NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2026 IL App (3d) 230578-U
Order filed August 25, 2026
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IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS THIRD DISTRICT
2026
JP MORGAN ACQUISITION ) Appeal from the Circuit Court CORPORATION, ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit, ) Will County, Illinois.
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. )
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DANNETTE BELL a/k/a Danette C. Bell; ) JAMES B. BELL a/k/a James Bell; ) UNKNOWN OWNERS; and NONRECORD ) CLAIMANTS, )
)
Defendants-Counter Plaintiffs, )
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(James B. Bell, ) Appeal No. 3-23-0578 ) Circuit No. 10-CH-2728 Defendant-Counter Plaintiff-Appellant), )
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LINEAR MORTGAGE, LLC, )
)
Plaintiff-Counter Defendant-Appellee, )
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and )
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JP MORGAN ACQUISITION ) CORPORATION and COMMUNITY LOAN ) SERVICING COMPANY f/k/a BAYVIEW ) MORTGAGE SERVICING, LLC, ) Honorable ) Theodore J. Jarz,
Third Party Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, Presiding.
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PRESIDING JUSTICE HETTEL delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Davenport and Bertani concurred in the judgment.
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ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court did not err when it granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff in a mortgage foreclosure case.
¶2 Plaintiff, Linear Mortgage, LLC, substituted as plaintiff into a mortgage foreclosure case brought by JP Morgan Acquisition Corporation against defendants, Dannette and James Bell. The circuit court granted summary judgment in Linear’s favor, and defendant James appealed. On appeal, James raises numerous contentions of error within his general argument that the court erred when it granted summary judgment in Linear’s favor. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 Many of the relevant facts of this case were set forth in this court’s previous decision, JP Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. v. Bell (Bell I), 2020 IL App (3d) 190128. We repeat only those facts necessary for the disposition of this appeal.
¶5 On January 13, 2005, spouses Dannette and James executed a mortgage agreement regarding a residence in University Park. The mortgage was recorded in Will County on January 25, 2005, and was designated number 200515045 by the Will County Recorder’s Office.
¶6 On May 25, 2006, Dannette and James executed a new mortgage agreement as tenants by the entirety as a refinancing of the original loan. The lender, ResMAE Mortgage Corporation, nominated Mortgage Electronic Registrations Systems, Inc. (MERS), as the mortgagee. Both Dannette and James signed the mortgage agreement. Beneath James’s signature was the following handwritten statement: “signing solely to waive any and all rights of homestead.” Only Dannette
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signed the promissory note, which was for $184,500, plus interest. MERS recorded the mortgage in Will County on June 12, 2006. The document was designated number 2006095856 by the Will County Recorder.
¶7 Just over two weeks later, on June 30, 2006, MERS recorded a satisfaction of the mortgage, which stated that the debt had been paid in full. The document was designated number 2006107810 by the Will County Recorder.
¶8 On July 19, 2006, MERS recorded a document titled “Certificate of Error.” The document stated that it was rescinding and disavowing the satisfaction of the mortgage, which it claimed had been issued in error. The document was designated number 2006119259 by the Will County Recorder.
¶9 On August 29, 2006, MERS recorded the mortgage agreement for a second time. The document was designated number 2006145083 by the Will County Recorder and was stamped on the first page, directly below the original recording stamp from June 12, 2006. Notably, the language below James’s signature regarding his waiver of homestead rights was crossed out.
¶ 10 Dannette died in July 2009. Years later, she was dismissed as a party defendant.
¶ 11 On April 27, 2010, MERS assigned the note and mortgage to JP Morgan. The document identified the property by its legal description and the mortgage as the one recorded on June 12, 2006 (designation number 200695856).
¶ 12 Subsequently, on May 3, 2010, JP Morgan filed a foreclosure action against Dannette and James. The complaint identified the mortgage by both the original recording number (2006095856) and the second recording number (2006145083) and alleged that the Bells had been in default since January 2010. The note was attached to the complaint and was indorsed in blank.
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¶ 13 Additional assignments were made while the foreclosure action was pending. The note continued to be indorsed in blank throughout each of the transfers. Ultimately, Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, came into possession of the note and was substituted into the case as the plaintiff in 2016.
¶ 14 In 2017 and 2018, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The parties argued several issues at the hearing in 2018, including whether the certificate of error rescinded the satisfaction and whether Bayview had standing. At the close of the hearing, the circuit court granted Bayview’s motion for summary judgment and denied James’s motion. James appealed after the residence was sold and the confirmation of sale was reported.
¶ 15 On appeal, a different panel of this court addressed, in part, the issues of whether the certificate of error rescinded the satisfaction and whether Bayview had standing. This court ruled that neither issue could be addressed because no business records had been submitted to show whether the debt had in fact been paid off. Bell I, 2020 IL App (3d) 190128, ¶¶ 46, 51. Accordingly, because a genuine issue of material fact existed, this court vacated the circuit court’s granting of summary judgment in Bayview’s favor. Id. ¶ 47. This court also included the following directions: “the trial court is directed to resolve the issue pertaining to Bayview’s standing, based on the language of the only assignment from the original lender to JP Morgan Acquisition, at the proper time following remand.” Id. ¶ 58.
¶ 16 After this court’s mandate issued, numerous motions were filed, including a motion to allow Linear to substitute as plaintiff, which was allowed.
¶ 17 In September 2021, Linear filed a motion for summary judgment. Attached to the pleading was the affidavit of Jason Crawford, a default portfolio manager with Linear. In it, Crawford averred that Linear acquired the note on August 19, 2020, from Bayview and integrated Bayview’s
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business records into its own file. At that time, the loan had been delinquent since January 2010. Crawford reviewed the loan documents and business records and determined that “the Loan was never paid in full or otherwise satisfied by James or Dannette Bell.” However, a satisfaction of the mortgage was erroneously recorded, followed by a certificate of error stating that the loan in fact had not been satisfied. Subsequently, the Bells made monthly mortgage payments until January 2010, when the loan went into default. As of August 31, 2021, the amount due was $381,237.94, consisting of a principal balance of $179,635, accrued interest of $170,392.40, and advances of $32,210.54. Attached to Crawford’s affidavit were numerous documents, including detailed transaction histories, the recorded 2005 mortgage (signed by both Dannette and James), the recorded 2006 mortgage containing both recording stamps, the 2006 note (signed by Dannette), the recorded 2006 satisfaction of mortgage document, and the recorded 2006 certificate of error.
¶ 18 In April 2022, the circuit court held a hearing on numerous motions. Of relevance to this appeal, the court addressed James’s argument from his motion to dismiss that Linear lacked standing to bring the foreclosure action. The court ruled that “in a mortgage foreclosure case, if you are able to present a copy of the note and a copy of the mortgage that you’re claiming that you have a right to enforce, you have standing.
Now in terms of whether or not you should be bound by that note or that mortgage, you certainly have a right to do what you’re doing and contest it, but in terms of resolving that standing issue and that motion to dismiss on which it’s based, I’m going to deny that motion ***.”
¶ 19 In June 2022, the circuit court held a hearing on numerous motions, including Linear’s motion for summary judgment. During the hearing, the court noted that Bell I stated that an issue of fact existed because “there wasn’t documentation in the record at the point of that appeal to
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essentially determine whether or not the loan in question had been paid.” The court also noted that James had not provided any counter-affidavits or other documentation to show that the debt had been paid off. Accordingly, the court found that no genuine issue of material fact existed surrounding the satisfaction and the certificate of error. The court also explained to James that his interest in the property was not superior to the bank’s interest. For these reasons, the court granted Linear’s motion. The circuit court issued its written ruling granting Linear’s motion for summary judgment in July 2022. The court also entered a judgment for foreclosure and sale.
¶ 20 James filed a premature notice of appeal in July 2022; this court dismissed his appeal in September 2022.
¶ 21 In November 2022, a judicial sale of the residence was held and Linear filed a motion to approve the sale. That motion was denied in May 2023 because Linear had failed to file a certificate of publication for the sale. Subsequently, Linear filed a second motion to approve the sale after filing the certificate of publication with the circuit court. In response, James filed a motion to dismiss Linear’s second motion to approve the sale. He alleged that the denial of Linear’s first motion was final and that no law allowed Linear to file a second motion.
¶ 22 James filed another premature notice of appeal in June 2023; this court dismissed his appeal (No. 3-23-0270) in July 2023. James filed a petition for rehearing, which this court denied on August 21, 2023.
¶ 23 On September 5, 2023, the circuit court held a hearing on Linear’s second motion to approve the sale. James did not appear at the hearing, at the end of which the court granted Linear’s motion.
¶ 24 On September 25, 2023, regarding appeal No. 2-23-0270, James filed a petition for leave to appeal to the supreme court.
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¶ 25 In October 2023, James filed a motion to vacate the circuit court’s order of September 5, 2023, which the circuit court denied. Also in October 2023, James filed a timely appeal from the granting of Linear’s motion to approve the sale.
¶ 26 Regarding appeal No. 3-23-0270, the supreme court denied James’s petition for leave to appeal in November 2023. The supreme court’s mandate issued in January 2024, and our mandate in appeal No. 3-23-0270 several days later.
¶ 27 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 28 Initially, we note that James lists nine issues for review in his brief. However, the argument portion of his brief does not track those listed issues and is, in fact, disjointed and often repetitive. We can discern what appear to be seven distinct arguments.
¶ 29 A. Arguments Related to Standing
¶ 30 James’s first argument on appeal is that Linear lacked standing to bring this foreclosure action because (1) it never obtained any interest in the mortgage or note due to the initial assignment referencing only the first recorded mortgage document, (2) the second recorded mortgage document was a forgery and therefore could not form a basis for standing, and (3) the debt had been discharged by the satisfaction and release.
¶ 31 A party has standing when it has “a real interest in the action brought and in its outcome.” In re Estate of Wellman, 174 Ill. 2d 335, 344 (1996). We review an issue of standing de novo. Powell v. Dean Foods Co., 2012 IL 111714, ¶ 35.
¶ 32 James mistakenly focuses on the first and second recorded mortgage documents in his first two sub-arguments on this issue. Standing in a mortgage foreclosure case is not based on any purported assignment of a mortgage. In Illinois, a mortgage is a mere incident to a debt and is not assignable at law. Moore v. Lewis, 51 Ill. App. 3d 388, 392 (1977). Rather, “[t]he assignment of a
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mortgage note carries with it an equitable assignment of the mortgage by which it was secured.” (Emphasis added.) Federal National Mortgage Association v. Kuipers, 314 Ill. App. 3d 631, 635 (2000); see also U.S. Bank National Association v. Gagua, 2020 IL App (1st) 190454, ¶ 49 (holding that “[a]ny possible technical defects with respect to the assignment of the mortgage, a mere incident to the debt, are irrelevant where US Bank was holder of the note and therefore also entitled to an equitable assignment of the mortgage”).
¶ 33 Standing in a mortgage foreclosure case, then, is based on whether the plaintiff is the true holder of the note. Gagua, 2020 IL App (1st) 190454, ¶¶ 45, 49. Accordingly, because an alleged lack of standing is an affirmative defense that a defendant must plead and prove, a defendant who raises the defense must prove that the plaintiff is not the true holder of the note. OneWest Bank FSB v. Cielak, 2016 IL App (3d) 150224, ¶¶ 28-29.
¶ 34 In this case, Linear was entitled to a presumption that it was the true holder of the note. See id. ¶ 29 (holding that “the attachment of a copy of the note to a foreclosure complaint is prima facie evidence that the plaintiff owns the note”); see also 810 ILCS 5/3-205(b) (West 2020) (stating that when a negotiable instrument is indorsed in blank, it becomes bearer paper “and may be negotiated by transfer of possession alone until specially indorsed”). James’s only remaining substantive attempt at disproving Linear’s standing is that the debt had been discharged by the satisfaction and release of the debt.
¶ 35 After Bell I’s remand, Linear filed Crawford’s affidavit, in which he opined that the satisfaction had been issued in error. The affidavit was supported by detailed transaction histories showing that neither James nor Dannette had ever paid off the debt. James did not provide any evidence to the contrary. Accordingly, James failed to meet his burden of proof regarding his
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affirmative defense. Under these circumstances, we hold that Linear had standing to bring this foreclosure action.
¶ 36 As a final matter on this issue, we note that James asserts here, and at other places in his brief, that this court “made several findings of fact and law” in Bell I that should be binding in this appeal under the law-of-the-case doctrine. Under that doctrine, “our decisions on questions of law in the previous appeal were binding on the trial court on remand and are also binding on this court in the present appeal.” Advocate Financial Group, LLC v. 5434 North Winthrop, LLC, 2015 IL App (2d) 150144, ¶ 39.
¶ 37 Among the alleged “findings” James asserts that this court made in Bell I came in a footnote in which we stated:
“The record does not contain a second assignment from MERS, as nominee for the original lender, ResMAE, to JP Morgan Acquisition dated after the second recording of the mortgage agreement, referenced as document number 2006145083. Based on this record, it does not appear that JP Morgan Acquisition had acquired any interest in document number 2006145083 to be assigned by JP Morgan Chase Bank, acting as the agent of JP Morgan Acquisition.” Bell I, 2020 IL App (3d) 190128, ¶ 15 n.2.
James’s use of this footnote to support his conclusion that Linear never obtained any interest in the note and mortgage is a non sequitur. Again, standing in a mortgage foreclosure case is predicated upon whether the plaintiff is the true holder of the note. Gagua, 2020 IL App (1st) 190454, ¶¶ 45, 49. Because the note was indorsed in blank, the purported assignments that occurred in this case are irrelevant. Moreover, we note that the law-of-the-case doctrine can be disregarded in two instances, one of which being that “our prior decision was palpably erroneous.” Id. To the extent that this court focused on the purported assignments and inferred that they dispositively
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impacted Bayview’s (and later, Linear’s) standing, we deem that focus to be palpably erroneous and we decline to follow it. See, e.g., Radwill v. Manor Care of Westmont, IL, LLC, 2013 IL App (2d) 120957, ¶ 12 (holding that “a court’s decision will be considered palpably erroneous only if that decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice”). Linear’s standing has been established, and James is not entitled to a windfall merely because a satisfaction was issued in error.
¶ 38 B. Arguments Related to the Summary Judgment Hearing
¶ 39 James’s second argument on appeal is that the circuit court erroneously conducted a “mini- trial” rather than a proper summary judgment hearing. He argues that the court ignored findings made by this court in Bell I and decided genuine issues of material fact regarding “the competing versions of facts presented by the mortgage agreement, the Note and the significance of defendant not signing the Note, the inferences to be drawn from the Satisfaction of Mortgage and the Certificate of Error, and whether plaintiff Linear owned an interest in the Note.”
¶ 40 Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, admissions on file, and affidavits, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, establish that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2020); Ragan v. Columbia Mutual Insurance Co., 183 Ill. 2d 342, 349 (1998). “If a party moving for summary judgment supplies facts which, if not contradicted, would entitle such party to a judgment as a matter of law, the opposing party cannot rely on his pleadings alone to raise issues of material fact.” Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229, 240-41 (1986). We review a circuit court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Ragan, 183 Ill. 2d at 349.
¶ 41 Our review of the record reveals that the circuit court did not conduct an inappropriate summary judgment hearing. The court correctly focused on whether the satisfaction was issued in
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error, basing its decision on the undisputed evidence presented by Linear in light of the fact that James provided no competing evidence to show that the debt had in fact been paid off. Thus, there was no longer any genuine issue of material fact regarding the validity of the note.
¶ 42 Our review of the record also reveals that the circuit court properly considered “the pleadings, depositions, admissions on file, and affidavits” when deciding whether any genuine issues of material fact existed. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2020). We hold that the circuit court did not employ an inappropriate analysis or decide genuine issues of material fact in arriving at its decision on summary judgment. Accordingly, we reject James’s procedure-related argument.
¶ 43 C. Other Arguments
¶ 44 James’s third argument on appeal is that the circuit court’s orders of September and October 2023 are void because the court lacked jurisdiction at the time, as this court did not issue its mandate in appeal No. 3-23-0270 until January 2024.
¶ 45 James filed a notice of appeal in June 2023 after the circuit court issued an order in May 2023 that denied Linear’s motion to approve sale. This court granted Linear’s motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, which argued that no final order had been issued in the case. James filed a petition for rehearing, which this court denied in August 2023. James then petitioned for leave to appeal to the supreme court, but that petition was denied in November 2023. The supreme court issued its mandate in late January 2024 and this court issued its mandate several days later.
¶ 46 “The filing of a notice of appeal from an order or judgment which the supreme court rules do not make appealable neither deprives the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed with the case nor vests the appellate court with jurisdiction to consider it.” North Community Bank v. 17011 South Park Ave., LLC, 2015 IL App (1st) 133672, ¶ 24. In a mortgage foreclosure case, the order
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confirming the sale is the final and appealable order. Id. ¶ 25. The Second District has astutely stated:
“If the appeal from an unappealable order were to divest the trial court of jurisdiction while the appellate court sorted it out, and only upon the issuance of the appellate mandate would jurisdiction be restored to the trial court, then a bad-faith litigant could file a notice of appeal on any order, halt the proceedings in the trial court until the appellate mandate, and repeat the process over and over so as to prolong the action in the trial court indefinitely and drain the resources of the other litigant or litigants.” In re Marriage of Levites, 2021 IL App (2d) 200552, ¶ 48.
¶ 47 Here, James attempted to appeal (No. 3-23-0270) before the circuit court approved the sale, i.e., before a final and appealable order had been issued. His premature appeal did not divest the circuit court of jurisdiction over the case. See id. Accordingly, the circuit court had jurisdiction over the case when it issued its orders in September and October 2023.
¶ 48 James’s fourth argument on appeal is that JP Morgan breached the mortgage contract by failing to give mandatory notice of acceleration before it proceeded with a foreclosure action.
¶ 49 An appellant who fails to raise an argument in the circuit court may not raise that argument for the first time on appeal. Haudrich v. Howmedica, Inc., 169 Ill. 2d 525, 536 (1996). Our review of the record reveals that James did not raise this argument in the circuit court. Accordingly, we decline to address the merits of this argument.
¶ 50 James’s fifth argument on appeal is that “[t]he orders entered by the circuit court are all void because they were all procured by and through fraud and forgery.” James’s argument is misplaced. Initially, we note that orders of the circuit court are void only if they are entered without personal jurisdiction or subject-matter jurisdiction. People v. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶¶ 11-
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12. There is no question that personal and subject-matter jurisdiction attached in this case. For this reason alone, James’s argument fails.
¶ 51 Moreover, the bulk of this section of James’s brief contains conclusory statements, reads like a fraud complaint against JP Morgan, and does not present a coherent argument for review. It is well settled that “[a] reviewing court is entitled to have issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and cohesive legal arguments presented [citation], and it is not a repository into which an appellant may foist the burden of argument and research [citation][.]” Obert v. Saville, 253 Ill. App. 3d 677, 682 (1993). Accordingly, we decline to address James’s contentions on this issue any further.
¶ 52 James’s sixth argument on appeal is that the circuit court failed to hold a hearing as mandated by section 15-1508(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/15-1508(b) (West 2020)) regarding the sale.
¶ 53 Section 15-1508(b) provides, in relevant part, that “Upon motion and notice in accordance with court rules applicable to motions generally, which motion shall not be made prior to sale, the court shall conduct a hearing to confirm the sale. Unless the court finds that (i) a notice required in accordance with subsection (c)
of Section 15-1507 was not given, (ii) the terms of sale were unconscionable, (iii) the sale was conducted fraudulently, or (iv) justice was otherwise not done, the court shall then enter an order confirming the sale.” Id.
The mandatory aspects of section 15-1508(b) are that the circuit court must (1) hold a hearing on the confirmation of a sale after a motion to confirm the sale has been filed and (2) confirm the sale unless one of the four enumerated problems are present. Household Bank, FSB v. Lewis, 229 Ill. 2d 173, 178 (2008).
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¶ 54 In this case, James did not challenge the sale based on any of the four grounds enumerated in the statute. Rather, he merely filed a motion to dismiss Linear’s second motion to confirm the sale, in which he argued that because the circuit court denied Linear’s first motion, it would be improper to consider the second motion. This was not a valid basis for challenging a sale. Moreover, we note that the circuit court did in fact hold a hearing on Linear’s second motion to confirm sale on September 5, 2023, which James did not attend. Under these circumstances, we hold that no error occurred regarding the confirmation of the sale.
¶ 55 James’s seventh argument on appeal is that the circuit court abused its discretion when, in January and April 2022, it denied his various motions to amend his pleadings and his motion to dismiss for lack of standing.
¶ 56 Initially, we note that the only citation to authority James includes in this argument is a single, unexplained reference to section 2-616 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-616 (West 2020)). James did not raise section 2-616 in defense of his pleadings in the circuit court. Arguments raised for the first time on appeal are forfeited. See, e.g., Hytel Group, Inc. v. Butler, 405 Ill. App. 3d 113, 127 (2010) (holding that “[a] reviewing court will not consider arguments not presented to the trial court”). Moreover, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) requires an appellant to include citations to authorities relied on in presenting an argument on appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). The absence of supporting authority in James’s argument on this issue results in forfeiture. See, e.g., Hytel, 405 Ill. App. 3d at 127 (holding that “even if the argument had not been forfeited for failure to raise it below, it would be forfeited for lack of support in this court [under Rule 341(h)(7)]”).
¶ 57 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the circuit court did not err when it granted summary judgment in favor of Linear.
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¶ 58 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 59 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.
¶ 60 Affirmed.