Joshua James Royer v. State of Iowa

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: July 3, 2024
• Docket: 23-0860
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-0860 Filed July 3, 2024

JOSHUA JAMES ROYER, Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Des Moines County,

Joshua P. Schier, Judge.

An applicant appeals the denial of postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.

Erin Carr of Carr Law Firm, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joseph D. Ferrentino, Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee State.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Badding and Buller, JJ. 2

BULLER, Judge.

A Des Moines County jury found Joshua James Royer guilty of first-degree

murder for shooting and killing Eddie Cooper Martin in 2014. As relevant to this

appeal, Royer sought pretrial change of venue based on local news coverage. The

court denied Royer’s request, finding the news coverage was not inflammatory and

providing that individual voir dire of jurors would be allowed to explore media

exposure. We affirmed Royer’s conviction on direct appeal, rejecting challenges

related to jury selection and evidentiary rulings. See State v. Royer,

No. 15-0895, 2016 WL 6652339, at *1–3 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2016).

Royer applied for postconviction relief, asserting among other claims that

his trial jury was not impartial and appellate counsel should have challenged the

venue-change ruling on direct appeal. The case was tried on a stipulated record,

and the postconviction court denied relief. Royer appeals, and we review de novo.

See Sothman v. State, 967 N.W.2d 512, 522 (Iowa 2021).

Royer’s first claim urges he did not have an impartial jury at trial because

one of the jurors had an undisclosed connection or relationship with the victim’s

family. We do not reach the merits of this claim, as it is barred by Iowa Code

section 822.8 (2017), which prohibits piecemeal litigation. Under this provision, “a

claim not raised on direct appeal cannot be raised in a postconviction relief

proceeding unless the applicant can demonstrate a sufficient cause or reason for

not properly raising the issue previously.” Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 141

(Iowa 2001). Royer does not urge any sufficient cause that would allow us to reach

this issue—such as a claim trial counsel handled jury selection ineffectively—and

the issue was litigated to some extent through the motion for new trial in the 3

criminal case and was not argued on direct appeal. See id. Royer did not file a

reply brief in this appeal, leaving the State’s argument on section 822.8

unanswered. And we are not independently aware of any sufficient cause that

would allow Royer to bypass section 822.8. We therefore must apply the bar on

piecemeal litigation and affirm the postconviction court’s denial of the impartial-jury

claim on that basis.

Royer’s second claim asserts his direct-appeal lawyer was ineffective for

not challenging the denial of his motion to change venue. “The benchmark for

judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so

undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot

be relied on as having produced a just result.” Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 686 (1984). A postconviction applicant claiming ineffective assistance

must prove both (1) counsel’s performance fell below reasonable standards and

(2) if counsel had acted differently, there would be a reasonable probability of a

different outcome at trial. Id. at 687–88, 694; see Sothman, 967 N.W.2d 522–23.

And when it comes to appellate counsel’s work, “[s]electing assignments to assert

as grounds for reversal is a professional judgment call we are reluctant to second-

guess.” Osborn v. State, 573 N.W.2d 917, 922 (Iowa 1998).

Royer does not claim the news coverage was so inflammatory that prejudice

must be presumed. See State v. Evans, 671 N.W.2d 720, 726 (Iowa 2003) (listing

the factors for publicity to be presumptively prejudicial). Instead, he focuses on

statements four potential jurors made during voir dire to explain why pretrial

publicity was pervasive and why he believes the venue-change motion should

have been granted. The problem for Royer is that none of these four prospective 4

jurors rendered a verdict in his case: only one of those potential jurors was selected

for trial, and she was an alternate who did not deliberate. And the trial and PCR

courts found the articles “provided factual, noninflammatory, nonmisleading

information concerning this case,” which Royer does not refute. We also broadly

agree with the postconviction court’s observation that the criminal-trial court “went

to great lengths” to ensure jury selection produced an impartial jury, such as by

calling an expanded venire pool and permitting individual voir dire. Direct-appeal

counsel had no duty to challenge the venue-change ruling, as Royer could not

prove prejudice then—just as he cannot prove it now. We are not convinced there

is any reasonable probability Royer could have shown an abuse of discretion in

denying the motion for venue change on this record. And appellate counsel

exercised reasonable judgment in electing to not pursue the issue on direct appeal.

See Osborn, 573 N.W.2d at 922.

AFFIRMED.