Joyner v. Hoffman

38 S.E. 174, 59 S.C. 528, 1901 S.C. LEXIS 69
Supreme Court of South Carolina·Decided March 19, 1901·Published·Cited by 3 cases

Opinion

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Mr. Justice Gary.

The facts of this case are thus set out in the decree of his Honor, the Circuit Judge: “This is an action by plaintiffs against the defendants, as heirs at law of one Rachel Willis; and its purpose is to compel the defendants to specifically perform a contract alleged to have been made betwixt plaintiffs and Rachel Willis. The cause was referred to the master, he reported on all the issues, and the matter now comes before me on exceptions by the plaintiffs. The argument before me was elaborate, and left me in grave doubt about the issues of fact. The issues of law are free from difficulty. *530 her lifetime, during the latter part of 1894, and the first part of 1895, agreed with the plaintiffs, that if they would live with her and her husband, Michael, on the said land, and care for them, in that event Rachel would at her death and that of Michael, give the said lands fc> plaintiffs; that plaintiffs moved upon the land pursuant to that agreement, and performed their part of the contract for the years 1895 and 1896; that Rachel left a paper writing, purporting h> be her last will, by which she undertook to devise the said lands to Michael for life, and then to plaintiffs forever. The defendants deny the alleged contract; they allege plaintiffs did live on the lands in 1895 and 1896, but under a contract betwixt them and Rachel, which either party had a right to terminate on proper notice; that Rachel elected to terminate the relationship at the end of 1896; that plaintiffs forfeited all their rights under the oontract by the ill treatment of Rachel, that defendants are tenants in common of the premises, and entitled to partition thereof, amongst themselves and the plaintiff, Ñola, as heirs at law of Rachel, who died intestate. These are the issues of fact. Michael died in 1896, and Rachel in 1899. Rachel died intestate, and the plaintiff, Ñola, and the defendants are her heirs at law, except Elizabeth Sharpe, who died since this action was begun, and whose sole heir, W. A. Sharpe, has been substituted in her stead. Rachel left a paper writing, purporting to be her last will and testament, dated 5th January, 1895, and thereby undertook to devise the said lands to Michael for his life, and then to the plaintiffs in fee. The paper is in apt language, free from ambiguity, and is in form and substance a will, except its execution is evidenced by two witnesses, instead of three. As a will, therefore, it is of no effect. This paper was in the possession of plaintiffs at the death of Rachel. Upon this paper, upon the occupation of the land by plaintiffs in 1895 and 1896, and their maintenance of Michael and Rachel, and upon a letter by Rachel to W. and Mrs. Garvin, addressed as ‘My dear Sister & Bro.,’ dated 13th November, 1894, the plaintiffs rest their case.

*529 “The subject of the action is 162 acres of land in Barn-well County, and particularly described in the complaint. The allegations of the complaint are that Rachel Willis, in

*531 “On the other hand, the defendants contend that the letter of 13th November, 1894, was not definite in its terms of proposal by Rachel to plaintiffs; that, indeed, it evidences no contract betwixt the parties. The defendants contend, further, that there was a written contract betwixt Rachel and plaintiffs, signed concurrently with the will, which contract gave each party thereto' the option to end the family arrangement; that Rachel chose to end it by her letter of 16th November, 1896, did end it, and plaintiffs agreed thereto * * * The testimony utterly failed to convict the Joyners of any neglect to the old people. They performed their obligation; and had the old folks died while the Joyners were on the premises, there would be no reasonable doubt of the equity. How is the case altered by their removal from the premises? They did not leave voluntarily; Rachel ordered them to quit, in the letter of 16th November, 1896. That letter assigned the reason for the old lady’s conduct, ‘Ñola and Elizabeth (Nola’s mother) both hurt my feelings so about Mr. Willis since his death, that I can never get over it as long as I live;’ again, T was told I ought to have put Nol'a out of rpy house, as she said what she did about Mr. Willis, etc.’ Rachel had no' right to thus break the contract, and by doing so she could impair no right thereunder which the plaintiffs had. The plaintiffs left, but there is no evidence tending to show that they acquiesced or waived any of their rights under the contract. And unless they did concur in what Rachel wrongfully did, there is not any reason to hold them bound by Rachel’s action.

“I am, therefore, of the opinion that the plaintiffs are entitled to have the lands described in the complaint specifically conveyed to them, and it is so ordered and decreed.”

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Joyner v. Hoffman, 38 S.E. 174, 59 S.C. 528, 1901 S.C. LEXIS 69 (S.C. 1901).

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