J-A05038-26
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, NA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : PETER BOTTOS : : Appellant : No. 2174 EDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment Entered October 16, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Civil Division at No(s): 2024-04334-CT
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED JUNE 25, 2026
Peter Bottos (“Bottos”) appeals the trial court’s judgment finding him
liable to JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“Chase”) for $14,802.74 for charges on
his Chase credit card. Because we find no merit in Bottos’s eight issues
asserting judicial bias, the absence of a valid contract, and various evidentiary
errors, we affirm.
In June 2024, Chase filed a complaint to collect a credit card debt from
Bottos, who filed an answer with new matter to which Chase responded. A
panel of arbitrators found for Chase. In response, Bottos demanded a trial.
Bottos elected not to attend the ensuing March 2025 trial. Chase presented
its case through the testimony of its custodian of records, Amber Near J-A05038-26
(“Ms. Near”).1 Ms. Near’s testimony, and the documents admitted at trial,
established that, on May 30, 2017, Bottos completed a cardmember
application on the internet and received a Chase Bank credit card (“the credit
card”). The credit card was later subject to a change in terms: namely,
because of a merger, in May 2019, Chase Bank USA, N.A. changed its name
to JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. See N.T., 3/6/25, at 10-18, Exhibits P-1 to P-
5.2 Bottos used the credit card for approximately six years until he ceased
payment. As of January 2024, Bottos owed Chase $14,802.74 in charges and
interest. See id. at 23-25.
The trial court found for Chase in the amount of $14,802.74. Bottos
filed a reconsideration motion, which the trial court treated as a post-trial
motion and denied. See Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9/2/25. Bottos
timely appealed and he and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Bottos presents eight issues for this Court’s review: ____________________________________________
1 Ms. Near, who was not a Chase employee at the time Bottos was a Chase
cardholder, identified herself as an “Associate Vendor Management Analyst,” N.T. 3/6/25, at 9. Regardless, she gave testimony about business records consistent with that of a custodian of records.
2 Chase introduced the following exhibits through Ms. Near’s testimony: Exhibit P-1, Bottos’s on-line internet credit card application, which contained his name, social security number, home phone number, and address, Exhibit P-2, the cardmember agreement for Bottos’s account, Exhibit P-3, an updated credit card agreement sent to Bottos at his home address in 2019, including notification that Chase Bank USA, NA had merged with Morgan Chase and changed its name to JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A, Exhibit P-4, an unredacted copy of Bottos’s on-line credit card application, and Exhibit P-5, the billing statements for Bottos’s account from 2017 to 2023, which were sent to Bottos’s home address. See N.T., 3/6/25, at 10-23.
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(1) Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion by questioning [Bottos’s] strategic decision not to appear at trial and making a negative inference therefrom adverse to [Bottos] immediately at the outset of the non-jury bench trial[?]
(2) Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion by issuing the written Order/Decision, dated March 6, 2025[,] in favor of [Chase] and against [Bottos], in the amount of $14,802.74[?]
(3) Whether [Chase] failed to establish the three (3) elements of a breach of contract action in Pennsylvania, as against [Bottos], including[,] but not limited to[,] failing to establish: (a) the existence of a contract by and between [Chase] and [Bottos], including its essential terms; (b) a breach of a duty imposed by the contract; and (c) resultant damages allegedly sustained by [Chase][?]
(4) Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion by failing to require [Chase] to produce evidence of the assignment of the credit card claim from Chase Bank USA, N.A. to [Chase] [?].
(5) Whether [Chase] failed to produce evidence of an assignment of claim from Chase Bank USA, N.A. to [Chase] ALLEGEDLY MADE ON May 18, 2019, as revealed on Bates Stamp page 0021 of [Chase’s] Trial Exhibit "P-2"[?]
(6) Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion by admitting into evidence at trial [Chase’s] Exhibit "P-1," a generic Chase Internet Application, [Chase’s] Exhibit "P-2," a generic Cardmember Agreement, [Chase’s] Exhibit "P-3," Notice of Change in Terms, [Chase’s] Exhibit "P-4," Unredacted Copy of Application[,] and [Chase’s] Exhibit "P-5," Chase billing statements, where [Chase] failed to satisfy the requirements of both the Business Record Exception to the Hearsay Rule, Pa.R.Civ.P. 803(6) and the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act, 42 Pa. C.S.A. Section 6108[?]
(7) Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion by failing to apply the doctrine of stare decisis RE: Commonwealth Financial Systems v. Larry Smith, 15 A.3d 492 (Pa. Super. 2011) to the facts of this case and to render a decision in favor of [Bottos] and against [Chase] [?]
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(8) Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion by admitting into evidence 261 pages of previously undisclosed documents in [Chase’s] Trial Exhibit "P-5," (Bates Stamped 0048- 0308), which were not provided by [Chase] to [Bottos] prior to trial, which was prejudicial to [Bottos] [?]
Bottos’s Brief at 1-3 (capitalization standardized, citation form corrected,
issues reordered).
Bottos asserts he is entitled to relief3 because the trial court commented
on his failure to appear at trial, demonstrating its bias. See Bottos’s Brief at
12-16.
A party’s failure to testify in a civil proceeding can support an inference
his testimony would have been unfavorable to him. See Kovach v. Solomon,
732 A.2d 1, 8-9 (Pa. Super. 1999). A party alleging bias bears the burden to
produce evidence of bias, prejudice, or unfairness. See Reilly by Reilly v.
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Authority, 489 A.2d 1291, 1299 (Pa.
1985) (assessing bias assertion in the context of a recusal claim). An issue
not raised in the trial court is waived and cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).
Bottos notes the trial court stated it expected him to be present at trial
and, further that Bottos required everyone else involved in the case to be
present but did not have the “courtesy” to appear himself. He asserts these
____________________________________________
3 All eight of Bottos’s claims are phrased as a request for reconsideration rather than for reversal.
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statements showed “prejudice, bias, capricious disbelief or prejudgment.”
See Bottos’s Brief at 12-14. Bottos also asserts the trial court did not directly
respond when his counsel requested that no negative inference be drawn from
Bottos’s absence, and the court instead allowed a “pregnant pause.” See id.
at 14-16.
The trial court denied that a “pregnant pause” occurred after counsel
asked it not to draw a negative inference; the court stated it simply changed
the subject to the possibility of settlement. The trial court further stated the
conclusion it drew a negative inference from Bottos’s failure to appear is “pure
speculation;” it was permitted to draw a negative inference against Bottos;
and, in any event, Chase proved its case. Trial Court Opinion, 8/12/25, at
2-4.
Bottos’s claim is unreviewable. The record shows that Bottos failed to
make timely objection to the trial court’s allegedly biased comments or the
alleged pregnant pause. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); see also Thorson v. EDDW,
LLC, 309 A.3d 141, 148 (Pa. Super. 2024) (stating to preserve an issue for
appeal, a litigant must make a timely, specific objection at trial). 4
4 Even if reviewable, Bottos’s claim would be without merit. The trial court was permitted to draw a negative inference from Bottos’s failure to testify. See Kovach, 732 A.2d at 8-9. Further, Bottos presents no evidence to meet his high burden to prove the court’s bias, prejudice, or unfairness. See Reilly by Reilly, 489 A.2d at 1299.
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Bottos combines his next two issues, which assert Chase failed to prove
the existence of a valid contract. See Bottos’s Brief at 16-23.
To prevail on a breach of contract claim, a party must establish the
existence of a contract, its breach, and damages resulting from the breach.
See 412 N. Front St. Associates, LP v. Spector Gadon & Rosen, P.C.,
151 A.3d 646, 657 (Pa. Super. 2016). To be enforceable, a contract must
make certain the nature and extent of the mutual obligations, and the parties
must have agreed on the material and necessary details of their bargain. See
Lackner v. Glosser, 892 A.2d 21, 30 (Pa. Super. 2006). In an action to
recover for credit card debt, a creditor need not present the original cardholder
agreement to prove a breach of contract; it may introduce an updated
agreement. See Discover Bank v. Booker, 259 A.3d 493, 496 (Pa. Super.
2021); Discover Bank v. Stucka, 33 A.3d 82, 87 (Pa. Super. 2011). Implied
contracts arise under circumstances which, according to the ordinary course
of dealing and the common understanding of people, show a mutual intent to
form a contract. See Ingrassia Constr. Co. v. Walsh, 486 A.2d 478, 483
(Pa. Super. 1984). The intent of the parties to make an implied-in-fact
contract is inferred from their acts in light of the surrounding circumstances.
Id. Contract interpretation is a question of law; therefore, our standard of
review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. McMullen v. Kutz,
985 A.2d 769, 773 (Pa. 2009).
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Bottos asserts he is due relief because he asserted in his new matter
that the contract with Chase was generic and “the goods purchased[,] if any[,]
were completely defective and worth nothing.” See Bottos’s Brief at 18. He
states Chase failed to prove the existence of a contract because, inter alia,
the contract offered at trial did not contain his name or address. See id. at
19-21, citing Atlantic Credit & Finance, Inc. v. Guiliana, 829 A.2d 340
(Pa. Super. 2003).5 Bottos claims Ms. Near could not testify with certainty
when the contract breach occurred, see id. at 22, and asserts Chase failed to
prove which portions of the debt were attributable to principal, accrued
interest, fees, and penalties. See id. at 22-23.
The trial court found the business records Chase admitted into evidence
included an unredacted copy of Bottos’s credit card application, establishing
Bottos opened his account in May 2017, and additional records showing
Bottos’s continued use of the card and implied acceptance of its modified
terms. The trial court also found Giuliana inapposite where, as here, a debt
collection claim is supported by evidence such as the account application,
changes to its terms and conditions, and the debtor’s continued use of the
card after changes to its terms and conditions. See Trial Court Opinion,
8/12/25, at 6-7, citing Booker, 259 A.3d at 496; J.F. Walker Co., Inc. v.
5 Bottos also asserts Ms. Near was not qualified to testify about Chase’s business records because her employment began after the transactions at issue. We address that claim in our discussion of Bottos’s challenge to the admissibility of business records.
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Excaliber Oil Group, Inc., 792 A.2d 1269, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2002) (stating
existence of a contract may be manifested orally or in writing, or as inferred
from the acts and conduct of the parties).
Through Ms. Near, Chase introduced into evidence Bottos’s on-line
internet application, which contained Bottos’s name, social security number,
home phone number, and address, and an unredacted copy of Bottos’s on-
line credit card application. Chase’s evidence also included Bottos’s
cardmember agreement, an updated agreement sent to Bottos at his home
address in 2019, which stated Chase Bank USA, NA was changed to JPMorgan
Chase Bank, N.A, and billing statements from the time he opened the account
in 2017 until his last statement in 2023, sent to Bottos’s home address,
demonstrating his payment of debt incurred on the credit card for
approximately six years until he abruptly ceased payment. See N.T., 3/6/25,
at 10-23. Ms. Near also testified the billing statements established Bottos had
a credit card balance of $14,802.74 on January 9, 2024, and the money was
not repaid. See id. at 23-25.
The evidence thus demonstrated that Bottos entered into a contract with
Chase which established the nature and extent of the parties’ mutual
obligations, Bottos’s awareness of Chase’s merger through written notice and
his continued use of his Chase credit card thereafter, Bottos’s breach of
contract by failing to pay the charges, and the damages Chase incurred. See
Booker, 259 A.3d at 496. Bottos provides no legal support for his additional
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assertion Chase was required to establish the amounts of his debt attributable
to principal, accrued interest, fees, and penalties. In the absence of proof
such details were required to establish a valid contract, we decline to award
relief on that basis.
Bottos’s next issue asserts the cardmember agreement notes that
JPMorgan Chase is a successor by merger to Chase Bank USA, N.A., but Chase
failed to prove the merger with evidence of a written bill of sale. See
Appellant’s Brief at 23-24.
The trial court quotes language from the 2019 update to the credit card
agreement, sent to Bottos, which stated Chase was a successor by merger to
Chase Bank USA, N.A., “and any other additional account agreements and
documents shall be read as JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.”
Bottos provides no authority for the proposition Chase may not collect
on his debt because he was not provided with a written bill of sale for Chase’s
merger. Moreover, Chase gave Bottos notice of its merger with JPMorgan and
Bottos assented to that merger by continuing to use his Chase credit card.
See Booker, 259 A.3d at 496-97. The claim thus has no merit.
Bottos’s next issue asserts Ms. Near admitted she had no documentation
of the assignment of Bottos’s debt by merger. See Bottos’s Brief at 30-33.
As just noted, Bottos’s continued use of the Chase credit card after notification
of the merger defeats this claim.
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Bottos’s sixth issue asserts the trial court erred in admitting Chase’s
Exhibits P-1 to P-5 under the business records exception to the hearsay rule,
Pa.R.E. 803(6), and 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6108 (“the Act”). See Bottos’s Brief at
24-29.
The admission of evidence implicates a trial court’s discretion and will
only be reversed if in reaching the conclusion the law is overridden or
misapplied or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result
of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will. See Maisano v. Avery, 204 A.3d 515,
523 (Pa. Super. 2019). A records custodian is qualified to authenticate
documents even if she did not personally record the specific information in the
documents. See Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Wicker, 206 A.3d 474,
486 (Pa. 2019). Further, business records are admissible even where the
authenticating witness had personal knowledge only of the record-keeping
procedures after the original record is created and even if those records were
created by another company. See id. at 484.
The business records exception has been incorporated into Pennsylvania
law through the Act and Rule 803(6). See Bayview, 206 A.3d at 483. The
Act provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
b) General Rule.-A record of an act, condition or event shall, insofar as relevant, be competent evidence if the custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation, and if it was made in the regular course of business at or near the time of the act, condition or event, and if, in the opinion of the tribunal, the sources of information, method and time of preparation were such as to justify its admission.
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42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6108(b). “As long as the authenticating witness can provide
sufficient information relating to the preparation and maintenance of the
records to justify a presumption of trustworthiness for the business records of
a company, a sufficient basis is provided to offset the hearsay character of the
evidence.” Boyle v. Steiman, 631 A.2d 1025, 1032-33 (Pa. Super. 1993).
Rule 803(6) provides, in relevant part, as follows:
The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay, regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness:
****
(6) Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity. A record (which includes a memorandum, report, or data compilation in any form) of an act, event or condition if,
(A) the record was made at or near the time by--or from information transmitted by--someone with knowledge;
(B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of a “business,” which term includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit;
(C) making the record was a regular practice of that activity;
(D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian or another qualified witness, or by a certification that complies with Rule 902(11) or (12) or with a statute permitting certification; and
(E) neither the source of information nor other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness.
Pa.R.E. 803(6).
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The Act and Rule 803(6) substantially overlap in that both generally
require that a custodian or other qualified witness testify that the record was
made at or near the time of the event recorded and that the record was kept
in the regular course of business. Bayview, 206 A.3d at 483. Moreover, both
the Act and the Rule provide for the trial court to determine whether the
circumstances surrounding the record justify its admission or indicate a lack
of trustworthiness. Id.
Bottos asserts Chase failed to authenticate the business records it
introduced at trial because they pre-dated Ms. Near’s employment, and
because Ms. Near had no knowledge of how Chase handled its business
records prior to the 2019 merger. See Bottos’s Brief at 24-26, citing
Commonwealth Financial Systems v. Smith, 15 A.3d 492 (Pa. Super.
2011). He additionally asserts, citing criminal law cases, that documents
prepared in anticipation of litigation do not qualify as business records. See
Bottos’s Brief at 28-30.
The trial court found Ms. Near identified the records in question and
testified they were maintained in the regular course of business, which defeats
the assertion the records were prepared in anticipation of litigation. The trial
court additionally determined Commonwealth Financial Systems is
inapposite because that case concerned an assignment from an original
creditor to a debt buyer whereas Chase’s records did not change; “the name
change was all that changed at the time of this change in terms.” Trial Court
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Opinion, 8/12/25, at 10, quoting N.T. 3/6/25, at 29. The court further found
Ms. Near’s testimony was trustworthy. See Trial Court Opinion, 8/12/25, at
10-11.
The trial court did not err in finding Ms. Near’s testimony trustworthy
supporting the admissibility of the business records Chase introduced at trial.
Ms. Near testified she knew Chase Bank U.S.’s records were created accurately
“[b]ased on my in-depth training of Chase’s practices and business
procedures.” See N.T. 3/6/25, at 31. See Bayview, 206 A.3d at 486
(declining to find abuse of discretion in the admission of business records
offered by a custodian of records personally acquainted with the recording
practice used by a predecessor company, justifying a presumption of
trustworthiness even though the custodian had not worked for that company).
Bottos next asserts the trial court erred by failing to accord stare decisis
effect to Commonwealth Financial Systems and precluding the admission
of Ms. Near’s testimony. He also cites a series of instances in which the trial
court overruled his objections during Ms. Near’s testimony. See Bottos’ Brief
at 33-39.
As discussed, Bayview held a new custodian of records can familiarize
herself with a company’s prior recordkeeping practices and thus offer
trustworthy testimony about practices preceding his/her employment, as
happened here. The Bayview court further recognized that the admissibility
of such a custodian’s testimony is a fact-sensitive determination. Here, the
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trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found Ms. Near’s testimony
sufficiently trustworthy. Bottos’s argument Smith constitutes stare decisis in
all cases in which a custodian of records testifies about a predecessor
company’s business practices lacks merit, given the fact-sensitivity of such a
claim.
Finally, Bottos asserts the court improperly admitted the copies of his
credit card statements from 2017-2023, which had not been previously
produced. See Bottos’s Brief at 39-43.
The trial court rejected this claim because Chase had emailed these
billing statements to Bottos during their business relationship and he had
made monthly payments on the account before defaulting. Additionally,
Bottos did not file a motion to compel their discovery. See Trial Court Opinion,
8/12/25, at 11.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the statements
into evidence. Bottos did not file a motion to compel their discovery, and he
had himself received copies of those documents during the entire course of
his contractual relationship with Chase.
Finding no merit in any of Bottos’s claims, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
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Date: 6/25/2026
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