JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Slade
This text of JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Slade (JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Slade) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
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Bureau Thomas J.K. Smith, State Reporter
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JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Slade
2026 NY Slip Op 02257
April 15, 2026
Appellate Division, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.
JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association, respondent,
v
Francine Slade, etc., appellant, et al., defendants.
Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department
Decided on April 15, 2026
2024-04988, (Index No. 11213/10)
Betsy Barros, J.P.
William G. Ford
Lourdes M. Ventura
Donna-Marie E. Golia, JJ.
Petroff Amshen LLP, Brooklyn, NY (Steven Amshen and James Tierney of counsel), for appellant.
BurgherGray LLP, New York, NY (Mark A. Samuel of counsel), for respondent.
DECISION & ORDER
In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the defendant Francine A. Slade appeals from an order and judgment of foreclosure and sale (one paper) of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Felice J. Muraca, J.), entered March 22, 2024. The order and judgment of foreclosure and sale, insofar as appealed from, upon an order of the same court (Thomas A. Adams, J.) dated May 8, 2017, inter alia, denying those branches of that defendant's cross-motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against her or, in the alternative, pursuant to CPLR 5015(a) to vacate her default in answering and for leave to serve a late answer, and upon an order of the same court (Thomas A. Adams, J.) dated November 22, 2019, among other things, denying that branch of that defendant's separate cross-motion which was to toll the accrual of interest on the subject mortgage loan from August 11, 2011, to July 12, 2016, granted the plaintiff's motion to confirm a referee's report and for a judgment of foreclosure and sale, confirmed the referee's report, awarded the plaintiff certain interest on the mortgage loan, and directed the sale of the subject property.
ORDERED that the order and judgment of foreclosure and sale is modified, on the facts and in the exercise of discretion, by deleting the provision thereof awarding interest on the subject mortgage loan from August 11, 2011, to July 12, 2016, and substituting therefor a provision tolling the accrual of interest on the mortgage loan from August 11, 2011, to July 12, 2016; as so modified, the order and judgment of foreclosure and sale is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs to the plaintiff, that branch of the cross-motion of the defendant Francine A. Slade which was to toll the accrual of interest on the subject mortgage loan from August 11, 2011, to July 12, 2016, is granted, the order dated November 22, 2019, is modified accordingly, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for a new determination of the amount of accrued interest in accordance herewith and the entry of an appropriate amended judgment of foreclosure and sale thereafter.
In July 2010, the plaintiff commenced this action against, among others, the defendant Francine Slade (hereinafter the defendant). The defendant failed to timely answer the complaint or make a pre-answer motion to dismiss the complaint.
In July 2016, the plaintiff moved to restore the action to the calendar, for leave to enter a default judgment, and for an order of reference. In an order dated September 30, 2016, the Supreme Court granted the plaintiff's motion, and an order of reference was executed.
In December 2016, the plaintiff moved for a judgment of foreclosure and sale. The defendant cross-moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against her or, in the alternative, pursuant to CPLR 5015(a) to vacate her default in answering and for leave to serve a late answer. In an order dated May 8, 2017, the Supreme Court, among other things, granted the plaintiff's motion for a judgment of foreclosure and sale and denied those branches of the defendant's cross-motion.
In July 2017, the plaintiff moved to vacate the judgment of foreclosure and sale, and the motion was granted. In July 2019, the plaintiff again moved, inter alia, for a judgment of foreclosure and sale, and the defendant cross-moved, among other things, to toll the accrual of the interest on the subject mortgage loan from August 11, 2011, to July 12, 2016. The motion and the cross-motion were denied in an order dated November 22, 2019.
In August 2023, the plaintiff moved to confirm a referee's report and for a judgment of foreclosure and sale. In an order and judgment of foreclosure and sale entered March 22, 2024, the court, inter alia, granted the plaintiff's motion to confirm the referee's report and for a judgment of foreclosure and sale, confirmed the referee's report, awarded the plaintiff certain interest on the mortgage loan, and directed the sale of the subject property. The defendant appeals.
The Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendant's cross-motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against her for lack of personal jurisdiction. In pertinent part, CPLR 308(2) provides that personal service upon a natural person may be made by delivering the summons to a person of suitable age and discretion at the actual place of business, dwelling place, or usual place of abode of the person to be served and by mailing the summons to the person to be served at his or her last known residence (see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Singh, 204 AD3d 732, 733). "'A process server's affidavit of service constitutes prima facie evidence of proper service and, therefore, gives rise to a presumption of proper service'" (Wilmington Sav. Fund Socy. v Brotherson, 221 AD3d 1053, 1054, quoting Bethpage Fed. Credit Union v Grant, 178 AD3d 997, 997). "A mere conclusory denial of service is insufficient to rebut the presumption of proper service arising from the process server's affidavit. In order to warrant a hearing to determine the validity of service of process, the denial of service must be substantiated by specific, detailed facts that contradict the affidavit of service" (U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v Catalano, 215 AD3d 992, 993-994 [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]; see Bethpage Fed. Credit Union v Grant, 178 AD3d at 997).
Here, the affidavit of the plaintiff's process server constituted prima facie evidence that the defendant was properly served pursuant to CPLR 308(2) (see Harrison v Schottenstein, 228 AD3d 848, 850; Bethpage Fed. Credit Union v Grant, 178 AD3d at 997-998). Contrary to the defendant's contention, her daughter's affidavit was insufficient to rebut the presumption of proper service arising from the process server's affidavit of service (see TD Bank, N.A. v Turbo Group, Inc., 226 AD3d 1058, 1059).
The Supreme Court also properly determined that the defendant was not entitled to vacate her default in answering the complaint pursuant to CPLR 5015(a).
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