Jourdan Ellison v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: July 1, 2025
• Docket: 01-24-00575-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued July 1, 2025

In The

Court of Appeals For The

First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00575-CR ——————————— JOURDAN ELLISON, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 262nd District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1646923

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Jourdan Ellison was convicted of the capital murder of Christian Lezama, Jr.

During trial, because the State intended to call Christian’s father, Christian Lezama,

Sr., as a next-of-kin witness, the parties agreed he would be permitted to remain in

the courtroom during the testimony of other witnesses. After hearing the testimony of a crime scene investigator, Lezama Sr. recalled that he had found an additional

shell casing in his son’s apartment, after police had finished their investigation,

which he discarded.

The issue in this case is whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying

Ellison’s request for a mistrial after Lezama Sr. disclosed this information during

trial and was permitted to testify about it as a fact witness. We hold that it did not,

and we affirm the trial court’s judgment of conviction.

Background

Christian was a rapper who was known throughout the City of Houston. His

friends described him as a “flashy” guy, who often wore designer clothes and

diamond jewelry. In addition to his rap career, Christian would “[h]ustle on the

side”—meaning he would sell marijuana.

On the morning of the shooting, Christian had picked up his best friend Jocson

Hernandez. Hernandez testified that Christian was wearing “[e]very piece” of his

jewelry that day, including a chain, grill, rings, watch, bracelet, and earrings. After

running some errands, the two men returned to Christian’s apartment and met up

with some friends, Quaron Jones and Jaylen Davis, as well as Ellison, who came to

buy drugs from Christian. The group hung out in Christian’s apartment for a while

playing video games, and then Ellison left to pick up “rillos,” i.e., “[l]eaves to roll

and smoke . . . [m]arijuana.”

2 After about 10to 15 minutes, Ellison returned to the apartment, alone.

Hernandez was still playing video games when Ellison suddenly grabbed Christian’s

.45 caliber handgun, which was sitting on the coffee table, put it to Hernandez’s

neck, and told him not to move. Ellison then grabbed Hernandez’s handgun (which

was a .22 caliber) from Hernandez’s hip and pointed it at Christian, Jones, and

Davis. Ellison ordered Davis to open the front door to the apartment. Hernandez

was on the floor, with Ellison’s foot on his head, so he did not see who else entered

the apartment. But he heard additional voices. Someone else came over to

Hernandez and “[got] on his neck.”

Hernandez heard Ellison tell Christian to “come off out of it” and “give [him]

the chain” or he would shoot Christian. Christian refused to give up his chain and

told Ellison to “chill,” and then Hernandez heard them “tussling.” The next thing

Hernandez remembered hearing was “[f]ive plus” shots fired. Hernandez was still

on the floor and when the shots stopped, he got up and saw that Christian had been

shot and was bleeding on the ground. Jones called 9-1-1.

Hernandez admitted that he did not see the shooting happen, but he identified

Ellison as the person who told Christian to “come off out of it or I’ll shoot you,” and

he knew that Ellison had taken two guns. Hernandez testified that neither Jones nor

Davis ever pulled out a firearm or threatened anyone in the apartment.

3 A. Lopez, an assistant medical examiner at the Harris County Institute of

Forensic Sciences, testified that Christian suffered four gunshot wounds. One to his

back showed “gunpowder stippling,” which indicates that it was fired within an

“intermediate range of fire”—meaning that the “barrel of the gun had to have been

within a couple of feet when he was shot.” According to Lopez, this shot was a

“lethal injury” and alone could have killed Christian. Lopez further testified that

another wound resulted in damage to the liver and right kidney and would have been

“very incapacitating.” Lopez also testified that one bullet was collected from

Christian’s body.

K. Wingert, a crime scene investigator with the Houston Forensic Science

Center, testified that police officers located eight cartridge casings at the crime

scene. Five of those casings were .45 caliber, and three of those casings were 9mm

caliber.

C. Bassett, a firearms examiner with the Houston Forensic Science Center,

testified that the three 9mm cartridge casings recovered from the scene were fired

from the same firearm, a recovered 9mm Luger Glock pistol. Bassett also opined

that the five .45-caliber cartridge casings recovered from the scene, as well as the

two recovered projectiles, were fired from the same .45-caliber firearm. One of

those projectiles was the bullet removed from Christian’s body by the medical

examiner during his autopsy.

4 Through their investigation, Houston Police Department officers identified

three persons of interest: Ellison, Derric Williams, and Michael Sykes. In social

media messages admitted at trial, Ellison, Williams, and Sykes communicated about

planning the robbery. In these messages, dated the day before the robbery, Ellison

described Christian as “green” and stated that he knew “how to get in and out.”

Houston Police Officer C. Arrington testified that, based on his training and

experience, he took this to mean that Ellison considered Christian a “prime target”

and that “money could be involved.” Ellison stated that Christian “ain’t got no gas

rn” and “he drive with no guns cause he got that ankle monitor”—meaning that

Christian lacked transportation or weapons due to an ankle monitor. Ellison stated

that he would “hit him regardless,” and he told Williams and Sykes to let him know

when they left. Officer Arrington testified that, in this context, to “hit” meant to

commit a robbery. On the date of the robbery, Ellison described Christian as “a

mark” (i.e., target), told Williams and Sykes to hurry over, and told Sykes they

needed “extra hands.”

Surveillance footage from the apartment complex and surrounding areas

showed that Ellison arrived at Christian’s apartment around the same time as a red

vehicle and that Williams and Sykes exited that vehicle and walked toward the

complex. Surveillance video from the apartment complex, timestamped around the

5 time of the 9-1-1 call reporting the murder, also showed Ellison, Williams, and Sykes

exiting a back stairway. Ellison’s shirt appeared to have blood on it.

Ellison was charged with capital murder committed in the course of

committing or attempting to commit a robbery. The jury found him guilty and

sentenced him to life in prison. This appeal followed.

Mistrial

Ellison asserts that the trial court erred by denying his request for a mistrial.

According to Ellison, Lezama, Sr.―who was permitted to sit through the trial up to

that point―was improperly allowed to testify and present information that, Ellison

argues, was contradictory to Wingert’s testimony. We disagree.

On the first day of trial, the parties agreed that Lezama, Sr. would be excluded

from the application of Texas Rule of Evidence 614 (the Rule)1 because he would

be testifying as Christian’s next of kin and did not have “any factual information as

it relates to the case.”

Two days later, and after Wingert’s testimony concluded―Lezama, Sr.

notified the State that he had watched a YouTube video of a news story that included

a clip of a woman outside Christian’s apartment complex on the date of the murder

and in which gunfire can be heard. Lezama, Sr. counted the number of gunshots—

1 See TEX. R. EVID. 614 (“At a party’s request, the court must order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear other witnesses’ testimony.”). 6 nine—that he heard in this video. He then recalled that he had found a shell casing

inside Christian’s apartment after the crime scene investigation was complete but

had thrown the casing away.

The State informed both the defense and trial court that neither it nor law

enforcement was aware of this information until Lezama, Sr. reported it to them

during trial. The trial court granted the defense’s request for a continuance to allow

it to investigate this information.

When the parties reconvened, the defense moved for a mistrial. The defense

agreed that “both sides were surprised by the information that Mr. Lezama, Senior

brought forward and we truly believe that the State had no knowledge of that until

that moment [on] July 17th when it was first brought forward.” But the defense

argued that it was moving for a mistrial “because of the way it affected our defense

of our client.” The defense explained that Lezama, Sr. was excluded from the Rule

because he was going to be the next-of-kin witness and would not testify at the

guilt/innocence stage. But because “he made himself a fact witness . . . after the

State’s crime scene unit officer . . . already testified to the number of cartridge

casings,” this “potentially change[d] [the] defense.” And, the defense argued, “[i]t

probably changed the way we had selected [the] jury.”

The State responded that there was no evidence that Lezama, Sr. had

intentionally sought to destroy evidence. And, because a mistrial is an extraordinary

7 remedy, the State argued that the trial court should consider less drastic alternatives

before granting a mistrial. The State contended that any prejudice had already been

remedied in light of the trial court’s continuance, which allowed an investigator for

the defense to interview Lezama, Sr. about this new information. Additionally, the

State argued that the defense had the right to recall a witness, to cross-examine

Lezama, Sr. on this issue, and to argue this in closing.

The trial court denied the Ellison’s motion for mistrial.

Lezama, Sr. subsequently testified that he was allowed to return to Christian’s

apartment after the crime scene investigation was complete. As he was sorting

through Christian’s things, Lezama, Sr. moved the TV stand and “a little spent

casing” rolled out from underneath the TV stand. He testified that the casing

appeared to be “on the bigger end of bullets” and did not appear to be a .22 caliber.

Lezama, Sr. testified that he did not know what to do with the spent casing and threw

it in the trash pile. He did not speak to law enforcement, or anyone else, about what

he found.

Lezama, Sr. further testified that after hearing Wingert’s testimony that eight

spent casings were found at the scene, he reviewed a YouTube video sent to him by

one of Christian’s fans. This video was taken by a bystander who coincidentally

happened to be outside Christian’s apartment complex at the time of the murder and

8 recorded the sound of gunfire. After viewing the video, Lezama, Sr. reported this

information about the spent casing to the State the next day.

A. Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial under an abuse of

discretion standard of review. Becerra v. State, 685 S.W.3d 120, 127 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2024); Archie v. State, 221 S.W.3d 695, 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). In

applying this standard, we do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.

Becerra, 685 S.W.3d at 127. Rather, we must decide whether the trial court’s

decision was arbitrary or unreasonable. Id. A trial court abuses its discretion when

no reasonable view of the record could support its ruling. Id.

In making that determination, we are instructed to uphold a trial court’s

decision to deny a mistrial “if it was within the zone of reasonable disagreement.”

Archie, 221 S.W.3d at 699; Griffin v. State, 571 S.W.3d 404, 416 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d). And we must review the trial court’s ruling in

light of the arguments that were before the trial court at the time it ruled. Wead v.

State, 129 S.W.3d 126, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).

A mistrial is an extreme remedy. Ocon v. State, 284 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2009). It is to be used sparingly for “a narrow class of highly prejudicial

and incurable errors” committed during the trial process. Turner v. State, 570 S.W.3d

9 250, 268 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).2 It is reserved for improper conduct during trial

that is “so prejudicial that expenditure of further time and expense would be wasteful

and futile.” Hawkins v. State, 135 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (internal

quotations omitted). And is “an extreme remedy and should be exceedingly

uncommon.” Williams v. State, 417 S.W.3d 162, 175 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d).

The State argues that we must balance three factors in determining whether

the refusal to grant a mistrial here was an abuse of discretion: (1) the severity of the

misconduct (including its prejudicial effect), (2) the effectiveness of the curative

measures taken, and (3) the certainty of the conviction absent the misconduct. See

Hawkins, 135 S.W.3d at 77 (citing Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 259 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1998)).3

2 See Archie v. State, 340 S.W.3d 734, 739 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (explaining that motion for mistrial is appropriate only when “the objectionable events are so emotionally inflammatory that curative instructions are not likely to prevent the jury from being unfairly prejudiced against the defendant” (internal quotations omitted)). 3 It is not clear whether these factors apply outside the context of a refusal to grant a mistrial for improper argument, but Ellison makes no argument to the contrary. Accordingly, we assume they apply here for purposes of our analysis. See Hawkins v. State, 135 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (holding that Mosley factors should be used to evaluate whether trial court abused its discretion in denying mistrial for improper argument, but stating “[n]evertheless, the question of whether a mistrial should have been granted involves most, if not all, of the same considerations that attend a harm analysis”). 10 B. Analysis

On this record, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that the new

information revealed by Lezama, Sr. was not so prejudicial that further time and

expense would be futile and, thus, a mistrial was not warranted. See Turner, 570

S.W.3d at 268; Hawkins, 135 S.W.3d at 77.

We consider first Ellison’s contention that a mistrial should have been granted

because after Lezama, Sr. heard Wingert’s testimony, he came forward with new

information that contradicted Wingert’s testimony. In support, he cites to case law

setting forth the standard for reviewing a trial court’s decision to permit a witness to

testify even after there has been a violation of the Rule.4

But Ellison did not separately seek to exclude Lezama, Sr.’s testimony in the

trial court on the basis that there had been a violation of the Rule. Nor did he argue

that the trial court should grant a mistrial because Lezama, Sr. violated the Rule.

And, as Ellison acknowledges, the parties agreed to exempt Lezama, Sr. from

application of the Rule because, at the time, they did not anticipate that he had any

factual information related to the case. Accordingly, Ellison’s contention that a

4 See, e.g., Bell v. State, 938 S.W.2d 35, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (noting that trial court has discretion to allow testimony from witness who has violated sequestration rule and that, in reviewing trial court’s decision to allow testimony, courts look at whether defendant was prejudiced by witness’s violation by considering whether witness actually conferred or heard testimony of other witnesses and whether witness’s testimony contradicts testimony of witness from opposing side). 11 mistrial was warranted based on a purported violation of the Rule is not properly

before us. See Wead, 129 S.W.3d at 129–30 (holding court of appeals erred in

considering appellant’s argument for mistrial that was not made in trial court).

Nor was there evidence of any misconduct on the part of the State. See

Hawkins, 135 S.W.3d at 77 (considering severity of misconduct in determining

whether denial of mistrial was abuse of discretion). Defense counsel expressly

stated that both sides were surprised by Lezama, Sr.’s disclosure and that he believed

that the State had no prior knowledge of this information. The State alerted defense

counsel and the trial court as soon as it learned of this new information. And the

trial court likewise concluded that both sides were surprised and that the spent casing

was not available “through no one’s fault.”

Moreover, Ellison has not identified how he was prejudiced by Lezama, Sr.’s

disclosure. Rather, Ellison argues only that a mistrial should have been granted

because Lezama, Sr. “meddle[d] in the trial and evidence,” and his story of “the

undisclosed shell casing was nothing more than an attempt to undermine the

defense.” He critically fails to explain how Lezama, Sr.’s testimony undermined the

defense.5

5 And based on Ellison’s apparent theory at trial that the scene was so chaotic it was impossible to know what happened and who shot Christian, this newly disclosed evidence of yet another spent casing seems to support rather the contradict the defense. 12 Furthermore, the trial court employed less drastic measures than a mistrial in

order to cure any prejudice. See id. (holding that courts should consider effectiveness

of curative measures taken). Ellison requested—and the trial court granted—a

continuance to allow Ellison to investigate the newly disclosed information. And,

after the State called Lezama, Sr. during its case-in-chief, Ellison was able to cross-

examine Lezama, Sr. about his discovery and why he did not report it to law

enforcement or to the State.

And during closing argument, Ellison was able to argue about the significance

of this evidence—urging the jury not to give “a pass to a grieving father who found

evidence and decided to destroy it and not turn it in.” Ellison argued that this piece

of evidence “could have been a very big deal because we don’t know what caliber

that casing may have been. We don’t know if there was another shooter . . . [or] if

Christian’s people weren’t shooting at [Ellison].”

Finally, there was ample evidence of Ellison’s guilt. See id. (considering

certainty of conviction). As noted above, social media messages before the murder

showed that Ellison planned to rob Christian with the help of Williams and Sykes.

Hernandez described the events leading up to the shooting, including Ellison leaving

the apartment to go to the gas station, and then once Ellison returned, Hernandez

saw Ellison grab two firearms. Although Hernandez did not see Ellison shoot

Christian, he heard Ellison order Christian to hand over his jewelry or he would

13 shoot him. When Christian refused, Hernandez heard them “tussle[]” and then

several shots. And surveillance footage from the apartment complex taken from

around the time of the 9-1-1 call showed Ellison, Williams, and Sykes exiting the

apartment building. Ellison’s shirt was covered in what appeared to be blood. This

evidence was sufficient to support Ellison’s conviction for capital murder committed

in the course of committing a robbery. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.03(a)(2); see also

id. §§ 19.02(b)(1), 29.02.6

We therefore conclude, for all these reasons, that Lezama, Sr.’s disclosure

during trial was not so prejudicial and incurable that it warranted the extreme step

of a mistrial. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

denying Ellison’s motion for a mistrial.

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s judgment of conviction in all things.

Terry Adams Chief Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Caughey and Johnson.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

6 Ellison was charged as a principal actor, party, and conspirator. 14