JOSHUA RAINEY v. STATE OF MISSOURI, Plaintiff-Respondent.

• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Decided: September 13, 2024
• Docket: SD38260
• Status: Published

Opinion

Missouri Court of Appeals Southern District

In Division JOSHUA RAINEY, ) ) Movant-Appellant, ) ) v. ) No. SD38260 ) ) Filed: September 13, 2024 ) STATE OF MISSOURI, ) ) Respondent-Respondent. )

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHRISTIAN COUNTY

Honorable Jessica L. Kruse, Judge

AFFIRMED

Joshua Rainey (“Rainey”) pled guilty to first-degree domestic assault under §565.072,

second-degree domestic assault under §565.073, armed criminal action under §571.015, and first-

degree burglary under §569.160. 1 Rainey subsequently filed a Rule 24.035 2 motion, asserting that

his Plea Counsel was ineffective in (1) failing to adequately inform Rainey of his right to plead

not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect (“NGRI”), (2) failing to enter a plea of NGRI, and

1 Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to RSMo 2016, as amended through December 4, 2018, the date of the alleged burglary and assault. 2 Unless otherwise noted, all rule references are to the Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2019).

1 (3) failing to inform the court that a psychiatric report found that Rainey fulfilled the criteria for

an NGRI defense. Finding no error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

On August 15, 2018, Rainey broke into the home of his ex-girlfriend (“Victim”) with a

crowbar, threatening to kill her. Victim’s neighbor (“Neighbor”) witnessed Rainey strike Victim

with the crowbar. Rainey then handed Neighbor the crowbar and said, “You go ahead and finish

her off.” Victim suffered multiple lacerations, a depressed skull fracture, and other serious injuries.

Rainey was charged, as a prior and persistent offender, with first-degree domestic assault, second-

degree domestic assault, armed criminal action and first-degree burglary.

Plea Counsel requested a psychiatric evaluation to determine whether Rainey suffered from

a mental illness and whether he was competent to proceed to trial. Rainey was diagnosed with

Schizoaffective disorder, and the evaluation found that Rainey “fulfilled the criteria for not guilty

by reason of mental disease or defect.” Based on this finding, Plea Counsel considered pursuing

a defense of NGRI. However, after determining that the “horrific” “911 call, [Victim’s] injuries,

[and] the statement from [Neighbor] would cause obstacles” for an NGRI defense, and after

discussing the case with his supervisor and Rainey, Plea Counsel pursued a diminished capacity

defense.

Rainey elected to plead guilty to all counts. During the plea hearing, Plea Counsel

informed the trial court that the psychiatric evaluation found Rainey competent to proceed. Plea

Counsel stated that he was “very confident that [Rainey] knows what he’s doing today.”

The trial judge inquired into Rainey’s mental state. Rainey disclosed that he suffered from

schizophrenia; however, Rainey stated that his mind was clear; that he was able to make decisions;

and that his medications did not impair his understanding of the proceedings. Rainey stated that

2 he was satisfied with Plea Counsel’s representation and that Plea Counsel explained “any and all

possible defenses [that he] might have in this case.” When asked by the trial judge whether Plea

Counsel did anything that Rainey told him not to do, Rainey responded, “No.” When asked by the

trial judge whether he understood that, by pleading guilty, he would give up his right to appeal his

conviction, Rainey answered, “Yes, I do.”

The trial court accepted Rainey’s guilty plea on all counts, and Rainey was sentenced,

pursuant to a plea agreement, to twenty-two years in prison.

On February 13, 2020, Rainey filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief. On February

21, 2021, appointed counsel filed an amended motion for post-conviction relief. 3 On March 29,

2023, the motion court held an evidentiary hearing.

During the evidentiary hearing, Rainey testified that Plea Counsel failed to inform him that

the psychiatric report found that he suffered from a mental disease or defect at the time of the

assault. Rainey stated that he did not understand the difference between a diminished capacity and

an NGRI defense, and that Plea Counsel did not inform him about waiving the NGRI defense.

Further, Rainey said that had he known about the NGRI defense he would not have pled guilty.

Plea Counsel testified that he discussed the psychiatric evaluation and an NGRI defense

both with Rainey and Rainey’s family. Plea Counsel stated that it was “clear to me that [Rainey]

understood [the NGRI defense]” and that “we had always talked about the NGRI.” Plea Counsel

3 Rainey was sentenced on November 14, 2019. Rainey filed his pro se motion for post-conviction relief on February 13, 2020. On September 28, 2020, the circuit court discovered that it had improperly processed Rainey’s motion. Upon discovery of the error, the circuit court clerk processed the motion. Post-Conviction counsel was appointed on September 28, 2020. On December 18, 2020, counsel was granted a thirty-day extension to file an amended motion. Rainey filed his amended motion for post-conviction relief on February 19, 2021. At the evidentiary hearing, the motion court granted Rainey’s request for an additional extension of time to file the amended motion, and made an alternative finding that in the event an extension wasn’t permitted, counsel had abandoned Rainey and the late filing would be permitted.

3 testified that he disclosed Rainey’s mental illness to the trial court, and that he advised that Rainey

was competent to proceed.

The motion court denied Rainey’s Rule 24.035 motion, finding that Plea Counsel acted

reasonably and that Rainey’s plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. This appeal followed.

Standard of Review

Our review of the denial of a post-conviction motion under Rule 24.035 is limited to

whether the motion court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are clearly erroneous. Rule

24.035(k); Chrisman v. State, 288 S.W.3d 812, 820 (Mo. App. S.D. 2009). “The motion court's

findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous only if, after review of the record, the appellate

court is left with the definite and firm impression a mistake has been made.” Conley v. State, 301

S.W.3d 84, 87 (Mo. App. S.D. 2010) (quoting Soto v. State, 226 S.W.3d 164, 166 (Mo. banc

2007)). The movant has the burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the motion

court clearly erred in its ruling. Id.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must show (1) counsel's

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that, as a result, movant

was prejudiced. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 674 (1984). Where the movant has

entered a guilty plea, “prejudice” requires the movant to show that, but for his counsel's alleged

unreasonable conduct, there is a reasonable probability he would not have pled guilty and would

have proceeded to trial. Cupp v. State, 935 S.W.2d 367, 368 (Mo. App. S.D. 1996). A movant’s

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must fail if either the performance or the prejudice prong

cannot be met. Patrick v. State, 160 S.W.3d 452, 455 (Mo. App. S.D. 2005).

Determinations concerning credibility are exclusively for the motion court and it is free to

believe or disbelieve any evidence, whether contradicted or undisputed. Mendez v. State, 180

4 S.W.3d 75, 80 (Mo. App. S.D. 2005). On appeal, we defer to the credibility determinations made

by the motion court. Id.

Analysis

I. Plea Counsel’s Alleged Failure to Adequately Inform Rainey of his Right to Plead

NGRI

In Point I, Rainey argues that the motion court clearly erred in denying his Rule 24.035

motion because Plea Counsel failed to adequately inform him of his right to plead NGRI, rendering

his guilty plea unknowing and involuntary. Rainey contends that, had it not been for Plea

Counsel’s failure to adequately inform him of his right to plead NGRI, he would have chosen to

proceed to trial.

“It is the duty of counsel to advise a client of the possible consequences of trial so that the

client may make an informed decision as to whether to accept or to reject a plea agreement.” Grace

v. State, 313 S.W.3d 230 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010). Counsel’s failure to inform a defendant of

possible defenses may render a guilty plea unknowing and involuntary. Wiggins v. State, 480

S.W.3d 379, 383 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015).

Viewing the evidence with deference to the motion court, we find no clear error. During

the plea, Rainey acknowledged that Plea Counsel discussed “any and all defenses” with him. Plea

Counsel testified that he discussed the NGRI defense with Rainey and his family, that it was “clear

to me that [Rainey] understood [the NGRI defense],” and that “we had always talked about the

NGRI.” As the motion court was free to disbelieve Rainey’s testimony at the motion hearing,

Rainey’s Point I is denied.

5 II. Plea Counsel’s Failure to Enter a Plea of NGRI

In Point II, Rainey argues that the motion court clearly erred in denying his Rule 24.035

motion because Plea Counsel failed to enter a plea of NGRI, rendering his guilty plea unknowing

and involuntary. Rainey contends that, had it not been for Plea Counsel’s failure to enter a plea of

NGRI, he would have chosen to proceed to trial.

Rainey again ignores the factual findings made by the motion court. Essentially, Rainey

argues that despite the fact that Plea Counsel advised him of the potential NGRI defense and that

Rainey, knowing of such defense, made the decision to plead guilty, Plea Counsel should have

ignored Rainey’s wishes and asserted an NGRI defense anyway. We need not analyze whether

Rainey’s assertion would have required Plea Counsel to violate Rule 4-1.2, as Rainey’s argument

is not cognizable in a proceeding under Rule 24.035. 4

A guilty plea waives all claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that do not involve the

voluntariness and understanding of the plea. Shepard v. State, 658 S.W.3d 70, 77 (Mo. App. E.D.

2022) (citing Meadors v. State, 571 S.W.3d 207, 211 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019)). In Shepard, the

defendant argued that his counsel failed to investigate and assert a defense under the Good

Samaritan Law. The court held that by pleading guilty, the defendant waived his right to assert

any defense as counsel’s failure to assert the defense did not pertain to whether the defendant’s

plea was knowing or voluntary. Id. at 78. The court reasoned that simply asserting counsel's

failure to present a defense overlooks the “myriad [of] other considerations that counsel must make

in advising a client to plead guilty.” Id. at 79. The court noted that the defendant’s claim was

4 A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation, subject to Rule 4-1.2(c), (f) and (g), and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued . . . In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify.

Rule 4-1.2(a).

6 contradicted by the record, which showed that he had acknowledged at the plea hearing that his

counsel discussed the defense with him and that he understood the consequences of his guilty plea.

Id. at 80.

Here, Plea Counsel’s failure to enter a plea of NGRI does not pertain to whether Rainey’s

guilty plea was made knowingly or voluntarily. Like the defendant in Shepard, Rainey’s claim is

contradicted by the record of the plea hearing, in which Rainey acknowledged that Plea Counsel

discussed "any and all defenses" with him, and that he understood the consequences of his plea,

including the waiver of his right to appeal. Contrary to Rainey’s assertion, we find nothing in

§552.015 that required Plea Counsel to enter a plea of NGRI. 5 Rainey’s Point II is denied.

III. Plea Counsel’s Failure to Disclose to the Court that the Psychiatric Report Supported

an NGRI defense

In Point III, Rainey argues that the motion court clearly erred in denying his Rule 24.035

motion because Plea Counsel failed to inform the court that the psychiatric report found that

Rainey fulfilled the criteria for a defense of NGRI, rendering his guilty plea unknowing and

involuntary. Rainey contends that, had it not been for Plea Counsel’s failure to inform the court,

he would have chosen to proceed to trial.

There is no requirement, however, that counsel must disclose any potential affirmative

defense to the plea court. (See Rule 24.02, §552.030 and §552.020). Rainey’s reliance on Short

v. State, 771 S.W.2d 859, 864 (Mo. App. E.D. 1989), does not change this analysis. In Short, the

defendant argued that his counsel should not have permitted him to plead guilty because a prior

5 “[Section 552.015] merely prescribes when evidence of a defendant's mental disease or defect is admissible in a criminal prosecution.” Caruthers v. Wexler-Horn, 592 S.W.3d 328, 331 (Mo. banc 2019).

7 psychiatric report indicated that he had a mental disease or defect. Id. The court held that the trial

court’s adequate inquiry into the defendant’s competency to proceed demonstrated that his plea

was voluntary, intelligent, and knowing. Id. at 865. Here, the trial court was aware of Rainey’s

diagnosis, adequately inquired into his competency at the plea hearing, and accepted the plea after

Rainey insisted that he was aware of “any and all possible defenses” and wished to plead guilty.

The motion court’s findings were not clearly erroneous. Rainey’s Point III is denied.

CONCLUSION

The Judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

MATTHEW P. HAMNER, J. – OPINION AUTHOR

MARY W. SHEFFIELD, J. – CONCURS

DON E. BURRELL, J. – CONCURS