Josephenie Robertson v. the Republic of Nicaragua

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 17, 2018
• Docket: 17-17156
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 17 2018 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSEPHENIE ROBERTSON, M.T.T., No. 17-17156 individually and as the Representative, Officer and Matriarch of the Traditional D.C. No. 3:17-cv-00852-JST Authority and Miskitu Government-In-Exile,

Plaintiff-Appellant, MEMORANDUM*

v.

THE REPUBLIC OF NICARAGUA; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Jon S. Tigar, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 11, 2018**

Before: SILVERMAN, PAEZ, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

Josephenie Robertson appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment

dismissing her action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal Rule of

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Maronyan v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 658 F.3d

1038, 1039 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Robertson’s action for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction because Robertson alleged claims that presented a political

question. See Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974, 980-82 (9th Cir. 2007)

(district courts have no jurisdiction to hear a case presenting a political question);

see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (setting forth tests to determine

whether case presents a political question); Mingtai Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v.

UPS, 177 F.3d 1142, 1145 (9th Cir. 1999) (authority to recognize foreign regimes

is committed to the Executive Branch alone).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Robertson’s motion

for appointment of counsel because Robertson did not demonstrate exceptional

circumstances. See Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 2014) (setting

forth standard of review and requirements for appointment of counsel).

To the extent that Robertson sought to maintain this action as a class action

lawsuit, Robertson cannot do so because she is not an attorney. See C.E. Pope

Equity Trust v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir. 1987) (a pro se litigant

has no authority to appear as an attorney for others).

2 17-17156 We reject as unsupported by the record Robertson’s contentions regarding

the district court’s denial of her motion for sanctions and treatment of Robertson’s

requests to amend her complaint.

AFFIRMED.

3 17-17156