Josephine M Schiavone v. Department of the Army

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedAugust 19, 2024
DocketPH-3322-20-0277-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Josephine M Schiavone v. Department of the Army (Josephine M Schiavone v. Department of the Army) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Josephine M Schiavone v. Department of the Army, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

JOSEPHINE M. SCHIAVONE, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, PH-3322-20-0277-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DATE: August 19, 2024 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Joseph Padolsky , Esquire, Boston, Massachusetts, for the appellant.

Matthew J. Harris , Esquire, Concord, Massachusetts, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman Henry J. Kerner, Member

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed her appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to vacate the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation that she was the subject of a personnel investigation as defined under 5 U.S.C. § 3322, we AFFIRM the initial decision. On petition for review, the appellant argues for the first time that her resignation was involuntary. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 5-6. She also argues for the first time that the Board has jurisdiction over her appeal challenging the notation on her Standard Form 50 (SF-50) “Resignation-ILIA” (resignation in lieu of an involuntary action) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 3322. 2 Id. at 7. The agency has filed a response arguing that the appellant improperly raised her involuntary resignation argument for the first time on review and did not make a nonfrivolous allegation that her appeal was within the Board’s jurisdiction pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 3322. PFR File, Tab 3 at 20-27. The Board will not consider an argument raised for the first time in a petition for review absent a showing that it is based on new and material evidence not previously available despite the party’s due diligence. See Banks v. Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 268, 271 (1980). The appellant has

2 Section 1140 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328, signed into law on December 23, 2016, added 5 U.S.C. § 3322 to the U.S. Code to grant Board appeal rights to former employees to challenge an agency’s decision to place a notation of an adverse investigative or administrative finding in the employee’s official personnel folder. 3

made no such showing regarding her new argument that her resignation was involuntary and she provides no explanation why she did not raise this claim in her initial appeal. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-6; Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 3, 5. In any event, the appellant’s argument on review that she resigned pending the outcome of her proposed removal “so that she would not be adversely impacted in her efforts to obtain employment with another Federal agency” and that she would not have resigned if she had known that the agency would reference the proposed removal on her SF-50 is unavailing. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6; see Covington v. Department of Health & Human Services, 750 F.2d 937, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (stating that it is well established that the fact that an employee is faced with an unpleasant situation or that her choice is limited to two unattractive options does not make the employee’s decision any less voluntary). Regarding the failure to respond to the administrative judge’s order to show cause that her appeal was within the Board’s jurisdiction, the appellant simply states that she was “under the mistaken impression that the deadline for opposing the [a]gency’s motion to dismiss was Wednesday, July 8, 2020.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 4 n.1. The administrative judge granted the appellant’s motion for a 10-day extension of the deadline to respond to the order to show cause and explicitly stated that the new deadline to file a response was the first business day after July 4, 2020, which was July 6, 2020. IAF, Tab 9 at 1. The appellant is responsible for her representative’s failure to raise the involuntary resignation claim on appeal or to file a jurisdictional response. See Sofio v. Internal Revenue Service, 7 M.S.P.R. 667, 670 (1981) (stating that it is well settled that an appellant is responsible for the errors and omissions of her chosen representative). Having reviewed the appellant’s arguments on appeal, we find that she has provided no basis to find that she has made a nonfrivolous allegation 3 that the

3 A nonfrivolous allegation is an assertion that, if proven, could establish the matter at issue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s). 4

Board has jurisdiction over her appeal. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-7; see Maddox v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that the Board’s jurisdiction is limited to those matters over which it has been given jurisdiction by law, rule, or regulation). The appellant makes a conclusory statement on review, without any supporting evidence or argument, that the Board has jurisdiction over her challenge to the “Resignation-ILIA” notation on her resignation SF-50 pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 3322. PFR File, Tab 1 at 7. We agree with the administrative judge that the appellant has failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation that 5 U.S.C. § 3322 applies to her claim challenging her resignation SF-50. IAF, Tab 10, Initial Decision (ID) at 2-4.

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Josephine M Schiavone v. Department of the Army, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/josephine-m-schiavone-v-department-of-the-army-mspb-2024.