Joshua Mason v. Patrick Glebe

Ninth Circuit

Joshua Mason v. Patrick Glebe

674 F. App'x 631

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedJanuary 3, 2017

Docket14-35736

StatusUnpublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 674 F. App'x 631 (Joshua Mason v. Patrick Glebe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Joshua Mason v. Patrick Glebe, 674 F. App'x 631 (9th Cir. 2017).

Pincite

Opinion

MEMORANDUM *

Petitioner-Appellant Joshua Mason (Mason) was convicted of two counts of first-degree rape and one count of second-degree assault, with a deadly weapon, and one count of witness tampering. He appeals the district court’s denial of his habe-as petition, arguing that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

As a preliminary matter, we conclude that Mason’s appeal was timely. The record supports Mason’s contention that “for all practical purposes he was acting pro se.” Vaughan v. Ricketts, 950 F.2d 1464, 1467 (9th Cir. 1991). Thus, he was entitled to the benefit of the prison mailbox rule, and his notice of appeal was timely because he delivered the notice of appeal “to prison authorities for mailing to the court within the limitations period.” Hernandez v. Spearman, 764 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).

Nonetheless, Mason failed to show that the “state decision resulted from an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Mason’s assertion that he was deprived of his right to conflict-free counsel because a relative paid his attorney and controlled the litigation is unavailing. There is no clearly established Supreme Court authority holding that a third-party fee arrangement results in a per se conflict of interest that “affected counsel’s performance—as opposed to a mere theoretical division of loyalties....” Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 171, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002) (emphasis omitted).

Mason also briefed the uncertified issue of whether the trial court violated his right *632 to be present at a critical stage of the proceedings, which we construe as a motion to broaden the certificate of appeala-bility. See Pham v. Terhune, 400 F.3d 740, 742 (9th Cir. 2005). We deny the motion because Mason has not “made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

AFFIRMED.

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

MEMORANDUM *

Petitioner-Appellant Joshua Mason (Mason) was convicted of two counts of first-degree rape and one count of second-degree assault, with a deadly weapon, and one count of witness tampering. He appeals the district court’s denial of his habe-as petition, arguing that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

As a preliminary matter, we conclude that Mason’s appeal was timely. The record supports Mason’s contention that “for all practical purposes he was acting pro se.” Vaughan v. Ricketts, 950 F.2d 1464, 1467 (9th Cir. 1991). Thus, he was entitled to the benefit of the prison mailbox rule, and his notice of appeal was timely because he delivered the notice of appeal “to prison authorities for mailing to the court within the limitations period.” Hernandez v. Spearman, 764 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).

Nonetheless, Mason failed to show that the “state decision resulted from an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Mason’s assertion that he was deprived of his right to conflict-free counsel because a relative paid his attorney and controlled the litigation is unavailing. There is no clearly established Supreme Court authority holding that a third-party fee arrangement results in a per se conflict of interest that “affected counsel’s performance—as opposed to a mere theoretical division of loyalties....” Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 171, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002) (emphasis omitted).

Mason also briefed the uncertified issue of whether the trial court violated his right *632 to be present at a critical stage of the proceedings, which we construe as a motion to broaden the certificate of appeala-bility. See Pham v. Terhune, 400 F.3d 740, 742 (9th Cir. 2005). We deny the motion because Mason has not “made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

AFFIRMED.

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

674 F. App'x 631, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/joshua-mason-v-patrick-glebe-ca9-2017.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack