATEMENT

Appellate case name: Tory House, et al. v. The O’Quinn Law Firm, John H. O’Quinn & Associates, LLP, and T. Gerald Treece, as Independent Executor of the Estate of John M. O’Quinn, deceased

Rolando Acevedo, et al. v. The O’Quinn Law Firm, John H. O’Quinn & Associates, LLP, and T. Gerald Treece, as Independent Executor of the Estate of John M. O’Quinn, deceased

Appellate case number: 01-14-00027-CV, 01-14-00138

Trial court case number: 392,247-404, 392,247-414

Trial court: Probate Court No. 2 of Harris County

Appellees, The O’Quinn Law Firm, John H. O’Quinn & Associates, LLP, and T. Gerald Treece, as Independent Executor of the Estate of John M. O’Quinn, deceased, were sued by numerous parties, including the 263 plaintiffs (“Plaintiffs”) and the 50 intervenors (“Intervenors”) in these appeals, in trial court cause number 392,247-404.1 Appellees filed individual partial motions for summary judgment against each of the Plaintiffs and individual partial motions for summary judgment against each of the Intervenors. On November 5, 2013, the trial court signed an order granting appellees’ “No Evidence Motions for Partial Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs.”2 That same day, the trial court also signed a separate order in trial court cause number 392,247-404 granting appellees’ “No Evidence Motions for Partial Summary Judgment as to Intervenors.”3 On December 18, 2013, the trial court signed two separate orders of severance, making each summary judgment order final and appealable. See City of Beaumont v. Guillory, 751

1 The names of the 263 plaintiffs and the 50 intervenors are delineated in the trial court’s November 5, 2013 orders. 2 The order granted summary judgment in favor of appellees against each of the 263 plaintiffs in these appeals. 3 The order granted summary judgment in favor of appellees against each of the 50 intervenors in these appeals. S.W.2d 491, 492 (Tex. 1992) (“A summary judgment that fails to dispose expressly of all parties and issues in the pending suit is interlocutory and not appealable unless a severance of that phase of the case is ordered by the trial court.”); Wickers v. Am. Sw. Ins. Managers, Inc., No. 14-12- 01055-CV, 2013 WL 1499585, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 11, 2013, no pet.) (“In this case, the trial court severed appellee from the main case number; thus, the partial summary judgment was final for purposes of appeal.”). The first “Order of Severance,” relating to Plaintiffs, states: On this day, the Court considered severance of the Order granting partial summary judgment as to the 263 Plaintiffs the subject of the No Evidence Motions for Partial Summary Judgment. After considering the merits of severance, and argument of counsel, this Court is of the opinion that severance is proper and should be GRANTED. It is therefore, ORDERED that the parties and all issues raised by the No Evidence Motions for Partial Summary Judgment, and Order granting same, be and are hereby severed regarding the 263 Plaintiffs listed . . . . It is further ORDERED [that] the clerk of the court assign a separate cause number of next available sub number to the severed action, and the clerk of the court is directed to make non-certified copies of: (1) the docket sheet; (2) a copy of this Order; and (3) the documents listed as Exhibit A and include them in the file of the severed case. The second “Order of Severance,” relating to Intervenors, states: On this day, the Court considered severance of the Order granting partial summary judgment as to the fifty (50) Intervenors the subject of the No Evidence Motions for Partial Summary Judgment. After considering the merits of severance, and argument of counsel, this Court is of the opinion that severance is proper and should be GRANTED. It is therefore, ORDERED that the parties and issues raised by the No Evidence Motions for Partial Summary Judgment, and Order granting same, be and are hereby severed regarding the 50 Intervenors listed . . . . It is further ORDERED that the clerk of the court assign a separate cause number of next available sub number to the severed action, and the clerk of the court is directed to make non-certified copies of: (1) the docket sheet; (2) a copy of this Order; and (3) the documents listed as Exhibit A and include them in the file of the severed case. A reading of the trial court’s two “Order[s] of Severance” indicates that the trial court intended to create two separate severed cases, one for Plaintiffs’ claims and one for Intervenors’ claims, each with its own “separate cause number of next available sub number,” and each distinct from the original trial court cause number 392,247-404. The trial court instructed the trial court clerk to assign cause numbers to these two severed cases, separately. It does not appear from the record, however, that the trial court clerk ever assigned a “separate cause number” to either Plaintiffs’ severed case or Intervenors’ severed case.4 See generally TEX. R. CIV. P. 23 (duty of clerk to assign cause number). On January 7, 2014, Plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal challenging the trial court’s November 5, 2013 order granting appellees’ “No Evidence Motions For Partial Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs.” Listed on Plaintiffs’ notice of appeal was the original trial court cause no. 392,247-404. On January 13, 2014, Intervenors filed their notice of appeal challenging the trial court’s November 5, 2013 order granting appellees’ “No Evidence Motions For Partial Summary Judgment as to Intervenors.” Also listed on Intervenors’ notice of appeal was the original trial court cause no. 392,247-404. Thus, in January 2014, the Clerk of this Court received two notices of appeal containing the same trial court cause number. This resulted in both Plaintiffs’ severed case and Intervenors’ severed case being docketed under the same appellate cause number, 01-14-00027-CV, despite the fact that Plaintiffs and Intervenors appealed from two separate orders in two separately severed cases. See TEX. R. APP. P. 12.2(c) (“All notices of appeal filed in the same case must be given the same docket number.”). Subsequently, on January 29, 2014, the trial court signed a “Second Amended Order of Severance,” in trial court cause number 392,247-404, in which the trial court states: On this day, the Court considered severance of the Order granting partial summary judgment as to the 263 Plaintiffs and 50 Intervenors, the subject of the No Evidence Motions for Partial Summary Judgment. After considering the merits of severance, and argument of counsel, this Court is of the opinion that severance is proper and should be granted. It is therefore, ORDERED that the parties and all issues raised by the No Evidence Motions for Partial Summary Judgment, and Order granting same, be and are hereby severed regarding the 263 Plaintiffs and 50 Intervenors listed below.

4 Although it is better practice for the trial court to assign a new cause number in its severance order, an order granting severance is effective when signed. McRoberts v. Ryals, 863 S.W.2d 450, 452–53 (Tex. 1993). Thus, the two severance orders signed by the trial court on December 18, 2013 were effective and created two separate severed actions (one for Plaintiffs and one for Intervenors), even without the trial court clerk’s creation of separate severed case files with different cause numbers. Id. at 452–53 & nn.3–4; see also Zurovec v. Miller, No. 04-96-00470-CV, 1196 WL 425993, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 31, 1996, no writ) (severance effective on date order was signed because, although order contained provision for assignment of new cause number, order in no way conditioned effectiveness of severance on that assignment). ...

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

McRoberts v. Ryals
863 S.W.2d 450 (Texas Supreme Court, 1993)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Juan Alaniz v. the O'Quinn Law Firm, John M. O'Quinn & Assoc., LLP, the Estate of John M. O'Quinn, and Abel Manji, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/juan-alaniz-v-the-oquinn-law-firm-john-m-oquinn-as-texapp-2014.