UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
J.T.F., et al., : : Plaintiffs, : Civil Action No.: 21-1453 (RC) : v. : Re Document Nos.: 71, 72 : DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, : : Defendant. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AND FEES
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs J.T.F. and her mother, Ana Flores, (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) bring this action
against Defendant the District of Columbia, (“Defendant” or “the District”) alleging violations of
their rights under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et
seq.; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; the Equal Educational
Opportunities Act of 1974 (“EEOA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq.; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794; and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1201 et seq. Earlier in this litigation, this Court dismissed all claims contained in the Amended
Complaint except for the claims within Counts 1–18 under the EEOA and the Count 18 claim
under the IDEA.
Defendant now moves for attorney’s fees and to dismiss Plaintiffs’ remaining claims with
prejudice as a sanction for failing to comply with discovery obligations. For the reasons set forth
below, the Court grants Defendant’s motions. The Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ remaining claims
and will award Defendant fees in the amount of $15,670.58 for the services of Assistant Attorney General Tasha Hardy; $2,589.60 for the services of Section Chief Steven Rubenstein; and
$1,210.50 in fees for the services of Senior Assistant Attorney General Veronica Porter.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Court assumes familiarity with the facts underlying this dispute, which are described
in the Court’s prior memorandum opinions. See Mem. Op. (“First Mem. Op.”), ECF No. 27;
Mem. Op. (“Second Mem. Op.”), ECF No. 40; Mem. Op. (“Third Mem. Op.”), ECF No. 54;
Mem. Op. (“Fourth Mem. Op.”), ECF No. 70. The facts are briefly recounted below.
Plaintiff Ana Flores brought this action on behalf of her daughter, J.T.F., who requires
specialized speech, language therapy, and occupational therapy services. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 17, 20,
ECF No. 2. J.T.F. and Ms. Flores are native Spanish speakers. Id. ¶¶ 17–18. Flores “reads and
writes only in Spanish, and understands little spoken English.” Id. ¶ 18. After allegedly
receiving an inadequate Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”) at Oyster-Adams Bilingual
School, the District of Columbia Public School System (“DCPS”) transferred J.T.F. to
MacFarland Middle School for the 2020–2021 school year. See id. ¶¶ 26–33, 72, 77–78.
Unhappy with the IEP and the resulting MacFarland placement, Flores filed a complaint
with the Office of Dispute Resolution (“ODR”) in the D.C. Office of the State Superintendent of
Education alleging that DCPS had violated the IDEA. Ex. 2 to Def.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss
at 4, ECF No. 9-2 (“ODR Complaint”). In February 2021, an ODR Hearing Officer determined
that Flores was not entitled to relief on most of her claims. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 88, 90–110. On May
27, 2021, Plaintiffs filed suit in this Court, alleging that Defendant had violated the IDEA and
various other education and anti-discrimination statutes. Id. ¶¶ 111–33; see also Compl., ECF
No. 1. Early in this litigation, Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims. Def.’s Mot.
Dismiss, ECF No. 9. On December 21, 2021, this Court dismissed each of the claims contained
2 in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, save for claims within Counts 1–18 under the EEOA and the
claim within Count 18 under the IDEA. See First Mem. Op.; Second Mem. Op. at 7–8.
The parties then proceeded to discovery. The Court’s initial scheduling order required
the parties to conclude fact discovery by July 5, 2022. Third Mem. Op. at 2. Defendant served
Plaintiffs with interrogatories and requests for production—to be answered by June 30, 2022—
but Plaintiffs never responded. Id. at 2–3. This Court extended the close of discovery to
September 30, with Plaintiffs to respond to Defendant’s requests by August 15. Id. at 3.
Plaintiffs again missed the deadline, and this Court ordered Plaintiffs’ discovery responses by
October 24. Id. On October 21, Plaintiffs submitted partial and incomplete responses to
Defendant’s requests. Id. On November 1, Plaintiffs objected to Defendant’s interrogatories
because they were not translated into Spanish, an objection the Court later rejected as an invalid
and inadequate reason for not providing Defendant with responses. Id. at 8. (citing Calderon v.
Reederei Claus-Peter Offen GmbH & Co., No. 07-61022-CIV, 2008 WL 4194810, at *3 (S.D.
Fla. Sept. 11, 2008)).
On February 6, 2023, Defendant filed a motion seeking to compel Plaintiffs to provide
“full and complete responses to its discovery requests,” which the Court granted on August 28,
2023. Id. at 4 The Court ordered Plaintiffs to fully respond to Defendant’s discovery requests
within 30 days of the August 28 order and expressly warned Plaintiffs that noncompliance “will
have consequences up to and potentially even including dismissal.” Id. at 8.
In October 2023, the parties notified this Court that J.T.F. and her mother no longer
reside in the District of Columbia. See Pls.’ Notice of Change of Address, ECF No. 66.
Defendant also notified this Court that Plaintiffs had not provided any further responses to
Defendant’s interrogatories or requests for production of documents. See Joint Status Report
3 (“JSR”) at 1, ECF No. 55. Defendant then moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ remaining IDEA and
EEOA claims on mootness grounds. See generally Def.’s Mem. in Supp. Def.’s Mot. Dismiss
(“Def.’s Second Mot. Dismiss”), ECF No. 56. Defendant moved in the alternative for the
sanction of dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37. See generally Def.’s Mem. in
Supp. Def.’s Mot. Sanctions (“Def.’s First Mot. Sanctions”), ECF No. 57.
This Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant’s motion to dismiss, dismissing
Plaintiffs’ IDEA claim as moot but allowing the Plaintiffs’ EEOA claim to proceed. See Fourth
Mem. Op. at 11, 14. Furthermore, this Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant’s
motion for sanctions, providing Plaintiffs with “one further extension” to fully respond to
Defendant’s discovery requests. Id. at 21. The Court expressly warned Plaintiffs that they must
“fully respond to the District’s discovery requests within thirty days of the date of [its] order,”
and that failure to so comply may result in sanctions, up to and including dismissal of their
remaining claims. Id. Plaintiffs have yet to provide Defendant with any response to the
interrogatories served on April 4, 2022—or any supplemental responsive documents—in
contravention of this Court’s order. See id.
Defendant now moves for attorney’s fees and for sanctions under Rule 37 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37; Def.’s Mot. Att’y’s Fees, ECF No. 71; Def.’s Mot.
Sanctions (“Def.’s Second Mot. Sanctions”), ECF No. 72. Plaintiffs filed a response to these
motions. See Pls.’ Resp. Def.’s Mot. Fees, ECF No. 74. 1
1 Plaintiffs’ filing appears to oppose Defendants’ motions in a cursory fashion, asking the Court to deny the motions without argument or citation to legal authority. See Pls.’ Response at 1–2; see also Local Civil Rule 7(b) (requiring parties to oppose motions with “a memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to the motion” (emphasis added)). The remainder of Plaintiffs’ briefing addresses other issues, and as such Defendant’s motions could be viewed as conceded. The Court nonetheless proceeds to a full analysis. In addition, Defendant filed a corrected motion for sanctions, see ECF No. 75-1, and Plaintiffs moved for an extension of time
4 III. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Motion for Sanctions
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 provides that a district court may order sanctions,
including dismissal of the action “in whole or in part,” for failure “to obey an order to provide or
permit discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A). When counsel repeatedly falls short of their
discovery obligations, courts may be “forced to issue harsher sanctions that affect the merits of
Plaintiffs’ action, up to and including dismissal with prejudice.” See Davis v. D.C. Child & Fam.
Servs. Agency, 304 F.R.D. 51, 64 (D.D.C. 2014). District courts are afforded broad discretion to
impose sanctions for discovery violations under Rule 37. See Kister v. District of Columbia, 229
F.R.D. 326, 329 (D.D.C. 2005).
When determining if the sanction of dismissal is warranted under Rule 37, courts must
first consider whether the other party’s ability to present its case has been “‘so prejudiced by the
misconduct that it would be unfair to require him to proceed further in the case.’” Webb v.
District of Columbia, 146 F.3d 964, 971 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting Shea v. Donohoe Constr. Co.,
795 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). Second, dismissal may be warranted where the errant
party’s behavior places “an intolerable burden on a district court by requiring the court to modify
its own docket and operations in order to accommodate the delay.” Id. (quoting Shea, 795 F.2d
at 1075). Finally, dismissal may be appropriate to “sanction conduct that is disrespectful to the
court and to deter similar misconduct in the future.” Id. (quoting Shea, 795 F.2d at 1077).
to file a response, see ECF No. 76. Given that Plaintiffs’ initial response to Defendant’s motions contained little of substance answering Defendant’s arguments, and that Plaintiffs have not filed a revised response in the ensuing six months, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ motion for an extension. Out of an abundance of caution, however, the Court relies on Defendant’s original briefing because Plaintiffs had the opportunity to respond to those motions.
5 Summarized, a sanction of dismissal must be justified by “(1) prejudice to the opposing
party, (2) prejudice to the judicial system [or] (3) the need for punishment and deterrence.”
Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm’n v. Reliable Limousine Serv., LLC, 776 F.3d 1, 4–5
(D.C. Cir. 2015). Any one of these justifications, standing alone, can provide a sufficient basis
for dismissing a case. See Webb, 146 F.3d at 971. Before imposing the sanction of dismissal,
courts are charged with considering whether lesser sanctions would be adequate. Moore v.
Napolitano, 723 F. Supp. 2d 167, 179 (D.D.C. 2010).
B. Motion for Attorney’s Fees
Where a party has failed to comply with an order, regardless of whether other sanctions
have been imposed, “the court must order the disobedient party, the attorney advising that party,
or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure, unless
the failure was substantially justified, or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C). When determining an appropriate award of attorney’s fees, courts
must assess (1) whether counsel’s requested hourly rate is reasonable and (2) whether the
number of hours expended by counsel is reasonable. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,
437 (1983).
Under the first step of determining what hourly rate is “reasonable,” a court’s analysis
“turns on three sub-elements: (1) ‘the attorney[’s] billing practices,’ (2) ‘the attorney[’s] skill,
experience, and reputation’ and (3) ‘the prevailing market rates in the relevant community.’”
Eley v. District of Columbia, 793 F.3d 97, 100 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Covington v. District of
Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). In establishing a reasonable rate, “a fee
applicant must ‘produce satisfactory evidence—in addition to the attorney’s own affidavits—that
the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by
6 lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.’” Eley, 793 F.3d at 100
(quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984)).
When assessing whether the requested rates are in line with “those prevailing in the
community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill,” this Court has
compared requested rates against the Fitzpatrick Matrix in the context of complex litigation. See
id.; J.T. v. District of Columbia, 652 F. Supp. 3d 11, 36 (D.D.C. 2023) (applying the Fitzpatrick
Matrix rather than the LSI Laffey Matrix). Furthermore, in the context of claims arising under
the IDEA, this Court has previously found it appropriate to award three-fourths of the applicable
matrix rates. See, e.g., Bond ex rel. K.M. v. Friendship Pub. Charter Sch. Bd. of Trustees, No.
23-cv-367, 2023 WL 8710370, at *6 (D.D.C. Dec. 18, 2023) (granting three-quarters of the
matrix rate in IDEA administrative proceeding).
Under step two of the attorney’s fees analysis—determining whether the number of hours
expended is reasonable—fee applicants bear the burden of “establishing entitlement to an award
and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437.
The supporting documents must be sufficiently detailed to allow for a determination with a high
degree of certainty that the hours claimed were actually and reasonably expended. Role Models
Am., Inc. v. Brownlee, 353 F.3d 962, 970 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
IV. ANALYSIS
The Court evaluates Defendant’s request for sanctions under Rule 37 and Defendant’s
request for attorney’s fees in turn. Having reviewed the request for sanctions, the Court finds
Defendant’s request reasonable and accordingly dismisses Plaintiffs’ remaining EEOA claim
with prejudice. Furthermore, the Court finds Defendant’s request for attorney’s fees reasonable,
and awards the requested amount, $19,470.68, in full.
7 A. Request for Sanctions
Defendant moves this Court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ remaining EEOA claim under Rule 37
for “willful failure to comply with [Plaintiffs’] discovery obligations, including [Plaintiffs’]
failure to provide full and complete responses . . . to [Defendant’s] outstanding April 4, 2022,
discovery requests.” See Def.’s Second Mot. Sanctions at 1. Defendant argues that all three
Webb factors have been met, and that dismissal is appropriate. Id. at 8–13. Plaintiffs’ response
does not engage with Defendant’s arguments for the sanction of dismissal and leaves large gaps
where Plaintiffs’ counsel presumably intended to insert Plaintiffs’ argument against dismissal
before filing with this Court. See Pls.’ Resp. Def.’s Mot. Fees at 6 (“[w]ith respect to __
claim{s} Plaintiffs asserted that ____. With respect to ___ claims, Ps asserted that filed their
Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Ecf-Doc __ on ___.”).
This Court already expressly warned Plaintiffs that “failure to comply [with Defendant’s
discovery requests] may result in sanctions, up to and including dismissal of all of their
remaining claims.” See Fourth Mem. Op. at 21. Although this Court previously found dismissal
of Plaintiffs’ remaining claims was not warranted as of June 7, 2024, this Court believes the
sanction of dismissal to be appropriate given that Plaintiffs are now in violation of two of this
Court’s orders and have not provided any new information in response to Defendant’s discovery
requests. See id. at 16. At a minimum, the Court finds the third Webb factor—the need to deter
similar misconduct in the future—has been satisfied. See, e.g., Arias v. Dyncorp Aerospace
Operations, LLC, 677 F. Supp. 2d 330, 332 (D.D.C. 2010) (explaining that “[w]hile a Rule 37(b)
dismissal usually follows some showing of willfulness, bad faith or fault, a plaintiff’s persistent
failure to comply with discovery and discovery-related orders can be viewed as willful where
multiple warnings and second chances have been given to the plaintiff”).
8 The first Webb factor requires Defendant to demonstrate that Plaintiffs’ noncompliance
with their discovery obligations has prejudiced Defendant to such an extent that “it would be
unfair to require [it] to proceed further in the case.” Webb, 146 F.3d at 971 (quoting Shea, 795
F.2d at 1074). When assessing whether a party’s misconduct has been so prejudicial as to make
it unfair to require the other party to proceed, “courts look to whether the aggrieved party has
cited specific facts demonstrating actual prejudice.” Cumis Ins. Soc’y, Inc. v. Clark, 318 F.
Supp. 3d 199, 211 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Campbell v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 309 F.R.D.
21, 26 (D.D.C. 2015)).
Here, Defendant points not only to Plaintiffs’ delay in producing discoverable documents
but also to Plaintiffs’ persistent noncompliance with Defendant’s motions to compel and with
this Court’s orders. See Def.’s Second Mot. Sanctions at 7. Defendant asserts this
noncompliance has prevented Defendant from “being able to understand and evaluate Plaintiffs’
novel claims, assess the bases and appropriateness of their sought-after remedies, or formulate its
defenses and defend this case.” Id. at 8.
This Court has given Plaintiffs many chances to comply with Defendant’s discovery
requests that would permit Defendant to develop defenses and better understand the nature of the
claims pending against it. See Fourth Mem. Op. at 17. However, it has now been over two years
since Plaintiffs last partially responded to Defendant’s discovery requests, first served on
Plaintiffs on April 4, 2022. See Def.’s Second Mot. Sanctions at 7. Moreover, Plaintiffs’
response was incomplete, and the responses Plaintiffs provided “were disorganized, unlabeled,
and did not correspond to the categories articulated in the District’s request.” Fourth Mem. Op.
at 5. Furthermore, it has been more than a year and a half since this Court’s first order granting
9 Defendant’s motion to compel and over nine months since this Court’s second order granting the
same. See Third Mem. Op.; Fourth Mem. Op.
As such, this Court now finds the first Webb factor to be satisfied: Plaintiffs’ two-year-
long refusal to comply with the Defendant’s discovery requests has prevented Defendant from
mounting a defense against Plaintiffs’ remaining claims. Def.’s Second Mot. Sanctions at 7; see
also Hyman v. Am. Inst. of Architects, No. 18-cv-2899, 2020 WL 709363, at *2 (D.D.C. Feb. 12,
2020) (finding plaintiff’s refusal to comply with a court order compelling discovery and
defendant’s discovery requests to warrant dismissal where such refusal prevented defendant from
assessing claims and formulating defenses).
The second Webb factor requires the Court to consider whether Plaintiffs’ noncompliance
has imposed an “intolerable burden” on the Court. See Webb, 146 F.3d at 971 (citation omitted).
Dismissal under this factor is proper “[w]here the delay or misconduct would require the court to
expend considerable judicial resources in the future in addition to those it has already wasted,
thereby inconveniencing many other innocent litigants in the presentation of their cases.” Shea
795 F.2d at 1075–76 (emphasis omitted).
The Court has already stated that it has “unquestionably been burdened by Plaintiffs’
failure to adequately respond to the District’s discovery requests.” Fourth Mem. Op. at 18. On
February 16, 2022, this Court ordered the parties to serve any discovery requests by April 4,
2022, and to conclude the discovery of facts by July 5, 2022. See Sched. Order. at 1, ECF No.
38. The Court granted a joint motion to extend the close of discovery from July 5, 2022, to
September 30, 2022. Joint Mot. Extend Sched. Order at 3–4, ECF No. 39; Min. Order, July 5,
2022. Plaintiffs then filed a motion to extend the close of discovery from September 30, 2022, to
10 January 31, 2023, which this Court granted. Pls.’ Mot. Extend Sched. Order, ECF No. 41; Min.
Order, Aug. 26, 2022.
Plaintiffs’ continued recalcitrance resulted in this Court’s issuance of two orders, one in
August 2023 and the other in July 2024, requiring that Plaintiffs comply with Defendant’s
discovery requests. See Third Mem. Op.; Fourth Mem. Op. Despite this Court’s continued
efforts to patiently afford Plaintiffs as much time as possible to comply with Defendant’s
discovery requests, Plaintiffs have failed to cooperate with either order. Therefore, the Court no
longer finds it appropriate to rearrange its docket and engage in further fruitless delay of the
resolution of this case. The second Webb factor is satisfied.
Finally, the third Webb factor requires the Court to consider the need to “sanction
conduct that is disrespectful to the court and to deter similar misconduct in the future.” Webb,
146 F.3d at 971 (quoting Shea, 795 F.2d at 1077). To date, Plaintiffs are in contravention of two
of this Court’s orders—Third Mem. Op.; Fourth. Mem. Op.—and have made no representations
that they plan to come into compliance with these orders. See JSR; Pls.’ Resp. Def.’s Mot. Fees.
Additionally, Plaintiffs’ response to Defendant’s motion for sanctions and fees is largely
incomprehensible—with formatting errors and blank lines inserted throughout—where Plaintiffs’
counsel presumably neglected to gap-fill before submitting the document to this Court. See e.g.,
Pls.’ Resp. Def.’s Mot. Fees at 14 (“Ds filed a motion to dismiss on__ , without complying with
LCR 5.2”). Moreover, Plaintiffs’ response appears to contain cut-and-paste sections from prior
pleadings on matters no longer at issue that have nothing whatsoever to do with the motion for
sanctions and the grounds stated therein. Plaintiffs’ lack of compliance with discovery requests
made by Defendant and ordered by this Court, combined with the submission of incomplete
work product, warrant dismissal to deter similar conduct in the future under Webb factor three.
11 Finally, before dismissing a case under Rule 37, the Court must determine whether lesser
sanctions would be adequate. Moore, 723 F. Supp. 2d at 179. In the June 2024 memorandum
opinion, this Court put Plaintiffs on notice of the possibility of dismissal if Plaintiffs continued to
disobey the August 2023 order and Defendant’s discovery requests. See Fourth Mem. Op. at 20.
Specifically, the Court warned Plaintiffs that their “intransigent approach to responding to
discovery and their utter refusal to answer the [Defendant’s] interrogatories despite the Court’s
. . . order compelling them to ‘fully respond’ to the [Defendant’s] requests . . . demonstrates a
willful refusal to comply with their discovery obligations and this Court’s orders that likely will,
if it continues, justify dismissal as a sanction.” Id. Despite repeated warnings, Plaintiffs have
yet to comply with Defendant’s discovery requests or this Court’s orders. Furthermore, this
Court’s decision to grant Defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees did not incentivize Plaintiffs to
comply. See id. at 22. Therefore, this Court has “no reason to expect that, if it grant[s] another
accommodation, [Plaintiffs] would meet [their] discovery responsibilities.” Guarantee Co. of N.
Am. USA v. Lakota Cont. Inc., No. 19-cv-1601, 2021 WL 2036666, at *4 (D.D.C. May 21,
2021). 2
In conclusion, the Court finds all three Webb factors are satisfied—even though only one
need be—and has determined the imposition of lesser sanctions to be powerless to deter
Plaintiffs’ recalcitrance. This Court grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ remaining
claims with prejudice under Rule 37. See Webb, 146 F.3d at 971 (stating any of the three factors,
standing alone, provides sufficient grounds for dismissal).
2 Given that Plaintiffs have moved away from the area, the Court wonders whether Plaintiffs’ counsel is in touch with her clients. Counsel’s refusal to respond to discovery and comply with this Court’s orders, thus jeopardizing her clients’ case, raises this possibility.
12 B. Request for Attorney’s Fees
a. Reasonable Fees
This Court has already acknowledged the appropriateness of awarding attorney’s fees in
this case, having previously notified Plaintiffs’ counsel that “further unwarranted delays and
unmeritorious objections may result in an award of fees in the future.” Third Mem. Op. at 8. To
determine Defendant’s hourly rate, this Court ordered Defendant to “submit within thirty days a
petition for attorneys’ fees and expenses . . . [a]ccompanied by supporting documentation and
affidavits.” Fourth. Mem. Op. at 22. In assessing the reasonableness of Defendant’s requested
hourly rates, the Court relies on Ex. 1 to Def.’s Mot. Sanctions (“Hardy Decl.”), ECF No. 71-1;
Ex. 2 to Def.’s Mot. Sanctions (“Porter Decl.”), ECF No. 71-2; Ex. 3 to Def.’s Mot. Sanctions
(“Rubenstein Decl.”), ECF No. 71-3.; and Ex. 4 to Def.’s Mot. Sanctions (“Fitzpatrick Matrix”),
ECF No. 71-4. Plaintiffs never responded to the fee petition.
Defendant submits that the reasonable hourly compensation rate for Assistant Attorney
General Tasha Hardy is $771.00 for legal work performed in October and November 2023 and
May 2024. 3 See Hardy Decl. ¶ 2; Fitzpatrick Matrix. The 2023 Fitzpatrick Matrix recommends
this hourly rate for an attorney with 25 years of experience. See Fitzpatrick Matrix. Ms. Hardy
has 25 years of experience as an attorney and 18 years of experience as an Assistant Attorney
3 The Court calculates the requested fees pursuant to the 2023 Fitzpatrick Matrix because Defendant relies upon this version of the Matrix in its initial request for fees, and because the work performed by Defendant’s counsel occurred before the 2024 Fitzpatrick Matrix became effective on October 4, 2024. Civil Division: Attorney’s Fees, U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFF. FOR D.C., https://perma.cc/UGL6-X7UV (last visited Feb. 24, 2024); see also Brackett v. Mayorkas, No. 17-cv-988, 2023 WL 5094872, at *6 (D.D.C. Aug. 9, 2023) (awarding fees according to the Matrix rate plaintiffs relied upon when first filing a motion for fees).
13 General with the Office of the Attorney General. Hardy Decl. ¶ 2; Def.’s Mot. Atty’s Fees at 5.
Counsel’s conservative request for hourly compensation at three-fourths of the Fitzpatrick
Matrix compensation rate is in line with this Court’s precedent (despite this case involving
federal court proceedings). See, e.g., Bond ex rel. K.M., 2023 WL 8710370, at *6 (granting
three-quarters of the matrix rate in IDEA administrative proceeding). This Court finds $578.25
(three-fourths of the $771.00 Fitzpatrick Matrix rate) to be a reasonable hourly rate given Ms.
Hardy’s experience, as detailed in her declaration. Hardy Decl. ¶ 2.
Defendant submits that the reasonable compensation for Section Chief Rubenstein is
$664.00 for legal work performed in November 2023 and May 2024. See Rubenstein Decl. ¶¶ 2,
3. The 2023 Fitzpatrick Matrix recommends this hourly rate for an attorney with 13 years of
experience. See Fitzpatrick Matrix. Mr. Rubenstein graduated from law school in 2011 and has
13 years of experience. Rubenstein Decl. ¶ 2. Furthermore, Mr. Rubenstein has almost six years
of experience representing the District of Columbia in civil litigation, as well as six years of
experience working with DCPS. Id. The Court finds $498.00 (three-fourths of the $664.00
Fitzpatrick Matrix rate) to be a reasonable hourly rate given Mr. Rubenstein’s 13 years of
experience. See Rubenstein Decl.; Fitzpatrick Matrix.
Finally, Defendant seeks fees on fees for the work performed by Senior Assistant
Attorney General Veronica Porter and requests compensation of $807.00 per hour for legal work
performed in July 2024 to draft its motion for fees. Porter Decl. ¶ 3. Though compensable, “fees
on fees must be reasonable, and not excessive.” Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Fed. Bureau of
Investigation, 80 F. Supp. 3d 149, 162 (D.D.C. 2015) (citation omitted).
The Fitzpatrick Matrix stipulates the reasonable rate for an attorney with Ms. Porter’s
experience is $807.00. The 2023 Fitzpatrick Matrix recommends this hourly rate for an attorney
14 with 35 or more years of experience. See Fitzpatrick Matrix. Ms. Porter graduated from law
school in 1985 and has over 35 years of experience. Porter Decl. ¶ 2. Furthermore, Ms. Porter
has extensive experience litigating on behalf of the District of Columbia and has worked for the
Office of the Attorney General for the District since 1987. Id. Therefore, this Court finds
$605.25, three-fourths of the Fitzpatrick matrix total rate ($807.00), to be reasonable. Id.;
Fitzpatrick Matrix at 1.
b. Reasonable Hours Expended
Having determined counsels’ reasonable hourly rates, the Court must also determine
whether the hours claimed by the applicant were reasonably expended. See Hensley, 461 U.S.
424, 434 (1983). Fee applicants bear the burden of “establishing entitlement to an award and
documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.” Id. at 437. The supporting
documents must be sufficiently detailed to allow for a determination with a high degree of
certainty that the hours claimed were actually and reasonably expended. Role Models Am., Inc.,
353 F.3d at 970.
The Court finds that Ms. Hardy, Mr. Rubenstein, and Ms. Porter have met their burden of
establishing reasonable hours expended. All three attorneys submitted declarations outlining
with sufficient specificity the individual task performed and a reasonable estimate of the number
of hours expended on each individual task. The attorneys submit in their declarations that, where
hours were not recorded contemporaneously, they made “conservative estimates” as to the time
expended. See, e.g., Hardy Decl. ¶ 4. Furthermore, the Court has not identified overly vague or
duplicative billing practices within the submitted declarations. See Cobell v. Jewell, 234 F.
Supp. 3d 126, 175 (D.D.C. 2017) (noting “sound billing judgment requires that legal matters are
‘appropriately staffed to do the work required efficiently and without duplicative billing’”
15 (quoting Blackman v. District of Columbia, 397 F. Supp. 2d. 12, 14 (D.D.C. 2005)). As such, the
Court finds the number of hours expended by each attorney to be reasonable.
Ms. Hardy seeks $15,670.58 in compensation for 27.1 hours spent “researching, drafting,
and filing the motion for sanctions and reply in support of the motion.” Def.’s Mot. Att’y’s Fees
at 5; see also Hardy Decl. ¶ 3. This request for compensation covers work performed in October
and November 2023 and May 2024. See Hardy Decl. ¶ 3. Therefore, using the previously
established fair hourly compensation rate of $578.00, Ms. Hardy’s total compensation is
$15,670.58. Id.
Mr. Rubenstein seeks $2,589.60 in compensation for 5.2 hours spent “reviewing and
editing the motion and reply.” Def.’s Mot. Att’y’s Fees at 5; see also Rubenstein Decl. ¶ 3. This
request for compensation covers work performed in November 2023 and May 2024. See
Rubenstein Decl. ¶ 2. Using the adjusted, fair hourly compensation rate of $498.00 per hour, Mr.
Rubenstein’s total compensation is $2,589.60. See id.
Finally, Ms. Porter seeks $1,210.50 in compensation for 2 hours of work spent
“researching, drafting and filing the District’s motion for attorney’s fees.” Def.’s Mot. Att’y’s
Fees at 1; see also Porter Decl. ¶ 3. This request for compensation was made in July 2024. See
id. Using the adjusted, fair hourly compensation rate of $605.25, Ms. Porter’s total
compensation is $1,210.50. See id.
As the Court explained in its previous memorandum opinion, it does not appear that
Plaintiffs themselves are responsible for the repeated failure to respond to the Court’s orders, and
it would therefore be unjust to assess any fee award against them. See Fourth Mem. Op. at 22.
Plaintiffs’ status as pro bono clients additionally implies that any fee award would place an
undue burden on them, and the Court therefore finds that Plaintiffs should not be held liable
16 either individually or jointly and severally with their counsel. The Court nonetheless finds a fee
award against Plaintiffs’ counsel justified by the cost, inconvenience, and difficulty that her
conduct has imposed on the District and the Court. See Shea, 795 F.2d at 1075 (explaining that
“the court may order the guilty counsel to pay a designated amount to the other party to cover his
costs and inconvenience”). In sum, Defendant is awarded $19,470.68 in attorney’s fees as a
sanction against Plaintiffs’ counsel.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees and motion for
sanctions are GRANTED; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE for failure to comply with the Court’s discovery orders and warnings; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant is awarded $19,470.68 in attorney’s fees,
payable by Plaintiffs’ counsel pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5)(A). An order
consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued.
Dated: March 18, 2025 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge