Joshua Cyrus Wynn v. the State of Texas
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Opinion
IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-23-00192-CR
JOSHUA CYRUS WYNN, Appellant v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
From the 272nd District Court Brazos County, Texas Trial Court No. 20-04066-CRF-272
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Joshua Cyrus Wynn pled guilty to and was convicted of one count of aggravated
assault of a public servant, one count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and
two counts of deadly conduct-discharge firearm. He also pled true to the allegation in
counts one and two that he used or exhibited a deadly weapon during the commission of
those offenses. The court sentenced Wynn to 25, 20, 10, and 10 years in prison,
respectively. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. BACKGROUND
In 2020, Wynn went to a park and encountered a man on a park trail. Wynn asked
the man, “Are you ready? Are you ready?” before pulling out a gun and shooting the
man in the stomach. Wynn walked into the nearby woods but returned and shot the man
again; this time, in the shoulder. Wynn ran to a family at a nearby picnic shelter before
running into the woods.
The chief deputy with the Brazos County Precinct 3 Constable’s Office responded
to the park for the shots-fired call and positioned himself at the south side of the
perimeter which had been set up around the park. While there, he saw Wynn standing
nearby but was unaware that Wynn was the person who had shot the man.
The deputy approached in his patrol vehicle to warn Wynn that officers were in
the area in response to an active shooter situation. Wynn initially responded pleasantly
but contorted his face and started muttering when warned that he needed to leave the
area. Due to Wynn’s odd behavior, the deputy turned the vehicle around to follow Wynn
as he jogged away. Wynn waved to two College Station officers as he continued to jog
away, but after passing the second officer, Wynn began running faster before stopping,
turning around, and firing at the deputy in his patrol vehicle.
After Wynn stopped firing, the deputy exited his vehicle and ordered Wynn to get
on the ground. Wynn was taken into custody by other officers. Later, officers located
two bullet strikes in the apartment building across the street from a childcare center and
behind where the deputy’s patrol vehicle had been when Wynn shot at him. Officers also
located a spent bullet in the roadway where the patrol vehicle had been, two bullet holes
Wynn v. State Page 2 in the patrol vehicle along with a hole in the deputy’s hat in the seat of the vehicle, and a
bullet hole in another vehicle belonging to an uninvolved citizen. Officers also recovered
a handgun from Wynn which he had bought five months before the shootings.
DEFERRED ADJUDICATION
In his first issue, Wynn contends the trial court abused its discretion in
adjudicating Wynn guilty rather than deferring an adjudication of guilt.
The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that:
if in the judge’s opinion the best interest of society and the defendant will be served, the judge may, after receiving a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, hearing the evidence, and finding that it substantiates the defendant’s guilt, defer further proceedings without entering an adjudication of guilt and place the defendant on deferred adjudication community supervision.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42A.101(a) (emphasis added). The power to defer
adjudication rests solely within the discretion of the trial court. Reed v. State, 644 S.W.2d
479, 483 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). The purpose of the statute is to allow the trial court the
flexibility to defer adjudication for deserving defendants if, in its opinion, the best interest
of society and the defendant will be served. Id. No defendant, absent a plea bargain, can
be assured of receiving it. Id. at 484. Should the trial court defer the proceedings without
an adjudication of guilt, the court must then, necessarily, “place the defendant on
deferred adjudication community supervision.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42A.101(a).
The granting of community supervision is a privilege, not a right. Dansby v. State,
448 S.W.3d 441, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). As such, the trial court's decision whether to
grant community supervision is "wholly discretionary and nonreviewable." Speth v. State,
6 S.W.3d 530, 533 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); McElyea v. State, No. 10-19-00296-CR, 2020 Tex.
Wynn v. State Page 3 App. LEXIS 5541, *1-2 (Tex. App.—Waco July 20, 2020, no pet.) (not designated for
publication) (overruling appellant's claim that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his request for community supervision as "nonreviewable").
Wynn likens the trial court’s decision not to defer an adjudication of guilt to the
trial court’s punishment assessment in Jackson v. State, where, under the limited facts of
the case and over a timely objection, the trial court’s punishment decision “in which there
was no evidence of the offense, no information about the defendant, no punishment
evidence, no plea bargain; in short, nothing at all upon which the punishment decision
could have been based,” was held to be an abuse of discretion. Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d
809, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). Jackson and this case are not the same. Most importantly,
Jackson was not a review of a trial court’s decision whether to defer the defendant’s
adjudication of guilt.
Accordingly, Wynn’s first issue is overruled.
SENTENCING
In Wynn’s second, third, and fourth issues, Wynn complains that the trial court
abused its discretion in its sentencing on each count. Generally, as long as a sentence is
within the proper range of punishment, the sentence will not be disturbed on appeal.
Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). Wynn does not contend that
the sentences for each count were not within the proper range of punishment. Rather, he
contends that the trial court abused its discretion in the sentences imposed when
compared to the “standards” set out by the Legislature in article 37.07 of the Texas Code
Wynn v. State Page 4 of Criminal Procedure. 1 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 37.07, sec. 3(a)(1). Thus, it appears
that Wynn is attempting to present a disproportionate-sentence claim in these issues.
A sentence may violate the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution
if the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the offense or to sentences in other similar
offenses even if it falls within the statutory punishment range. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S.
277, 289-90, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983). A disproportionate-sentence claim,
however, must be preserved for appellate review either by objecting when the sentence
is imposed or by raising the claim in a timely-filed motion for new trial. TEX. R. APP. P.
33.1(a)(1); Castaneda v. State, 135 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (cruel and
unusual punishment claims may be waived); Noland v. State, 264 S.W.3d 144, 151 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref'd) (to preserve gross disproportionate claim,
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