Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association v. James Farah

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: February 13, 2025
• Docket: A-1196-23
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1196-23

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JAMES FARAH AND JULIA FARAH, husband and wife, AMERICAN EXPRESS NATIONAL BANK, and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendants-Respondents, _________________________

REY OLSEN,

Appellant. _________________________

Submitted February 4, 2025 – Decided February 13, 2025

Before Judges Gooden Brown and Smith.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Morris County, Docket No. F-011096-18. Rey Olsen, appellant pro se.

McCalla Raymer Leibert Pierce, LLP, attorneys for respondent JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association (Brian P. Scibetta, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Rey Olsen, a non-party to this foreclosure action, appeals the Chancery

Division's order denying his motion for an emergency stay of eviction and his

motion to vacate a foreclosure judgment entered against defendant James Farah.

We affirm.

In 2008, defendant James Farah (Farah) executed a promissory note in the

amount of $924,415 in exchange for a loan from Washington Mutual Bank

(WaMu). As security, Farah and his wife, Julia Farah (defendants), executed a

mortgage to WaMu on their property located in Chatham. WaMu subsequently

went into receivership, and plaintiff J.P. Morgan acquired the note and mortgage

in 2008.

Farah defaulted in 2010, and plaintiff commenced foreclosure proceedings

in 2014. After one dismissal for lack of prosecution and a subsequent voluntary

dismissal, plaintiff finally filed a foreclosure complaint in May 2018, which

resulted in the Chancery Division's entry of final judgment against defendants

on February 19, 2020 in the amount of $1,442,701.38 plus costs and fees. The

A-1196-23 2 final judgment permitted recovery against defendants James Farah and Julia

Farah "and all parties holding under said Defendants the possession of the

premises." The judgment also ordered the sale of the mortgaged property, and

foreclosed "all equity of redemption of, in and to the mortgaged premises[.]"

The trial court also denied Farah's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for

lack of jurisdiction. A writ of execution was issued the same day.

Farah then filed a flurry of motions, all of which were denied by the trial

court. The trial court eventually scheduled sale of the property. Plaintiff

acquired the deed to the Chatham property after sheriff's sale on October 27,

2022. After denying yet another Farah motion to vacate and application for an

emergent stay, the trial court issued a writ of possession on March 9, 2023.

On April 18, 2023, defendants assigned a twenty-percent interest "in all

claims that they assert against J.P. Morgan Chase, N.A. (Chase) in connection

with the alleged improper foreclosure of a mortgage in the following cases filed

in the Superior Court of Morris County, New Jersey . . ." to Rey Olsen (Olsen).

The assignment further stated that "Olsen may file a lawsuit in his own name as

the assignee of the Farahs or in the name of the Farahs or may negotiate directly

with Chase."

A-1196-23 3 Next, Olsen, apparently acting as Farah's assignee, moved to vacate the

foreclosure judgment and sought related relief, ultimately asking the court to

dismiss plaintiff's foreclosure complaint with prejudice. Because Olsen was not

a party to the litigation, the court clerk rejected the motion.

On September 15, 2023, the trial court again issued a writ of possession.

On November 1, Olsen once again filed an emergent application to stay the

eviction. He moved to vacate the "the foreclosure judgment and all related

[o]rders," arguing two theories. First, he contended that a statute of limitations

defense to the foreclosure complaint applied. Second, he argued that the

foreclosure judgment should be vacated under Rule 4:50-1. This time, the court

heard the motion and issued a November 1 order denying the application and

making findings.

On the statute of limitations argument, the court looked to N.J.S.A. 2A:50-

56.1(c), and found plaintiff timely filed the 2018 complaint. On the Rule 4:50-

1 argument, the trial court found Olsen failed to show excusable neglect or a

meritorious defense. The trial court also denied Olsen's request to stay the

eviction pending appeal, finding that he failed to meet his burden under Crowe

v. De Gioia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982). Olsen appeals the court's November 1, 2023

A-1196-23 4 order, contending the trial court erred in denying his motion to vacate and to

seek other relief.

The threshold question before us is whether Olsen, a non-party, has

standing to appeal the trial court's November 1, 2023 order. We conclude the

answer is clearly no.

Although "[o]ur courts generally take a liberal view of standing," a party's

"standing is not automatic." N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,

453 N.J. Super. 272, 291 (App. Div. 2018). A party has standing to appeal when

it is "aggrieved by a judgment." State v. A.L., 440 N.J. Super. 400, 418 (App.

Div. 2015) (quoting Howard Sav. Inst. v. Peep, 34 N.J. 494, 499 (1961)). "It is

the general rule that to be aggrieved a party must have a personal or pecuniary

interest or property right adversely affected by the judgment in question." Ibid.

(quoting Howard Sav. Inst., 34 N.J. at 499).

The record shows Olsen took an assignment of defendants' rights to pursue

a claim, if any, more than three years after entry of final judgment in plaintiff's

foreclosure action against Farah. The record also shows that, even if a

cognizable claim exists, Olsen never applied for intervention under Rule 4:33.

It follows that Olsen has no standing to appeal the November 1, 2023 order.

We need not reach the merits of the appeal.

A-1196-23 5 Affirmed.

A-1196-23 6