Jovian Alexi Caraballo Rodriguez v. the State of Texas
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Opinion
AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed October 7, 2024
S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-23-00634-CR
JOVIAN ALEXI CARABALLO RODRIGUEZ, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 199th Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 199-82820-2021
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Pedersen, III, Smith, and Garcia Opinion by Justice Smith Appellant Jovian Alexi Caraballo Rodriguez pleaded not guilty to a charge of
continuous sexual abuse of a child; a jury convicted him of the lesser-included
offense of indecency with a child and assessed punishment at twenty years’
confinement. The trial court sentenced appellant accordingly, and he now appeals.
In a single issue, he contends that the State violated his due process rights by urging
a conviction for uncharged acts during jury argument. Because appellant failed to
preserve his complaint for our review, we affirm. Background
The facts resulting in appellant’s conviction are well known to the parties and
unnecessary to our analysis of the sole issue before us. Accordingly, we recite only
those facts needed to determine this appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
Appellant was arrested following an outcry of sexual abuse by his niece A.A.
and was indicted for continuous sexual abuse of A.A. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. §
21.02. The State notified appellant that it intended to introduce evidence of his prior
sexual abuse of both A.A. and her younger sister S.A. at trial. Appellant objected,
and the trial court overruled the objection after a pretrial hearing.
During its opening statement, the State described the evidence it would
present and stated, among other things, that “we’re here this week because that man
sexually abused his nieces for months” and “I’m asking you to find him guilty for
what he did to [A.A.] and [S.A.].” The State presented evidence, including the
testimony of A.A. and S.A., that appellant sexually abused them. Appellant also
testified, denying the abuse. The State’s closing argument included the following
comments:
What he told you makes no sense. What [A.A.] and [S.A.] lived does make sense. Their details made sense. They’ve waited for years. They’ve waited for this trial. They have been living with this case over their heads, and now it’s in y’all’s hands, okay?
That’s why you’re here this week. You’re here to give justice for those girls. You’re here to do the right thing, and to do the only
2 thing that makes sense in this case, and that’s to find him guilty of continuous sexual abuse of a child because of what he did.
The charge instructed the jury that it could convict appellant only if it found
beyond a reasonable doubt that, on or about the 2nd day of June, 2017, through the
14th day of March, 2021, he committed two or more acts of sexual abuse against
A.A. or that he had committed the lesser offense of indecency with A.A. by contact.
The jury convicted appellant of the lesser-included offense and sentenced him to
twenty years’ confinement. This appeal followed.
Improper Jury Argument
In his sole issue, appellant complains of the State’s reference to uncharged
conduct against S.A. during opening and closing arguments. Specifically, he cites
the Court to the following comments by the State: (1) appellant “sexually abused his
nieces for months,” (2) “I’m asking you to find him guilty for what he did to [A.A.]
and [S.A.],” (3) A.A. and S.A. had waited for trial “with this case over their heads,”
and (4) “[y]ou’re here to give justice for those girls.”1
To be permissible, jury argument must fall within one of the following four
general areas: (1) summation of the evidence; (2) reasonable deductions from the
evidence; (3) response to argument of opposing counsel; and (4) pleas for law
1 Appellant asserts that the State’s “closing argument was replete with references to what [appellant] purportedly did to both of his nieces,” but he cites only to the statements described above.
3 enforcement. Milton v. State, 572 S.W.2d 234, 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019) (citing
Freeman v. State, 340 S.W.3d 717, 727 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)). We reverse a trial
court’s erroneous overruling of a defense objection to improper jury argument if the
error affected the defendant’s substantial rights. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b);
Martinez v. State, 17 S.W.3d 677, 692–93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). However, a
defendant who fails to object to improper prosecutorial jury argument and pursue
the objection to an adverse ruling forfeits his right to complain about the argument
on appeal. Hernandez v. State, 538 S.W.3d 619, 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018);
Cockrell v. State, 933 S.W.2d 73, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (“a defendant’s ‘right’
not to be subjected to incurable erroneous jury arguments is one of those rights that
is forfeited by a failure to insist upon it”)).
Appellant acknowledges that he did not object to the complained-of
statements. Citing this Court’s recent decision in Tuazon v. State, 661 S.W.3d 178
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2023, no pet.), he nevertheless asserts that the State’s remarks
constituted a “fundamental unwaivable” violation of his due process rights.
In Tuazon, the trial court used a football field analogy to describe the State’s
burden of proof during voir dire. Id. at 186–87. We concluded, and the parties
agreed, that the court’s comments violated the appellant’s right not to have the court
define reasonable doubt in a manner that shifted the State’s burden of proof. Id. at
188. We further concluded that the right was a waivable-only, Marin-category-two
4 due process right. Id. at 189, 192; see Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275, 279 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1993) (discussing three types of litigant “rights” in our justice system:
(1) absolute requirements and prohibitions that are not waivable (e.g., that case be
tried by court with jurisdiction); (2) rights that must be implemented unless expressly
waived (e.g., right to jury trial); and (3) rights that are implemented on request only
(e.g., objections to testimony or evidence).
Appellant, however, complains of the State’s comments during jury argument,
and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has made clear that such a complaint is a
Marin-category-three error that must be preserved by an objection at trial. See
Hernandez, 538 S.W.3d at 622; Cockrell, 933 S.W.2d at 89. Because appellant did
not contemporaneously object to the State’s comments, he failed to preserve his
complaint for our review. Hernandez, 538 S.W.3d at 622; Cockrell, 933 S.W.2d at
89. Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s sole issue.
Conclusion
Having overruled appellant’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/Craig Smith/ CRAIG SMITH Do Not Publish JUSTICE TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b) 230634F.U05
5 S Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
JOVIAN ALEXI CARABALLO On Appeal from the 199th Judicial RODRIGUEZ, Appellant District Court, Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 199-82820- No. 05-23-00634-CR V. 2021.
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