J.T.A. v. J.A.

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: December 20, 2024
• Docket: A-2241-23
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2241-23

J.T.A.,1

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

J.A.,

Defendant-Appellant. _________________________

Submitted December 11, 2024 – Decided December 20, 2024

Before Judges Mayer and Rose.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Bergen County, Docket No. FV-02-1814-24.

Bastarrika, Soto, Gonzalez & Somohano, LLP, attorneys for appellant (Jane M. Personette, of counsel and on the brief).

Respondent has not filed a brief.

1 We refer to the parties by their initials. R. 1:38-3(d)(10). PER CURIAM

Defendant appeals from a February 13, 2024 final restraining order (FRO)

entered by default in favor of plaintiff pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic

Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. He also appeals from a

February 22, 2024 order denying his motion to reconsider the default FRO. For

the reasons that follow, we vacate the entry of the default FRO and remand for

a new trial. The February 3, 2024 temporary restraining order (TRO) shall

remain in effect pending the outcome of the new trial.

We recite the facts from the trial and motion record. On February 3, 2024,

plaintiff obtained a TRO against defendant. The TRO ordered the parties to

appear for a domestic violence trial, in person, at 9:00 a.m. on February 13,

2024. On February 12, due to anticipated inclement weather on February 13,

the trial court's staff emailed individuals scheduled for trial on February 13 that

all matters would proceed remotely if the courthouse closed. The email included

a link for counsel and parties to participate remotely for those events.

The Bergen County courthouse closed on February 13 due to inclement

weather. Plaintiff timely appeared for the domestic violence trial via the court-

provided Zoom link. Defendant did not appear. The Family Part judge waited

until 10:30 that morning to proceed with the trial. At that time, the judge

A-2241-23 2 conducted a default hearing on plaintiff's application for an FRO against

defendant.

Plaintiff testified defendant pulled her hair, choked her, and touched her

offensively on February 2. After hearing plaintiff's testimony, the judge found

plaintiff met her burden of proving defendant committed the predicate act of

harassment under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(b).

After determining plaintiff satisfied her burden of proving defendant

committed "an act of harassment," the judge found "the best interests of the

plaintiff are supported by the entry of a restraining order, and that there's an

immediate danger to the plaintiff in this case." The judge entered an FRO by

default in favor of plaintiff.

The next day, February 14, 2024, defendant filed an application to modify

the FRO. In his application, defendant stated he arrived at the courthouse on

February 13 at 8:15 a.m., but was informed by an officer that the courthouse was

closed. The officer provided a telephone number for defendant to call.

According to defendant, no one answered the telephone when he called the

number provided by the officer. Defendant further asserted he first saw the

February 12 email from the court's staff after he returned home from the

courthouse on February 13. Defendant attempted to log in via the Zoom link

A-2241-23 3 but the trial already concluded. In his application, defendant requested a new

FRO hearing.

On February 22, the Family Part judge who entered the default FRO held

a hearing on defendant's application. While defendant requested modification

of the FRO, the judge treated the application as a motion to vacate the FRO.

The judge did not ask defendant why he failed to appear for trial via the Zoom

link. In a February 22, 2024 order, the judge denied defendant's motion to vacate

the FRO, explaining defendant failed to show "excusable neglect, because he

was sent the Zoom link the day before the date of the trial and did not log into

the Zoom call . . . until 2:00."

After defendant filed a notice of appeal, the Family Part judge issued an

April 4, 2024 written amplification of his February 22, 2024 order denying the

motion to vacate the FRO. In his amplification, the judge stated:

[D]efendant admitted that he was aware of the matter proceeding remotely on February 13, 2024 and offered no showing of excusable neglect to support his failure to participate in the hearing on that date. All attempts to contact the defendant on that date were unsuccessful. In addition, the [c]ourt received no communication from the defendant on that date explaining his actions and his failure to appear.

....

A-2241-23 4 The defendant was aware of the matter proceeding remotely via Zoom and failed to properly avail himself of the Zoom link to appear during the scheduled matter and failed to present a cogent reason for his failure to appear remotely despite the defendant being fully aware of his requirement to participate.

On appeal, defendant argues the judge erred in denying defendant's

application for a new FRO hearing. Defendant also contends plaintiff failed to

meet her burden of proof in support of the FRO.

Our review of a Family Part judge's order is limited. See Cesare v. Cesare,

154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998). "Because of the family courts' special jurisdiction

and expertise in family matters, appellate courts should accord deference to

family court factfinding." Id. at 413. Accordingly, "findings by the trial court

are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible

evidence." Id. at 411-12. However, we review a Family Part judge's

interpretation of the law de novo. D.W. v. R.W., 212 N.J. 232, 245-46 (2012).

Additionally, a judge's decision on a motion to vacate default judgment

will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. US Bank Nat'l Ass'n v.

Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012). Further, we review a judge's decision on

a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion. Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc.

v. ABC Caging Fulfillment, 440 N.J. Super. 378, 382 (App. Div. 2015). An

abuse of discretion arises when a decision is "made without a rational

A-2241-23 5 explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an

impermissible basis." Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)

(citation omitted).

We first address the Family Part judge's treatment of defendant's motion.

The judge reviewed defendant's application as a motion to vacate the default

FRO. However, the order entered on February 22, 2024 denied a motion for

reconsideration. The two applications are reviewed under different legal

principles and court rules.

Under Rule 4:49-2, reconsideration should be granted only where (1) "the

[c]ourt has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational

basis," or (2) "it is obvious that the [c]ourt either did not consider, or failed to

appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence." D'Atria v.

D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990). In other words, "a motion

for reconsideration provides the court, and not the litigant, with an opportunity

to take a second bite at the apple to correct errors inherent in a prior ruling."

Conforti v. County of Ocean, 255 N.J. 142, 169 (2023) (quoting Medina v. Pitta,

442 N.J. Super. 1, 18 (App. Div. 2015)).

On the other hand, a motion to vacate default judgment is governed by

Rule 4:50. Rule 4:50-1 allows a court to vacate a default judgment "whenever

A-2241-23 6 necessary to prevent a manifest denial of justice." Manning Eng'g, Inc. v.

Hudson Cnty. Park Comm'n, 74 N.J. 113, 120 (1977). This rule "is designed to

reconcile the strong interests in finality of judgments and judicial efficiency with

the equitable notion that courts should have authority to avoid an unjust result

in any given case." Ibid.

"It is axiomatic that an application to vacate a default judgment is 'viewed

with great liberality, and every reasonable ground for indulgence is tolerated to

the end that a just result is reached.'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. T.J.B.,

338 N.J. Super. 425, 434 (App. Div. 2001) (quoting Marder v. Realty Constr.

Co., 84 N.J. Super. 313, 319 (App. Div. 1964)). Any doubt regarding an

application to vacate a default judgment "should be resolved in favor of the

parties seeking relief." Mancini v. EDS, 132 N.J. 330, 334 (1993) (citing Arrow

Mfg. Co. v. Levinson, 231 N.J. Super. 527, 534 (App. Div. 1989)).

Applications to vacate a judgment are "particularly important when the

results have consequences of magnitude." T.J.B., 338 N.J. Super. at 434. The

entry of an FRO has significant ramifications, including prohibitions against the

possession of weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b), and "registration in a central

registry . . . that is not subject to expungement." Shah v. Shah, 184 N.J. 125,

140 (2005) (citing In re M.D.Z., 286 N.J. Super. 82 (App. Div. 1995)).

A-2241-23 7 Rule 4:50-1 provides grounds for vacating a default judgment. Under

subsection (a) of this rule, a default judgment may be vacated based on a finding

of "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." Under subsection (f)

of this rule, a default judgment may be vacated for "any other reason justifying

relief from the operation of the judgment or order."

Here, the judge declined to vacate the default FRO because defendant

"failed to show excusable neglect." However, at the February 22, 2024 hearing,

the judge never asked defendant to explain his failure to appear at trial. Nor did

the judge ask why defendant waited until 2:00 p.m. on February 13 to log into

the hearing via the Zoom link. Despite lacking this information, the judge

concluded defendant had "more than sufficient time" to appear for the domestic

violence trial at 10:30 a.m. on February 13. Moreover, while the judge's written

amplification stated "[a]ll attempts to contact the defendant on [February 13]

were unsuccessful," the record provides no information how the judge's staff

attempted to contact defendant. There are a variety of reasons defendant may

have been unable to participate remotely in the domestic violence trial.

However, the judge failed to inquire why defendant did not appear for trial

before concluding defendant failed to establish excusable neglect in support of

vacating the default FRO.

A-2241-23 8 Additionally, the Family Part judge never considered vacating the default

FRO under Rule 4:50-1(f). This subsection authorizes relief from judgments in

"exceptional situations." Mancini, 132 N.J. at 336 (quoting Baumann v.

Marinaro, 95 N.J. 380, 395 (1984)). Because subsection (f) "deals with

exceptional circumstances, each case must be resolved on its own particular

facts." Baumann, 95 N.J. at 395. "Among the factors to be taken into

account . . . are the 'extent of the delay in making the application for relief, the

underlying reason or cause, fault or blam[e]lessness of the litigant, and any

prejudice that would accrue to the other party.'" In re Guardianship of J.N.H.,

172 N.J. 440, 474 (2002) (quoting C.R. v. J.G., 306 N.J. Super. 214, 241 (Ch.

Div. 1997)).

Here, there are reasonable grounds for relief under subsection (f). First,

defendant faces serious and enduring consequences as a result of the default

FRO. Additionally, any argument that defendant deliberately failed to appear at

trial via the Zoom link is belied by defendant's physical presence at the Bergen

County courthouse before 8:30 a.m. on February 13. Moreover, the day after

the entry of the default FRO, defendant filed an application requesting a new

FRO hearing. Further, we discern no resulting prejudice to plaintiff by vacating

A-2241-23 9 the default FRO and scheduling a new domestic violence trial because the TRO

will remain in full force and effect until the conclusion of the new trial .

Additionally, although the judge's February 22, 2024 order denied

reconsideration, the judge never addressed the court rule or case law governing

a motion for reconsideration. Judges are required to "make findings of fact and

to state reasons in support of their conclusions." Heinl v. Heinl, 287 N.J. Super.

337, 347 (App. Div. 1996); see also R. 1:7-4. "Meaningful appellate review is

inhibited unless the judge sets forth the reasons for his or her opinion." Strahan

v. Strahan, 402 N.J. Super. 298, 310 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting Salch v. Salch,

240 N.J. Super. 441, 443 (App. Div. 1990)). "The absence of adequate findings

. . . necessitates a reversal." Heinl, 287 N.J. Super. at 347.

Here, neither the judge's oral statement of reasons placed on the record on

February 22, 2024, nor his April 4, 2024 written amplification addressed

whether the FRO was issued "upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis," or

failed to consider "probative, competent evidence." D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. at

401.

On this record, we are constrained to vacate the default FRO and remand

for a new trial. On remand, we take no position on the merits of plaintiff's

application for an FRO.

A-2241-23 10 Vacated and remanded for a new trial. The TRO remains in place pending

the outcome of the new trial. We do not retain jurisdiction.

A-2241-23 11