J.R. v. J.J.

2025 IL App (2d) 240114-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: January 17, 2025
• Docket: 2-24-0114
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2025 IL App (2d) 240114-U No. 2-24-0114 Order filed January 17, 2025

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

J.R., Individually and as Mother and Next ) Appeal from the Circuit Court Best Friend of A.R., a Minor; R.R., as Father ) of Lake County. and Next Best Friend of A.R., a Minor; ) and A.R., a Minor, ) ) Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) ) v. ) No. 21-L-31 ) J.J. and B.J., Individually and as Parents and ) Next Best Friends of S.J., a Minor; and ) S.J., a Minor, ) Honorable ) Jorge L. Ortiz, Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Jorgensen and Mullen concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Default judgment was void for lack of personal jurisdiction where the trial court’s order allowing alternative means of service required hand delivery and mailing, but plaintiffs did not mail the summons and complaint.

¶2 Plaintiffs, J.R. (individually), J.R. and R.R. (as parents and next best friends of A.R.), and

A.R. obtained a default judgment against defendants, J.J. and B.J. (as parents and next best friends

of S.J.), and S.J. Defendants petitioned under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure 2025 IL App (2d) 240114-U

(Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2022)) to vacate the judgment as void for want of personal

jurisdiction. The trial court granted the petition. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On January 14, 2021, plaintiffs filed a seven-count complaint against defendants. The

factual basis for the complaint was that, on January 19, 2019, J.R. and A.R. were at home when

S.J. entered and attacked J.R., causing her severe injuries, pain, and medical expenses and

traumatizing A.R. The complaint sought recovery under theories of general negligence (count I),

negligent parental supervision (count II), negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress

(counts III and IV), and battery and assault (counts V and VI). Count VII sought recovery under

the “Family Expense Act,” i.e., section 15 of the Rights of Married Persons Act (750 ILCS 65/15

(West 2018)). Later, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed both A.R. as plaintiff and count VII.

¶5 On February 3, 2021, plaintiffs filed an affidavit of service by Justin Rundall, a Lake

County deputy sheriff. He stated that, on January 28, 2021, he attempted to serve process on all

defendants at their putative residence in Lake Forest but could not do so because they had moved.

On March 1, 2021, on plaintiffs’ motion, the trial court appointed Jeffrey Caudill as a special

process server to serve an alias summons on defendants.

¶6 On April 13, 2021, plaintiffs moved per section 2-203.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure

(735 ILCS 5/2-203.1 (West 2018)) to serve defendants “by alternative means.” Their motion

alleged as follows. On March 7, 16, 20, 21, and 27, 2021, Caudill “attempted to serve the

[d]efendants, but the [d]efendants refused to answer.” The motion attached Caudill’s signed

report, which detailed his numerous attempts to effect personal service. These included several

visits to defendants’ current residence in Glenview, where he received no answer even though one

or more vehicles were parked in defendants’ driveway. The trial court granted plaintiffs’ motion.

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The court’s written order stated, in pertinent part: “Plaintiffs to have Complaint hand[-]delivered

to the [d]efendants’ house as well as sent via US Mail.”

¶7 The cause was continued several times, with no defendant appearing. On September 23,

2021, plaintiffs moved for a default judgment against all defendants. On September 28, 2021, the

trial court entered an order continuing the cause for status on plaintiffs’ motion for default and

granting plaintiffs “leave to *** have a copy [of the motion] hand[-]delivered to [d]efendants’

abode.” On October 14, 2021, the court further continued the status hearing to November 17,

2021.

¶8 The record contains an October 22, 2021, letter from plaintiffs’ counsel to defendants,

referencing two attachments: (1) the September 23, 2021, motion for default and (2) the October

14, 2021, continuance order. The letter informed defendants that, on November 17, 2021, plaintiffs

would present to the trial court the motion for default. The record also contains a copy of a

certified-mail receipt card stating that the letter was delivered to all three defendants at their

Glenview house. In the card’s “Signature” and “Received by” spaces appear the date “10/25/21”

and a set of initials, apparently “KS.”

¶9 On November 17, 2021, the trial court found defendants in default and continued the cause

for a prove-up on January 6, 2022. The court ordered plaintiffs to give defendants notice of the

judgment and the prove-up. Subsequent orders continued the prove-up. Ultimately, on June 30,

2022, the court scheduled the prove-up for August 23, 2022.

¶ 10 On August 23, 2022, Caudill filed two affidavits of service. The first, dated April 19, 2021,

stated as follows. On Saturday April 17, 2021, at approximately 12:15 p.m., he went to defendants’

house, rang the front doorbell, and knocked loudly on the door, but got no answer. He then placed

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the following items in the front mailbox of the house: “Alias Summons, Complaint & Order,

(Plaintiff’s [sic] Motion to Serve by Alternative Means), filed on April 14, 2021.”

¶ 11 Caudill’s second affidavit, dated August 19, 2022, stated as follows. On Saturday, July 16,

2022, he went to defendants’ house and “[p]osted *** two documents on the front door of the

residence”: the June 30, 2022, order setting the prove-up for August 23, 2022, and a letter dated

July 6, 2022, from plaintiffs’ counsel to J.J. and B.J. He observed three vehicles parked on the

premises. Also, after posting the documents, Caudill drove to the end of the block and turned

around. As he drove back toward the house, he saw the front door closing; the person closing the

door “had white paperwork in their hand and the posted documents were gone. This was

approximately two minutes after posting.”

¶ 12 On August 23, 2022, defendants not having appeared, the trial court heard plaintiffs’

evidence of damages, attorney fees, and costs and entered a judgment for $785,397.68.

¶ 13 On October 26, 2023, defendants appeared by counsel. On November 14, 2023, they filed

their section 2-1401 petition to quash the summons and vacate the judgment. The petition alleged

that, although the order allowing service by alternative means required the complaint to be “hand

[-]delivered” to defendants’ house and sent via United States mail, the affidavits of service neither

designated who was served nor stated that a copy of the complaint was mailed.

¶ 14 Each defendant’s affidavit was attached to the section 2-1401 petition. Each defendant

stated that he or she “never received a copy of the [s]ummons and [c]omplaint via mail (regular or

certified) or otherwise or had actual knowledge of the pendency of the above litigation until after

[j]udgment was entered and a copy was received as a result of the investigation into the file in

August 2023.”

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¶ 15 The trial court allowed plaintiffs to depose defendants. The depositions were taken

remotely on December 21, 2023.

¶ 16 S.J. testified that, after moving with his parents and sister to Glenview in 2020, he lived at

home except for periods when he resided at college in Chicago. He testified to two lease periods

during which he was at college. His first lease began in January 2022 and ended in June or July

2022, and his second lease began in June or July 2022 and ended in June or July 2023. He

specifically confirmed that he lived at home in Glenview in April and October 2021. For part of

March 2021, his family vacationed in Florida. S.J. testified that, while living at home, he was

never approached by anyone trying to serve him process.

¶ 17 S.J. testified that he first learned of the lawsuit against him and his parents in July or August

2023 when he was searching online for information about his juvenile court case in connection

with the 2019 attack. He did so “[o]ut of curiosity.” In his search, he saw a reference to “[R]. v.

[J]., the lawsuit.” He immediately showed it to J.J. S.J. or J.J. soon relayed the information to B.J.

¶ 18 S.J. further testified that he had no knowledge of the sheriff ever attempting to serve him,

J.J., or B.J. When shown the certified-mail receipt card dated October 25, 2021, he testified that

he did not know whose initials were signed, but they were not his. He did not recall whether he

or his parents were home that day. He did not recall anyone ever knocking on the door and leaving

papers at the front door or in the mailbox.

¶ 19 B.J. testified that she and her family moved to Glenview in October 2020. They never had

problems receiving mail. During 2021, 2022, and 2023, no family member received any

documents left on the front door. She received no documents from plaintiffs’ attorney’s firm, and

neither J.J. nor S.J. ever told her that he had received such documents. Nor had she seen any letters

signed by plaintiffs’ attorney. B.J. learned of the present lawsuit only in July or August 2023 when

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J.J. showed her what S.J. had found online. At that point, defendants contacted their attorney, who

told them about the default judgment. Before then, B.J. had not been aware that anyone was trying

to serve process on defendants.

¶ 20 B.J. testified that her family was on vacation in Florida on March 16, 20, 21, and 27, 2021.

When they were home, defendants did not answer their door unless someone called in advance to

arrange a visit. B.J. testified that she did not recognize the signature on the certified-mail receipt

card; she did not know anyone with the initials “KS” and had no idea who had signed the card.

Nobody had informed her of the card or the delivery of any certified mail on October 25, 2021.

She did not recall whether anyone in her family was home that day. Also, she never received

notice of a letter dated June 8, 2022, from plaintiffs’ attorney.

¶ 21 J.J. testified that, since 1993, he had been a self-employed private detective, working

mostly online from home. J.J. first learned of the present suit from S.J., who discovered it online

in August 2023. Until then, J.J. had never seen plaintiffs’ motion for service by alternative means

or any of the process servers’ affidavits.

¶ 22 J.J. testified that his family was vacationing in Florida in middle and late March 2021.

Some friends visited their home to feed their cat. J.J. never received any documents related to the

present action; nothing was posted on his front door or mailed to his family at any address. He

never received any correspondence from plaintiffs’ attorney. Defendants’ front doorbell did not

work, and they did not answer their door unless they knew who was coming—a precaution

necessitated by J.J.’s occupation. J.J. did not recognize the signature on the certified-mail receipt

and did not know anyone with the initials “KS.”

¶ 23 Plaintiffs responded to defendants’ section 2-1401 petition as follows. Defendants’

conduct reflected a deliberate lack of diligence. They had purposely disregarded the efforts to

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serve them. Moreover, after learning of plaintiffs’ suit, defendants had not diligently filed their

section 2-1401 petition.

¶ 24 Defendants replied that they need not establish due diligence in filing the petition, because

the default judgment was void. Defendants contended that plaintiffs had to prove that they

complied strictly with the requirements for serving process, but they had not done so. In particular,

the trial court required that the complaint and summons be (1) hand-delivered to defendants’ house

and (2) sent to defendants’ house by United States mail. Yet there was no evidence that the papers

were either hand-delivered or mailed to defendants. There was no proof that any defendant signed

the certified-mail receipt.

¶ 25 On January 19, 2024, the trial court entered an order noting that it had heard argument on

the section 2-1401 petition. The court granted the petition and vacated the default judgment. The

court found that Caudill’s April 19, 2021, affidavit proved that plaintiffs complied with the

requirement to hand-deliver the papers. However, the court found, plaintiffs did not prove that

they complied with the further requirement of service by United States mail. The court also denied

plaintiffs’ oral motion “to supplement the record to provide an email and/or affidavit.” (We note

that the record contains no report of proceedings of the hearing on defendants’ petition.)

¶ 26 Plaintiffs timely appealed.

¶ 27 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 28 At issue is whether the grant of defendants’ section 2-1401 petition was proper. Plaintiffs

contend that (1) the trial court erred in finding that they failed to comply with the order granting

their motion to effect service by alternative means and (2) “as a matter of public policy,” they

should not be “punished for defendants’ negligence and disregard for the court’s process.”

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¶ 29 We set out the general principles of review. Although, ordinarily, a section 2-1401

petitioner seeking to vacate a judgment must show both due diligence and a meritorious defense,

neither of these is required when the petition attacks the judgment as void. Sarkissian v. Chicago

Board of Education, 201 Ill. 2d 95, 104 (2002). A judgment entered by a court that lacks

jurisdiction over the parties is void and may be attacked at any time. Id. at 103. To obtain personal

jurisdiction over a defendant, there must be service of process in the manner directed by statute.

State Bank of Lake Zurich v. Thill, 113 Ill. 2d 294, 308 (1986). A judgment entered without proper

service of process is void even if the party against whom the judgment is entered actually knew of

the proceedings. Id. at 308-09; White v. Ratcliffe, 285 Ill. App. 3d 758, 763-64 (1996). Where, as

here, the trial court held no evidentiary hearing on the issue of personal jurisdiction, our review is

de novo. See Abbington Trace Condominium Ass’n v. McKeller, 2016 IL App (2d) 150913, ¶ 10.

¶ 30 We turn to plaintiffs’ first argument on appeal. Under section 2-203.1 of the Code, if

service upon an individual by the method specified in section 2-203 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-

203 (West 2020)) is impractical, the plaintiff may move the court to “enter an order directing a

comparable method of service.” Id. § 2-203.1. The court may order service to be made “in any

manner consistent with due process.” Id.

¶ 31 Here, the trial court required that plaintiffs “have [the] Complaint hand[-]delivered to the

[d]efendants’ house as well as sent via US Mail.” (Emphasis added.) The court found that

plaintiffs effectuated hand-delivery but not delivery by United States mail. Plaintiffs contend that

they complied with the trial court’s order by “serving by registered U.S. mail or by posting the

summons on [d]efendants [sic] door.” (Emphasis added.) However, plaintiffs simply misread the

court’s order: the phrase “as well as” plainly conveyed that both methods of service were required,

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not merely one “or” the other. Plaintiffs do not contend that they served defendants by United

States mail.

¶ 32 We agree with the trial court that the default judgment was void for want of personal

jurisdiction over any of the defendants, given (1) the plain meaning of the court’s order requiring

service by United States mail, (2) plaintiffs’ implicit concession that they did not serve defendants

by United States mail, and (3) the absence of evidence of service by United States mail.

¶ 33 Plaintiffs’ second argument is that “public policy” considerations require us to reverse the

trial court’s judgment. Plaintiffs contend that they should not be “punished for [d]efendants’ own

negligence, indifference, and disregard of the [trial] court’s process.”

¶ 34 We agree with defendants that plaintiffs have forfeited their “public policy” argument by

failing to raise it in the trial court. An appellant may not obtain relief based on a theory not raised

in the trial court. Kravis v. Smith Marine, Inc., 60 Ill. 2d 141, 147 (1975); WC Media, Inc. v.

Village of Gilberts, 2020 IL App (2d) 190250, ¶ 22. Further, we agree with defendants that,

forfeiture aside, plaintiffs’ argument lacks a sufficient legal basis. Relying on their subjective

characterization of defendants’ conduct, plaintiffs essentially ask us to disregard the established

authority on which the trial court’s judgment is based. Although plaintiffs might consider the

result harsh, the court did not err in finding that plaintiffs failed to comply with its order allowing

alternative service by the means clearly specified therein resulting in a failure to obtain personal

jurisdiction over the defendants.

¶ 35 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 36 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County.

¶ 37 Affirmed.

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