Joyce v. Dartmouth Med. School

2002 DNH 179

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: October 8, 2002
• Docket: CV-02-274-B
• Status: Published

Opinion

Joyce v . Dartmouth Med. School CV-02-274-B 10/08/02

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Terrence J. Joyce, M.D.

v. Civil N o . 02-274-B Opinion N o . 2002 DNH 179 Dartmouth Medical School and Dartmouth Graduate School

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Terrence J. Joyce, M.D., a Massachusetts resident, brings

this pro se action against Dartmouth Medical School and Dartmouth

Graduate School (“Dartmouth”).1 Joyce alleges that Dartmouth

breached a contract and committed various torts against him

including: slander; slander per s e ; libel; intentional infliction

of emotional distress; negligent infliction of emotional

distress; and negligence. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6),

Dartmouth moves to dismiss. It argues that several of Joyce’s

1 Trustees of Dartmouth College is the formal corporate name of Dartmouth College. Both Dartmouth Medical School and all Dartmouth graduate programs are operated by the Trustees of Dartmouth College. As such, the “two” defendants are one entity. For purposes of this Order, the two named defendants are therefore referred to in the singular as “Dartmouth.” claims are barred by the New Hampshire statute of limitations,

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4, and that his remaining claims fail

to state viable causes of action. For the reasons stated below,

I grant Dartmouth’s motion.

I. BACKGROUND2

Joyce began medical school at Dartmouth in 1989 as a first

year medical student. Although Dartmouth offered other medical

students from liberal arts backgrounds preparatory anatomy

courses during the summer prior to entering medical school, Joyce

was not provided with such an opportunity. During that same

academic year, Dartmouth began a new curriculum for first year

medical students. Both students and faculty were dissatisfied

with the new curriculum because it was “excessively stressful and

poorly planned.” Compl. ¶ 4 .

During his first year of medical school, Joyce failed two

required courses: neuroanatomy and physiology. As a result,

2 As required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the following facts are described in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Joyce. See Dartmouth Review v . Dartmouth Coll., 889 F.2d 1 3 , 16 (1st Cir.1989).

-2- Dartmouth’s Committee on Student Performance (“CSP”) required

Joyce to repeat his first year of medical school, even though

other students had been permitted to make up courses during the

summer semester. After he was notified of CSP’s decision, Joyce

suffered “severe emotional distress.” Compl. ¶ 8 . Joyce

continued to suffer emotional distress throughout his second year

at Dartmouth due to “poor treatment” by Dartmouth faculty.

Compl. ¶ 9 . Joyce discussed the possibility of transferring to

another medical school with “the Dean’s office.” Compl. ¶10.

However, his requests to transfer were denied. Other students in

the Medical School with “similar performance records” were

permitted to transfer. Id.

In 1992, at the completion of his second year of medical

school, Joyce sought to transfer to Harvard Medical School.

Joyce was interested in joining Harvard’s joint MD/PHD program.

Some time during the application process, an Associate Dean at

Dartmouth requested that Joyce consider joining Dartmouth’s joint

MD/PHD program. Joyce spoke with several members of Dartmouth

faculty about the program. After being informed by Dartmouth

-3- faculty that he would receive a tuition waiver for the last two

years of medical school, and possibly a small stipend, Joyce

ultimately decided that he would like to join Dartmouth’s MD/PHD

program.

Joyce was accepted into and joined the Pharmacology and

Toxicology graduate program (within the MD/PHD program) in 1992.

At this point, Joyce requested a letter from the Chairman of the

Graduate Committee, Alan Eastman, confirming the fact that he

would receive a tuition waiver. Eastman did not respond in

writing to Joyce’s requests. Nonetheless, Joyce began the

prerequisites for the PHD program. The prerequisites consisted

of three major components: (1) a written exam; (2) an “NIH” style

grant; and (3) an oral defense of the grant before the Graduate

Committee. Joyce passed the written exam, but encountered

problems with the grant, in part because his grant advisor,

Edward Bresnick, Chairmen of the Department of Pharmacology and

Toxicology, left Dartmouth after Joyce had completed his grant

and made all pertinent corrections.

The Graduate Committee, for reasons unclear from the record,

informed Joyce that he would have to write a second grant. As a

-4- result, Joyce again “suffered emotional distress.” Compl. ¶30.

Joyce completed another grant and spent “an inordinate amount of

time” defending his grant before a “hostile examining committee.”

Compl. ¶33. The Graduate Committee ultimately “decided to fail

[Joyce] mainly on subjective grounds.” Compl. ¶34.

Dartmouth also refused to permit Joyce to pursue a master’s

degree. Joyce was “demoralized and emotionally distressed as a

result of his graduate school experience.” Compl. ¶39. Joyce

left graduate school, without graduating, approximately two-and-

one-half years after he entered in 1992.

In 1995, Joyce returned to Dartmouth Medical School. During

his third and fourth years, Joyce was required to repeat at least

two surgical clerkships. He also endured “excessively long and

grueling hours” during this same time period. Compl. ¶46. After

his fourth year of medical school, Joyce decided to spend another

year at Dartmouth to take additional surgical clerkships and act

as student editor of a medical journal.

Joyce completed Dartmouth Medical School in 1998. At this

point, he began to look for residency programs in plastic surgery

and/or neurosurgery. Despite his “best attempts,” Joyce could

-5- not secure a single recommendation from Dartmouth for plastic

surgery or neurosurgery residency programs. Compl. ¶49.

Instead, Dartmouth recommended that Joyce look into family

practice or pathology programs. Joyce ultimately agreed that he

should look for a residency in pathology after several

conversations with the Dean’s office. In one such conversation,

a faculty member told Joyce that he would be in a better position

to transfer to a plastic surgery program after completing a year

in a pathology residency program.

Joyce was a resident in pathology at Yale from July 1998 to

June 1999, when he left the program without completing his

residency. In the fall of 1999, Joyce sought help from Dartmouth

Medical School in finding a residency in ENT/plastic surgery. A

letter of recommendation from the dean of an applicant’s medical

school is a requirement for residency programs. Dartmouth

nevertheless failed to assist him in finding a residency

position. As a result, Joyce was not invited for any interviews

for residency positions in ENT/plastic surgery.

In the Spring of 2000, Joyce contacted Dartmouth for help in

gaining admission to the public health program at Harvard

University. Once again, Dartmouth declined to assist him. Joyce

-6- continues to have difficulty finding employment because potential

employers are concerned about his first year of medical school

and his failure to complete both graduate school and his

residency. In addition, Joyce is often questioned about why he

has not received support from Dartmouth. Joyce believes he

suffered irreparable career damage. He has hired several

employment agencies to aid in his search, but remains unable to

secure employment as a physician in his “area of expertise.”

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When I consider a motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim, I must accept the plaintiff’s well-plead factual

allegations as true, “draw all reasonable inferences [from the

complaint] in the plaintiff’s favor and determine whether the

complaint, so read, sets forth facts sufficient to justify

recovery on any cognizable theory.” Martin v . Applied Cellular

Tech., Inc., 284 F.3d 1 , 6 (1st Cir. 2002). Despite the liberal

pleading requirements established by the federal rules, I need

not accept subjective characterizations, bald assertions, or

-7- unsubstantiated conclusions. See Correa-Martinez v . Arrillaga-

Belendez, 903 F.2d 4 9 , 52-53 (1st Cir. 1990); Dewey v . Univ. of

N.H., 694 F.2d 1 , 3 (1st Cir. 1982).

Pro se pleadings are held to a less-stringent standard than

those drafted by lawyers. See Ahmed v . Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886,

890 (1st Cir. 1997); Rockwell v . Cape Cod Hosp., 26 F.3d 2 5 4 , 255

(1st Cir. 1994). Despite this rule, however, pro se status “does

not free a litigant in a civil case of the obligation to comply

with procedural rules,” such as the minimum pleading

requirements. Ruiz Rivera v . Riley, 209 F.3d 2 4 , 2 8 , n.2 (1st

Cir. 2000); see Eagle Eye Fishing Corp. v . United States Dept. of

Commerce, 20 F.3d 503, 506 (1st Cir. 1994); FDIC v . Anchor

Props., 13 F.3d 2 7 , 31 (1st Cir. 1994). It is with this standard

in mind that I analyze Joyce’s claims.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Claims Barred by the Statute of Limitations

Joyce filed his complaint on March 1 2 , 2002. Dartmouth

argues that the applicable statute of limitations, N.H. Rev.

Stat. Ann. § 508:4 (1997 & Supp. 2001), bars Joyce’s claims to

the extent that they are based on acts or omissions that occurred

-8- more than three years before he filed his complaint. I agree.

Joyce concedes that he discovered both his injuries and the

causal connection between Dartmouth’s improper actions and his

injuries when Dartmouth engaged in the conduct on which his

claims are based. Thus, he has no claim that § 508:4's three-

year limitation period should be tolled after he “discovered” his

causes of action. Nor does he plead any facts that would support

an equitable tolling or fraudulent concealment defense to the

statute of limitations. Finally, he cannot claim that the

statute of limitations should not begin to run until he

discovered the full extent of his injuries because the New

Hampshire Supreme Court has explicitly considered and rejected

that argument. See Rowe v . John Deere, 130 N.H. 1 8 , 22-23

(1987). Accordingly, Joyce’s claims are barred by § 508:4 to the

extent that they are based on conduct that occurred prior to

March 1 2 , 1998.

B. Other Claims

The only claims Joyce makes that are not barred by the

statute of limitations are his claims that Dartmouth is liable

because it improperly failed to assist him in obtaining a

residency in plastic surgery in the fall of 1999 and admission to

-9- the Harvard Public Health program in the spring of 2000. These

claims are deficient, however, because Joyce has failed to allege

in other-than-conclusory terms that Dartmouth owes him a duty,

either contractual or otherwise, to provide him with the

requested assistance. Accordingly, Joyce has failed to state a

viable claim for relief.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the forgoing reasons, Dartmouth’s motion to dismiss

(Doc. N o . 8 ) is granted. Dartmouth’s Motion for a More Definite

Statement is denied as moot in light of this Order. (Doc. N o . 9 )

SO ORDERED.

Paul Barbadoro Chief Judge

October 8 , 2002

cc: Edward A . Haffner, Esq. Terrence J. Joyce, pro se

-10-