Juan A. Cabrera v. Florida Soft Side South

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT MYERS DIVISION

JUAN A. CABRERA,

Petitioner, Case No. 2:26-cv-797-KCD-NPM

v.

FLORIDA SOFT SIDE SOUTH,

Respondent, /

ORDER Petitioner Juan A. Cabrera has filed a pro se habeas corpus petition challenging his detention by U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement. (Doc. 1.)1 He claims that his continued detention violates the Fifth Amendment. (Id. at 7-8.) Respondents oppose the petition. (Doc. 10.) For the reasons below, the petition is DENIED. I. Background Petitioner entered the United States in 1973 as a lawful permanent resident. (Doc. 10 at 2.) He was incarcerated from 2014 through 2023 and was transferred to ICE custody upon termination of his sentence. (Doc. 10-4 at 3.) On January 26, 2023, an order of removal was entered against him, but by that point, he had been released. (Doc. 10-5.) ICE again detained him on October 26, 2025, and he has been in custody ever since.

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all internal quotation marks, citations, case history, and alterations have been omitted in this and later citations. II. Legal Framework The federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, provides authority to

issue writs of habeas corpus when an individual is “[i]n custody in violation of the Constitution or law or treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3). “At its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its

protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). “Section 2241 authorizes federal courts to hear challenges to immigration detention.” Grigorian v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-22914-RAR, 2025 WL 2604573, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2025).

III. Discussion The statutory framework for removal works like this: when a noncitizen’s removal order becomes final, the government has 90 days to effectuate removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). During that period, detention is

mandatory. Id. § 1231(a)(2)(A). If the 90 days pass and the noncitizen is still here, the statute gives the government a choice: release the individual on supervision or keep them detained. Id. § 1231(a)(6). But as the Supreme Court explained in Zadvydas, the authority to

detain does not stretch into infinity. To avoid serious constitutional problems, the Court read an implicit limitation into the statute: the government may detain a noncitizen only for a period “reasonably necessary” to secure his removal. 533 U.S. at 659. And to make that rule workable, the Court established a presumption. For the first six months, detention is

presumptively reasonable. Id. at 701. After that period has passed and the alien “provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” the burden then shifts to the government to provide evidence sufficient to rebut that showing. Akinwale v.

Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002). Thus, “in order to state a claim under Zadvydas, the alien not only must show post-removal order detention in excess of six months but also must provide evidence of a good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the

reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. Applied here, Cabrera cannot satisfy the initial temporal requirement. ICE took him into custody on October 26, 2025. (Doc. 10 at 2.) Because he has been detained for just five months, he remains within the window in which

his detention is presumptively reasonable. Seemingly recognizing this, his petition jumps to the burden-shifting framework, arguing that his removal to Cuba is not likely. (Doc. 1 at 7.) This argument puts the cart before the horse. Until the six-month Zadvydas period concludes, detention is presumptively

reasonable, and any due process claim is not ripe. See, e.g., Grigorian v. Bondi, Case No. 25-CV-22914-RAR, 2025 WL 1895479, at *8 (S.D. Fla. July 8, 2025); Lopez v. Dir. of Enf’t and Removal Operations, Case No. 3:25-cv- 1313-JEP-SJH, 2026 WL 261938, at *12 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2026); Guerra- Castro v. Parra, Case No. 25-cv-22487-GAYLES, 2025 WL 1984300 at *4

(S.D. Fla. July 17, 2025) (finding habeas petition “premature” because “Petitioner has not been detained for more than six months”). Cabrera also notes that he has been diagnosed with cancer and cares for his wife and children. (Doc. 1 at 7.) To the extent these are arguments for

habeas relief, they are summarily rejected. Challenges to conditions of confinement are not appropriately raised in the habeas context. Nor can the Court release Cabrera because his position is sympathetic. See Vaz v. Skinner, 634 F. App’x 778, 781 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Petitioner’s § 2241 petition

is not the appropriate vehicle for raising an inadequate medical care claim, as such a claim challenges the conditions of confinement, not the fact or duration of that confinement.”). Cabrera’s due process claim under Zadvydas is not yet ripe, so the

habeas petition is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE2 to him refiling a new petition should his current detention exceed the six-month mark, and he can demonstrate there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably

2 Petitioner also asks this Court to provide him relief under a California case that certified a class action of aliens who are in immigration detention and being denied access to a bond hearing. See Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 WL 3288403 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025). Yet Bautista is inapplicable here. Following an order of removal, immigration detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231. See Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 544 (2021). Under § 1231, detention during the removal period is mandatory. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A). foreseeable future. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly, terminate any pending motions and deadlines, and close the case. ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on April 16, 2026.

Kyle C. Dudek United States District Judge