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3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE 9 10 JOSHUA EGGLESTON, CASE NO. C25-1467JLR 11 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 12 BRUCKNER TRUCK SALES INC., 13 et al., 14 Defendants. 15 I. INTRODUCTION 16 Before the court is Defendant Bruckner Truck Sales Inc.’s (“Bruckner”) motion to 17 dismiss Plaintiff Joshua Eggleston’s complaint, (MTD (Dkt. # 7); MTD Reply (Dkt. 18 # 11); see also Compl. (Dkt. # 1-1)), and Mr. Eggleston’s motion to remand this matter to 19 state court (MTR (Dkt. # 10); MTR Reply (Dkt. # 17)). Each party opposes the other’s 20 motion. (MTR Resp. (Dkt. # 15); MTD Resp. (Dkt. # 9).) The court has reviewed the 21 22 1 parties’ submissions, the relevant portions of the record, and the governing law. Being 2 fully advised,1 the court GRANTS Mr. Eggleston’s motion to remand.
3 II. BACKGROUND 4 Mr. Eggleston alleges that Bruckner and other yet unknown Washington entities 5 (collectively “Defendants”) violated the Washington Equal Pay and Opportunities Act 6 (“EPOA”), RCW 49.58.110, by publishing defective job postings that did not disclose the 7 wage scale and benefits being offered to the hired applicant. (Compl. ¶¶ 1-2, 10.) Mr. 8 Eggleston initiated this putative class action in King County Superior Court on July 16,
9 2025. (See 8/4/25 Not. (Dkt. # 1) at 2.) On August 4, 2025, Bruckner removed this case 10 to this court, asserting that federal jurisdiction is proper based on diversity of citizenship 11 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). (Id. at 2-5.) On August 11, 2025, Bruckner moved to 12 dismiss the action, contending that Mr. Eggleston lacks Article III standing, or, in the 13 alternative, for improper venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391. On September 2, 2025,
14 Mr. Eggleston moved to remand this action to state court for lack of Article III standing 15 and subject matter jurisdiction. (MTD at 1.) 16 On September 4, 2025, while the parties’ respective motions were pending, the 17 Washington Supreme Court issued its decision in Branson v. Washington Fine Wine & 18 Spirits, LLC, 574 P.3d 1031 (Wash. 2025). The Court addressed the question of what a
19 plaintiff must prove to be considered a “job applicant” within the meaning of RCW 20 21
1 Bruckner requests oral argument. (MTD at 1.) The court concludes that oral argument 22 is not necessary to decide either motion. See Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 7(b)(4). 1 49.58.110(4)—and specifically, whether the applicant must prove they are a bona fide 2 applicant. Branson, 574 P.3d at 1034. The Washington Supreme Court held:
3 A job applicant need not prove they are a ‘bona fide’ applicant to be deemed a ‘job applicant.’ Rather, in accordance with the plain language of RCW 4 49.58.110(4), a person must apply to any solicitation intended to recruit job applicants for a specific available position to be considered a ‘job applicant,’ 5 regardless of the person’s subjective intent in applying for the specific position. 6 Id. at 1040. 7 Bruckner asserts that Branson moots its arguments for dismissal based on 8 standing. (See MTD Reply at 1, 3.) Bruckner accordingly withdrew its motion to 9 dismiss for lack of standing and asked the court to resolve only its motion to dismiss for 10 improper venue, or in the alternative, to transfer this action to the Eastern District of 11 Washington. (Id. at 3-8.) Bruckner also asked the court to resolve both pending motions 12 together because the issues in its motion to dismiss “substantially overlap with those 13 raised” in Mr. Eggleston’s motion to remand. (Id. at 4 n.3.) Mr. Eggleston, meanwhile, 14 requested that the court resolve his motion to remand before addressing Bruckner’s 15 motion to dismiss. (See MTD Resp. at 5.) The court agreed that it was appropriate for 16 the court to defer resolution of Bruckner’s motion to dismiss until briefing was complete 17 on Mr. Eggleston’s motion to remand. (See 9/9/25 Order (Dkt. # 12).) Briefing on Mr. 18 Eggleston’s motion to remand is now complete and the issue is ripe for the court’s 19 review. 20 21 22 1 III. ANALYSIS 2 As discussed below, the court concludes that Mr. Eggleston lacks standing to
3 pursue his EPOA claim in federal court. Therefore, the court grants Mr. Eggleston’s 4 motion to remand and denies Bruckner’s motion to dismiss as moot. 5 A defendant can remove a case initially filed in state court to federal court if the 6 case could have originally been brought in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The court 7 construes removal jurisdiction in favor of remand to protect state court jurisdiction. 8 Harris v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 698 (9th Cir. 2005). Because removal
9 and subject matter jurisdiction statutes are “strictly construed,” a “defendant seeking 10 removal has the burden to establish that removal is proper.” Hawaii ex rel. Louie v. 11 HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 761 F.3d 1027, 1034 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Luther v. 12 Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP, 533 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008)). If there is 13 any doubt as to the right of removal, the court must reject jurisdiction. Id. If the plaintiff
14 lacks Article III standing to pursue its case in federal court, the court must remand the 15 case rather than dismiss it. Polo v. Innoventions Int’l, LLC, 833 F.3d 1193, 1196 (9th 16 Cir. 2016). 17 The parties dispute whether Mr. Eggleston has Article III standing in this court. 18 (See MTR at 4-10 (arguing Mr. Eggleston does not have standing because he failed to
19 allege he was a bona fide job applicant); see MTR Resp. (arguing, post-Branson, that Mr. 20 Eggleston has standing because he need not be a bona fide applicant to allege a violation 21 of EPOA).) Standing is a “threshold question in every federal case, determining the 22 power of the court to entertain the suit”, Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975), and 1 standing requirements “can neither be waived by the parties nor ignored by the court[.]” 2 Yakima Valley Mem'l Hosp. v. Wash. State Dep't of Health, 654 F.3d 919, 932 n.17 (9th
3 Cir. 2011). In a challenge to Article III standing, “[t]he burden of showing that there is 4 standing rests on the shoulders of the party asserting” that standing is proper in the case. 5 Smelt v. Cty. of Orange, 447 F.3d 673, 682 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of 6 Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). 7 To establish standing and successfully challenge the motion to remand, Bruckner 8 must show that Mr. Eggleston has suffered an injury-in-fact that is (1) concrete and
9 particularized, (2) actual or imminent, (3) fairly traceable to Defendants’ conduct, and 10 (4) likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Cal. Sea Urchin Comm'n v.
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3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE 9 10 JOSHUA EGGLESTON, CASE NO. C25-1467JLR 11 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 12 BRUCKNER TRUCK SALES INC., 13 et al., 14 Defendants. 15 I. INTRODUCTION 16 Before the court is Defendant Bruckner Truck Sales Inc.’s (“Bruckner”) motion to 17 dismiss Plaintiff Joshua Eggleston’s complaint, (MTD (Dkt. # 7); MTD Reply (Dkt. 18 # 11); see also Compl. (Dkt. # 1-1)), and Mr. Eggleston’s motion to remand this matter to 19 state court (MTR (Dkt. # 10); MTR Reply (Dkt. # 17)). Each party opposes the other’s 20 motion. (MTR Resp. (Dkt. # 15); MTD Resp. (Dkt. # 9).) The court has reviewed the 21 22 1 parties’ submissions, the relevant portions of the record, and the governing law. Being 2 fully advised,1 the court GRANTS Mr. Eggleston’s motion to remand.
3 II. BACKGROUND 4 Mr. Eggleston alleges that Bruckner and other yet unknown Washington entities 5 (collectively “Defendants”) violated the Washington Equal Pay and Opportunities Act 6 (“EPOA”), RCW 49.58.110, by publishing defective job postings that did not disclose the 7 wage scale and benefits being offered to the hired applicant. (Compl. ¶¶ 1-2, 10.) Mr. 8 Eggleston initiated this putative class action in King County Superior Court on July 16,
9 2025. (See 8/4/25 Not. (Dkt. # 1) at 2.) On August 4, 2025, Bruckner removed this case 10 to this court, asserting that federal jurisdiction is proper based on diversity of citizenship 11 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). (Id. at 2-5.) On August 11, 2025, Bruckner moved to 12 dismiss the action, contending that Mr. Eggleston lacks Article III standing, or, in the 13 alternative, for improper venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391. On September 2, 2025,
14 Mr. Eggleston moved to remand this action to state court for lack of Article III standing 15 and subject matter jurisdiction. (MTD at 1.) 16 On September 4, 2025, while the parties’ respective motions were pending, the 17 Washington Supreme Court issued its decision in Branson v. Washington Fine Wine & 18 Spirits, LLC, 574 P.3d 1031 (Wash. 2025). The Court addressed the question of what a
19 plaintiff must prove to be considered a “job applicant” within the meaning of RCW 20 21
1 Bruckner requests oral argument. (MTD at 1.) The court concludes that oral argument 22 is not necessary to decide either motion. See Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 7(b)(4). 1 49.58.110(4)—and specifically, whether the applicant must prove they are a bona fide 2 applicant. Branson, 574 P.3d at 1034. The Washington Supreme Court held:
3 A job applicant need not prove they are a ‘bona fide’ applicant to be deemed a ‘job applicant.’ Rather, in accordance with the plain language of RCW 4 49.58.110(4), a person must apply to any solicitation intended to recruit job applicants for a specific available position to be considered a ‘job applicant,’ 5 regardless of the person’s subjective intent in applying for the specific position. 6 Id. at 1040. 7 Bruckner asserts that Branson moots its arguments for dismissal based on 8 standing. (See MTD Reply at 1, 3.) Bruckner accordingly withdrew its motion to 9 dismiss for lack of standing and asked the court to resolve only its motion to dismiss for 10 improper venue, or in the alternative, to transfer this action to the Eastern District of 11 Washington. (Id. at 3-8.) Bruckner also asked the court to resolve both pending motions 12 together because the issues in its motion to dismiss “substantially overlap with those 13 raised” in Mr. Eggleston’s motion to remand. (Id. at 4 n.3.) Mr. Eggleston, meanwhile, 14 requested that the court resolve his motion to remand before addressing Bruckner’s 15 motion to dismiss. (See MTD Resp. at 5.) The court agreed that it was appropriate for 16 the court to defer resolution of Bruckner’s motion to dismiss until briefing was complete 17 on Mr. Eggleston’s motion to remand. (See 9/9/25 Order (Dkt. # 12).) Briefing on Mr. 18 Eggleston’s motion to remand is now complete and the issue is ripe for the court’s 19 review. 20 21 22 1 III. ANALYSIS 2 As discussed below, the court concludes that Mr. Eggleston lacks standing to
3 pursue his EPOA claim in federal court. Therefore, the court grants Mr. Eggleston’s 4 motion to remand and denies Bruckner’s motion to dismiss as moot. 5 A defendant can remove a case initially filed in state court to federal court if the 6 case could have originally been brought in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The court 7 construes removal jurisdiction in favor of remand to protect state court jurisdiction. 8 Harris v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 698 (9th Cir. 2005). Because removal
9 and subject matter jurisdiction statutes are “strictly construed,” a “defendant seeking 10 removal has the burden to establish that removal is proper.” Hawaii ex rel. Louie v. 11 HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 761 F.3d 1027, 1034 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Luther v. 12 Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP, 533 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008)). If there is 13 any doubt as to the right of removal, the court must reject jurisdiction. Id. If the plaintiff
14 lacks Article III standing to pursue its case in federal court, the court must remand the 15 case rather than dismiss it. Polo v. Innoventions Int’l, LLC, 833 F.3d 1193, 1196 (9th 16 Cir. 2016). 17 The parties dispute whether Mr. Eggleston has Article III standing in this court. 18 (See MTR at 4-10 (arguing Mr. Eggleston does not have standing because he failed to
19 allege he was a bona fide job applicant); see MTR Resp. (arguing, post-Branson, that Mr. 20 Eggleston has standing because he need not be a bona fide applicant to allege a violation 21 of EPOA).) Standing is a “threshold question in every federal case, determining the 22 power of the court to entertain the suit”, Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975), and 1 standing requirements “can neither be waived by the parties nor ignored by the court[.]” 2 Yakima Valley Mem'l Hosp. v. Wash. State Dep't of Health, 654 F.3d 919, 932 n.17 (9th
3 Cir. 2011). In a challenge to Article III standing, “[t]he burden of showing that there is 4 standing rests on the shoulders of the party asserting” that standing is proper in the case. 5 Smelt v. Cty. of Orange, 447 F.3d 673, 682 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of 6 Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). 7 To establish standing and successfully challenge the motion to remand, Bruckner 8 must show that Mr. Eggleston has suffered an injury-in-fact that is (1) concrete and
9 particularized, (2) actual or imminent, (3) fairly traceable to Defendants’ conduct, and 10 (4) likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Cal. Sea Urchin Comm'n v. Bean, 883 11 F.3d 1173, 1180 (9th Cir. 2018), as amended (Apr. 18, 2018). To decide whether a 12 statutory violation constitutes a concrete harm or injury-in-fact, the court considers 13 (1) “whether the statutory provisions at issue were established to protect . . . concrete
14 interests (as opposed to purely procedural rights)” and (2) “whether the specific 15 procedural violations alleged in [the] case actually harm, or present a material risk of 16 harm to, such interests.” Magadia v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc., 999 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 17 2021). 18 The court concludes that Bruckner fails to meet its burden to show Mr. Eggleston
19 has standing and that removal to this court is proper. Smelt, 447 F.3d at 682. Bruckner 20 has not shown that Mr. Eggleston suffered an injury that was concrete and particularized 21 or actual or imminent. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61. Bruckner also has not shown that Mr. 22 Eggleston has alleged a “material risk of harm[.]” Magadia, 999 F.3d at 679. 1 Bruckner puts forth that it has met its burden to show that Mr. Eggleston suffered a 2 cognizable injury sufficient to establish Article III standing because the Washington
3 Supreme Court rejected the requirement that a EPOA plaintiff be a bona fide applicant. 4 (MTR Resp. at 2, 7 (citing Branson, 574 P.3d at 1040).) The court rejects Bruckner’s 5 proposal that the Branson holding is pertinent to the court’s Article III standing analysis. 6 (See MTR Resp. at 2.) Although Mr. Eggleston asserts that he applied for a Bruckner job 7 posting that did not disclose the wage scale or salary range, he contends that he does not 8 have standing in this court because he did not plead any facts to show his intent. (MTR at
9 10 (“Mr. Eggleston did not plead subjective intent because it is not an element under the 10 statute’s plain language and is therefore not required to state a claim.”); id. at 6 (affirming 11 that Mr. Eggleston neither alleged bona fide applicant status nor that he engaged in pay 12 negotiations or was offered an interview).) He also does not provide other facts that would 13 permit the court to plausibly infer that he was exposed to a real risk of receiving unfair
14 wages. (See generally Compl.) The court agrees with Mr. Eggleston. Absent a showing 15 of bona fide intent or good faith, Mr. Eggleston cannot show an injury-in-fact. See 16 Magadia, 999 F.3d at 679; see also Kent v. Tech Mahindra (Americas) Inc., No. C24- 17 1168BJR, 2025 WL 2810715, at *4, (W.D. Wash. Oct. 3, 2025) (affirming, post-Branson, 18 that an EPOA plaintiff must show an injury-in-fact to establish federal standing regardless
19 of the requirements to state a claim under state law); Hill v. Les Schwab Tire Ctrs. of Wash. 20 LLC, No. C24-0425BJR, 2025 WL 3062646, *5 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 31, 2025) (granting a 21 motion to remand an EPOA matter for lack of Article III standing post-Branson where the 22 1 defendant could not establish that plaintiff had suffered an injury-in-fact and had Article 2 III standing).
3 Because Bruckner has not shown that Mr. Eggleston sufficiently alleged an 4 injury-in-fact, it fails to establish Mr. Eggleston has Article III standing in this court, Cal. 5 Sea Urchin Comm'n v. Bean, 883 F.3d at 1180. Therefore, the court grants Mr. 6 Eggleston’s motion to remand. See Hawaii ex rel. Louie, 761 F.3d at 1034; Polo, 833 7 F.3d at 1196. 8 IV. CONCLUSION
9 For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS Mr. Eggleston’s motion to remand 10 this case to the King County Superior Court (Dkt. # 10) and DENIES Bruckner’s motion 11 to dismiss (Dkt. # 7) as moot. 12 13 Dated this 11th day of November, 2025. A 14 JAMES L. ROBART 15 United States District Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22