J.T. v. District of Columbia
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Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
J.T.,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 24-cv-1400-RDM-MJS
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION This case presents the latest episode in a long-running saga surrounding whether the
District of Columbia Public Schools (“DCPS” or the “District”) met its obligations to provide
minor student V.T. a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) under the Individuals with
Disabilities Act (“IDEA”). This installment focuses on the 2021–22 school year. For that year, a
Hearing Officer determined that DCPS failed to offer V.T. a FAPE in several respects but
nevertheless refused to entertain an award of compensatory education based on those denials.
V.T.’s mother, J.T., now challenges that outcome, principally arguing that the Court should remand
for further proceedings on the issue of compensatory education. Secondarily, J.T. contends that the
Hearing Officer improperly brushed aside other alleged IDEA violations and wrongly rejected her
claim seeking what she contends were “educational records” from DCPS, namely class rosters and
various emails. Both J.T. and the District have filed dueling summary judgment motions, which
are before the undersigned by virtue of a referral for full case management. The Court has
thoroughly reviewed the administrative record, the parties’ briefing and arguments, and governing
precedent. The Court concludes that the Hearing Officer erred in rejecting J.T.’s request for
compensatory education based on what was tantamount to a waiver finding and that certain (but
1 not all) of J.T.’s claims for the 2021–22 school year warrant another look on remand. But the Court
finds that the Hearing Officer appropriately denied J.T.’s request for additional documents as
“educational records.” Accordingly, the undersigned RECOMMENDS, for the reasons explained
below, that the Court GRANT IN PART and DENY IN PART both Plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment (ECF No. 21) and the District’s motion (ECF No. 23).
STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
Congress enacted the IDEA to help ensure all children with disabilities receive a “free
appropriate public education” or “FAPE.” See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). This mandate “requires
an educational program reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress in light of the
child’s circumstances.” Endrew F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 580 U.S. 386, 403 (2017).
The “IEP”—or “individualized education program”—is “the centerpiece of the statute’s
education delivery system[.]” Id. at 391. An IEP is a “comprehensive plan prepared by a child’s
‘IEP Team’” that serves as “the means by which special education and related services are ‘tailored
to the unique needs’ of a particular child.” Id. (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch.
Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 181 (1982)). 1 Under the statute, an IEP must include “a statement
of the child’s present levels of academic achievement and functional performance,” a list of
“measurable annual … academic and functional goals,” and “a description of how the child’s
progress toward meeting the annual goals … will be measured.” 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(a)(i). An
IEP must also identify the “special education and related services … that will be provided” to help
the child “advance appropriately toward attaining the annual goals.” Id. And, at least annually, the
IEP Team must meet to review and revise a child’s IEP “as appropriate.” Id. § 1414(d)(4).
1 The composition of an “IEP Team” is prescribed by statute, 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B), and generally “includes teachers, school officials, and the child’s parents,” Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 391. 2 A court reviewing “an IEP must appreciate that the question is whether the IEP is
reasonable, not whether the court regards it as ideal.” Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 399 (emphasis in
original). After all, “Congress has not committed to educational perfection.” Z.B. v. Dist. of
Columbia, 888 F.3d 515, 528 (D.C. Cir. 2018); Leggett v. Dist. of Columbia, 793 F.3d 59, 70 (D.C.
Cir. 2015) (“[A] public school district need not guarantee the best possible education or even a
potential-maximizing one.”) (citation and quotations marks omitted). Moreover, any judicial
assessment of an IEP’s “substantive adequacy” must be based on information “as of the time each
IEP was created rather than with the benefit of hindsight.” Edward M.R. v. Dist. of Columbia, 128
F.4th 290, 294 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (quoting Z.B., 888 F.3d at 524). Putting the two principles together,
then, “[t]he key inquiry regarding an IEP’s substantive adequacy is whether, taking account of
what the school knew or reasonably should have known of a student’s needs at the time, the IEP it
offered was reasonably calculated to ensure the specific student’s progress.” Z.B., 888 F.3d at 524.
“When a hearing officer or district court concludes that a school district has failed to
provide a student with a FAPE, it has ‘broad discretion to fashion an appropriate remedy,’” which
can include “compensatory education.” B.D. v. Dist. of Columbia, 817 F.3d 792, 797–98 (D.C. Cir.
2016) (quoting Boose v. Dist. of Columbia, 786 F.3d 1054, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). Compensatory
education comprises prospective educational services meant to “compensate for a past deficient
program.” Reid v. Dist. of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 522 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also id. at 518
(describing compensatory education as the “replacement of educational services the child should
have received in the first place”). As the D.C. Circuit has explained: “An appropriate compensatory
education award must rely on individualized assessments, and the equitable and flexible nature of
the remedy will produce different results in different cases depending on the child’s needs.” B.D.,
817 F.3d at 798 (citing Reid, 401 F.3d at 524).
3 RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The claims here implicate the 2021–22 school year, so the Court focuses its factual
overview accordingly, along with some additional high-level background for context. 2
J.T.’s son, V.T., is a student with autism spectrum disorder who suffers from sensory
processing issues—the record indicates he is a “sensory seeker for visual stimuli and an extreme
sensory avoider for sounds.” (ECF No. 13, Administrative Record (“AR”) at 11.) 3 Given this,
DCPS found V.T. eligible for special education services several years back. Per an agreement
between J.T. and the District, DCPS began providing virtual instruction to V.T. starting in June
2020 and continuing through the 2020–21 school year. (Id. at 12.) In July 2020, when V.T. was a
rising fifth grader enrolled (virtually) at DCPS’s Garrison Elementary School, an IEP Team
developed an IEP for him—amended in October 2020 to correct a typographical issue—providing
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
J.T.,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 24-cv-1400-RDM-MJS
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION This case presents the latest episode in a long-running saga surrounding whether the
District of Columbia Public Schools (“DCPS” or the “District”) met its obligations to provide
minor student V.T. a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) under the Individuals with
Disabilities Act (“IDEA”). This installment focuses on the 2021–22 school year. For that year, a
Hearing Officer determined that DCPS failed to offer V.T. a FAPE in several respects but
nevertheless refused to entertain an award of compensatory education based on those denials.
V.T.’s mother, J.T., now challenges that outcome, principally arguing that the Court should remand
for further proceedings on the issue of compensatory education. Secondarily, J.T. contends that the
Hearing Officer improperly brushed aside other alleged IDEA violations and wrongly rejected her
claim seeking what she contends were “educational records” from DCPS, namely class rosters and
various emails. Both J.T. and the District have filed dueling summary judgment motions, which
are before the undersigned by virtue of a referral for full case management. The Court has
thoroughly reviewed the administrative record, the parties’ briefing and arguments, and governing
precedent. The Court concludes that the Hearing Officer erred in rejecting J.T.’s request for
compensatory education based on what was tantamount to a waiver finding and that certain (but
1 not all) of J.T.’s claims for the 2021–22 school year warrant another look on remand. But the Court
finds that the Hearing Officer appropriately denied J.T.’s request for additional documents as
“educational records.” Accordingly, the undersigned RECOMMENDS, for the reasons explained
below, that the Court GRANT IN PART and DENY IN PART both Plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment (ECF No. 21) and the District’s motion (ECF No. 23).
STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
Congress enacted the IDEA to help ensure all children with disabilities receive a “free
appropriate public education” or “FAPE.” See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). This mandate “requires
an educational program reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress in light of the
child’s circumstances.” Endrew F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 580 U.S. 386, 403 (2017).
The “IEP”—or “individualized education program”—is “the centerpiece of the statute’s
education delivery system[.]” Id. at 391. An IEP is a “comprehensive plan prepared by a child’s
‘IEP Team’” that serves as “the means by which special education and related services are ‘tailored
to the unique needs’ of a particular child.” Id. (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch.
Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 181 (1982)). 1 Under the statute, an IEP must include “a statement
of the child’s present levels of academic achievement and functional performance,” a list of
“measurable annual … academic and functional goals,” and “a description of how the child’s
progress toward meeting the annual goals … will be measured.” 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(a)(i). An
IEP must also identify the “special education and related services … that will be provided” to help
the child “advance appropriately toward attaining the annual goals.” Id. And, at least annually, the
IEP Team must meet to review and revise a child’s IEP “as appropriate.” Id. § 1414(d)(4).
1 The composition of an “IEP Team” is prescribed by statute, 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B), and generally “includes teachers, school officials, and the child’s parents,” Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 391. 2 A court reviewing “an IEP must appreciate that the question is whether the IEP is
reasonable, not whether the court regards it as ideal.” Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 399 (emphasis in
original). After all, “Congress has not committed to educational perfection.” Z.B. v. Dist. of
Columbia, 888 F.3d 515, 528 (D.C. Cir. 2018); Leggett v. Dist. of Columbia, 793 F.3d 59, 70 (D.C.
Cir. 2015) (“[A] public school district need not guarantee the best possible education or even a
potential-maximizing one.”) (citation and quotations marks omitted). Moreover, any judicial
assessment of an IEP’s “substantive adequacy” must be based on information “as of the time each
IEP was created rather than with the benefit of hindsight.” Edward M.R. v. Dist. of Columbia, 128
F.4th 290, 294 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (quoting Z.B., 888 F.3d at 524). Putting the two principles together,
then, “[t]he key inquiry regarding an IEP’s substantive adequacy is whether, taking account of
what the school knew or reasonably should have known of a student’s needs at the time, the IEP it
offered was reasonably calculated to ensure the specific student’s progress.” Z.B., 888 F.3d at 524.
“When a hearing officer or district court concludes that a school district has failed to
provide a student with a FAPE, it has ‘broad discretion to fashion an appropriate remedy,’” which
can include “compensatory education.” B.D. v. Dist. of Columbia, 817 F.3d 792, 797–98 (D.C. Cir.
2016) (quoting Boose v. Dist. of Columbia, 786 F.3d 1054, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). Compensatory
education comprises prospective educational services meant to “compensate for a past deficient
program.” Reid v. Dist. of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 522 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also id. at 518
(describing compensatory education as the “replacement of educational services the child should
have received in the first place”). As the D.C. Circuit has explained: “An appropriate compensatory
education award must rely on individualized assessments, and the equitable and flexible nature of
the remedy will produce different results in different cases depending on the child’s needs.” B.D.,
817 F.3d at 798 (citing Reid, 401 F.3d at 524).
3 RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The claims here implicate the 2021–22 school year, so the Court focuses its factual
overview accordingly, along with some additional high-level background for context. 2
J.T.’s son, V.T., is a student with autism spectrum disorder who suffers from sensory
processing issues—the record indicates he is a “sensory seeker for visual stimuli and an extreme
sensory avoider for sounds.” (ECF No. 13, Administrative Record (“AR”) at 11.) 3 Given this,
DCPS found V.T. eligible for special education services several years back. Per an agreement
between J.T. and the District, DCPS began providing virtual instruction to V.T. starting in June
2020 and continuing through the 2020–21 school year. (Id. at 12.) In July 2020, when V.T. was a
rising fifth grader enrolled (virtually) at DCPS’s Garrison Elementary School, an IEP Team
developed an IEP for him—amended in October 2020 to correct a typographical issue—providing
for full-time specialized instruction outside of general education, along with multiple related
services. (Id. at 15, 76–109.) Specifically, the IEP provided for: (a) 24 hours per week of
specialized instruction; (b) 360 minutes per month of speech-language pathology; (c) 360 minutes
per month of occupational therapy; and (d) 240 minutes per month of behavioral support services.
(Id.) It also provided for the support of a dedicated aide for six hours per day, as well as specialized
instruction in a highly structured small-group setting (i.e., numbering six to nine students). (Id.)
2 This is far from J.T.’s first foray into federal IDEA litigation, however. J.T. has pursued several prior lawsuits challenging DCPS’s educational placements for V.T. and its overall compliance with IDEA, meeting with mixed success along the way. See, e.g., J.T. v. Dist. of Columbia (“J.T. I”), 496 F. Supp. 3d 190 (D.D.C. 2020) (awarding compensatory education based on DCPS’s “failure to identify [a] placement for [V.T.] for the 2019–2020 school year,” but denying other claims), aff’d, 2022 WL 126707 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 11, 2022); J.T. v. Dist. of Columbia (“J.T. II”), 2023 WL 9121577 (D.D.C. Jan. 4, 2023) (denying relief), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 8369938 (Dec. 4, 2023), appeal dismissed, 2024 WL 3033764 (June 14, 2024). Curious readers can consult these prior rulings for a more fulsome history. 3 Page citations to the AR refer to the running pagination in the lower middle margin. Page citations to the parties’ briefing, by contrast, refer to the ones assigned by the Court’s electronic filing system.
4 The record reflects that V.T. made meaningful progress during the 2020–21 school year.
IEP progress reports for the year show that V.T. mastered several academic goals (in math and
written expression) and three motor skills/physical development goals, and V.T. progressed in
many other goals. (AR at 110–19.) His end-of-year report card stated that V.T. made “a lot of
academic progress” and participated in “at least 80% of his classes independently.” (Id. at 1320.)
In May 2021, DCPS scheduled an IEP meeting to review and revise V.T.’s IEP, to the extent
necessary, for the 2021–22 school year. (AR at 417–31.) Despite the District’s efforts to secure
their attendance at the IEP meeting, V.T.’s parents would not participate, so DCPS filed an
administrative due process complaint to secure an order that they do so. (See id.) 4 A hearing officer
issued a decision on that complaint in October 2021, ordering DCPS to convene an IEP meeting
to develop an updated IEP within fourteen days and ordering that the parents “shall participate.”
(Id. at 428.) The decision indicated that “[a]ny delay in [DCPS] meeting the timelines of [the]
order that is the result of action or inaction by [the parents] shall extend the timelines on a day for
day basis.” (Id. at 428 n.8) Meanwhile, on August 31, 2021, DCPS approved V.T.’s request for a
virtual placement for the 2021–22 school year. (Id. at 287; see also id. at 276.)
The District moved promptly to set up the IEP meeting that had been ordered by the hearing
officer, and DCPS sent a letter of invitation to V.T.’s parents for a meeting to be held on November
3, 2021. (AR at 432.) Through counsel, the parents responded soon afterward, indicating that the
proposed date “will not work” and asking for alternative dates. (Id. at 399–401.) For reasons
unexplained, though, DCPS moved forward with the IEP meeting on November 3 anyway and
developed a new IEP without V.T.’s parents’ participation or input.
4 Based on the record, it appears that V.T.’s parents wished to postpone that IEP meeting pending the completion of an independent educational evaluation and a transportation study. (AR at 417–31.) 5 The November 2021 IEP reduced V.T.’s occupational therapy hours and removed him from
full-time special education. Additionally, the IEP contemplated in-person learning for V.T., despite
his documented—and DCPS-approved—need for remote instruction. (AR at 440–61.)
While those issues played out, V.T. had started the 2021–22 school year in a virtual
placement assigned to Alice Deal Middle School (“Deal”), in its Communications and Educations
Supports (“CES”) classroom. (AR at 253.) According to J.T., the placement was “a disaster from
the beginning.” (Id. at 1464.) The Hearing Officer’s findings of facts credited some of the
challenges J.T. recounted, which the decision summarized as follows:
[V.T.’s] online services at [Deal] had many problems. [V.T.] was not able to log in to the CES classroom. [V.T.] was the only distance learning student and he … could only view the teacher and the blackboard – not the rest of the class. [V.T.] could not follow the teacher in class and [J.T.] had to work with him … There was no visual aids or instructions for [V.T.] It was difficult to communicate with the dedicated aide because the aide did not have a computer to be [online] with [V.T.] or the class.
(AR at 21.) In addition, J.T. contends that the CES classroom had more than ten students, above
the nine-student maximum contemplated by his IEP. (Id. at 1466 (J.T. testifying that the teacher
told her it was a “class of more than 10 kids”).) J.T. contends she repeatedly attempted to work
with the teacher and other staff to address these problems, without much success.
Ultimately, in December 2021, J.T. arranged “for the teacher to send paper copies of the
core academic materials home,” and J.T. did her best to educate V.T. herself. (AR at 21–22, 1474–
75.) J.T. candidly recognized, however, that she is “not a specialist” and does not herself have the
“confidence” or “ability of a special education teacher.” (Id. at 1475.)
In notable contrast to the prior 2020–21 school year, the IEP progress reports for V.T. for
the 2021–22 school year reflect that he did not master any of his academic goals and failed to even
“progress” toward half of them. (Id. at 1074–78.) The progress reports do indicate, however, that
V.T. progressed in other non-academic areas. (Id. at 1078–84.)
6 Relatedly, although J.T. acknowledges that V.T. was able to receive some of his specified
services remotely from DCPS during the 2021–22 school year, she says DCPS failed to provide
many of those services, at least in meaningful part. For one, although the IEP prescribed six hours
per month of speech-language therapy (totaling around 54 hours for the school year), J.T. contends
that DCPS provided less than half of that amount, totaling only about 24 hours of services. (AR at
314–27.) Similarly, although the IEP prescribed four hours per month of behavioral support
services (totaling around 36 hours for the school year), J.T. says DCPS provided less than half of
that amount, totaling only about 15.5 hours of services. (Id. at 328–42.)
After the 2021–22 school year, V.T.’s parents removed him from DCPS altogether and
enrolled him in a private school, Friendship Public Charter School. (AR at 22, 1502–03.)
According to J.T.’s testimony, V.T. has been doing “very well” in that setting. (See id.)
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 21, 2023, J.T. filed the due process complaint preceding this lawsuit, which was
amended on September 13, 2023, after the Hearing Officer ruled the original complaint was too
non-specific. (AR at 6, 518–21, 576–79.) Through the amended complaint, J.T. claimed the
November 2021 IEP was improper because it: (1) was developed without parental participation;
(2) prescribed too few hours of specialized instruction and occupational therapy; (3) did not
include extended school year or transportation accommodations; (4) prescribed a classroom that
was too large; and (5) prescribed insufficient calming strategies and equipment. (AR at 577.)
Additionally, J.T. claimed that that V.T.’s placement at Deal was inappropriate on various grounds,
including because Deal failed to provide: (1) all the specialized instruction, occupational therapy,
behavioral support services, and speech-language pathology prescribed by V.T’s IEP; (2) a
sufficient amount of specialized instruction, occupational therapy, behavioral support services, and
7 speech-language pathology; (3) the class size prescribed by the IEP; and (4) an appropriately small
classroom. (Id.) 5 On a parallel track, J.T. filed a separate due process complaint alleging that DCPS
violated the IDEA by failing to produce various “education records.” (Id. at 6, 608–10.)
As relief for these claims, J.T. requested that DCPS be ordered to do one of the following:
(a) award “appropriate compensatory education”; (b) “determine appropriate compensatory
education for V.T. through an appropriately staffed IEP meeting”; or (c) “fund an independent
compensatory education evaluation,” to be followed by further proceedings as needed to determine
the amount of an award based on the results of the evaluation. J.T. additionally asked that DCPS
be ordered to provide the requested records about V.T. (AR at 578, 609.)
The Hearing Officer consolidated the due process complaints and convened an
administrative hearing covering all the various claims over two consecutive days on January 30
and 31, 2024. During the hearing, five witnesses testified on behalf of DCPS, and J.T. testified on
her behalf. The Hearing Officer issued a determination on February 13, 2024, less than two weeks
after the hearing closed, ruling in J.T.’s favor in some respects but not others. (AR at 4–46.)
Starting with the rulings in J.T.’s favor, the Hearing Officer determined that DCPS
committed a procedural IDEA violation by holding the November 2021 IEP meeting without the
participation of V.T.’s parents, which resulted in the denial of a FAPE. (AR at 25–28.) Moreover,
the Hearing Officer concluded that the IEP developed by DCPS in November 2021 (without the
input or participation of V.T.’s parents) was substantively deficient because “[Deal] could not
provide [V.T.] his … required specialized instruction in an appropriate setting.” (Id. at 28–30.) This
was principally because DCPS “ignor[ed] that [V.T.] was approved for virtual education” and
instead proposed “an in-person placement.” (Id. at 30 (“I conclude that DCPS’ proposal of an in-
5 J.T. withdrew her claims for extended school year services, transportation accommodations, insufficient calming strategies and equipment, and occupational therapy during the hearing. (AR at 1427–28.) 8 person educational placement for [V.T.] – when the District was fully aware that [V.T.] was
certified by a physician to require virtual learning – was not specially tailored to meet [V.T.’s]
unique needs. DCPS’ proposed educational placement for [V.T.] in the November 3, 2021 IEP was
therefore not appropriate and this was a denial of FAPE.”).)
On the other hand, the Hearing Officer ruled against J.T. on other points. For one, the
Hearing Officer disagreed that the November 2021 IEP offered too few hours of specialized
instruction and occupational therapy. (AR at 30–31.) For another, the Hearing Officer found that
DCPS did not deny V.T. a FAPE by failing to provide all the specialized instruction, speech-
language pathology, and behavioral support services prescribed by the IEP. (Id. at 31–34.) As to
behavioral support, the Hearing Officer credited the social worker’s testimony “that she was pretty
consistent with [V.T.’s] services” and said J.T. did not rebut that testimony. (Id. as 32.) As to
speech-language therapy, although the Hearing Officer found that DCPS failed to provide “some
15%” of the service hours required by V.T.’s IEP, the Hearing Officer reasoned that this “shortfall”
did not deprive V.T. of “substantial educational benefit.” (Id. at 33–34.) Still more, the Hearing
Officer found that J.T.’s claim that the classroom size exceeded the maximum students
contemplated by the IEP was “moot” because V.T. attended classes virtually. (Id. at 32.) Finally,
the Hearing Officer denied J.T.’s records claim, concluding that the requested class rosters and
relevant emails were not “education records” under the statute. (Id. at 34–37.)
Turning to remedy, the Hearing Officer began by reiterating the identified denials of FAPE
by DCPS related to the November 2021 IEP: “proceeding with the November 3, 2021 IEP meeting
without the Parents’ participation and … offering an inappropriate in-person educational
placement in the IEP, when [V.T.] was only attending school online.” (AR at 37.) But the Hearing
Officer declined to consider any compensatory education award because J.T. did not “propose a
9 well-articulated compensatory education plan” during the hearing. (Id. at 40; id. at 41 (“Because
Petitioners have failed to demonstrate what compensatory education, if any, should be provided to
Student for the denials of FAPE in this case, I will deny the Parents’ request for a compensatory
education award.”).) The Hearing Officer grounded this conclusion in the rationale of JT II, 2023
WL 8369938, at *13–15 (D.D.C. Dec. 4, 2023), which the Hearing Officer found persuasive on
the basis that it “concerned the same parties and [was] so recent[.]” (Id. at 40.)
J.T. then timely filed this lawsuit to challenge the Hearing Officer’s decision in various
respects. (ECF No. 1, Compl.) After lodging the administrative record, the parties proceeded to
brief cross motions for summary judgment, which are now ripe for resolution.
LEGAL STANDARDS
Although motions seeking review of a hearing officer decision are typically framed as
motions for summary judgment, the Court does not follow “a true summary judgment procedure”
in this context. Middleton v. Dist. of Columbia, 312 F. Supp. 3d 113, 128 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting
L.R.L. v. Dist. of Columbia, 896 F. Supp. 2d 69, 73 (D.D.C. 2012)). Rather, “[a] motion for
summary judgment operates as a motion for judgment based on the evidence comprising the record
and any additional evidence the court may receive.” D.R. v. Dist. of Columbia, 637 F. Supp. 2d 11,
16 (D.D.C. 2009). Put another way, the motion for summary judgment is “the procedural vehicle
for asking the judge to decide the case on the basis of the administrative record.” M.G. v. Dist. of
Columbia, 246 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2017) (citation omitted).
On judicial review under the IDEA, courts “shall grant such relief as [they] determine[] is
appropriate,” based upon “a preponderance of the evidence.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C); see also
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205–06. In doing so, courts may not “substitute their own notions of sound
educational policy for those of the school authorities which they review.” Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206.
10 Rather, courts “must give due weight to the administrative proceedings and afford some deference
to the expertise of the [independent hearing officer] and school officials responsible for the child’s
education.” Gill v. Dist. of Columbia, 751 F. Supp. 2d 104, 108 (D.D.C. 2010) (citation and
quotation marks omitted). In general, “a hearing officer’s findings based on credibility
determinations of live witness testimony are given particular deference where there is no
supplementation of the record.” McAllister v. Dist. of Columbia, 45 F. Supp. 3d 72, 76–77 (D.D.C.
2014) (citation and quotation marks omitted). But “a hearing decision ‘without reasoned and
specific findings deserves little deference.’” Reid, 401 F.3d at 521 (quoting Kerkam v.
Superintendent, D.C. Pub. Schs., 931 F.2d 84, 87 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).
ANALYSIS
The principal issue presented here is a relatively focused one: whether the Hearing Officer
properly declined to consider a compensatory education award based on what amounted to an
implicit finding that J.T. waived any entitlement to relief by not adducing sufficient evidence of a
“well-articulated compensatory education plan.” J.T. separately challenges some of the Hearing
Officer’s rulings on the claims that DCPS did not properly implement the operative IEP during the
2021–22 school year, including prior to November 2021. Finally, J.T. contends that the Hearing
Officer improperly rejected her “education records” claim seeking copies of class rosters and
various emails. The Court concludes that the Hearing Officer missed the mark on the compensatory
education award—mostly by placing inapt reliance on J.T. II—and failed to fully engage with
certain of J.T.’s claims about the 2021–22 school year. But the Court agrees that the Hearing
Officer made the right call on the records claim. The Court discusses each issue in turn.
11 I. The Court Should Remand For Further Proceedings On Compensatory Education
Start with some foundation. Broadly speaking, “compensatory education aims to put a
student … in the position he would be in absent the FAPE denial.” B.D., 817 F.3d at 798. An award
of compensatory education, like all forms of IDEA relief, “depends on ‘equitable considerations.’”
Reid, 401 F.3d at 523 (quoting Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15–16
(1993)). In this way, “[a]n appropriate compensatory education award must ‘rely on individualized
assessments,’ and the equitable and flexible nature of the remedy ‘will produce different results in
different cases depending on the child’s needs.’” B.D., 817 F.3d at 798 (quoting Reid 401 F.3d at
524); see also Reid, 401 F.3d at 524 (“[J]ust as IEPs focus on disabled students’ individual needs,
so must awards compensating past violations rely on individualized assessments.”).
Fashioning a compensatory education award is an imperfect science, to be sure. Indeed,
the D.C. Circuit has “recognize[d] … the difficulty inherent in figuring out both what position a
student would be in absent a FAPE denial and how to get the student to that position.” B.D., 817
F.3d at 799. Mindful of that difficulty, the Circuit has instructed that if “further assessments are
needed” to craft an appropriate award, a “Hearing Officer should not hesitate to order them[.]” Id.
at 800; see also Reid, 401 F.3d at 526 (“[T]he parties must have some opportunity to present
evidence regarding [a student’s] specific educational deficits resulting from [the] loss of FAPE and
the specific compensatory measures needed to best correct those deficits.”). At bottom, “the
essence of equity jurisdiction is to do equity … meaning that flexibility rather than rigidity should
be the guide.” Lopez-Young v. Dist. of Columbia, 211 F. Supp. 3d 42, 55 (D.D.C. 2016).
That said, a compensatory education award is not always “mandatory in cases where a
denial of FAPE is established,” such as where a student did not suffer any educational harm due to
the denial. See J.T. II, 2023 WL 8369938, at *14. Where the record establishes that a FAPE denial
12 did harm the student and prevented educational progress, however, “simply refusing to grant” an
award of compensatory education “clashes with Reid” and its emphasis on “a ‘qualitative focus on
individual needs of disabled students.’” Stanton v. Dist. of Columbia, 680 F. Supp. 2d 201, 207
(D.D.C. 2010) (citing Reid, 401 F.3d at 527); accord Butler v. Dist. of Columbia, 275 F. Supp. 3d
1, 5 (D.D.C. 2017). As such, a hearing officer without sufficient information to fashion an
appropriate award has “at least two options”: (1) “allow the parties to submit additional evidence
to enable … an appropriate compensatory education award,” or (2) “order the assessments needed
to make the compensatory education determination[.]” Butler, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 5. But what the
hearing officer “cannot do” in that scenario is “outright reject an award for compensatory services
and terminate the proceedings.” Id. (citing Stanton, 680 F. Supp. 2d at 207).
Applied here, these principles make clear that the Hearing Officer’s decision to brush aside
J.T.’s request for compensatory education relief was in error. Recall that the Hearing Officer
identified two FAPE denials by DCPS: “proceeding with the November 3, 2021 IEP meeting
without the Parents’ participation” and “offering an inappropriate in-person education placement
in the IEP, when [V.T.] was only attending school online.” (AR at 37.) But the Hearing Officer
denied compensatory education, with the only proffered rationale being that J.T. “did not propose
a compensatory education plan[.]” (Id. at 40; id. at 41 (“Because Petitioners have failed to
demonstrate what compensatory education, if any, should be provided to Student for the denials of
FAPE in this case, I will deny the Parents’ request for a compensatory education award.”).) In
short, the Hearing Officer found that J.T. waived any entitlement to compensatory education by
failing to create a sufficient record for such an award during the proceedings.
The Hearing Officer’s determination was grounded almost entirely in J.T. II, 2023 WL
8369938. Because that ruling “concerned the same parties and [was] so recent,” the Hearing
13 Officer posited, he believed its “compensatory education analysis to be on point and persuasive.”
(AR at 40.) But beyond those superficial similarities, the Hearing Officer did not explain why the
substantive reasoning of J.T. II’s compensatory-education analysis supposedly mapped onto the
FAPE denials that were found to have occurred here.
It does not. J.T. II mostly addressed compensatory education as related to the District’s
FAPE denial in “not including additional transportation accommodations in [V.T.’s] 2020 IEP.”
J.T. II, 2023 WL 8369938, at *13. Even though that omission “violated V.T.’s substantive rights
under the IDEA,” the court explained, there was nothing in the record to demonstrate “that the
transportation deficiency harmed V.T.’s education during the 2020–2021 school year” because the
COVID-19 pandemic meant “bus transportation was not occurring at that time” for anyone. Id. In
other words, because the record did not show that V.T. suffered any actual harm or educational
deficiency due to the lack of transportation accommodations in his IEP, the court’s “fact-specific
inquiry of the record [did] not support a finding that an unspecified compensatory education
evaluation was deemed appropriate relief.” Id. The court also discussed the broader absence of
“any specific evidence of harm V.T. sustained stemming from the 2020 IEP formulation.” Id. at
*15. As the court put it, “the record [was] robust with evidence from teachers and administrators
of V.T. performing at or better than expected for that school year [i.e., 2020–21].” Id. For this
reason, too, the J.T. II court held that “no compensatory education [was] required.” Id.
Those considerations are inapplicable here. For one thing, unlike the “transportation
accommodations” that would have never been provided anyway during the 2020–21 school year
since “bus transportation was not occurring at that time,” 2023 WL 8369938, at *14, the District
here failed to craft a virtual-placement IEP for V.T. while he was indisputably approved for and
actively engaged in virtual learning. So one cannot chalk up DCPS’s violation to “no harm, no
14 foul” because V.T. would have benefited from an appropriately crafted virtual-placement IEP
during the year. For another thing, unlike in J.T. II, there is little evidence in the record here—let
alone “robust” evidence—to show that V.T. performed “at or better than expected” during the
2021–22 school year. J.T. II, 2023 WL 8369938, at *15. The opposite was true. Unlike the IEP
progress reports from the 2020–21 school year reflecting V.T.’s mastery of several academic goals
and progress on many others (AR 110–19), the 2021–22 progress reports show that V.T. did not
master any academic goals and made progress on fewer than half of them (id. at 1074–78). So V.T.
certainly cannot be said to have “flourished” during the 2021–22 school year, as the J.T. II court
believed true for the prior school year. Simply put, J.T. II’s “fact-specific” analysis about
compensatory education is inapposite to the circumstances here.
The Court also acknowledges the Hearing Officer’s one-sentence observation that there
was no “evidence of the educational deficit or harm” caused by DCPS’s FAPE denials. (AR at 41.)
But for many of the reasons already discussed, and even accounting for the deference typically
owed a hearing officer’s factual findings, that statement is all but impossible to square with the
record here. And the Hearing Officer did not engage in any fact-specific analysis to support it.
Reid, 401 F.3d at 521 (“[A] hearing decision without reasoned and specific findings deserves little
deference.”); Kerkam, 931 F.2d at 87 (same). The absence of such analysis is particularly notable
given the Hearing Officer’s findings about the “many problems” with V.T.’s virtual placement at
Deal in the fall of 2021, which ultimately prompted J.T. to educate V.T. herself at home. Amid all
those challenges, DCPS prepared an updated IEP in November 2021—without input or
participation from V.T.’s parents—that was predicated on an in-person placement at Deal, even
though V.T. required specialized instruction and additional services by way of virtual instruction.
As the Circuit found in somewhat analogous circumstances, “[i]t makes little sense to think that
15 the absence” of an appropriate IEP specially tailored to V.T.’s unique needs “left [V.T.] no worse
off than he would have been had the District provided them.” B.D., 817 F.3d at 799. 6
The Hearing Officer’s observation that V.T. was reportedly doing “very well” at Friendship
Public Charter School—in the years after leaving DCPS—does not change things. As J.T. rightly
puts it, “[t]hat fact, while good to hear, says nothing about the harm [V.T.] suffered from DCPS’s
denials of FAPE in his last school year in their system, the only year in question in this case.” (ECF
No. 21 (“Pl.’s Mem.”) at 15.) Insofar as the Hearing Officer was trying to use that testimony to
suggest another similarity with J.T. II and its finding that V.T. “flourished” despite the alleged
IDEA violations, the comparison is inapt. There, the court’s analysis was premised on a finding
that V.T. had “flourished” during the year covered by the allegedly deficient IEP, not years later.
V.T.’s progress and academic performance years after the fact is a very different matter, and the
Hearing Officer did not otherwise identify or discuss any evidence reflecting strong academic
success during the 2021–22 year—certainly nothing along the lines discussed in J.T. II. In fact, as
the Court already outlined, the evidence regarding V.T.’s progress in the 2021–22 year undercuts
any such finding, especially when compared to the 2020–21 school year.
The bottom line is that the Hearing Officer’s narrow reliance on J.T. II was misplaced. If
anything, the facts underlying J.T. I present a far closer analogue to the situation here. J.T. I, 496
F. Supp. 3d 190. There, DCPS failed to provide V.T. an appropriate placement for essentially an
entire school year (2019–20), in part because the placement it proposed in November 2019 was
noncompliant with his IEP. Id. at 213. While not a perfect match, that is a reasonably close
6 The Court was struck by the District’s assertion, in its reply brief, that J.T. supposedly “concede[d] that she failed to present evidence of specific educational harm” simply by virtue of stating that she “sought further examination and determination of that impact by independent experts.” (See ECF No. 28 at 4.) Suggesting the record would benefit from “further” expert assessment comes nowhere close to admitting that no evidence of harm exists without it. It is certainly no concession. 16 description of what happened here by virtue of the inappropriate November 2021 IEP. And in
J.T. I, the court reasoned that because of DCPS’s failings, V.T. was “entitled to compensatory
education … as well as an independent evaluation to ascertain what, if any, progress V.T. would
have made during the 2019–2020 school year, and by extension determine the compensatory
education that V.T. needs.” Id. These are the same remedies J.T. requests now.
Finally, beyond J.T. II, the District points to several cases in arguing that the Hearing
Officer was correct to find J.T. waived any claim to compensatory education based on “a failure
of proof.” (ECF No. 23 (“Def.’s Mem.”) at 24–26, 33 (citing and discussing cases).) They are all
distinguishable. In Wade v. District of Columbia, for instance, the plaintiff expressly withdrew any
claim for compensatory education in the hearing and “merely sought a subsequent IEP meeting”
as a remedy. 2021 WL 3663630, at *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 2021) (“A federal court … is not the form
in which a litigant may pick up the sticks she dropped in an administrative hearing.”). The same
was true in Jones v. District of Columbia, 2017 WL 10651264, at *9 (D.D.C. Jan. 31, 2017)
(“Plaintiff withdrew her request for compensatory education … prior to the administrative
hearing[.]”). Nothing like that happened here. Otherwise, in Smith v. District of Columbia, the
court agreed that a compensatory education award was unwarranted based on “insufficient
evidence,” but only because the hearing officer first gave the plaintiff “thirty days to supplement
the record.” 2023 WL 6291637, at *6 (D.D.C. July 31, 2023). Again, nothing like that happened
here. The District also cites Herrion v. District of Columbia, 2023 WL 2643881, at *22 (D.D.C.
Mar. 27, 2023), for the proposition that “a plaintiff [may also] waive the right to compensatory
education by failing to present evidence of a proper compensatory education plan.” (Def.’s Mem.
at 24, 33.) But Herrion went on to find no waiver “because the Parents ha[d] insisted throughout
th[e] case and in the administrative proceedings below that they [sought] relief in the form of
17 assessments to inform and ultimately aid in the calculation of an appropriate compensatory
education award[.]” Id. So, in reality, Herrion cuts against the District and in favor of J.T. Finally,
the District invokes J.T. II, but the Court already explained why that case is inapposite here.
J.T. has consistently pursued compensatory education for the 2021–22 school year—she
certainly never expressly waived or withdrew that request—and the Hearing Officer never gave
J.T. an opportunity to supplement the record, whether with the benefit of an additional DCPS-
funded evaluation or otherwise, to substantiate an appropriate compensatory education award for
the FAPE denials that affected V.T. This was error. The undersigned therefore recommends that
the Court remand to the Hearing Officer to reconsider J.T.’s request for a compensatory education
award. In remanding, the Court should instruct that the Hearing Officer may “allow the parties to
submit additional evidence to enable … an appropriate compensatory education award,” or “order
the assessments needed to make the compensatory education determination[.]” Butler, 275 F. Supp.
3d at 5. But the Hearing Officer cannot simply “outright reject an award.” Id. 7
II. The Hearing Officer Should Reevaluate Additional Claims On Remand
Beyond her compensatory-education claim, J.T. contests several of the Hearing Officer’s
determinations about DCPS’s implementation of V.T.’s IEP during the 2021–22 school year,
including between V.T.’s initial placement at Deal in September 2021 and the November 2021 IEP.
Specifically, J.T. complains about: (1) the overall unworkability of the prescribed specialized
instruction with the Deal virtual placement, especially given the “many problems” the Hearing
Officer identified with online services at Deal; (2) a class size above the limit prescribed by V.T.’s
7 Because the Court recommends remanding on the compensatory education issue with these instructions, it need not reach J.T.’s alternative argument that the Court should order a compensatory education meeting. (Pl.’s Mem. at 22–26.) Relatedly, because the Court agrees that the Hearing Officer’s compensatory education analysis was deficient based on the record as it exists, the Court need not consider whether to accept J.T.’s additional evidence in the form of Exhibits 1 through 9 to her summary judgment motion.
18 IEP; (3) the lack of a functional dedicated aide for V.T.; and (4) DCPS’s failure to provide all the
speech-language therapy and behavioral support services hours prescribed by V.T.’s IEP.
As an initial matter, the District seems to suggest that these claims—or at least some subset
of them—were not included in J.T.’s administrative complaint(s) and are therefore unexhausted.
(Def.’s Mem. at 22–23, 38–39.) “The law is clear that the scope of an IDEA hearing extends only
to those issues raised in the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]omplaint, and that matters not presented to the
Hearing Officer are not administratively exhausted for the purposes of district-court review.”
Adams v. Dist. of Columbia, 285 F. Supp. 3d 381, 394 (D.D.C. 2018) (collecting cases).
To the extent the District is talking about claims focused on the 2020–21 school year under
the prior IEP—before V.T.’s virtual placement at Deal—the District is correct. But J.T. is not
arguing otherwise. Her claims focus on the period from September 2021 forward, under the prior
IEP but after V.T.’s virtual placement at Deal. And the amended due process complaint raised
claims about DCPS’s failure to provide V.T. with various elements of his IEP during the 2021–22
school year at Deal. (AR at 576–79.) While there was originally some uncertainty as to whether
the timeframe before the November 2021 IEP (i.e., back to the start of the school year) was
properly at issue, the Hearing Officer ultimately dispelled that uncertainty. He deemed the
allegations about “an inappropriate placement … to date to [V.T.’s] placement at [Deal] on or
around September 9, [2021].” 8 (AR at 24 n.2.) Plus, the Hearing Officer’s substantive engagement
with DCPS’s alleged shortcomings in implementing V.T.’s IEP during the earlier part of the year
(see AR 29–34) further supports that these claims were exhausted and properly at issue below.
The one exception relates to J.T.’s claim that DCPS failed to provide a dedicated aide for
V.T. As DCPS correctly argues (Def.’s Mem. at 22), the due process complaint(s) did not raise any
8 The Hearing Officer used “September 9, 2023,” but, given the broader context, J.T. says the use of “2023” was a scrivener’s error for “2021.” The Court agrees, especially since the District does not argue otherwise. 19 claim to this effect (AR at 576–79), and this remained true even after the Hearing Officer deemed
the original complaint to be insufficiently detailed (id. at 571). The amended complaint added more
specificity, outlining DCPS’s alleged failure to provide “specialized instruction prescribed in [the]
IEP,” “all occupational therapy, speech-language pathology, and behavior support related services
prescribed in [the] IEP,” and “a classroom as small as prescribed in the IEP.” (AR at 577.) But it
did not mention the dedicated aide prescribed by the IEP. Neither did the Hearing Officer’s
prehearing order specify a claim to this effect; it understandably focused on the specific allegations
in the amended complaint. (AR at 613–14 (specifying the relevant issue as whether “DCPS denied
[V.T.] a FAPE at Deal Middle School in the 2021–2022 school year by failing to provide all IEP
specialized instruction and all occupational therapy, speech-language pathology, and behavioral
support related services; and a classroom setting as small as prescribed in the IEP”).).
J.T. does not dispute these facts. Instead, she emphasizes that her counsel “questioned
multiple witnesses regarding the aide and lack thereof” and “argued the aide issue in [the] closing,
with no objection from DCPS.” (Pl.’s Reply at 22–23.) But even if true, these rejoinders miss the
point. The due process complaint and the prehearing order frame the issues, and that seems
especially important here given the Hearing Officer’s requirement that the complaint be amended
to provide greater specificity after deeming the original filing insufficient and too vague. Adams,
285 F. Supp. 3d at 394 (finding claim unexhausted even though it was “discussed during the
hearing” when it was not explicitly presented in the due process complaint or identified in
prehearing order); Dist. of Columbia v. Pearson, 923 F. Supp. 2d 82, 87–88 (D.D.C. 2013). The
Court finds J.T.’s claim for failure to provide a dedicated aide to be unexhausted.
The Court next turns to evaluating each of J.T.’s other theories against the record.
20 First, as to whether DCPS properly implemented V.T.’s specialized instruction during his
virtual placement at Deal, the Hearing Officer thought that claim unsubstantiated because the
record supposedly “[did] not establish how many hours or services were available to [V.T.] online
… before December 2021, when [J.T.] apparently gave up on virtual special education and decided
that she would teach [V.T.] herself.” (AR at 32.) But this statement came in the wake of the factual
findings about the “many problems” with V.T.’s virtual placement at Deal, including that: (1) V.T.
had problems logging into the CES classroom; (2) V.T. “was the only distance-learning student”
and “could only view the teacher and the blackboard – not the rest of the class”; (3) V.T. “could
not follow the teacher in class”; (4) “[t]here were no visual aids or instructions” for V.T.; and (5)
“[i]t was difficult to communicate with the dedicated aide because the aide did not have a computer
to be online with [V.T.] or the class.” (Id. at 21.) These are notable findings. Yet the Hearing Officer
failed to meaningfully engage with them in turning aside J.T.’s claim about specialized instruction.
Fair engagement with the full record, including the Hearing Officer’s own factual findings,
requires more. The undersigned recommends that the Court remand for further consideration on
this point—namely, whether and to what extent the “many problems” the Hearing Officer
identified with V.T.’s placement gave rise to a FAPE denial. Shaw v. Dist. of Columbia, 2019 WL
49831, at *20 (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 2019) (recommending remand on issues likely to “implicate
educational policy concerns that fall within the Hearing Officer’s expertise”).
Second, J.T. asserts that the Deal placement exceeded the nine-student maximum
prescribed by V.T.’s IEP(s). The Hearing Officer declined to engage with this claim as “moot” on
the basis that V.T. attended classes virtually, not in person. (AR at 32.) This was a dodge. Virtual
or not, a larger class size would make it harder for the teacher “to provide individualized instruction
to [V.T.’s] level and “any 1-on-1 help,” as J.T. appropriately argues. (Pl.’s Mem. at 34 n.12.) Plus,
21 the District does not really defend the Hearing Officer’s mootness finding, focusing instead on
arguing why the evidence supposedly showed that V.T.’s class was not too large. (Def.’s Mem. at
39.) For at least these reasons, the Court believes the Hearing Officer was too quick to adjudge the
claim moot, at least without a more fulsome explanation considering the points just mentioned.
And while the evidence about class size would be up to the Hearing Officer to weigh and interpret
in the first instance, the Court observes that DCPS points only to testimony about the District’s
general policy for CES classrooms (see id. (citing AR at 1586 (“So, the CES classroom policy is
that the max of students is eight students in the classroom.”))), whereas J.T. testified that V.T.’s
teacher told her the specific classroom here had “more than 10 kids” (see Pl.’s Mem. at 34 (citing
AR at 1466)). The latter evidence seems far more compelling on the specific question at hand—
i.e., V.T.’s actual class size, rather than a policy in the abstract—and the District was certainly in a
position to refute J.T.’s testimony, if appropriate, with evidence as to the actual number of students
on the roster for the Deal CES classroom during the 2021–22 school year. 9 The undersigned
recommends that the Court remand for further consideration on the class-size claim, as well.
Third, this leaves J.T.’s argument that the District failed to provide the full measure of
speech-language therapy and behavioral support services hours prescribed by the IEP(s).
As to behavioral support, the Hearing Officer credited the testimony of the social worker
who provided them, who said she was “pretty consistent” with the services. (AR at 32; see also id.
at 1691 (“I believe it was Thursdays at 12:00 … every week. And the only time we may have
missed is if there was maybe a closure or something of that nature. But other than that, we always
9 Indeed, as the Court understands things, this is the reason J.T. asked the District to produce V.T.’s class rosters. While the Court agrees with the District that it was not required to produce those rosters as “education records” under the statute (as explained below), DCPS certainly could have opted to introduce evidence—or at least specific and particularized testimony from V.T.’s teacher—about the actual class size, assuming the information supported its position on this point and undercut J.T.’s. 22 made up services if he couldn’t have it that specific time or day.”); id. at 1697 (“He’s the only
virtual student I had. So, I made sure that I allotted time for him.”).) J.T. contests the Hearing
Officer’s determination on this point because the DCPS service trackers assertedly reflect a
considerable shortfall in the hours provided, despite testimony from DCPS witnesses. (Pl.’s Mem.
at 36 (citing AR at 325–41).) The Court acknowledges some tension between the hours shown in
the service trackers and the social worker’s testimony that she was “consistent.” But that tension
was placed squarely before the Hearing Officer during witness examination (see AR 1694–98),
and the Hearing Officer credited the witness’s testimony on the issue against the record as a whole.
The Hearing Officer’s finding on this point is entitled to deference, and J.T. has not carried her
burden to show that the Hearing Officer’s determination was wrong. See, e.g., Garris v. Dist. of
Columbia, 210 F. Supp. 3d 187, 190 (D.D.C. 2016) (“[T]hese objections are about how
the Hearing Officer weighed the evidence .... That Plaintiffs draw a different conclusion from that
evidence does not make the Hearing Officer’s alternative conclusion improper.”); A.W. v. Dist. of
Columbia, 2014 WL 12884524, at *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 19, 2014) (reiterating that IDEA plaintiffs
cannot secure reversal of a hearing officer’s decision simply because “some evidence in the record,
if given substantial weight, could support a finding in their favor”).
As to the speech-language therapy, the Hearing Officer looked to the District’s service
trackers to conclude that V.T. received 2,640 minutes of services and missed 140 minutes due to
absences, which meant DCPS failed to provide about “470 minutes out of 3,240 minutes” of
prescribed services—an approximately 15% shortfall. (AR 32–33.) J.T. relies on those same
service trackers to argue the actual hours were far less, including because the Hearing Officer
“incorrectly counted” certain categories of time in his total. (Pl.’s Mem. at 35.) In other words,
J.T.’s fact-based argument again boils down to a disagreement on how the Hearing Officer weighed
23 and interpreted the evidence, and the Court defers to the Hearing Officer’s assessment on that
factual finding, Garris, 210 F. Supp. 3d at 190—that DCPS should have provided V.T. with about
eight additional hours of speech-language therapy services in 2021–22 school year.
That leaves the question of whether that eight-hour shortfall was a “material failure” to
implement V.T.’s IEP. Relying on Middleton v. District of Columbia, 312 F. Supp. 3d 113, 144–45
(D.D.C. 2018), the Hearing Officer concluded it was not. (AR at 34.) The Court agrees.
Courts in this District agree that “[a] material failure to implement a student’s IEP
constitutes a denial of a FAPE.” Middleton, 312 F. Supp. 3d at 144 (citing Johnson v. Dist. of
Columbia, 962 F. Supp. 2d 263, 268–69 (D.D.C. 2013)). “Generally, in analyzing whether a
student was deprived of an educational benefit, ‘courts ... have focused on the proportion of
services mandated to those actually provided, and the goal and import (as articulated in the IEP)
of the specific service that was withheld.’” Id. (quoting Beckwith v. Dist. of Columbia, 208 F. Supp.
3d 34, 49 (D.D.C. 2016)). In Middleton, the court found that a 20–40% deprivation of a student’s
specialized instructional hours was material and not de minimis, id. at 145, and other courts in this
District have reached similar results on similar facts, see Beckwith, 208 F. Supp. 3d at 49–51
(finding that a failure to provide “between 207.5 and 287.25 hours of required instruction” during
the year was a meaningful deprivation of educational benefits and thus a denial of FAPE); Turner
v. Dist. of Columbia, 952 F. Supp. 2d 31, 40–41 (D.D.C. 2013) (finding that a failure to provide
eleven hours per week of specialized instruction was material). By contrast, courts have come
down the other way where the implementation shortfall was more modest and did not implicate
core instruction time but rather ancillary related services. See, e.g., Catalan v. Dist. v. Columbia,
478 F. Supp. 2d. 73, 75–76 (D.D.C. 2007) (holding that a failure to provide modestly fewer speech-
therapy hours than prescribed was not material enough to constitute a FAPE deprivation, where
24 the record still showed that the student “received consistent speech therapy in accordance with the
IEP”). see also T.M. v. Dist. of Columbia, 75 F. Supp. 3d 233, 242 (D.D.C. 2014) (holding that ten
missed hours of occupational therapy out of about 34 hours was not a material failure).
J.T.’s claim fits far more comfortably within the latter camp. The Hearing Officer found
DCPS failed to provide V.T. with slightly fewer than 8 hours of speech-language therapy services
over the course of the year. That figure sounds more significant when expressed in percentage
terms of 15%, which explains why J.T. tries to analogize to a 15% “change in inflation from 3%
to 18%” or an academic grade dropping “from an A+ to a B.” (Pl.’s Mem. at 35.) But those
arguments just demonstrate why percentage-based comparisons often require more context,
especially in the context of relatively small numbers, as here. Despite the District’s modest
shortfall, the record nevertheless shows that V.T. “received consistent speech therapy in accordance
with the IEP.” Catalan, 478 F. Supp. 2d. at 76. And as the Hearing Officer noticed, J.T. “did not
call a speech and language expert or other professional to testify about the goal and import of the
hours of SLP services that were not provided.” (AR at 34.) In other words, J.T. failed to show how
the gap in speech-language services was material. The briefing before this Court fares no better.
Apart from rhetoric, J.T. fails to identify any helpful caselaw, and she does not even attempt to
engage with the Hearing Officer’s reliance on Middleton and the relevant legal principles above.
Thus, the Court finds that J.T. failed to show that the Hearing Officer was wrong in her
rejecting her claims based on behavioral-support and speech-language services.
III. J.T.’s Claim for Education Records
J.T.’s final challenge to the Hearing Officer’s decision focuses on her inability to obtain
from DCPS certain documents that she contends qualify as “education records” under the IDEA.
She says the Hearing Officer should have ordered DCPS to produce certain emails related to V.T.
25 and his placement, as well as copies of V.T.’s class rosters. (Pls.’ Mem. at 37.) 10 In her briefing,
J.T. posits that if the Court grants relief in her favor on other grounds, this claim would become
moot. Since the Court recommends a remand to the Hearing Officer on the issue of compensatory
education, it could take J.T. at her word and decline to pass on this secondary claim. But in the
interest of thoroughness on review, the Court addresses it all the same. 11
The IDEA requires that a school district provide “[a]n opportunity for the parents of a child
with a disability to examine all records relating to such child[.]” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1). The
statute’s implementing regulations add a bit more meat to those bones, providing that “[e]ach
participating agency must permit parents to inspect and review any education records relating to
their children that are collected, maintained, or used by the agency under this part.” 34 C.F.R. §
300.613(a) (emphasis added). “Education records,” as used in the regulation, “means the type of
records covered under the definition of ‘education records’ in 34 CFR part 99 (the regulations
implementing the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 [(“FERPA”].” 34 C.F.R. §
300.611(a), And that regulation defines “education records” as “those records that are: (1) directly
related to a student; and (2) maintained by an educational agency or institution[.]” 34 C.F.R. §
99.3(a); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1323g(a)(4)(A) (defining “education records” in the same way).
Two decades ago, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the term “education records,” as used
in FERPA, to decide whether “peer-graded classroom work and assignments” fit the bill. Owasso
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Falvo, 534 U.S. 426 (2002). In holding they did not, Owasso focused in large
part on the definition’s inclusion of the term “maintain,” which the Court believed was suggestive
10 Specifically, J.T. through counsel asked that DCPS provide “all emails, including internal email, directly related to [V.T.] and maintained by DCPS,” and “a class roster for [V.T.’s] class, with other students’ names redacted, as of September 1, 2021, November 1, 2021, and May 1, 2021.” (AR at 588.) 11 J.T. filed a “motion to compel” production of these records at an earlier point in the case, which the Court denied as procedurally improper. J.T. v. Dist. of Columbia, 2024 WL 5075805 (D.D.C. Dec. 11, 2024).
26 of records “kept in a filing cabinet in a records room at the school or on a permanent secure
database[.]” 534 U.S. at 433. Plus, under FERPA, institutions shall “‘maintain a record, kept with
the education records of each student’” that “must list those who have requested access to the
student’s education records and their reasons for doing so.” See id. at 434 (citing 20 U.S.C. §
1232g(b)(4)(A)). And “FERPA requires a ‘record’ of access for each pupil” that “must be kept with
the education records,” charging a “school official” with responsibility for the records. See id. at
434-35. All these indicators, the Court reasoned, “impl[y] that education records are institutional
records kept by a single central custodian[.]” Id. at 435 (emphasis added). “Individual assignments
handled by many student graders in their separate classrooms” were not that. Id.
In the years since, multiple federal courts have applied Owasso’s reasoning to conclude
that ordinary school-staff emails—like the ones J.T. requested here—fall comfortably outside the
definition of “education records” under the IDEA, except where they are specifically added to a
student’s official file. See, e.g., Doe v. Rutgers, 2023 WL 2239399, at *3 (3rd Cir. Feb. 27, 2023)
(holding that routine emails are not “education records” under FERPA “because they are not …
institutional records and are not held by a central custodian”); Burnett v. San Mateo Foster City
Sch. Dist., 739 F. App’x 870, 873-74 (9th Cir. 2018) (concluding that school district did not violate
IDEA “when it only turned over emails concerning [a student] that had been printed and added to
[the student’s] physical file”); S.B. v. San Mateo Foster City Sch. Dist., 2017 WL 4856868, at *18
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2017) (agreeing it was appropriate for the school district to limit production of
“education records” to “those contained in [the student’s] central file”); E.D. v. Colonial Sch. Dist.,
2017 WL 1207919, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2017) (“Unless Defendant kept copies of e-mails
related to E.D. as part of its record filing system with the intention of maintaining them, we cannot
reach the conclusion that every e-mail which mentions E.D. is a bona fide education record within
27 the statutory definition.”); S.A. v. Tulare Cnty. Ofc. of Educ., 2009 WL 3126322, at *5-7 (E.D. Cal.
Sept. 24, 2009) (concluding that emails not placed in a student’s “permanent file” are not
“maintained” by the school district and thus not “education records”). This Court agrees.
J.T.’s only real rejoinder is to argue that “DCPS work emails are kept secure on DCPS
servers – i.e., ‘maintained’ – as are class rosters.” (Pl.’s Mem. at 38.) That may be true, but it
oversimplifies the necessary analysis and ignores the more nuanced interpretation of “maintain”
explicated by the Supreme Court in Owasso and applied in many cases since to exclude routine
email correspondence from the ambit of “education records” under FERPA and the IDEA. 12 And
at least on the facts here, the same analysis applies to the class rosters. As the District explains,
DCPS witnesses testified about DCPS’s EasyIEP Special Education Data System (“SEDS”) and
the Aspen database, which serve as central repositories for official files and records, and confirmed
that no emails or class rosters were maintained or located in those systems in the course of
searching for records in response to J.T.’s requests. (AR at 1590-92, 1712.)
Simply put, based on the governing legal precedent and the evidence presented at the
hearing, the Hearing Officer appropriately concluded that DCPS did not violate the IDEA by
declining to produce the additional emails and class rosters that J.T. requested.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
For these reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court GRANT IN PART
and DENY IN PART both Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 21) and the
12 J.T. also tosses out a one-sentence argument that DCPS was required to produce “computer media” records under the FERPA regulatory definitions, which she says encompasses “emails.” (Pl.’s Mem. at 38.) But “computer media” is a component of the definition of “record” within those regulations, and the IDEA and its implementing do not require the production of any “record” writ large, but only “education records.” And J.T.’s argument that emails comprise “education records” fails for the reasons explained. 28 District’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 23) and REMAND to the Hearing Officer for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Specifically, the Court should REMAND to the Hearing Officer with instructions to:
(1) reconsider J.T.’s claim for compensatory education—including by ordering any assessments
needed to fashion an appropriate award, or by at least allowing the parties to submit additional
evidence on that issue—and (2) reconsider J.T.’s claims that DCPS failed to properly implement
V.T.’s IEP during the 2021–22 school year at Deal as to: (a) specialized instruction in light of the
“many problems” with V.T.’s virtual placement identified by the Hearing Officer; and (b) V.T.’s
class size. The Court should otherwise deny J.T.’s motion and grant the District’s motion and
uphold the other determinations in the Hearing Officer’s decision.
Dated: July 21, 2025 MATTHEW J. SHARBAUGH United States Magistrate Judge
29 * * *
The Court hereby advises that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and LCvR 72.3(b),
any party who objects to a report and recommendation must file a written objection within fourteen
(14) days of the party’s receipt of the report and recommendation. The written objections must
specifically identify the portion of the report or recommendation to which objection is made and
the basis for such objections. Failure to file timely objections to the findings and recommendations
set forth in this report may waive that party’s right of appeal from an order of the District Court
that adopts such findings and recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
J.T. v. District of Columbia, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jt-v-district-of-columbia-dcd-2025.