Joshua B. Stam v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Indiana Court of Appeals·Decided May 20, 2019·No. 18A-CR-2873·Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any May 20 2019, 9:08 am

court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK Indiana Supreme Court

the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals and Tax Court

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE John Kindley Curtis T. Hill, Jr. South Bend, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

Jesse R. Drum

Supervising Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Joshua B. Stam, May 20, 2019 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-2873

v. Appeal from the Miami Circuit Court

State of Indiana, The Honorable Timothy P. Spahr, Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge Trial Court Cause No.

52C01-1709-F1-28

Altice, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2873 | May 20, 2019 Page 1 of 10

Case Summary

[1] Joshua Stam appeals the sixteen-year sentence he received after pleading guilty

to Level 3 felony aggravated battery, which stemmed from his attack on a correctional officer who was transporting Stam from a court hearing back to prison. He claims that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character.

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History [3] In August 2017, Stam was serving a sentence at the Miami Correctional

Facility. Following a court appearance on August 30, Decatur County Sheriff’s Department Transport Officer David Weakley picked up Stam from the Sheriff’s Department to return him to the Miami Correctional Facility. Officer Weakley shackled and handcuffed Stam and placed him in the front seat of his patrol car. While Officer Weakley was driving, Stam freed his left hand from the handcuff and struck Officer Weakley in the face. Stam also freed himself from his seatbelt and climbed over the center console in the car and on top of Officer Weakley. Stam unsuccessfully attempted to remove Officer Weakley’s gun from its holster. He then used a strip of cloth, which was one inch in width and sixty-six inches in length and appeared to be bedding material, to strangle Officer Weakley until he lost consciousness. When Officer Weakley regained consciousness, Stam was trying to put the car in gear. Two bystanders saw what was happening and removed Stam from the car.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2873 | May 20, 2019 Page 2 of 10

[4] On September 14, 2017, the State charged Stam with Level 1 felony attempted murder, Level 3 felony aggravated battery, Level 4 felony escape, and Level 5 felony battery resulting in bodily injury to a public safety official and also alleged that Stam was a habitual offender. The parties entered into a plea agreement, and on November 1, 2018, Stam pled guilty to Level 3 felony aggravated battery, and the State dismissed the remaining charges and the habitual offender allegation. Sentencing was left to the discretion of the court.

[5] At the guilty plea hearing, Stam’s counsel questioned Stam and provided the following factual basis:

Q. Back on August 30, 2017 were you in Miami County, in the State of Indiana?

A. Yes sir.

Q. On that day did you knowingly inflict injury on David Weekly [sic] that created a substantial risk of death?

A. Yes sir.

Q. And that is why you feel that you’re charged with Aggravated Battery, am I correct?

A. Yes sir.

Q. You think they could prove that if it went to a jury?

A. Yes sir.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2873 | May 20, 2019 Page 3 of 10

Q. No further questions.

STATE: No questions.

COURT: Okay I have no additional questions for this witness regarding the establishment of a factual basis either so evidence is concluded.

Transcript at 79. The trial court accepted the plea agreement and, with the parties’ agreement, proceeded to sentencing.

[6] The information before the court 1 indicated that Stam started using drugs when he was ten years old and has used marijuana, cocaine, methamphetamine, and heroin, and has abused prescription drugs. He was adjudicated delinquent for theft, runaway, resisting law enforcement, and forgery. As an adult, he was convicted of Class D felony auto theft, Class D felony theft, Class B felony burglary, Level 4 felony burglary, and Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement. He has never successfully completed probation or community corrections and

1 Stam suggests that the factual basis presented at the hearing was minimal, and to the extent that Stam is arguing that the trial court should not also have considered the facts outlined in the probable cause affidavit (PCA), we find no error with the trial court’s reliance on that information when sentencing Stam. The presentence investigation report (PSI) filed with the court included the PCA as well as the arrest warrant, and Stam had no corrections or deletions to the PSI’s contents, other than minor technical corrections. Accordingly, the trial court could consider the PCA. See Sullivan v. State, 836 N.E.2d 1031, 1036-37 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (where defendant indicated there were no corrections to be made to presentence report and did not object to introduction of PCA at sentencing hearing, defendant effectively admitted to contents of report and affidavit). Furthermore, our Supreme Court has recognized that, unless the plea agreement provides otherwise, “it is not necessary for a trial court to turn a blind eye to the facts of the incident that brought the defendant before [it].” Bethea v. State, 983 N.E.2d 1134, 1145 (Ind. 2013).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2873 | May 20, 2019 Page 4 of 10 has violated probation at least three times. The parties stipulated that Stam’s criminal history was an aggravator.

[7] Stam, who was twenty-eight years old, testified at the hearing about his childhood and drug abuse. He explained that, after being removed as a baby from his mother’s care, he was adopted and that his adoptive father was verbally and physically abusive. After breaking his leg at age thirteen, Stam was prescribed hydrocodone to manage the pain, which ultimately led to addiction and to crime. He first started getting into trouble at age thirteen or fourteen, and he dropped out of high school in ninth grade. After a commitment to the Boys School, he got a job and attempted to join the military but was rejected due to his history of drug use. Stam testified that, not long after, he got arrested and was sentenced to prison for nineteen years with seven years suspended. He was released early on community corrections, but violated the terms of his placement, and the court revoked his suspended sentence, returning him to prison. With regard to the incident with Officer Weakley, Stam conceded that he “screwed up” badly and that it was “every bit of [his] fault.” Id. at 96.

[8] Stam’s counsel argued that Stam’s troubled childhood, including conflict with his adoptive father, and drug addiction starting at a young age, were mitigating circumstances. Stam asked the court to impose twelve years with six years executed. The State maintained that there were no mitigators and sought the maximum sixteen-year sentence. Officer Weakley did not appear at the hearing, but in a statement of allocution Stam expressed, “I really wish Mr. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2873 | May 20, 2019 Page 5 of 10

Weekly [sic] was here so I’d be able to tell him that I’m sorry . . . for the pain and inconvenience that I cause [sic] him and his family.” Id. at 104.

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