Jourdan v. Barrett

45 U.S. 169, 11 L. Ed. 924, 4 How. 169, 1846 U.S. LEXIS 392
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedJanuary 27, 1846
StatusPublished
Cited by23 cases

This text of 45 U.S. 169 (Jourdan v. Barrett) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jourdan v. Barrett, 45 U.S. 169, 11 L. Ed. 924, 4 How. 169, 1846 U.S. LEXIS 392 (1846).

Opinion

Mr. Justice CATRON

delivered the opinion of the court.

The record brings before us two petitory actions; one of Landry against Barrett; and the other of Jourdan against the same defendant. The State District Court of Louisiana adjudged the title, of Barrett the better, and for this reason decided in his favor in both actions ; but in that of Landry it was also held, that the title to the land he claimed was invalid, because he produced no other evidence of claim than the receipt of the receiver above set forth, dated 8th March, 1836 ; that the act of June 15, 1832, limited his right to purchase to three years ; and not having filed his notice of claim, and paid his money, until the 8th of March, 1836, he came too late, and for this reason, also, the petition must be dismissed. The judgment being affirmed generally by the Supreme Court of Louisiana, and being opposed to the authority exercised by the officers of the United States, acting in virtue of acts of Congress, it becomes our duty to examine whether the judgment, below was. proper on this' ground. We find the District Court overlooked the act of February 24, 1835,'which extended the time to the 15th of June, 1836, to owners of front tracts to become purchasers by preference of the back tracts adjacent to those owned by them; so that the purchase made by Landry on the 8th of March, 1836, was in-time. It follows, the claims of Landry and Jourdan are alike ; and the opposing claim of Barrett, being the same as to each of the petitioners, the controversy, may he treated as one suit. It depends on mixed questions of law and fact; both having been submitted to the courts below for their judgment, without the aid of a jury ; and as the facts giving rise to the controversy call for construction- of acts - of Congress to give the facts effect, they come before this court for its action under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act. This is the settled doctrine here, as will be seen by the cases of Pollard’s heirs v. Kibbie (14 Peters, 353), The City of Mobile v. Eslava (16 Peters, 234), and Chouteau v. Eckhart (2 How. 372).

Neither party has a patent; and each comes before us asserting a superior equity to the lands in dispute. Barrett insists that the entry under which he claims title, dated April 12,' 1822, was made for a specific quantity of 510 superficial acres, and designated by *178 survey and side lines ten years and more before the opposing claims originated, and therefore his possession cannot be disturbed by their assertion.

On the other hand, it is insisted that Bringier, under whom Barrett claims title, had no preference extended to him by the act. of May 11, 1820, to enter so much as 510 acres as back land to the Whitehall tract; that it fronted on the.inside of a bend of the Mississippi River, and conformed to Spanish and French forty arpent concessions made on fronts, in concave bends, in the extension of side lines ; which uniformly converged in proportion to the greater or less ' circle of the bend ; that the Whitehall tract was much narrower on the back than on the front side ; that the act of Congress did not permit Bringier to enter any other back land than that within his direct side lines, produced from the river eighty arpents deep ; and that Barrett’s equity is limited to the “ back land,” in quantity to forty arpents deep within these lines, although much .less than 510 acres. And that, as this mode of surveying the double concession will not include the land entered by either of the petitioners, they are entitled to recover ; furthermore, that in this form has Barrett’s claim been surveyed by public authority, and in no other.

In December, 1832, Bringier caused Wilson, a surveyor, to run out his claim of 510 acres, in the same form of the front tract; that is, he began at the back terminus of each side' liné of the-old tract, and ran diverging lines so as to make the opposite side of his new survey of the same width with the- front on the river, thus making á tract of 1,020 acres, little more than half as wide in the middle as it is at either end. This survey was neither returned to, nor -recorded in, the surveyor-general’s office ; nór recognized by the officers of the United States as a public survey. Bringier, and those claiming under him, however, took and held possession of the land surveyed, and improved the same, assuming that it covered the land entered in 1832, and that it was lawfully made ; at least, as against any claim the petitioners can be permitted to set up. This we suppose mainly, to depend on the true construction of the act of 1811, which was renewed from time to time.

The surveys of township No. 11, including the lands in dispute, were not made until thb’fall of 1829 and spring of 1830, and then only in part, both as to the ordinary extension- lines, and as regarded the private grants and back lands subject to be attached by preference of entry to front grants. Until these latter were surveyed, they could not be acted on as to specific quantity. By the act of March 2, 1805, section 7, the powers of the surveyor of lands south of Tennessee were extended over the Territory of Orleans. And by the 9th section of the act of April 21, 1806, he was directed to appoint two principal deputies,'one *179 for each of the districts into which the. Orleans Territory was divided ; who were to keep separate offices of their own, and to execute public surveys in their respective districts, in conformity to the regulations and instructions of their principal.

By the act of March 3, 1831, ¡a surveyor-general of public lands lying in the State of Louisiana was ordered to be appointed ; and on whom, within thá .. State, were devolved the duties formerly imposed on the surveybn of lands south of Tennessee ; that is, after the 1st of May, 1831 ; and also the duties of the two principal deputies authorized by the act of 1806. The latter offices were abolished, and the duties appertaining to them merged in the surveyor-general’s office of Louisiana. That officer took charge , of the official records and papers ; and on him was imposed the duty of doing equity among those entitled to back concessions under the acts of 1820 and 1832, where it had not been previously done. His own deputies did the 'field work not done on his coming into office ; and in his time were the surveys in township No.. 11 completed; and by him were they first approved after their completion. This the government recognizes as the legal survey of the township, by which the United States are bound, and on extracts from which patents and certificates can be founded ; and to this end the approved plan of .it was filed in the register’s office of the Southeastern District of Louisiana, on the 8th of August, 1834 ; by it all those purchasing from the United States, either by preference of entry, or otherwise, are bound to abide, unless legal alterations have been made, or there were existing legal and sanctioned surveys, laying off back lands to particular front owners, independent of the general survey. None such was made for the Whitehall tract, as we think, and its back land, as to extent and form, is governed by the general plán 'above named. The one made by Rightor’s direction, approved by Gideon Fitz, surveyor of public lands south of Tennessee (March 9, 1832), received no additional value from such approval, as the act of 1831 superseded bis authority in this respect. Rightor deposes, that at no time had the surveyor south of .

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Bluebook (online)
45 U.S. 169, 11 L. Ed. 924, 4 How. 169, 1846 U.S. LEXIS 392, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jourdan-v-barrett-scotus-1846.